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CHAPTSa I
THS PROBLEM AND BBPIÏÏITI0N3 OP TERMS USED
THE PROBLEM ' "" .
of the jwohlem. In.. a study of literature
concerning the development of the public school system in
the State of Montana it was noted that veiy little mention was
made of the office of the attorney general* The history of
the Montana public school system has been the subject for a
, section in most of the general histories of Montana* It has
been the subject of at least one doctoral dissertation*
In these studies » however* very little mention was made of
the attorney general and no mention was made of the weight
of his opinion*
The weight of an opinion of an attorney general of the
State of Montana was decided in the case of Barr v# District
Court* It may be stated as followsJ
*While construction of a law in an an opinion of 
an attorney general is not binding upon the 
supreme court* even though ecquleseed in by 
several legislative sessions* it is entitled 
to respectful consideration, end will be upheld 
if not palpably erroneous***
This study* in an attempt to show the importance of the
position of the attorney general to education in the State
of Montana, has compiled in a single paper the Official
Opinions of the Attorney General of the State of Montana
which have had some effect on Montana*s educational system
from January 1, 1946 through December 31, 1955* These
opinions have been placed together in specific categories in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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« meaner that they will be eeelly accessible to all 
latereated persons without nécessitating such persons having
to go to the glflslaj M22ES. 22.W .P1L1 2 l JÜm M m m  
Qene,ral when a legal problem ruled on by tW attorney general 
confronts him# This compilation of official opinions of the 
attorney general might also be a useful reference tool in a 
course In school law#
Importance pf the stud?. Since the official opinions of 
the attorney general carry the weight of law until overruled 
by the courts# there was a need for them to be complied in 
such a manner that the opinions rendered in clrctasstancea of 
a similar nature might be seen together end comparison and 
collation might more easily take place# In this way the 
actual effect of the office of the attorney general is more 
easily seen# This study might eliminate some unnecessary 
re<%uests to the attorney general for opinions on school matter; 
where opinions covering like circumstances already exist.
Procedure U8®4* first step was to determine what
'
constitutes sn official opinion of an attorney general# An 
official opinion of ®a attorney general I# sa opinion rendered
•t
in  ft field of general Interest to the people of the St̂ t̂e of 
Montana published in the Report m #  Pfĵ’iclc.I OptaloM s i. 
Attorney General, ftaring the ten year period under considéra» 
tion countless numbers of letters of opinion were written by 
the attorney general which differ from the official opinions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
only in that the attorney general did not deem them to involve 
questions of general public Interest and therefore did not 
havéî them published*
With this in mind the next task was to extract all of 
the official opinions of the attorney general which concerned 
education from the Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney 
General*
Since no volumes of the Report end Official Opinions of 
the Attorney General have been issued since early 1951, the 
problem of compiling these opinions was on® of much greater 
. magnitude than had been expected* It would have been impossible 
without the cooperation of the then Attorney General, Arnold 
H. Olsen .and his first assistant Moody Brlckett#
The pertinent official opinions were segregated according 
to specific headings as seemed necessary in the light of the 
problem considered end pieced under these headings in chrono-* 
logical order.
As an added precaution the writer used the official 
opinions exactly as they were rendered by the attorney general# 
Ko editing was done* Ho personal views were injected* Great 
care was taken to quote the attorney general exactly* If 
the terminology of the attorney general had been taken out of 
context or if briefing had been attempted, extensive explana­
tions would have been necessitated and the meaning or the 
intention of the attorney general easily might have been 
altered*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Each of the official opinions reported contains the 
opinion number and/ year in which the opinion was rendered, 
a brief summary of the opinion in the words of the attorney 
general and the letter written by the attorney general to the 
person or agency requesting the opinion in which the facts of 
the case and the rule or laws utilised by the attorney general 
in reaching his decision were given#
At the conclusion of each chapter there is placed a 
section of references* These references Indicate the 
particular volume of the Report and Official Opinions of the 
Attorney General in which the opinions used in the chapter 
can be found*
DEFINITIONS OF TEEMS
Appellant. One who appeals from a decision of law# 
Conversion. Illegally taking and using the property of 
another person as if it were ones own*
Decree. An authoritative order or injunction forbidding 
some action*
Defendant# A person required to make an answer in a 
legal action*
In junction# A court writ requiring a party to do or 
restrain from doing certain acts*
Judgment. The determining, as in a court, what conforms 
to law and justice; also the decree or sentence of a court.
Mandamus. A writ issued by a court against a lower court 
or aginst a corporation or an individual, to enforce some duty,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Petition» A formal request, addressed to an official 
person or body, for some privilege or right#
P^hibition» A declaration or injunction forbidding 
some action*
Tort# Any wrong, in jury or damage#
Writ. An order issued in the name of the sovereign 
power or in the name of a court or judicial authority, com** 
mending the performance or non-performance of some act#
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II 
ELECTIONS
Opinion 131 • 1946
Held; A public meeting at which candidates lor the office 
of school trustee of a first class district are nominated 
must be held forty full days before the date of the election, 
and as held in the above case* the day of the meeting and 
the day of the election must be excluded from the computa-» 
tion of the forty day period*
March 5* 1946
Mr* Horace d» Dwyer 
County Attorney 
Deer Lodge County Anaconda* Montana
Dear Mr* Dwyer;
Tou have submitted the following for my consideration;
The Clerk of School District Ho* 10* Deer Lodge 
County* Montana* has advised you that a group of fifty^seven electors held a meeting on Monday 
night* February 25* 1946* He stated that notice 
was published or extended to the public to attend 
said meeting* but on the other hand* an invitation 
or request was extended by telephone to the said 
electors that attended said meeting* The purpose 
of the meeting was to nominate two nominees to run 
for trustees of a school district* Did that con­
stitute a bona fide public meeting in accord with 
Section 990* Revised Codes of Montana, 1935* as 
amended by Chapter 205* Laws of 1943* at page 399?
Section 990, Revised Codes of Montana* 1935# as amended
by Chapter 205* Laws of 1943* provides in part;
•In districts of the first class* no person shall 
be voted for or elected as trustees unless he has 
been nominated therefore at a bona fide public meet­
ing, held in the district not more than sixty (60) 
days nor less than forty (40) days before the day 
of election and at which at least twenty (20) quali­
fied electors were present**#"
-6—
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Th« meeting la questloo %tm h«I4 oa féb ru& rf 25th «rtd
the eXeetloa 1# ta h« held April 6th, (Seetloa 9#7# Revised
Codes of Moatsae, 19)5# ) The meeting vm  held more th&a
forty day# before the election if the day of the election
is counted a# one of forty days. However, if the day of
the election is excluded from the computation, the meeting
was held on the fortieth day before the election end the
statute provides the meeting should be held not "less than
forty (40) days before the election,"
Our $uprme Court la State v# Mount joy, $Z Mont* 594
266 W *  566, considered e statute %hich required that
petitions for aminations be filed "not less then forty
day# before the date of the primary nominating election•*
The court ««id in construing the provisiont
"The language of the statute is exclusive, and 
Section 10707» Revised Codes of 1921, providing 
that "the time la which any act provided by lew is to be done is computed by excluding the first 
day and including the last,* etc,, relied upon by the learned counsel appearing in support of 
the secretary of state*# position is without ep*
fllcatloa, {State ex rel St* George v« Justice ourt, 80 Mont* 5Î 257 fee, 1034$) A# the act here required must be done at least forty day# 
before the date of the primary election, which is 
July 17 this yesr, it i» manifest that July 17 can^ 
not be included in computation of the forty*^y 
period. The statute say# it must be prior to the 
date of election, July 17, and forty day# before 
July 17 would be June 6, as full day# are required 
and the date of filing must be excluded from 
comfmitation,"
The above quoted case i# conclusive of the meaning of 
the language used in Section 99G, a# amended.
It i# therefore my opinion that e public meeting at 
which candidate# for the office of school trustee of a
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first cl&as school district are nominated must be held fœ  ty 
fall days before the date of the election# and as held in 
the above case# the day of the meeting and the day of the 
election. must be excluded from the computation of the 
forty "-day period*
Sincerely yours#
R. Y* BOTTÛMLY#
Attorney General
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Opinion 2U  - 1946
Held* An absent voteras ballot for a school district bond 
election has not been authorized by our legislature and 
therefore the only ballots which may be counted at such 
election are those cast by qualified electors who are 
present at the polls and vote in person&
October 30I 1946
Mr* R. T* Delaney 
County Attorney 
Lake County 
PoisonI Montana
Dear Mr# Delaney;
You have requested my opinion concerning the right of 
a qualified elector to vote by absent ballot in a special 
school district bond election* Tou advisee that the 
special election will be held on tbe same day as the general 
election#
Section 715# Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended
by Chapter 234# Laws of 1943, providesi
«Any qualified elector of this state, having com­
plied with the laws in regard to registration, vho 
is absent from the county or who is physically in­
capacitated from attending the precinct poll of which he is an elebtor on the day of holding any general 
or special election, or primary election for the 
nomination of candidates for such general election, 
or any municipal# genefal, or primary election,may vote at such election as hereinafter provided,* 
(Emphasis mine#)
The above quoted section would seemingly grant the author 
Ity and right to a qualified elector to vote by absent voter’s 
ballot at a school bond election as it would be a special 
election*
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However, Section 716# Eevlsed Codes of Montana# 1935# as 
amended by Chapter 234# Laws of 1943# provides that those who 
are eligible to such absent voter’s ballot ”may make applica­
tion to the county clerk of such county, or to the city or 
town} clerk, in the case of a municipal, general̂  or primary 
election # for an official ballot or official ballots to be 
voted at such election as an absent or physically Incapaci­
tated voter’s ballot or ballots,*
It Is to be noted that the application la made to the 
county clerk# or to the city or town clerk# and no mention 
is made of the clerk of the school district# and this becomes 
important when it is observed that the county clerk has the 
ballots printed for county wide election {Section 6?0, Re­
vised Codes of Montana, 1935)# Section as amended# and the
4
city clerk has the ballots printed for municipal elections 
{Section 679» Revised Codes of Montana# 1935)# Section 1224,11# 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935# as amended by Chapter 17##
Laws of 1939# states "the school district clerk shall cause 
ballots to be prepared for all such bond elections,,,* The 
conclusion to be drawn is that the application for an absent 
voter’s ballot is addressed to the clerk having custody of 
the ballots and as the school district clerk is not mentioned 
no such application can be made to him,
ill of the sections pertaining to absentee voting men­
tion the county and city or town clerk# but do not name the 
school clerk who is the custodian of the bond election bal­
lots, Section 969# Revised Codes of Montana# 1935* provides 
that the general election laws do not apply to school elections#
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and this would suggest that the legislative Inteit was not 
to Include school elections within the absent voteras law# 
It Is therefore my opinion that an absent voter»a 
ballot for a school district bond election has not been 
authorised by our legislature and therefore the only bal«* 
lots which may be counted at such election are those cast 
by qualified electors who are present at the polls and 
vote in person#
Sincerely yours>
S* V# BOTTOMLI 
Attorney General
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Opinion 216 - 1946
Held* An election to abolish à county' high school shall 
be submitted to the registered voters of the county, with­
out the requirement that their names appear on the assess­
ment rolls. The poll books for such election are the same 
as those used for the election of county officers, without 
the requirement of the preparation or posting of a separate 
list#
November 1, 1946
Mr. Mlson W« Kent 
County Attorney 
Granite County Phillpsburg, Montana
Dear Mr. Kent*
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the procedure
to be followed In the conduct of the special election for
the abolishment of the county high school. Tou ask If
there are any special qualifications for the electors.
Section 1262.19 to 1262.25, Revised Codes of Montana,
1935, cover the manner of holding an election to abolish
a county high school.
Section 1262.20, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, states
that the petition for abolishment of the county high school
must be signed by 20^ of the qualified electors "who are
also assessed in their own names on the assessment books
of the county for that year upon real or personal property."
The qualifications of those eligible to vote on the proposl#
tlon are to be distinguished from the qualifications of the
signers of the petition to abolish, in that Sections 1262,21,
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and 1262,23# Revised Codes of Montana^ 1935# provide that 
the question of the aholishment of the county high school 
shall be submitted to the **registered voters,* So qualifi* 
cation of being a taxpayer is included in the sections next 
above referred to concerning the right to vote on the 
abolishment of the high school*
Touvdid not advise me the date your high school was
1
established, but you will find that Chapter 76# Laws of
y
1913# sets out a procedure for the establishment of a■ .L '
county high school, and in that chapter it was provided that
■
the petition for the creation of the high school must be 
signed by one hundred freeholders of the county, but the 
electors eligible to vote were *qualified electors* and 
there was no requirement that the voters on the question be 
freeholders* In other words# in the establishment of a 
high school, there was not the requirement that the elec­
tor be a freeholder although the latter were the only au­
thorized persons who could, by petition Institute the pro­
cedure for such an election*
Section 2, Article IX of the Montana Constitution, was 
amended In 1932 by the addition to the qualifications to 
vote that*
«If the question submitted concerns the creation 
of any levy, debt or liability the person, In 
addition to possessing the qualifications above 
mentioned# must also be a taxpayer whose name 
appears upon the last preceding completed assess­
ment roll, in order to entitle him to vote upon 
such question**
The question of the abolishment of the county high
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school does not come within the above quoted portion of 
our constitution In that a debt or liability does not re­
sult from the abolishment of the high school#
Section 1262$%3, Revised Codes of IWtana, 1935| pro­
vides In parts
***♦##such question shall be submitted to the re­
gistered voters of the county at the ensuing general 
election in November# and the votes cast thereon 
canvassed and returns thereof made in the manner 
provided by law for the election of county officers 
at that election *#*♦**
The above quoted indicates that the poll books used 
and the manner of conducting the election do not differ 
from the manner of electing county officers with the ex­
ceptions of the notice given under Section 1262*22 and the 
form of ballot as found in Section 1262*23#
It is therefore my opinion an election to abolish a 
county high school shall be submitted to the registered 
voters of the county, without the requirement that their 
names appear on the assessment rolls*
It is also my opinion the poll books for such election 
are the same as those used for the election of county offi­
cers, without the requirment of the preparation or posting 
of a separate list#
Sincerely yours, 
a. V. B0TTGM1Ï,
Attorney General
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Oplnion 25 - 1947
HeldJ That the extra levy authorized by Chapter 274, taws 
of 1947* for County High Schools may be submitted to the 
qualified electors of a high school building district under 
the provisions of Chapter 114 of the Political Code of the 
Revised Codes of Montana, Î935*
That the election submitting the question of an extra 
levy for county high schools In counties not divided into 
high school building districts must be held in confoneity 
with the general election laws#
April 9, 1947
Mr# Robert F# Swanberg 
County Attorney î̂ issoula County 
Missoula I Montana
fear Mr# Swanbergt
You have requested my opinion as to the procedure to
be followed in submitting the question of a special levy
for a county high school*
Chapter 274, laws of 1947» authorises a special levy
for county high schools# The Act contemplates that the
question shall be submitted to the qualified electors of a
high school building district, when the county has been
divided into high school building districts, Section 2 of
Chapter 274» states that”the question of the special levy
shall be submitted la high school building district at the
regular election held in such high school building district,
or special election called for that purpose*" There is no
regular election held in high school building districts as
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they were created for construction purposes onlŷ  Section 
1501*5 Eevlsed Codes of Montane* 1935# ard Chapter 275* 
laws of 1947» However* the Act does provide for the call-* 
Ing of a special election by the board of trustees of said 
district* Sections 1219.to 1223# Revised Codes of îîontana# 
1935# provide a method and procedure for holding an election 
and submitting the question of a special levy to the quali­
fied electors of a school district and such procedure would 
be adaptable to the election held in a high school building 
district*
The method of holding a special election in counties 
not divided into high school building districts offers a 
more difficult problem.
Section 2 of Chapter 274* laws of 1947# prmrldes in
part#
****.•*.Where a County High School has no building 
district» then such special levy may be submitted 
and voted upon on the date of tne regular county 
school election# or/at a special election called 
for that purpose by the board of county trustees 
of such county high school shall, by resolution 
in their minutes# state that such extra tajcatlon 
levy is necessary for any of the purposes herein­
above mentioned.” /
There is no regular county school election asi trustees 
of county high schools are appointed to their offices by 
the board of county commissioners with the exception of 
the county superintendent who is ex#offlclo a member.
Section 1262*4# Revised Codes of Montana# 1935*
The only solution is to call a special election.
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Sections 1219-1223  ̂supra* are not applicable as such 
sections by their terms are operative in school districts*
It must have, been the intent of the legislature to utilise 
the general election laws in the procedure for such an 
election*
There Is not designated by the codes any specific 
notlcefor such a special election, except that Section 
#53^# Revised Codes of 1935, require» that all
questions submitted to the people of the county must be 
advertised for two weeks before the election*
In the absence of a more specific statute for such 
a special election, registration must be closed In accord­
ance with the provisions of Section 566, Revised Codes of 
!4ontana, 1935, and the list of registered electors printed 
and posted as provided in Section 567, Revised Codes of 
Montana, .1935, as amended by Chapter 167, laws of 1945*
The county clerk, by virtue of Section 686, Revised 
Codes of Montana, 1935* is authorised to prepare the neces- 
saiy ballots whenever any question is submitted to the voters 
of a county# The ballot might well conform with the form 
found in Section 1222, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935#
As this is an election to vote upon the creation of a 
levy the eligible voters must be taxpayers whose names appear 
upon the last preceding complete assessment roll* Section 2 
Article IX, Montana Constitution, and Section 544# Revised 
Codes of Montana, 1935*
It would seem that Chapter 114 of the Political Code of
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th® Revised Codes of 1935# which defines the procedure for 
an election to authorise a special levy in school district 
would be pertinent# This Chapter# however Is limited to 
school districts* In Panchot v# Leet# 50 Bîont. 315# 146 Pac* 
927# our Court held that a county high school is county pro#» 
party and obligations Incurred In behalf of the county hij^ 
school are county obligations# It therefore follmfs that a 
levy for county high school purposes in a county not divided 
into high school building districts must be a county levy 
and in the absecace of any prescribed procedure the elec­
tion held in conformity with the general election laws per­
taining to county wide elections#
However# the hours the polls shall be open are specifi- 
-cally fixed by Chapter 2# Laws of 1937» and this Chapter 
must bo followed*
In proceeding in this matter the Board of County Com­
missioners should keep in mind the dates of the preliminary 
and final budgets for high schools#
The levy provided by said election is only for the 
fiscal year following said election as the need for the funds 
must be determined in anticipation of the current budget#
It is apparent that the procedure suggested above is 
cumbersome# but the legislature did not see fit to fix a 
more satisfactory procedure#
It is therefore my opinion that the extra levy authorised 
by Chapter 274# Laws of 1947» for the county high schools may 
be submitted to the qualified electors of a high school 
building district under the provisions of Chapter 114 of the
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Political Code of the Revised Codes of Montana# 1935#
It is also my opinion that the election submitting the 
question of an extra levy.for county high schools in counties 
not divided into high school building districts must be held 
in conformity with the general election laws*
Sincerely yours#
R* V# 0ÜTTOÎLX 
Attorney General
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Opinion 99 • 1950
Held; 1$ The School Trustees appointed to office after 
the creation of a new school district by consolidation and 
and change of classification of the district hold office 
until the next school election*
2à %here the terms of the five trustees of second class 
district expire at the next school election due to the 
fact they were appointees, five trustees should be elected 
at the election, one of whom shall serve for one year, two 
for two years and two for three years*
March U, 1950
Mr* John M* Comfort County Attorney Madison County 
Virginia City, Montana
Dear Mr, Comfort;
You have requested my opinion concerning the election 
of trustees in a school district of your county. You ad­
vise me that o third class districts were consolidated 
end a new district was formed and three trustees were 
appointed to serve until the next school election* Sub­
sequently, the County Superintendent made an order changing 
the class of the district to that of a second class district 
and appointed two additional trustees*
Section 75-1613, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, authorises 
the consolidation of two or more adjacent school districts 
or the annexation of one or more districts to an existing 
district*
Only a third class district can be annexed by a second 
or first class district. Two third class districts can be
under the provisions of Section 75-1813, Revised
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Codes of Montana I 1947# and a new district la formed# Sub­
sections 4 and 5 of Section 75-1013 provide In part*
"• • # If the order be for the formation of a new 
district# it shall specify the name and number of such 
district, and the County Superintendent shall appoint 
three (3Î trustees to serve until the first Saturday 
in April succeeding#
(5) At the regular election succeeding there shall 
be elected by the regularly qualified electors three 
(3) trustees# one of whom shall serve for one (1) 
year# one for (2) two years# and one for three (3) 
years# The election of trustees end terms shall be 
the same as for other districts under general school 
laws#**
Your County Superintendent# in appointing three trustees 
for the new district created by the consolidation of the two 
third class districts followed the above quoted statute*
The two trustees appointed by the County Superintendent, 
after the classification of the district was declared# were 
appointed in accordance with the provlsionsof Section 75* 
1002# Revised Codes of Montana# 1947# This means that 
there are now five trustees who were all appointed to office# 
The terms of office and the number of trustees to be 
elected are the problems which are presented under your 
unusual situation# Subsection 5 of Section 75-1313 quoted 
above would solve the problem if it were not for the fact 
the classification of the district has been changed from that 
of 6 th Ird to a second class district# The appointment of 
two additional trustees presents a situation not contemplated 
in the first sentence of Sub-section 5 of Section 75-1313# 
Revised Codes of Montana# 1947* However, the second sentence 
directs that the general school laws shall apply in the 
election of trustees#
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In t&# *&## of Stftto ftjc ml# Itihl v# Katwr# «t at# 95 
Mont# $$3# 27 (2<i) 111), t&# eotrt hold that SoGtlan 1001
â$vl@W GWw of Montmm# 1921, (wm Soctloa 75-1617, Eovlmed
Cod#* of Koatmn#, 1947î b#* w  apÿU#«ttôa to tho «laotion
of tru#t«#* who b*vo boon appoint #d to off loo# Sootloa
75-1617 1» #* follow;
**hon at any annnal oohoal election th® t#m# of th* 
majority of th# tm#t##o ropnlofly oaplrstn dietriota of th# firot *1*#*, thro# tmotooo, in diotrlot* of 
tho # w m d  *1#*#, two tnwt###, in diatria# of th# 
third *l9»#, on# tm#t*#, #h#ll h# oleotod for thro# 
y m r» i and th# romain lag truiteo or trwateo* who»# 
torn® «acyire #h*ll hold ovor for on# or two yts-r# a* 
nsy h# nooaooary to praront th# term* of « majority 
of th* hoard of Tnxat### axplrlng in any on# year* 
provided, th%t it ahhll ha dotarmlnod hy lot wtiat tmat## *hall hold or*,, and for whet torn#»
Opinion 50# 61, Volm# 16, daport a nd Official Opinion# 
of th# Ittomay Oanaral followadth* Kwhl #### nmdar f&ot# 
*l»llar to tho## pr###nt#d bar# and hald that ill tnjataw 
indio reoaivW thair offio* hy appointment hold offlea %&til 
th* na%t aohooi alaotlon at which time thalr t« m* expired 
and avca#aaora mn#t h« alaoted#
Suh-aaotion 5 of Section 161) aantaaplttaa that in th* 
election of tm#tee$ for a dlttriet eraatad hy coaâ Jldstlon 
th# tru&t*#* elect ad to off la# *k*ll hold office for tawi# 
of 1, 2 aad > y ear* m  that In any on* y#»r, there will h* 
a majority of tnasteei held over with amperieac# ao that th* 
buain*## of th# ##hool district c m  go on withcot iatarrup- 
tlon, Thi# l#gl#lativ# policy 1# #l#o #%pr9**$d in Section 
75-1617 and cm fe# givm recognition by electin# on# truate# 
£<fr a ter» of on* year, two far tara# Of two yo'ra ar.d two 
for term# of thm# ytrr»# th* method of selection of the 
term# for which caWldAtea will atmnd for election cm be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-23- 1
dona by the aominatlng petitions filed with the clerk as- 
provided in Section Revised Codes of Montana^ 1947#
is therefore my opinion that the school trustees 
appointed to office after the creation of a new school distric 
by consolidation end change of classification of the district 
hold office until the next school election#
It is also ray opinion that where the terras of the five 
trustees of a second class district expire at the next school 
election due to the fact they were appointees, five trustees 
should be elected at the election, one of whom shall serve 
for one year, two for two years and two for three years#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# ÜI3ER 
Attorney General*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-24» ,
Opinion 25 - 1951
Helds Establisbiaent» holding retail baer and liquor 
licenses must be closed during the hours when the polls 
are open on the day of the annual election of school 
trustees and on the days of special bond elections*
June 27» 1951
Mr* H* M* 0*Heam
State Liquor Administrator
Helenaj Montana
Dear Mr# 0»Hearn}
You have requested the opinion of this office on the 
following question; "Must licensed retail beer and liquor 
establishments be closed during the hours the polls ere 
open on (1) the day of the annual election of school 
trustees; (2) the day of the annual election in cities and 
towns; (3) days of special bond elections*"
Section 4-414» H# C* M*, 1947» provides that retail 
liquor establishments ■ shall not sell» offer for sale or 
give away liquor at retail "on any day of a general or pri­
mary election during the hours the polls are open» excepting 
bond elections*" Ssetioa 4*303» H, 0* M*, 1947» provides 
that licensed beer establishments shall be closed during 
the hours the polls are open "on any day of a. general, 
primary, or special bond election#" A retail liquor licensee 
must also be the holder of a retail beer license# Section 
4-411, E. C# M*» 1947. Section 4-303» &. C. M., 1947 is 
later legislation than Section 4-414» E. 0# M. » 1947 having 
been enacted as Section I, Chapter 16» Laws of 1943» while 
Section 4-414 was enacted as Section 12, Chapter 04» Laws 
Î /* A retail beer establishment, when "closed", must
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ba closed for all purposes f including the dispensing of 
liquor* See note 22 In 11 Corpus Juris at page 917* 
relating to definitions of «closed saloon*»♦ Obviously* 
an establishment licensed for the sale of beer or for the 
sale of beer and liquor at retail must be «closed*» on a 
day of a special bond election during the hours the polls 
are open In view of the wording of Section 4-303* R. C. M«* 
1947#
A **general election* Is one that recurs In each election 
precinct of the state on a day designated by law for the selec 
tlon of officers» Arps# v* State Highway Commission* 90 Mont, 
152, 162, 300 Fao# 549# A «general election" Is also defined 
as one provided by law for the election of officers through­
out the state or certain subdivisions thereof, 29 C, J# S, 
Elections* par, 1 {b). Election of school trustees occurs 
annually in each school district in the state under the 
requirement of Section 75-1603* R# G* K#* 1947# Such elec­
tions are* therefore* "general elections" within the usually 
accepted meaning of the term. In the case of Ford v* Moss 
124 Ky. 2SS, 9# S# W# 1015 It was held that school elections 
were general elections within the meaning of a statute pro­
hibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor on "general election" 
days.
The elections held by cities end towns annually are not 
elections held In each and every voting precinct of the state 
and are not therefore «general elections". Therefore, Sec­
tions 4-303 and 4-414, R# G. M.* 1947, do not require that 
establishments licensed to sell beer and liquor be closed 
during the hours the polls are open for such municipal
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exactions*
It is my opinion that establishments licensed for the 
sale of beer or liquor at retail must be closed during the 
hours the polls are open on (1) the day of the annual elec* 
tlon of school trustees} (2) the day of any special bond 
election held in the voting district where the licensed 
establishment is located* Of course, there is no question 
but that such establishments shall be closed during the 
hours the polls are open on days of elections regularly 
recurring the first Tuesday after the first Monday of 
November in each even numbered year and the regular S0'*> 
called Primary election" held every other year on the third 
Tuesday of July*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion Ô6 » 1952
Held* The names of deceased voters may not be deducted from 
the registration llsis in determining the necessary forty 
per cent of the qualified electors voting on a bond pro­
position submitted at school district election»
May 20, 1952
Mr# Bert W* Kronmlller 
County Attorney 
Big Horn County Hardin, Montana
Dear Mr# Kronmiller t
lou have requested my opinion as to whether there may 
be deducted from the list of registered electors for a bond 
election the names of those who have died prior to election#
I ou advise me that in determining the necessary forty per 
cent of the qualified ©lectors, the election failed by two 
votes# You ask if the names of two deceased voters on the 
mgistration list may be disregarded#
Section 75-3912, Eevlsed Codes of Montana, 1947, provides 
that at a school bond election "only qualified registered 
electors residing within the district who are taxpayers upon 
property therein end whose names appear upon the last com­
pleted assessment roll*#*###* shall have the right to vote*" 
This section also requires the county clerk to prepare lists 
of such registered electors and poll books for the use of the 
judges at the election*
Under the provision of Section 75-3914, Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1947, it is provided*
"Whenever the question of issuing bonds for any purpose 
is submitted to the qualified electors of a school 
district at either a general or special school election
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not less than forty (40) per centum of the qualified 
electors entitled to vote bn such question at such 
election must vote thereon̂  otherwise such question shall be deemed to have been rejected; provided, 
however, that If forty (40) per centum or more of such 
qualified electors do vote on such question at such 
election and a majority of such votes shall be cast In favor of such proposition, then such proposition 
shall be deemed to have been approved and adopted#"
It is to be noted that forty per cent of the qualified 
electors must vote, otherwise the proposition will be con* 
sidered rejected* As Section 75-3912 requires the voters 
to be registered and makes it the duty of the county clerk 
to prepare lists of the registered elector®, it is reason­
able to assume that the forty per cent must be determined on 
the basis of the list prepared by the county clerk# The 
Supreme Court of Georgia, in several cases, considered a 
similar question as presented here, and held that where a 
majority must be computed on the basis of registration lists 
that the courts may not deduct disqualified voters from the 
list in order to determine whether & ĵ ajority has favored 
the proposition submitted* Chapman v* Sumner Consolidated 
School District, 152 Ga* 452, 109 S* S# 129; P&irburn School 
District V* McClarin, 166 Ga# 367, 144 S* S* 765; and Cal*
, loway V# Tunnell Hill School District, 51 Ga, App. 101, 179 
S. S. 737.
The purpose of the requirement of a forty per cent vote 
is to set a standard for public interest in the election and 
it is not designed to disenfranchise qualified electors, but 
to assure that the taxpayers will not be subjected to payment 
of bonds approved by the very small number of qualified 
electors within a school district#
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,‘VIt is, therefore, my opinion that the names of deceased
\ 'voters may not be deducted from the registration lists in 
determining the necessary forty per cent of the qualified 
electors voting on a bond proposition submitted at a school 
district election#
Very truly yours,
A&KOLD H# OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Oplnioa 33 - 19̂ 5
Held; The defeat of the question to change the site of a 
school house in a third class district does not preclude 
a second election in less than three years time resubmitting 
the question of change of site,
August 5, 1955
Mr, Roy W, Holmes 
County Attorney 
Carter County Ekalaka, Montana '
Dear Mr* Holmes;
tou have requested my opinion as to whether a second
election may be held on the question of changing a school
house- site in a third class district within a period less
than three years after an election at which the majority
voted again* the change of site.
Section 73-3101# Revised Codes of Montana# 1947#
authorite# an election in a third class district to vote
upon the question of selection of a school site in a third
class district with the limitation "that any sites so changed
cannot again be changed within three years from the date of
such action,"
It is apparent that where the question of selecting a 
new site is rejected by the voters there has been no change 
of site. In 14 C, d, S, 397# the text defines change as mean­
ing ".♦#i.,,,to alter or make different, to exchange# to put 
one thing in the place of another# or to render someth'ing 
essentially different from what it was,,**. If the present 
location of a school is rejected by the electors and a new 
site selected# then there would be a change in site. In
School District No, 6, 110 Kan, 317, 203 Pac,
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The limitation of the statute is directed to the ayoldam
of too frequent changes of location of schools end not to
multiplicity of elections* In a recent Montana case, Schmied*
kamp vs* School District No* 24, Mont* 27# fae* (2d) 5#4, the
court recognized that,
**#$Tbe defeat of a proposition to issue bonds does not 
prevent a second submission of the proposition, where*» 
as a proposition to Issue bonds which has been adopted 
by the voters ordinarily cannot be resubmitted in the 
absence of statutory authority*"
The above quoted is analogous to the question submitted 
by you*
It is therefore my opinion that the defeat of the 
question to change the site of a school house in a third 
class district does not preclude a second election in less 
than three years time resubmitting the question of change of 
site*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN 
Attorney General
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CHAfTER III
 ̂ TRUSTEESOpinion 31S ^ 1946
Held; The trustees of a second class school district have 
the power to purchase two lots adjoining a grade school 
for playground purposes without submitting the question to 
a vote of the electorate#
2# School trustees may enter into a contract for the pur­
chase of additional land adjoining a school site and the 
purchase price paid by an appropriation provided in the 
next ensuing budget or the purchase price may be paid in 
installments by provision contained in three successive 
budgets#
3# A school board of the first or second class may not 
build a school house* or purchase or locate a school site 
unless directed so to do by a majority of the electors of 
the district voting at an election as provided in Section 
1015*6* Revised Codes of Montana* 1935, as amended by 
Chapter 165, laws of 1937*
January 29, 1946
i
Mr# Wilbur P* Werner 
County Attorney 
Glacier County 
Cut Bank, Montana
Dear Mr# Werneri
You advise me that a second class school district in
your county contemplates the purchase of two lots which
adjoin the present school property for .playground jpbrposeŝ
You ask specifically the following questions;
Can the trustees of School District Mo. 15 purchase the lots as additional playgrounds or as a possible
—33—
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additional grade sehool site without an election authorising them to do so?
If the school board can purchase the lots with or with­
out authorisation from the electorate, can they set 
up in their budget for the years 1946-47 a sufficient sum to purchase th m  or should they have a bond elec­tion for the purchase of them? If they purchase them 
under their budget would it not be permis sable to make 
the purchase price payable over a three-year period?
If the lots are not purchased and it is decided to 
build a grade school in the north part of town away 
from their present grade school, would it be necessary 
to submit to the electorate the site that the new grade school would be built upon?
Your first question is answered by Section 101$, Re­
vised Codes of Montana, 1935i amended by Chapter 16$
Laws of 1937, which provides in part as followsj
**Every school board unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law shall have power and it shall be its 
duty*#,.##"6* To purchase, acquire, sell and dispose of plots 
or parcels of land to be used as sites for school- 
houses, school dormitories and other school buildings, 
and for other purposes in connection with the schools in the district, and to sell and dispose of the same; provided, that they shall not build or remove school- 
houses or dormitories, nor purchase, sell or locate 
school sites unless directed so to do by a majority 
of the electors of the district voting at an election 
held in the district for that purpose, and such elec­tion shall be conducted and votes canvassed in the 
same manner as at the annual election of school offi­cers, and notice thereof shall be given by the clerk 
by posting three notices in three public places in 
the district at least ten days prior to such election, 
Wiich notices shall specify the time, place end pur­pose of such election* Provided further, that this 
subdivision shall not be so construed as to prevent the board of trustees from purchasing one or more 
options for a school site#* (anphasls mine)
The above quoted permits the trustees "to purchase### 
parcels of land for other purposes in connection with the 
schools of the district#" From the facts given, it appears 
that the trustees contemplate the enlargement of the school
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groimds by pturchage of mdjolnlng lot@* end not the 
eeleotlon of # «ohool alto. In $& G* J. 740» the word "alt#* 
1» defined e« follow:
»A plot of ground aultabl# or m t apart for aoaa apaol» 
fie ua#| « aeat or ground plot. Th« term does not of Itself 
neeeasarlly mean a pise# or tract of lend fixed by definite 
boundsriea.”
Our codes ws« the word "site* as above defined| th&t la, 
In the aeiis# that It means s general location for a specific 
purpose, but not In the sense that the boundaries are fixed. 
An ealergOTent of the school grounds would not constitute a 
change in the site, and thus necessitate submission of the 
Question to the voters at m  election#
Tour first Question also states that the two additional 
lota together with the lots the school district now owns may 
be used for the construction of a new grade school building., 
Bubsectloa $ of Section 1015. supra, provides that the con­
struction of a new building shall be submitted to the voters 
and also the selection of a school site shall likewise be 
euWltted. Authorisation for the trustees to build a school 
building and the aelection of the site for the same must be 
given by the electors at m  election h%ld for that purpose.
Section 1019.3, Revised Codes of Montais, 1935# which 
is « part of the budget act for school districts, provides fox 
"new building and alterations." While this item does not 
specifically mention the purchase of additional l&nd, yet it < 
is broad enough to cover such a purchase. If the district 
may allocate fund* under this Item for the fiscal ye%r 1946-
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1947 sufficient to make the purchase without exceeding the 
funds available for the year, and without depriving some 
other items of the budget of necessary funds, it would be 
within its power# Also the district could enter into a 
contract of purchase and agree to pay the purchase price 
over a period of three years* The trustees, having the power 
to make such a purchase, may enter into a contract for the 
best interest of the district# An analogous situation is 
the case of Bennett v* Petroleum County, Ô7 Mont* 436, 2ÔÔ 
Pac# 101#, in which case our court held that the coramissionerg 
having the power to lease county buildings may enter into a 
lease for a term of four years although such a lease would 
extend beyond the terra of the commissioners entering into 
the lease. The court did not direct its attention to the 
fact the lease would create an obligation to be met in future 
budgets, but such would be the effect, as would the plan 
of purchase under consideration here. The limitation of 
indebtedness, Section 6 of Article HII must be observed in 
the incurring of this indebtedness.
Your third question is answered by subsection # of Sectlc 
1015, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended, which is 
the applicable statute for the acquisition of a new school 
site by a second class district, Nichols v. School District, 
#7 Mont* 131, 2#7 Pec, 624, held that Section 1014, Revised 
Codes of Montana, 1921, had been amended by Chapter 122, Laws 
of 1923# Section 1014, appears in the 1935 Codes as giving 
the power to trustees In first and second class districts to 
change or select school sites, but the Nichols case would con­
trol# It would, therefore, be necessary to submit the ques-
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tioa of the sale of the school site and also the question of 
the location and purchase of a new school site to a vote of 
the qualified electors.
It la therefore my opinion that)
1* The trustees of a second class school district have 
the power to purchase two lots adjoining a grade school for 
playground purposes without submitting the question to & 
vote of the electorate,
2, School trustees may enter into a contract for the 
purchase of additional land adjoining a school site and the 
purchase price paid by an appropriation provided in the 
next ensuing budget or the purchase price may be paid by 
installments by provision contained in three successive 
budgets,
3* A school board of the first or second class may,not 
build a school house or purchase or locate a school site un­
less directed so to do by a majority of the electors of the 
district voting et an election as provided in Section 1015,0, 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended by Chapter 165, 
haws of 1937#
Sincerely yours,
R, V, BUTT0Î4LX 
Attorney General
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HeldI At a Joint meeting of a board of trustees of a 
county high school and a district high school which acts 
upon the question of the employment of a district super* 
intendant and county high school principal, the board of 
tNsthes- of the county high school shall have the number of 
votes at said meeting equal to the number of votes of the 
board of trustees of the school district*
ĵîarch 6, 1946
Mr# Seth G# Manning 
County Attorney 
Wibaux County 
Wibaux, Montana
Dear Mr* Manning;
You requested my opinion concerning the following facts;
The seven trustees of the Wibaux County High School met 
with the five trustees of the School District Ho* 6 
as a joint board on the l6th day of January, 1946, The 
county superintendent of schools was also in attendance 
at the meeting* All of the trustees present voted on 
the question of rehiring the incumbent of the combined 
office of superintendent of school district No, 6 and 
principal of the county high school* The vote cast was 
nine votes not to rehire and three votes to rehire the 
present incumbent* The chairman of the board gave notic to the incumbent that his contract would not be renewed. 
You asked what the effect is of the action taken#
Section 1262*61I Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, provides
for the organisation of & joint meeting of the two boards end
states in part as follows %
"For the purpose of voting upon any question relative 
to the employment of a district superintendent and 
county high school principal, or to the employment of 
joint teachers, or of determining any question of joint 
administrative policy, or of apportioning any item of joint expense, the board of trustees of the school dis­
trict and the board of trustees of the county high schco 
shall each be entitled to the same number of votes at any meeting of the joint board# To this end the board 
of trustees of the county high school shall choose a
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number o t its members equal to the number of members 
of the school district which comprise its board. The 
county superintendent of schools shall not be one of 
the trustees so selected by the county high school 
board* The names of the trustees, so chosen by the 
county high school board, shall be given to the sec­retary of the joint board as the designated represen­tatives of the board of trustees of the county high
school who are entitled to vote at all meetings of thejoint board*”
It is to be noted in the foregoing quoted provision of 
our •'law the Board of Trustees of the County High Sdiool shall 
have the same number of votes as the Board of Trustees of the
School District* In this case it would mean the Board of
Trustees of the County Hi^ School would have five votes*
From the facts you gave me It is apparent all of the trustees 
of the County High School voted at the meeting and thus vio­
lated the above section of our code*
In 14 American Jurisprudence 323 the text states j
"If the statute requires a particular procedure In 
elections of administrative officers by a school board, it must be strictly adhered to, and the mere unanimity 
of the choice will not validate an election in which the statutory requirements were ignored***”
In 56 Corpus Juris 334 it is stated: .
"A board of education, or of directors, trustees, or 
the like, of a school district or other local school 
organization can exercise its powers in no other mode 
than that prescribed or authorized by statute,.#*
The, foregoing authorities make it the duty of the boards 
to conform to the statutory procedure, which obviously was not 
done.
In McNair v* School District No, 1, $7 Mont* 423, 2BÔ
Pac* 10S, our Supreme Court said:
"The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes the 
board of directors and managing officers of the cor­
poration, and may exercise only those powers expressly conferred upon them by statute and such as are neces­sarily Implied in the exercise of those expressly con-
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ferred# The statute granting power be regarded 
both as a grant and a limitation upon the powers, of the 
board*"
A school board must act in conformity with the statute 
granting the power which in this instance was not done* Since 
the legislature has prescribed! a specific and mandatory pro­
cedure to be followed $ that procedure and no other —  will 
meet the legislature’s requirements*
It is therefore my opinion that, at a joint meeting of a 
board of trustees of a county high school and a district high 
school which acts upon the question of the employment of a 
district superintendent and county high school principal, the 
board of trustees of the county high school shall have the 
number of votes at said meeting equal to the number of votes 
of the board of trustees of the school district; and in the 
event all the members of the board of trustees of the county 
high school are permitted to vote, then said meeting and the 
action taken thereat is of no effect and not in conformity 
with Section 1262*61, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935#
Sincerely yours,
R* V* BQTTOMLÏ
Attorney General
• .
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Held* In school districts of the first class, where but one 
public meeting Is held, and only one candidate be nominated 
for each term to be filled, then and in that event no election 
need be held and the clerk of such district shall certify. 
such facts to the board of trustees of the district, acting 
as a board of canvassers who shall thereupon certify the 
election of such persons to the county superintendent of schools*
March 16, 1946
Mr# Horace J# Dwyer 
County Attorney Deer Lodge County 
Anaconda, Montana
■ Dear Mr* Dwyer*
I am In receipt of a copy of the opinion you rendered
to Mr# G# A* Peterson, Clerk of School District Ho* 10,
Deer Lodge County, Anaconda, Montana* As I understand it,
the facts are as follows*
On February IB, 1946, the board of education called a 
mass meeting in the junior high school auditorium at 
7 o’clock P*M* for the purpose of nominating school trustees to fill two vacancies* Five persons were nominated; then a ballot was cast and the two receiving 
the ̂ highest number of votes were declared the two nominees* You now Inquire as to whether all five names should appear on the election ballot or just the names of the two candidates nominated*
Section 1 of Chapter 130, Laws of 1945, governs elections 
In districts of the first class as to nominations and conduct­
ing of elections* Said Section 1, insofar as the same Is 
pertinent here, reads as follows *
®In districts of the first class, no person shall be 
voted for or elected as trustee unless he has been 
nominated therefor at a bona-fide public meeting, held Jla the district not more than sixty (60) days nor less 
' ' forty (40) days before the day of election, and at
at least twenty (20) qualified electors were present, chairman and secretary were elected, and a certi­ficate of such nomination setting forth the place where
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the meeting was held, givihg the nmuv* of the candidates 
In full, and If there are different terms to be filled, the term for which such candidate was nominated, duly certified by the chairman and secretary of such meeting, 
shall be filed with the district clerk within 10 days 
after such public meeting,#* In the event there be held 
only one (l) such public meeting, end only one (!) 
candidate be nominated for each term to be filled then 
and la that event no election need be held and the clerl 
of such district shall certify such facts to the board of trustees of the district, acting ee a board of can­
vassers who shall thereupon certify the election of such 
persons to the county superintendent of schools,*
As I understand the facts, the public meeting held on 
February iBth wos for the purpose of nominating two caddidatec 
for the offfc e of school trustees for two terms to be filled. 
The names of five candidates were placed in nomination. There 
upon the ballot was cast and the two persons receiving the 
highest number of votes were declared to be the nominees of 
that particular public meeting. In this event, the names of 
the two nominees for the two terms to be filled would ordin­
arily go upon the election ballot. However, inasmuch as there 
are but two terms to be filled and but two candidates nominate 
and only one public meeting held, there would be no need of 
holding an election, as the last part of Section 1 of said 
Chapter 130, supra, provides}
*In the event there be held only one (1) such public 
meeting and only one (1) candidate be nominated for each term to be filled then and in that event no elec­
tion need be held and the clerk of such district shall 
certify such facts to the board of trustees of the dis­
trict, acting as & board of canvassers who shall there­
upon certify the election of such persons to the county 
superintendent of schools,*
Therefore, it is my opinion that in school districts of 
the first class, where but one public, meeting is held and onlj 
one term to be filled{as in this instance), then and in that 
event no election need be held and the clerk of such district
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shall certify such facts to the bosrd of trustees of the 
district, acting as a board of canvassers who shall thereupon 
certify the election of such persona to the county superlntent 
ent of schools#
Sincerely yours,
' a ,  V #  B ü T T Q M L Î  ,
Attorney General
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Opinion 179 - 1946
Held* A school trustee Is not precluded from holding such 
office because he Is not registered to vote and the residence 
of such trustee must be determined from the facts in accordgnc 
with the rules of Section 574# Revised Codes of Montana, 1935.
July 6j 1946
Mr* Chester E# Onstsd 
County Attorney Powder River County 
BroaduSf Montana
Dear Mr* Onstadt
You have requested my opinion concerning the eligibility 
a school trustee to hold office. You advise me the trustee 
in question maintains a home in Wyoming and owns a large 
ranch in Montana* You also state he was a registered voter 
in Wyoming for the 1944 election and is not now registered 
to vote in Montana*
The qualifications for holding public office are pres­
cribed by the Constitution sad legislative enactment. Sec­
tion 11 of Article IX of the Montana Constitution provides I 
•Any person qualified to vote at general elections end 
for state officers in this state, shall be eligible to any 
office therein except as otherwise provided in this consti­
tution, and subject to such additional qualifications es may 
be prescribed by the legislative assembly for city offices 
and offices hereafter created.®
The qualifications for electors at school elections are 
fouW in Section 1002, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as 
amended by Chapter 83, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 65, Laws of
1941, which provides*
•Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty
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one years or over who has resided In the State of 
Montana for one year, and thirty days in the school 
district next preceding the election, may vote thereat.*
The qualifications of a school trustee are found in 
Section 9#5, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935§ which reads as 
follows*
“Any person, male or female, who is a qualified voter at 
any election under this act, shall be eligible to the 
office of school trustee in such district**
In the facts which you submitted for my consideration, 
you stated the trustee vdiosa right to bold office is ques­
tioned Is not registered to vote in the State of Montana*
Our Supreme Court in the case of State v# ^umish, 4S
Mont. 2d, 134 Pac* 297, said;
*It is a principlelong established that registration is no part of the qualifications of an elector and adds nothing to them; it is merely a method of ascertaining 
who the qualified electors are, in order that abuses of 
the elective franchise may be guarded against.”
The Supreme Court of Nevada had under consideration the
same question, end held;
"**, that if, by the expression ’qualified voters* the 
legislature of 1939 had Intended that registration be required (as a qualification of holding office) they 
would naturally have used the word ’registered* as was 
done, for example, by the legislature of North Carolina when the words ’qualified registered voters’ were em­
ployed.**” (Gilbert v, Breithaupt, 60 Nev. 162, 104 
Pac* (2d) 143,)
Meffert v. Brown, 132 Ky 201, 116 S. W* 779 , 730, 1177.
42 American Jurisprudence, page 913#
From the foregoing it would appear to me that the fact 
the trustee is not registered to vote would preclude him from 
voting but will not disqualify him from being elected to and 
holding the office if otherwise a qualified voter* However, 
Section 1002, as amended, requires that electors must have
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resided In the State of Montana for one year and in the school 
district for thirty days# Any person eligible to hold the office 
of trustee must meet such residence requirements* This raises 
a question of fact#
Section $74# Revised Codes of Montanâ  1935, sets out 
rules for determining the place of residence for the purpose 
of voting* Subsection 4 of Section 574 states that a person 
who leaves the home to go into another state or district for 
t^porary purposes does not lose his residence "provided he 
has not exercised the right to the election franchise in said 
state or district*" If the trustee in question voted at the 
election in Wyoming in the year 1944 his residence in Montana 
could only be acquired subsequent to that date*
Under the rules set out in Section 574, it was necessary 
for the trustee to move to Montana with the intent to remain 
there as a resident which is a question of fact to be deter­
mined from all the evidence available*
It is therefore my opinion that a school trustee is not 
precluded from holding such office because he is not registered 
to vote and that the residence of such trustee must be deter­
mined from the facts in accordance with the rules of Section 
574, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935*
Sincerely yours,
-, a# V* BUTTvMLI 
Attorney General
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Opinion 15 # 1947 [
Helds Board of school trustees may enter Into contracts with 
teachers at any time during the year» except as restricted*
Board of school trustees has t only such powers and authority 
as granted by statute* or reasonably implied* but has wide dis­
cretion in exercising same* When Board finds anticipated ex­
penditures for year exceed anticipated revenue from authorised 
levy and other sources* it is its duty to submit question of 
an extra levy to electors of the district as provided by law*j
" February 22* I947
Mr# James D* Freeboum 
County Attorney Silver Bow County 
Butte* Montana
Dear Mr* Freeboum 1
You have submitted to this office your opinion rendered to 
the Board of Trustees of School District Ho* 1, Silver Bow Count] 
with reference to the duties and powers of the board* and parti­
cularly to the duties end powers of entering Into contracts with 
teachers*
Your opinion has quite fully covered the law applicable to 
the questions presented, and after careful consideration and 
study of the opinion I am glad to concur therein*
In determining the powers and duties of ^ school board we 
must keep in mind the rule laid down by our Supreme Court in 
many cases* to the effect that such boards have no powers except 
those expressly granted* or necessarily implied from those grants 
{McNair v. School District No* 1 of Cascade County, Ô7 Mont* 423 
2Ô8 Pac. 199*) With this rule of law in mind the questions sub­
mitted to you and considered in your opinion will be considered 
in the same order in this opinion*
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1# la It legal for the board to enter into contracts with 
the teachers at the present time for the school year I947-1948?
Section 1015» Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended
by Chapter 103, Laws of 1943» dealing with powers of boards of
trustees, provides, insofar as applicable here;
”2, To employ or discharge teachers,#,and to fix and 
order paid their wages,.*# All contracts of employment of teachers authorised by proper resolution of a board 
of trustees shall be in writing end executed in duplicate 
by the chairman and clerk of the board, for the district and by the teacher,”
Section 1075, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, provides in
part as follows;
"After the election of any teacher or principal for the 
third consecutive year in any school district in the state, such teacher or principal so elected shall be 
deemed re-elected from year to year thereafter at the same salary unless the board of trustees shall by major-* ity vote of its members on or before the first day of 
May give notive in writing to said teacher or principal 
that he has been re-elected or that his services will 
not be required for the ensuing year: provided that
nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent re- election of such teacher or principal by such board at 
en earlier date,,,," (Emphasis mine,}
With reference to the specific question, these are the 
only statutes applicable end clearly give the trustees the 
power and duty to enter into contracts of re-employment with 
the teachers and principals who have been employed for three 
years or more at any time with the provision, of course, that 
if any such teacher is not notified prior to May first his 
services are not required, he is deemed re-employed for the 
ensuing year at the same salary. It is likewise made the 
duty of the trustees to enter Into written contracts with 
these teachers. Having the power to fix and order paid the 
wages or salaries of teachers employed by the board as pro­
vided in Section 1015, supra, the board therefore has the
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/power to fix the salary and provide for the same in the contrat 
at any time* '
The second question present iaj "Should the board enter 
into a contract with the teachers at this time on the antici­
pation that the amount would be voted as a special millage by 
the people of the district in the election in April, and the 
people failed to so vote, would the contract still be binding 
upon the district?"
I fully agree with your opinion that;this question, as to 
whether the board should enter into such a contract, is a 
question of administrative discretion with which the board is 
vestlve and determinative only by the board itself* As to 
whether the board has authority to enter into such a contract, 
we may again look to the statutes to find such authority.
The board is given the power end duty to employ and dis­
charge teachers and to fix their salaries* (Section 1015, 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, supra)# Aside from the re­
strictions as to employment of teachers prior to May 1, there 
are no restrictions on the power of the board in the hiring 
of teachers or fixing salaries#
In the provisions of the statutes dealing with the prepar* 
ation, submission and final adoption of school budgets, we fine 
the following language in Section 1019*13, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1935*
"#,* provided further that if any contract has been 
entered into between the boardl of trustees of any 
school district and any teacher, principal or other person, by the terms of which contract such teacher, 
principal or other person has been employed for the 
school year for which the preliminary budget has been 
d, or when any teacher or principal, by reason oyment during the last school year, is entitled he provisions of Section 1075, to retain his
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position and salary during the sehool year for which 
the preliminary budget was prepared, the board of school 
budget supervisors must not make any change in any item 
for salaries or wages which will reduce or in any manner 
affect the salary or wages of such teacher, principal or other person,*
As stated In your opinion, therefore, the law is clear 
that, apart from the restrictions imposed by Section 1075, 
the board may et any time hire teachers and fix salaries end 
terms by written contract, and from the time of the execution 
of the contract, the amount of such salary must be inserted 
In the budget and cannot be changed. The contract becomes a 
binding obligation of the district. That the board has the 
Implied if not the granted power to fix the salary at any 
figure it deems advisable, within its reasonable discretion, 
is apparent from the further provisions of the statute pro*
vlding for the submission of an extra levy to a vote of the
«people in the event the proposed expenditures a&proved in the 
?! ‘ budget ̂ 1 1  exceed the anticipatèàirevenue,
,v "Section 1019.7, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, which is
a part of the chapter of the Code on the preparation, submission
end approval of the budget, provides in part*
*».. the board must determine and make an estimate of 
the amount of such deficiency and the number of mills 
of additional levy required to be made to meet and take 
care of such deficiency and must call an election for the purpose of obtaining the approval of the quali­
fied electors.••*
This section then provides for the time when such election 
may be held*
It would appear, therefore, from these provisions of the 
statute that the legislature contemplated that at some time 
the estimated expenditures of a district would exceed the es­
timated revenue to be derived from the authorized levies, and
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fill Other fioureea» end therefore provided ui ..«ens of meeting 
such filtustion by enacting Section 1019*7, supra. It may be
reasonably inferred the legislature contemplated such a de*
. *
flciency might be caused by an increase in salary from the 
feet that it made it the duty of the board to enter into 
written contracts with the teachers and provided there should 
be no reductions in the budget of the amount fixed in such 
contracts.
Prom the express authority given the board to enter into 
written contracts as to term and salary, and the prohibition 
against the reduction the amount of salaries so fixed In such 
contracts, together with the provisions for the submission of 
the question of an extra levy to a vote of the people in the 
event of a deficiency in the budget, it would appear that the 
only considerations of the board In fixing the amount of sa­
laries to be paid the teachers should be reasonableness of the 
amount based upon a fair and just remuneration for the ser­
vices under the existing economic conditions.
The third question presented Is* *Would it be possible 
to make a contract in such a way that it would be binding if 
the people voted the money but not binding If the people falle 
to vote it?"
As has been pointed out, the board has power and it is 
made its duty to enter into Contracts with the teachers as to 
terms and salary. Having the power to contract with the teach 
the board may contract as to any conditions not restricted by 
law. I find no law preventing the board from entering into a 
conditional contract such as suggested in your question* Like 
any other contract, the terms thereof depend upon the agree*
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ment of the parties end, nnlesa euch terms, or any thereof, 
ere prohibited by law become binding upon both parties.
The fourth question present is; »»Are the Individual board 
members personally responsible for the contracts they enter int 
If the people of the district fail to vote proper millage to 
cover the amount designated in the contracts?**
I assume by this question is meant —  are the members of 
the board individually liable to pay the amount of the salaries 
contracted for In the event the electors fall to authorize the 
extra millage.
A board of school trustees is a body politic and may act 
only as a body and not individually* Only such contracts as 
are entered into by the board acting as such in meeting duly 
assembled are binding upon the district* When contracts are 
entered into in such manner they become the contracts of the 
district and not of the individual members, and hence only the 
district is liable thereon* State ex rel School District No, 
29, Flathead County v. Cooney, 102 Mont* $21, 59 Pac, (2d) 
School District No* 2 of Silver Bow County v. Richards, 62 
. Mont* 141, 205 Pac* 206. McNair v. School District No, 1 of 
Cascade County, S? Mont, 423, 23S Pac* ISS,
Hence, if the contract In question is entered into by the 
board acting as such la meeting duly assembled, the board havic 
the power to enter into such contract, In the absence of fraud, 
such contract is binding upon the district and the individual 
members may not be held liable .therefore.
The board of trustees of a school district having only su< 
powers end authority es the legislature has given it, may act 
only within such powers. It is the duty end obligation of a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
! ; *53- ' '
board of trustees toexercise such powers and such authority 
' > reasonably and for the best interests of the district* la 
the present Instance It Is the duty of the board to negotiate 
a contract with the teachers which Is just, equitable and 
reasonable both for the teacher and the district, based upon 
the economic conditions presently existing* If the amount 
contracted for salaries on this basis, together with other 
anticipated expenditures of the district, exceeds the an- 
' ticipated revenue from the authorized mlllege and other 
sources, It is the duty of the board under the provisions off f f
Section 1019#7, supra, to determine the amount necessary to 
cover the deficit end to submit the question of levy of such 
extra mlllege necessary to the voters of the district* The 
trustees are not bound to conjecture as to the result of such 
election* When the question is. submitted to the electors the 
boards* duty has been performed and the matter is then left 
to the electors*
It is therefore my opinions
1* A* board of school trustees may enter into contracts 
with teachers at any time during the year, except as restricted 
by the provisions of Section 1075 Revised Codes of Montana, 1935* 
2* A board of school trustees has only such powers and 
authority as la granted it by statute, or which ere reasonably 
implied from those granted, but has a wide discretion in honestly 
and fairly exercising such powers and authority,
3* When the board finds that the anticipated expenditures 
for the year exceed the anticipated revenue from the authorized 
levy and other sources, it is its duty to submit the question of 
an extra levy to the electors of the district as provided by law*
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4# Members of a board of sehool trustees are not liable 
individually' for any contracts or acts done by the board acting 
08 such in meeting duly noticed and assembled.
Sincerely yours*
E. ?. BOTTŒ&Y 
Attorney General
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Held ; That the failure of a school trustee to qualify within
V
the time fixed dOes not of itself create a vacancy in the 
office end this hla qualification prior to an appointment to 
the office precludes there being any vacancy in the office#
k
April 8, 1947
Hr* Robert F# Swanberg County Attorney Missoula County 
Missoula, Montana
Dear Mr# Swanbergî
You have requested my opinion as to whether there Is a
vacancy in the office of school trustee resulting from the
failure of the trustee elected to file his oath of office
within fifteen days from the time he received notice of
election and the blank oath of office from the clerk# You
advised ' me that the trustee was elected to succeed himself #
Section 997* Revised Codes of Montana, 1935* providesî
"Trustees elected shall take office immediately after 
qualifying, and shall hold office for the term of three 
years e;œ@pt as elsewhere expressly provided herein, end until their successors are elected or appointed end 
qualified#
The clerk of the district shall, at the time of Issuing 
certificate of election to a person elected as trustee, deliver to such person a blank oath of office# Every 
trustee shall file his oath of office with the county superintendent of schools within fifteen days of the receipt of the certificate of election and blank oath 
of office from the cclerÿ̂ . Any trustee failing to qualify 
as herein provided shall forfeit all rights to his office 
and the county superintendent of schools shall appoint to 
fill the vacancy caused thereby#"
From the above quoted code section it appears that the
failure to file the oath of office within fifteen days from the
date of the receipt of the certificate of election and blsnk
oath of office may result in a vacancy in the office#
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In State ex rel Wallace v. Callow* 7ê Montana 30&, 254
Pac* I87» onr court considered Section $11, Revised Codes of
I92I, which provides In part that en office becomes vacant
wpon the refusal or neglect to file the official oath or bond
within the time prescribed, Under the facts In the case a
proper bond was not filed and an appointment made, with the
result that the appointee received the office# The court In
considering Section $11, which is similar to Section 997, said
"As courts are required to construe statutory provisions 
in accordance with the legislative intent, it is held 
that the word *v&c&ncy^, as used in such statutes, is 
not to be considered in its literal sense, it is ordin­
arily given a more liberal figurative meaning conforming to the Intention of the lawnaker and the purpose to be 
acocmplished; *•• that 'within the meaning* of a statute 
identical with ours, such officer-elect is to be con* 
sidersd an 'incumbent* of the office to which hehaa been elected; •«« and, while the statute is not self exe­
cuting, the declaration of the proper authority, after 
the expiration of the statutory period and before quali­
fication by the officer elect, creates a 'vacancy! in th 
office on the commencement of the term to which euch officer is elected»" '
It is to be noted that the court held the statute not to 
be self-executing and that a vacancy is created by the "declar 
tioa of the proper authority, after the expiration of the stat 
tory period and before qualification by the officer-elect," I 
other words if the officer files his oath beforw an appointmen 
is made, even though after the prescribed time, there is no 
vacancy. Also in the Callow case, the court quoted with ap­
proval from a leading text the following r
"These provisions es to time, though often couched in
most explicit language, are usually construed to be directory only ana not mandatory; •»* a failure to give 
bond within the time prescribed does not therefore, ipse 
facto work a forfeiture, »#, even thou^ the statute 
expressly provides that upon a failure to give the bond 
within the time prescribed, the office shall be deemed 
vacant and may be filled by appointment,"
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la State ex rel B&gle v# Stafford 99 Montana SS 43 
P&o# (2nd) 636, onr court again considered Section 511 end 
held that the failure to file a bond would preclude the in* 
cumbent from holding an office claimed by an appointee whose 
appointment had been confirmed by the Senate* The Court 
recognised the rule that the vacancy occurs upon the appoint­
ment and its confirmation as the court said;
"Such a vacancy may be filled by the official authorized 
to do so as soon aslt occurs, as the appointing power 
is plenary, but where, as here, confirmation is necessar 
the appointment is not effective to oust the Incumbent until the new appointee Is confirmed**
The text in 42 Am* Jir* 97̂  states in regard to a statute
providing for forfeiture of an office for failure to qualify
within the time fixed as follows1
*The object of such provisions is accomplished, it is 
said by holding that a faulure to qualify does not in 
itself work a forfeiture of the party’s right to office, 
but simply authorizes the proper authority to declare 
such forfeiture and fill the office by appointment*®
From the facts you gave,no appointment has ever been made 
and in particular none was made during the time the trustee wa 
in default for failure to file his oath of office*
It is therefore my opinion that the failure of a school 
trustee to qualify within the time fixed does not of itself 
create a vacancy la the office and that his qualification prie 
to an appointment to the office precludes there being any va­
cancy la the office.
Sincerely yours, 
a, V. jsorroîLî 
Attorney General
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Opinion 55  ̂1947 :
Held Kl) A Board of Trustees of $. school district may set up a 
school In a church building for temporary use and to meet an 
emergency* The selection of a permanent school site end the 
construction of a school building must be authorized by the 
qualified electors of the district at an election called for 
that purpose* within e reasonable time*
(2) School trustees must purchase end furnish textbooks for 
the use of the schools In their districts* 
t3) School trustees must hire # teacher or teachers for the 
schools in their districts even though the teachers will be 
employed in a new school temporarily located#
I
August 11, 1947
Air, Melvin S# Magnuson 
County Attorney Lewis and Clark County Helena, Montana
Dear Mr# Magnusonj
Tou have advised me that, in school district Ho# 27, the 
school building and the school site were previously sold* Since'' 
the sale, a colony of Hutterites have moved into the district 
and wish to have a public school established# Tou also state 
the Hutterites have offered the use of their church for school 
purposes for the next school year# The questions which you sub­
mitted are as follows *
{e) Kay the school trustees temporarily set up a public 
school in the church building owned by the Hutterites, 
ŵ iich is located upon the private property of the Hutterites?
(b) Must the school trustees furnish free textbooks for the 
conduct of such a school?
(c) Must the school trustees furnish a teacher for the 
conduct of such a school?
The Montana Constitution makes it the duty of the legis-
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leture to provide for schools♦ Our Supreme Court* in Grant
V# Kichels, 9$ Mont* 452* 23 Pac# (2d) 266* considered the
constitutional provision and said*
"Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution declares that *lt shall be the duty of the legislative assembly 
of Montana to establish and maintain a general, uniform 
and thorough system of public, free, common schools#»This is a » solemn mandate» to the legislature for the purpose of insuring to the people the system described. 
{Evers v* Hudson, 36 Moat. 135, 92 Pac. 462*1 This . ' 
mandate was obeyed by the legislature In the enactment 
of laws setting up the machinery for the creation and 
maintenance of school districts throughout the state*.The number, location and extent of the districts within 
a county must, of course, be, and is by law, left to 
local option and governed by circumstances;*....#.#."
It is apparent from the above quoted that the maintenance
of schools within the state is of paramount importance. In
Section 1015, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended it is
made the duty of trustees to employ teachers, to provide school
furniture and to acquire school houses. The selection of a
school site must be done under the direction of & majority of
the electors. However the problem wh Ich you present is not
the selection of a permanent school site or school house, but
the selection of a temporary school house to meet idiet amounts
to an emergency. In State ex rel. Bean v* Lions, 37 Mont* 354,
96 Pac# 922, our Court held;
"It may well be that in cases of emer*gericies, and for 
temporary purposes until electors may be consulted the 
trustees might move the school*"
A similar conclusion was reached by this office in Volume 
7, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General, page 
157, wherein it was held;
"A Board of Trustees has the authority to employ a teacher, 
furnish books, and temporarily maintain a new school without 
a vote of the electors# This would not include the right 
to locate a permanent site for the school house#*
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It must be kept ia alad that such a school is of a tan* 
porary nature, to meet an emergency| end that a permanent site 
for the school house must be authorised by the qualified electors 
of the district within e reasonable time* Also, the school will 
be a public school conducted under the laws of the State of 
Montana# ̂
The question of fumishlng free textbooks is answered by 
Section 1198# Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, which makes it 
the duty of all school boards to purchase textbooks for the 
us® of the pupils in attendance at their schools*
I am assuming that the board of trustees has taken the 
proper budgetary problems#
It is therefore, my opinion*
(1) A board of Trustees of a school district may set up 
a school in a church building for temporary use and to meet
an emergency# The selection of a permanent school site and the 
construction of s school building must be authorised by the 
qualified electors of the district at an election called for 
that purpose, within a reasonable time#
(2) School trustees must purchase and furnish free text­
books for the use of the schools in their districts*
(3) School trustees must hire a teacher or teachers for the 
schools in their districts even though the teachers will be em­
ployed temporarily in a new school temporarily located#
Sincerely yours,
R* V# BOTTUMLT 
Attorney General
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Held; 1, The board of trustées of a county high school has 
the authority to sell real property owned by the district and 
. undesirable for school purposes under the provisions of Chapter 
106, Laws of 1939» as amended by Chapter 232, Laws of 1947*
2» The board of county commissioners has the power to pur­
chase real property necessary for county purposes under the 
authority granted in Section 4465#7» Revised Codes of Montana» 
1935» and in conformity with the provisions of the "Budget Act."
November 16, 1947
Mr# Dick Armstrong 
County Clerk and Recorder Sweet Grass County 
Big Timber» Montana
Dear Mr# Armstrong;
You have requested my opinion concerning the sale of 
county high school property and the purchase of the property 
by the county# You advise me that the trustees of the county 
high school purchased a site for a dormitory in 1919, and It 
has never been used and the trustees would like to sell the 
property* You also state that the county would like to pur­
chase the same for a county hospital site#
In answering your question It is Important to note that 
a board of trustees has limited powers as was observed in 
McNair v. School District 6? Mont* 423 266 Pac# 166, in which 
case the Court said:
"The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes the board 
of directors and managing officers of the corporation, and 
may exercise only those powers expressly conferred upon 
them by statute and such as are necessarily implied In the 
exercise of those expressly conferred* The statute grant­
ing power must be regarded both as a grant and a limita­
tion upon the powers of the board*"
There is no express authority which would permit the
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trustees a t a county high school to convey property to the 
county ̂ without holding a sale.
As the property under consideration has been held by the 
school for a great number of years and never been used, and 
the trustees do not contemplate that it will be used, it can 
be considered as undesirable for school purposes# Chapter 
106, Laws of 1939, as amended by Chapter 232, Laws of 1947, 
authorises trustees to sell lands which are unsuitable or 
undesirable for school purposes and defines the procedure to 
be followed. The chapter does not require that an election 
shall be held and thus results in a saving to the county for 
the sale of property coming within the provisions of the statute.
The board of County Commissioners is limited in its powers
as is the board of trustees of the county high school, which
principle was recognized in Lewis v. Petroleum County, 92
Mont. 563, 17 Pao# (2d) 60, wherein it was statedî
"The principle is well established that the board of 
county commissioners may exercise only such powers as 
are expressly conferred upon it or which ere necessarily 
Implied from those expressed, and that where there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a particular 
power in the board of county commissioners, it must be resolved against the board, and the power denied."
Section 4465.7, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, grants the 
power to the board of county commissioners to purchase real 
property necessary for the use of the county, but a purchase 
of real property in excess of flOQv.OO must not be made without 
securing an appraisal of the value, and in accordance with the 
Budget Act.
In your letter you did not state the approximate value of 
the property, but if the purchase priceis in excess of $10,000,00, 
one of the provisions of the Section 5 of Article XIII of the
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Montana Constitution must be observed, which providesi
•’Sio county shall Incur any Indebtedness or liability for any single purpose to an amount exceeding tea thousand 
dollars (110,000*00) without the approval of a majority of the electors thereof, voting at an election to be provided by law**
See Opinion No* 43, Report and Official Opinionsof the 
Attorney General, Volume 22, and Opinion No* 15, Report and 
Official Opinions of the Attorney General, Volume 21*
It is opinion that the board of trustees of a county 
high school has the authority to sell real property owned by 
the district and undesirable for school purposes under the 
provisions of Chapter 106, laws of 1939, as amended by Chapter 
232, Laws of 1947.
It is also my opinion that the board of county commissioners 
has< the power to purchase real property necessary for county 
purposes under the authority granted in Section 4465.7, Re» 
vised Codes of Montana, 1935* and in conformity with the pro­
visions of the B̂udget Act**
Sincerely yours,
R. V. BOTTOMLT 
Attorney General
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Opinion 7 * 1951
Held I That e majority of the board of trustees of a school 
district may be elected at the annual election when oneof 
the trustees so elected will fill the unexpired term resulting 
from a vacancy in the office,
March 20, 1951
Mr, Frank T# Hooka 
County Attorney 
Broadwater County 
Townsend, Montana
Deer Mr, Hooks*
You have requested my opinion concerning the filling of
a vacancy in the hoard of trustees of a school in your county#
You advise me that the district is a second class district
with five trustees and that a vacancy has occurred due to the
death of a member whose tens would not expire in the year 1951,
Section 75*1614# Revised Codes of Montana, 1947» provides
in part:
♦•A vacsncy In the offic©shall be filled by appointment by the county superintendent of schoolsj provided, that in districts of the first and second class, such appoint* 
ment shall be subject to confirmation by a majority of 
the remaining members of said board, if those remaining constitute a majority of the total number of the board.The trustees so appointed shall hold office until the 
next annual election, st which election there shall be elected a school trustee for the unexpired term,"
The above quoted would apparently conflict with Section
75-1617 which reads:
"When at any annual school election the terms of a majority 
of the trustees regularly expirein districts of the first 
class, three trustees, in districts of the second class, two 
trustees in districts of the third class, one trustee, shall be elected for three years, and the remaining trustee or trustees whose terms expire shall hold over for one 
or two years as may be necessary to prevent the terms of 
a majority of the board of trustees expiring in any one 
year: provided, that it shall be determined by lot, whet trustee shall hold over, and for what term,"
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As there ere five trustees in your district, two of whose 
terms will expire in 1951# the election of a candidate to fill 
the unexpired term resulting from the vacancy would then re­
sult in a majority of the trustees being elected et the next 
school election. Section 75-1617 contemplates that the terras 
of trustees be arranged to prevent the terras of a majority 
expiring in eny one year. In the case of Euhl v, Kaiser,
95 Mont, 550, 27 Pac, (2d) 1113, the court considered the 
above code sections and held that there is no conflict between 
the sections and that the word "terra" applies to the office 
and not to the persona and under Section 75-161̂  a person 
appointed to fill a vacancy holds until the next annual elec­
tion st which time a trustee is elected for the unexpired 
term. The fact that a majority of trustees will be elected 
is not violative of Section 75-1617, What is prohibited by 
the Section is the expiration of the terms of a majority of 
the trustees at the same time. The election of a trustee for 
the unexnlred terra will in no way change the expiration of 
the terms with the result that at some future date the terras of 
a majority will expire at the same time.
This will mean in the next election in your county two 
trustees will be elected each for a three year term and one 
trustee elected to fill the vacancy and who shall hold office 
for the unexplred term of the personally originally elected.
It is therefore my opinion that a majority of the board 
of trustees of & school district may be elected at the annual 
election when one of the trustees so elected will fill the 
unexpired terra resulting from a vacancy in the office.
Very truly yours,
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/mold H» Olsen 
Attorney General
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, Opinion 36 - 1951 
Held; The board of trustees of a school rict may lease
a grade school building which is not needed for present school
purposes to the United States Government for a period of one
ye&r, or for a term that will not interfere with the useof
the building in the future for school purposes*
August 27t 1951
Mr* J* J* î'îcintosh 
County Attorney 
Rosebud County 
ForsythI Montana
Dear Mr* McIntosh;
You have requested my opinion concerning the power of .,, 
the Board of Trustees of a school district to lease a school 
building to the Federal Government for a period of one year*
You advise me that one of the grade school buildings in your 
district la not needed at present for school purposes, but 
the board of trustees contemplates that the building will 
be needed for school purposes in the future*
Section 75-1&32 Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, as amended 
by Chapter 207, Laws of 1951, enumerates the powers of every 
school board and sub-section 7 grants to the trustees the 
authority;
*To repair and insure schoolhouses and to rent, lease and let to such persons or entities es the board may 
deem proper, the grade school ha2s, gymnasium and buildings and part thereof for such time and rental as the board 
may designate. All rentals shall be paid to the county treasurer for the credit of the school district*"
The above quoted is a broad authorization to the board of 
trustees to lease school buildings that are not needed for 
school purposes# In the case of Young vs* Board of Trustees,
90 Mont* 576, 4 Pac* (2d) 725, our Supreme Court approved the
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rental of a high school gyujassium for public dances and ssld;
*As evidencing the legislative intent and progressive 
thou^on the subject, the foregoing section was amended 
by the next legislative ass^bly by eliminating ell restrictions and permitting the board to "rent, lease or let" the described property to any "person or entities 
the board may deem proper, for any purpose and for such time and rental ©s the board may designateé".
Another Montana case which approved the lease of a muni­
cipal building la that of Colwell vs# City of Great Falls, 11? 
Mont 126, 157 Pac# (2d) IOI3, where the court said;
"Indeed a benefit would and does result to them (thetaxpayers) by the Interim renting of the auditorium of 
the Civic Center Building at such times as it is not 
needed for other purposes as provided in the exception 
clause of the lease under the interim leasing Ordinance No# 835#*
There is additional statutory authority given to the 
Board of trustees of each school district to receive rental 
for school property as Section 75**1624 E# G# M# 1947, provides
in part, "the trustees of the district shall have the power to
lease any property belonging to the district which is not being 
used for school purposes#
School property is acquired by the district for the schools 
of the district and not as an investment# The lease of any 
school property should always be made subject to the use of 
the property for school purposes# It is to be noted that both 
the Supreme Court and our Legislature in approving the renting 
of public property restricted the use of the property by others 
to such times as it was not needed for public purposes# It 
would therefore, be incumbent upon your trustees to limit the 
term of the lease of the building so thft there will not be 
any interference with the prospective;need for the building 
for school purposes#
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It iŝ  therefore, my opinion that the board of trustees of
t
a school district may lease a grade school building which is
■%not needed for present school purposes to the United States 
Government for a period of one year, or for a tom that will 
not interfere with the use of the building in the future for 
school purposes.
Very truly yours ̂
ARNOLD H. ÜLSSS 
Attorney General
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Held: (1) Neither school districts nor Board of Trustees
ere liable in tort for injuries arising out of the govern̂
)
mental activities of the school in the absence of a specific 
statute*
(
(2) School district boards of trustees have no authority 
to expend school district funds to contract for liability 
Insurance*
October 19$ 1951
Mr, Edward J, Ober, Jr.
County Attorney Hill County HavreI Montana
Dear Mr, Ober*
You have requested my opinion regarding the liability of 
a school district and the trustees for injury where a student 
sustained a broken ankle while engaged in a regularly scheduled 
tumbling class# This same question has arisen in several dis­
tricts in connection with the authority of trustees to contract 
for liability Insurance*
In Volume 6, Opinions of the Attorney General* page 427* 
it was held that the board of trustees has no authority in law 
for using any part of the school monies to pay doctor's bills 
for treatment of a student injured by an electric saw in the 
manual training department* despite the fact that the injury 
was due to defective machinery. Then Attorney General Poindexter 
stated*
"A school district is not liable in tort and its officers 
have no jurisdiction to compromise or pay any claim such 
as you describe* It is my opinion the doctrine announced 
by our suprmae court in Smith v* Zimmer* 45 Mont* 2o2*
4Ô Mont, 332* with respect to non-liability of counties for tort and individual Habilites of county officers for neglect* applies with equal force to school districts and
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the officers thereof**
In the many years since that opinion has been issued, it
has not been reversed or questioned*
Our Supreme Court has directly passed upon school district
liahlity on several occasions*
The general rule holds the school district immune from
suit for injuries caused by negligence of its officers, agents
or employees, unless liability is imposed by specific statute.
Perkins v* Trask, et &1«, 95 Mont* 1. This rule vas kffirmed
generally by the later case of Bartell v* School District 2d,
114 Mont* 451, 1)7 Pac. (2d) 422.
The Bartell case involved an accident which occurred on
a playground field, end the language of the court thereon Is
applicable to the Instant situation* At page 457 of 114 Mont*
the Court stated5
*It is unquestioned that physical training is part of the educational duty entrusted to the public schools 
(Mcîîair V. School District Ko* 1, Ô7 Mont* 423, 28S Pac. 
iSà, 69 A* I. R* 866), We find no authority for the proposition that these educational duties are limited to members of voluntary athletic teams and can Imagine 
no serious argument which could be made to that effect*"
In the latest case concerning the liability of a school -
district, Rhoades v* School District No, 9, the argument of
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions was
strongly urged* The Rhoades case concerned an Injury to a
paying spectator at a brsketball game conducted by the high
school and resulting from s collapse of a stfWay in the gym.
The court found the allegations of negligence sufficient to
state 8 cause of action *if the school district or its board
of trustees is liable in negligence,* and held th%t the school
was acting in a governmental capacity in conducting the basket-
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ball gam®, and was therefore not liable*
The general rule has been little modified by the language 
of the later cases* So fir as it applies to the Instant 
situation, it is unchanged*
It Is therefore my opinion that neither the school district 
nor the trustees are liable in tort for any injury arising 
out of the governmental activities of the school*
The stated distinction between governmental and proprie­
tary functions which has developed in the later opinions of 
the SupremeCourt has given rise to a correlative question con­
cerning the authority of school districts to contract for lia­
bility insurance* In view of the long established of non- 
liability set forth supra, there appears little practical basis 
for such an expenditure of school district funds* Decisions 
based upon cases arising against municipalities are not good 
yardsticks by which to measure the liability of a school dis­
trict* While both are corporate entities, the scope of acti­
vity allowed a municipal corporation lords to many activities 
proprietary In nature* The school districts operate within the 
more restricted area of statutory authority* It is not empowered 
to engage in aon-educational activities and is therefore not 
bpbject to the same possibilities for liability rs is a muni­
cipal corporation today* This distinction is set forth by our 
Supreme Court in the recent case of Felton v# Great Falls, lid 
Mont, 536, 169 Pac* (2d) 229.
It Is therefore my opinion that a board of trustees has 
no authority to expend school district funds upon liability 
insurance in the absence of specific statutory authority*
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Very truly yours, 
M30LD H, 01331! 
Attorney General
J
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Opinion 54 - 1951 
. Reldi 1* The board of trustees of a school district
maintaining a high school and the board of trustees of
a county high school have the power to enter into contracts
with the State Water Conservation Board a water users*
association for the furnishing of water and sewerage
disposal for the schools of the district and the county
high school#
2* A high school district, acting through its board of 
trustees, does not have the power or authority to enter 
into a water and sewerage disposal contract#
December 29, 1951
Mr# M# 1. Parcells 
Countŷ  Attorney Stillwater County 
Columbus, Montana
Dear mr. farcellsi
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority
of a high school district end ® school district to enter
into water and sewerage service contracts with the State
Water Conservation Board and a water users* association#
The contracts provide for annual payments over a
period of years for the services furnished# The school
districts would be participating purchasers in the water
users* association#
The case of Parmer# State Bank v« City of Conrad, 100
Mont# 415, 47 P*(2nd) &53, approved the execution of such
y
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contracts by ft city, and the reasoning In the case would 
apply to school districts* An opinion of this Office, 
Opinion No# 23#, Vol. 1#, Report and Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General, approved such contracts for school 
districts and I agree with this opinion#
A high school district is to be distinguished from 
a school district as a high school district has limited 
powers# Section 75-4605, S# C* M#, 1947, as amended, 
states I
"The high school districts created under the 
provisions of this act, are for construction, 
repair, improvement and equipment purposes only 
and it shall not be construed so as to interfere with or repeal any existing laws relating to the 
maintenance or operation of high schools within 
the county." *
This is a specific limitation on the powers of the
high school district and it is an express recognition that
the law for the government of a high school. as found
elsewhere is not altered or repealed# Section 75-4101
H, C# M#, 1947, defines a high school as follows;
"A high school is a public school as defined in the general school laws end is an integral unit of the public school system which comprises some 
one or more of the grades of school work inter- mediate between the elementary schools and the 
institutions of higher education of the state of Montana, and which has its own administrative head and corps of teachers under the direct super­
vision either of a district superintendent and 
the board of trustees of a school district, or 
of a county high school principal and board of 
trustees of such county high school, as the case 
may be.*
This statute pieces the control end supervision of the
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high school in the bo?rd of trustees of the school district
maintaining the high school or in the board of trustees
of th%;|̂ county high school. This Is not altered by the law
authorising the establishment of high school building.■»
districts as Section 75-4601, H. G, M,, I947, as amended,
provides in part:
"In any county having a high school, the board of 
trustees of the county high school, if there be one, and the boards of trustees of any school districts 
maintaining high schools, are hereby designated as the boards of trustees or the respective high school 
districts established under this act.*
The recent case of Rankin v. love, Kont.*, 232 Fee. (2nd) 
99&, raises a doubt as to the validity of high school building 
districts, yet such is not materiel here as in any event a 
high school district does not have the authority, acting 
through its board of trustees, to enter Into a contract per­
taining to the operation of a high school.
This does not mean the trustees of a district maintaining 
a high school, or the board of trustees of a county high 
school, cannot enter into such a contract. In fact they 
have such power.
It is therefore my opinions
1. The board of trustees of a school district main­
taining a high school rnd the board of trustees of a county 
high school have the power to enter into contracts with 
the State Water Conservation Board and a water users♦ 
association for the furnishing of water and sewerage dis­
posal for the schools of the district and the county high
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achool, t
‘ i.2# A high eehaol dlmtrlot* eetlag through ita hoard 
of truatoosy do®a not h«v« th* power or authority to enter 
into # water end aewerage dl#po*al contract»
Very truly your#.
laavLB %» 9L32K 
Attorney a»n@r@l
J
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Opinion 102 * 1952
Held; Tha Board o f Trustees o f a School district may not 
engage in any activities which are not exclusively for 
educational purposes*
Whether or not the school district may operate a cannery 
as part of their adult education program is a question which 
must be decided by the members of the board of trustees* The 
determinate factor being the utility of the appliance for 
educational uses* However, the cannery may la no manner be 
used as a commercial or general service device*
July 9, 1952
Mr# Robert Hurley 
County Attorney Valley County Glasgow, Montana
Dear Mr* Hurleyî
You have submitted the following question to me for an
f
official opinions
*May the board of trustees of a school district 
operate a cannery as part of their adult education 
program?*
It is a basic proposition that school boards have no /’
powers except those expressly granted, or necessarily
Implied from those granted# See, McNair vs# School District
No* 1 of Cascade County, 3? Mont# 423# 223 Pac# 133.
Section 75*1633, Revised Codes of Montana, 1946, provides;
"The board of trustees of any school district or 
of any county high school is authorized to permit the use of/School rooms for adult education, schools or classes for adults sixteen (16) years of age or 
over, and $f the school Is desirous of raising money
J
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To help effect the purpose of this met, the board of county commissioners may levy a tax of not to 
exceed one (1) mill on the dollar of all taxable 
property real end personal within the district, in addition to ell other levies for school pur­poses, for the support end maintenance of such 
adult education, schools or classes, provided that the board of school trustees of any such district requiring such levy must call an 
election in the manner prescribed for such extra levies by section 75-170?, for the purpose of 
obtaining the approval of the district to the making of such additional levy end provided 
further that such election must be held before the first day of July*”
It has been held that êducation* is the process of 
developing and training the powers and capabilities of 
humrn beings, as preparing end fitting one for a calling 
or business, or for activity or usefulness in life, and 
may be particularly directed to either mental, moral or 
physical powers and facilities, but in its broadest and 
best sense it relates to all of them* Lyme iHigh School 
Asa’n vs* Ailing 113 Conn* 220, 154 A* 43&, also, McNair 
vs. School District No* 1 of Cascade County, ( supra)
A cannery, that is, canning machinery and the operation 
thereof is as much a pert of adult education as welding 
machines and manual training equipment, as such it may be 
maintained and operated in the school* However, a com­
mercial cannery not Intended for instructional purposes 
not be within the purview of a school district*
School funds cannot be used for a community project which 
is unrelated to education* Section 75-4131, C, M., 1947, 
enumerates the general powers end duties of boards of
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trustees. It Is a basic proposition that school boards 
have no powers except those expressly granted, or neces­
sarily Implied fixm those,granted* McNair vs* School 
District Ho. 1 of Cascade County, Ô7 Mont* 423, 228 Pac* 
188. Consequently, the school board must act within the 
purview of this statute* The statute clearly limits the 
school trustees to educational functions.
What constitutes educational purposes has been 
raised in eases involving private liability* See Perkins 
vs. Trask et al., 95 Mont. 1* 23 Pac. (2d.) 983. Bartell 
vs* School District No. 28, Lake County, 114 Mont. 451,
137 Pat. 422. The question might well arise again In this 
Instance. Given & community project operated by a school 
district and utilized generally, who would be liable for 
accidents? If used exclusively for education general 
immunity would extend to the school district. However, 
if the cannery is used commercially, the trustees might 
be individually liable.
Whether the board should enter into such an arrange­
ment is in the fin̂ l analysis, a question of administrative 
discretion with which the bô rd is vested and determinative 
only* by the board itself. It becomes a question of fact 
rather than law* In order to bring the facts within the 
law the cannery must be operated exclusively to educate 
adults in the methods of canning. Whether it is necessary 
to have a canner in order to teach proper canning methods
such as would be adaptable to better home techniques la
_ for the board to decide. If the cannery is to be operated
J
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es a coiamereial project whereby people can bring their 
goods to be canned as they desire It is not a proper func­
tion of the school district in the absence of legislative 
permission, no matter how worthwhile the project may be 
from a civic viewpoint*
It is therefore my opinion that the board of trustees 
may not engage In any endeavors which are not exclusively 
for educational pruposes# Whether or not the school 
district may operate a cannery as a p&rt of their adult 
education program is a question which must be decided by 
the members of the board, the determinate factor being 
the utility of the appliance for educational uses*
It is further my opinion that the cannery may in no 
manner bÀ used as a commercial or general service device. 
Such functions are beyond the powers of the board of < 
trustees#
Very truly yours.
AENOLD H* OLSM 
Attorney General
y
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Opinion 4 1953
Held! The additional members elected to the board of 
trustees of districts maintaining high schools which 
high schools are also district high schools, shall 
participate on an equal basis with other members in all 
business transacted pertaining to the high school.
January 30, 1953
Mr. Leo H* Murphy 
County Attorney 
Teton County Chouteau, Montana
Dear Mr* Murphy?
You have requested my opinion concerning the powers 
of the additional trustees elected to the board of trustees 
of districts maintaining high schools#
Chapter lôâ, Laws of 1951, emended Section 75*4601,
R4 C#>M*, 1947, to allow the election of additional 
trustees to boards of trustees of school districts main­
taining high schools which are also district high schools# 
The amendment provided in parts
”The additional members elected to the board 
of trustees of districts maintaining high 
schools, shall take office immediately after qualifying and shall participate on an equal 
basis with other members in all business trans­
ected by the board of trustees pertaining to 
the high school maintained by said districts#"
The above quoted portion of the state is unambiguous&
and standing alone would not require Interpretation* How­
ever, there is another statutory provision in the high
_ J
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school district Xm that is in apparent conflict* I
refer to Section 75-4605» K* C, M,, 1947, es amended by
Chapter 188, laws of 1951, which reads In part as follows;
”The high school districts crested tinder the pro­visions of this act, are for construction, repair, 
Improvement, and equipment purposes only, and it 
shall not be construed so as to interfere with or repeal any existing laws relating to the mainten­
ance or operation of high schools within the county.»
The,amendment to Section 75-4605 did not affect or alter 
this part of the statute which has been the law since its 
enactment as Chapter 275, Laws of 1947* In State ex rel*
>'S
Henderson vs* Dawson County, 87 Mont* 122, 286 Pac, 125,
** ' .
Our Supreme Court said;
»***wher@ a section or a part of a section isamended, it is not to be considered as having beenrepealed and re-enacted in its amended form, but 
the portions which are not altered are to be con­
sidered 68 having been the law from the time when they were enacted.**
The limited purposes of high school districts were 
designated in Section 75-4605 prior to the amendment of 
Section 75-4601, which latter section was amended so as to 
provide additional trustees end thus make high school dis­
tricts administrative units for high schools. If we were
to ignore the express declaration that the ̂ additional 
members shall participate in all business pertaining the 
high school** then the amendment would bê a nullity* In  
Nichols vs* School District, 87 Mont. 181, 287 fac* 624, 
the court said;
y
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"la the coastruction of an amendatory set it will 
be presumed that the legislature, in adopting it, 
intended to make some change in the existing law, and the courts will endeavor to give some effect 
to the amendment
It is therefore my opinion that the additional members 
elected to the board of trustees of districts maintaining 
high schools, which high schools are also district high 
schools, shall participate on an equal basis with other 
members in all business transacted pertaining to the high 
school*
Very truly yours,
AMOLD H. OLSSS 
Attorney General
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Opinion 67 • 1954 t
Held* 1% is not the duty of the board of trustees of 
school districts to conduct the election of trustees of 
hospital districts.
March 29, 1954
Miss Mary M#, Condon 
Superintendent of Public Instruction State Capitol Building 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon*
You have requested my opinion as to whether school
trustees are to conduct the elections for hospital district
tp u'Btees.
Section 7# Chapter 155» Laws of 1953» provides for the 
government of hospital districts and fixes the terns of 
procedure for election of trustees. This section states 
in part*
"...All elections thereafter shall be conducted 
by said qualified voters in the seme manner as 
election for school trustees of a first-class 
school district.*."
The election of school trustees is held on the first 
Saturday in April, of each year, as Section 75-1603» R* 0. M,, 
1947» fixes such day as school election day. Section 7 
of Chapter 155# supra, does not designate any particular 
day of the year for holding the election of hospital district 
trustees. However# s method is fixed for ascertaining the 
election day for hospital district trustees. Section 7
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iof Chapter 155* stipra, states that the trustees first 
elected hold for terms which commence oa the date of the 
organisation of the district and these terms ere for one, 
two or three years# The election for the creation of the 
hospital district may be held, according to Section 5 of 
the act, at the next general election or at a special 
election. Such an election would not be held, in all 
probability, on the first Saturday In April, and es a 
consequence would not conform with the school election 
date, end a change from the anniversary date of the first 
election of trustees to the first Saturday In April would 
alter the terms of the trustees first elected#
The fact that Section 7 of Chapter 155* supra, requires 
*all elections thereafter shall be conducted by said quali­
fied voters in the seme manner as election for school 
trustees of a first class school district, ” does not make 
it the duty of school officers tlo conduct the election.
The effect of this provision is to Incorporate by reference 
the procedural statute for conducting the election, but 
no duties are Imposai on the school trustees. The title 
to Chapter 155, supra, does not state that this is one of 
the purposes of this new legislation.
As a ppÿfeiicsl matter, it would not be possible in all 
counties for the trustees of a school district to conduct the 
election as there is a marked difference in nominating
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candidates in flrst-olsss districts end third-class districts#»
(Sections 75-1604 end 75-1606 R* G* 1947)# In fact, 
there is no election held In first-class districts when 
only one candidate Is nominated for each terra to be filled# 
Also, many conntiea do not have first-class school districts# 
Another probable obstacle to an election conducted by 
school trustees is that the boundaries of any one school 
district will not conform to the boundaries of the hospital 
district with resulting conflicting authority of two or 
more schools boards#
It Is, therefore, ray opinion that it is not the duty of 
the board of trustees of school districts to conduct the 
election of trustees of hospital districts#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# OLSSN 
Attorney General
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Oplnlon 93 ^ I954 
Held; The board of oouaty coaaaieaionera and the board ofI
trustees of a county high school may lease to a school 
district for a term not exceeding four years a county high 
school building not needed for the purposes of the county 
high school* %hich building would be used by the district 
for school purposes*
; August 27i 1954
Mr* Harold I* Allen 
County Attorney 
Gallatin County Bozeman, Montana
Dear Mr. Allen;
. ,
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the power of 
the board of trustees of a county high school to lease a 
high school building to a school district to be used for 
junior high school purposes, tou advise me that a new 
high school will b© constructed and the present county 
high school building will not be needed for high school 
purposes after the construction of the new building.
As a county high school is constructed with county 
funds and by the issuance of county bonds, the legal title 
to the county high school is in the county. (Pierson v. 
Hendricksea, 9^ Mont. 244# 38 Fac (2d) 991.) Section 75- 
1636, R» C* M* 1947, gives specific authority to the county 
commissioners to lease any county real or personal pro­
perty to school districts. This section reads as follows; 
"Leasing of County Lands for School Purposes -
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Limitation of Term, Whenever any county of the state of Montana shall have acquired title to any real or personal property in any manner now pro­
vided by law and such property is suitable or use­
ful for dormitory or gymnasium or school purposes to any public school located within the same city, town or school district where said property is 
situated, the board of county commissioners of said county may, upon request of the board of 
trustees of any such school district, lease said 
property to such school district for school dor­mitory or gymnasium purposes for such rental as 
the said board of county conimlssioner» may deem 
adequate end for such term of years, not exceeding four years, as the board may see fit,"
It is to be noted in the above quoted statute that 
the commissioners have not only discretionary power as to 
whether a lease should be given to a school district, but, 
also, as to the rental* However, the term of the lease 
cannot exceed four years,
V.
Subsection 11 of Section 75-4231, E. C# M, 1947, 
grants to the trustees of every county high school the 
power*
"To rent, lease and let to such persons and entities S3 the board may doem proper the high school halls, 
gymnasiums, buildings, and parts thereof, for such 
time and rental as the board may designate, and to 
pay over to the county treasurer all sums collected 
on account of such letting for the credit of the high school,"
The above quoted gives broad authority to the trustees 
of a county high school to lease school buildings. Exact 
limitations are not prescribed on the exercise of the 
power and as a consequence much is left to the discretion 
of the trustees. In view of this section and Section
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75-1626, R* C# M* 1947$ both the county commissioners 
and the trustees of the high school district should 
execute the lease and avoid any question concerning the 
proper parties to sign the lease on behalf of the county*
In considering your problem, the authority of the 
school district to become the lessee must be sanctioned 
by statute. Subsection S of Section 75-1632, E, C, M,
1947» gives authority to every school board ”to build, 
purchase or otherwise acquire schoolhouses, school dor­
mitories and other buildings necessary in the operation 
of schools of the school district, and to sê l and dispose 
of the same,* This also is a broad power and permits the 
trustees of a school district to lasso buildings necessary 
for the operation of the schools of the district. The 
case of Bennett v# Petroleum County, 07 Mont# 436, 2BB 
Psc, 1018, approved a lease entered into by the board of 
county commissioners of buildings for the use of the county. 
The statute under which such lease was made was very broad 
in its terms and while it specifically authorised the 
leasing of buildings for county purposes yet the case is 
authority for a school district to lease buildings as 
Subsection 8 of Section 75-1632, E* C* M,, 1947# i® also 
a broad grant of power#
The beneficial title to all school property is in the 
state (Pierson v# Hendrickson, 96 Mont, 244, 38 Psc (2d) 991)
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and It would serve the public Interest by permitting a 
school district to use county high school buildings not neces­
sary for the county high school*
It is, therefore, my opinion that the board of cô mty 
commissioners and the board of trustees of a county high 
school may lease to a school district for a term not ex­
ceeding four years a county high school building not 
needed for the purposes of the county high school, which 
building would be used by the district for school purposes*
Very truly yours.
PMOUD H* OLSM 
Attorney General
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Opinion 24 - 1955
Held! The trustees of a school district do not have the 
power of authority to establish and budget for a six- year 
high school*
^uly 2, 1955
Mr* Chester L« Jones 
County Attorney 
Madison County 
Virginia City* Montana
Dear Mr* Joness
Tou have requested my opinion as to whether a school 
district has the authority to establish and budget for a 
six-year high school.
In answering your question it is necessary to consider
the limited power of the trustees of the school district.
In McNair v# School l̂ lstrlct No. 1, 07 Mont* 423, 200 Pac,
100, our Supreme Court said;
".*.The board of trustees, therefore, constitutes 
the board of directors end managing officers of 
the corporation, and may exercise only those powers 
expressly conferred upon them by statute and such 
as are necessarily implied la the exercise of those 
expredsly conferred* The statute granting power 
must be regarded both as a grant and a limitation 
upon the powers of the board.*."
from the above quoted it is apparent that the officers 
of the school district are limited to express statutory 
provisions in the administration of the schools of the 
districts.
Section 75-4101, R* *̂ M., 1947» defines a high school 
as an integral unit of the public school system which com-
J
prises one or more of the grades of school work between the
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between,the elementary school and the Institution of higher
education# A junior high school is defined in Section 75-
* '
4102^ E* C« M«| 1947, as a public school which comprises 
work of the seventĥ  eighth and ninth grades of the school
system* In your question you ask if a school can be estab-'
llshed which will include all of the grades of a high 
school and in addition the seventh and eighth grades which 
are elementary grades# As the trustees have limited powers 
and the statutes authorise high schools, junior high schools 
end eleaentary schools* the proposed school does not fit 
in any one of the three. The High School Budget Act has 
application to a# districts maintaining high schools and 
all county high schools# When a junior high school is 
established, the high* school budget supports the educational 
costs of all high school pupils in the junior high school# 
There is no statutory provision for the adoption by the 
trustees of an independent budget for the junior high school. 
Also, the legislature has not authorized a school comprising 
the last six grades of work and In the absence of a, statute 
authorizing such a new school, the doubt must be resolved 
against the power to establish such a school with an inde­
pendent budget#
It is therefore my opinion that the trustees of a 
school district do not have the power of authority to 
establish and budget for a six-year high school.
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Very truly yours*
ARNOLD H# OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 34 - 1955
Holdi 1* The trusteed of a school district ere not 
authorised to aedept a coiabinatlon bid for contracts of 
transportation for two School bus routes when the ad­
vertisement for bids stated end requested bids for each 
route separately, and when the lowest bidder for each 
route was rejected and a combination bid accepted with 
greater es^ense to the school district*
2» The board of trustees of a school district has 
discretionary power in determining the responsibility of 
bidders, but such discretionary power must be based on 
facts and is not an arbitrary power*
August Id, 1955
Mr* B« Miles Larson 
County Attorney 
McCon© County 
Circle, Montana
Dear Mr* LarsonI
Tou have requested my opinion as to whether the trusteesÎ
of a school district may accept a combination bid for two 
transportation routes when the two routes were advertised 
as separate Items# You state that separate bids were 
offered for the two routes which were lower than a combina­
tion bid for the two routes and the trustees accepted the 
combination bid*
Contracts for transportation of school children are 
covered in Section 75-3405, R* C« M#, 1947* The portion of
't
this section with which we are concerned reads as followsj
«•#*The board shall let the contract to the 
lowest responsible bidder; provided, that the
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board shall have the right to reject any and all blda*^ . .
The problem you present is whether a combination bid
of two routes may be considered the lowest bid when bids
were submitted for the two routes at an aggregate figure
lower than that contained in the combination bid* While
the trustees had the authority to request bids for the
two routes as a unit, y et not having done so, bids
must be considered only on the contracts as advertised»
In C« J« 3» 1266, the text states;
**»»,A board of education may not let contracts 
for two different buildings to e bidder whose 
aggregate bid is the lowest, if contracts with 
responsible bidders might be made for a smaller 
sum by contracting separately for each building»*
The above quoted is in accord with our statutory 
requirement that the contract shall be let to the lowest 
bidder. To accept a combination bid which will result in 
a greater cost to the school district and also very from 
the request for bids contained in the advertisement would 
not be in the best interests of the school district and 
would mislead bidders.
It is true that the trustees of a district have some 
discretionary power in determining the responsibility of 
bidders. In Hudson vs, the Board of Education, 41 Ohio, 
app, 402, 179 K, E, ?01, in determining the responsibility 
of a prospective contractor, the court recognized the
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limitation placed on a board of trustees in determining
the responsibility of a prospective contractor* The Ohio
Court quoted with approval the followingj
•The term ’responsible* is net, however, limited 
to pecuniary* ability*** but pertains to many 
other characteristics of the bidder, such as his 
general ability and capacity to orry on the 
work, his equipment and facilities, his prompt» 
ness, and the quality of work previously done by 
him, his suitability to the particular task, and 
such other qualities as ere found necessary to 
consider in order to determine whether or not, 
if awarded the contract, he could perform it 
strictly in accordance with its terms.* (Qs- 
phasis Supplied)
It is therefore my opinion that the trustees of a
school district are not authorized to accept a combination
bid for contracts of transportation for two school bus
routes when the advertisement for bids stated end requested
bids for each route separately, and when the lowest bid
from a responsible bidder for each route was rejected and
If
a ccwabination bid accepted with greater expense to the 
school district*
It is also my opinion that the board of trustees of a 
school district has discretionary power in determining the 
responsibility of bidders, but such discretionary power 
must be based on facts and is not an arbitrary power*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 35 - 1955 ^
Held* 1# That the Board of Trustees of School District 
No# 1 of Silver Bow County in appointing a teacher who Is 
not a teaching principal to the position of supervisory 
principal I violated Section 3 of Rule 4 when there were 
teaching principals qualified and willing to accept the 
position*
2* That it is the duty of the Board of Trustees 
when there is & vacancy In the position of supervisory 
principals, to give sufficient and adequate notice to 
all teaching principals of such vacancy, which notice 
should request applications to be filed with the board 
on or before a fixed date#
3# That the Board of Trustees has the power and 
authority to transfer supervisory principals from one 
school to another, and after such transfer any vacancy 
in the position of supervisory principal must be filled 
from the ranks of the teaching principals*
August 22, 1955
Mr# N. A* Rotering 
Qounty Attorney 
Silver Bow County 
Butte, Montana
Deer Mr# Rotering*
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the employ­
ment of e supervisory principal for a school In your county, 
Tou have submitted for my consideration a copy of the rules
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relating to the employment o f teachers In School District 
Ko# 1 of your county which are a result of an agreement 
between the Board of Trustees and the Butte Teacher's 
Union* Tou state that the trustees appointed a teacher 
to the position of supervisory principal and this resulted 
in a controversy as to whether there had been a violation 
of one of the riles of employment in the school system# 
Section 3 of &ule 4# which is pertinent to the con­
troversy here# reads as followss
"Section 3# Beginning principals will be considered 
for assignment to teaching principalships. and the 
teaching principals with the greatest seniority 
will be considered for advancement to supervisory 
principàlships# All teaching principals must 
indicate their desire and file requests with the 
Board to become supervisory principals; however, 
if any teaching principal with seniority does not 
wish to accept a supervisory principalship, the 
principal next in line of seniority will be con­
sidered for the position."
The first sentence of the above quoted rule in 
stating "Beginning principals will be considered for . 
assignment to teaching principalships,#**" clearly 
indicates that teachers who are appointed principals must 
first start ea teaching principals* An apprenticeship 
as a teaching principal is contemplated before an advance­
ment is made to a supervisory principalship* This con­
clusion becomes apparent when the second part of the first 
sentence of Rule 4 is considered, which reads* "*##and 
the teaching principals with the greatest seniority will
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be considered for advancement to supervisory principalship."
The word "consider" aa used in the rule might be inter-
f * •>
preted to mean that teaching principals| together with all 
other persons having the necessary qualifications other than 
the position of teaching principal will constitute a group 
from which the Board has the power to pick a supervisory 
principal. Such an Interpretation would render Section 3 
of Rule 4 meaningless and of no effect. However, if the 
word "consider" as used in the rule is limited in meaning 
and the Board must pick from the teaching principals the 
supervisory principals, then the rule will accomplish its 
purpose.
The selection of a supervisory principal from a group 
of teaching principal® is analagous to a civil service sy­
stem wherein the appointing power may select an employee 
from Ê number of names which are certified as eligible by 
the civil service commission to an appointing officer in 
reference to the making of a,particular appointment*
In State vs* Frear, 146 Wis. 302, 131 H.W. #32, it was 
held that a Civil Service Lew which provided that upon notice 
by an appointing officer of a vacancy, the Civil Service 
Commission shall certify three names of eligible persons for 
appointment is a valid law* The court said concerning the 
discretionary appointing power that;
"The opinion doubtless also prevailed in the
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Legislature that a selection from three candidates 
on the certified eligible list would provide a 
sufficient scope for the exercise of a reasonable 
discretion by the appointing officer In making 
appointments of persons found to be qualified to 
perform services under the appointing officer#**
The Board of Trustees has the appointing power# Section
3 of Rule 4i means that supervisory principals must be 
selected from teaching principals# Thus, Section 3 of Rule
4 regulates the selection of supervisory principals, but ' 
does not deprive the trustees of the appointing power#
The second portion of Section 3, Rule 4# provides?
"All teaching principals must indicate their desire end 
file request with the Board to become supervisory principals,*** 
While this provision does not specifically state that 
notice must be given to each teaching principal that there 
is a vacancy to be filled for a supervisory principalship, 
yet, if such notice;! is pot given, then an injustice might 
result# In the absence of a specified form of giving no­
tice, a reasonable method which gives adequate time for 
preparation would satisfy this requirement# It is my 
opinion that a written notice, or letter, directed to each 
of the teaching principals stating that a vacancy is to 
be filled in the position of supervisory principal should 
be mailed to each teaching principal and such notice should 
State the time in which applications should be filed with 
the board# As the board has the power to transfer a super­
visory principal from one school to another, it would be
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the better policy first to make any transfer considered 
desirable and then state In the notice the school for 
which a supervisory principal Is to be appointed.
Under Section 75'*2517t R# 0. ,M$, 1947# It Is provided In 
Subsection 4, that a person^ In order to be a principal 
or supervisor# must not only be qualified to teach In 
such school# but In addition shall have such qualifications 
as the State Board of Education may from time to time 
prescribe. The applicant must have a certificate from 
the State Board of Education stating that he or she is 
qualified before a contract may be entered into with the 
Board of Trustees of the school district*
It is therefore my opinionj
1* That the Board of Trustees of School District No*
1 of Silver Bow County In appointing a teacher who Is not 
a teaching principal to the position of supervisory prlncl* 
pal, violated Section 3 of Rule 4 when there were teaching 
principals qualified and willing to accept the position*
2* That it la the duty of the Board of Trustees# when 
there is & vacancy In the position of supervisory principal, 
to give sufficient notice to all teaching principals of such 
vacancy, which notice should request applications to be 
filed with the Board on or before a fixed date*
3* That the Board of Trustees has the power end 
authority to transfer supervisory principals from one school
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to 6aoth«r» end eXter such transfer any vacancy in the 
ÿposition oX supervisory principal must be filled from the 
ranks of the teaching principals#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD Ht OtSKN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 11 • 1947
Held; A school district may recover under the law the amount 
of the cost of educating a child in the elementary school 
from the school district of the child’s residence when the 
requisite permission for attendance had been given.
A school district is not required to permit the attendance 
of a child resident In another district at its elementary 
school when the child has not received the requisite per­
mission for transfer from the county superintendent of the 
county of:the child’s residence.
February 14, 1947
Mr, Herb W. Conrad, Jr*
County Attorney 
Pondera County 
Conrad, Montana
Dear Mr, Conrad;
You have requested my opinion concerning the following;
Prior to the school year of 1945-1946 and within the■s
time required by law the Board of Trustees of School District 
No, 19 in Pondera County gave its written permission for five 
elementary school children residing in School District No, 26 
of Teton County to attend school in School District No, 19 of 
Pondera County, Montana, The superintendent of schools of 
Teton County gave her consent to the attendance of said childri 
at School District No. 19. The budget for School District No,
-105-»
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26 of Teton County included an item for the transfer of funds 
to pay the educational costs of the school in Pondera County 
for five childrenI but the county superintendent in Teton 
County did not notify the treasurer and request a transfer 
of the funds# tou ask if the Pondera County School District 
may recover the amount due for the attendance of these chil­
dren at the Pondera County School.
You also advise there are children from Teton County 
who are attending school in Pondera County> but the super­
intendent of schools of Teton County refused to grrnt per­
mission for such attendance and the school district in 
Teton County refuses to pay the costs for such attendance.
Your questions corac within the provisions of Chapter 
203, Laws of 1943, which provides in parti
"Children may attend public elementary schools.•# 
when in a district in an adjoining county ivritten 
permission is secured from the Board of Trustees 
of the district in which they are to attend school and when written permission has been given by the 
county superintendent of schools of the County in 
which the children reside."
The proper written permissions were given for the
attendance of the five children in the school year 1945-1946
and the liability of the district of the residence is apparent
from the following quoted portion of Chapter 203î
"When approval of attendance in another district 
within or without the county has been granted, 
the district in which such cl.ild resides shall ppy 
to the school district where such child attends, 
the actual cost of educating a child in the school 
attended
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While Chapter 203 makes it«the duty of the county 
superintendent of the county of the child*s residence to 
notify the treasurer the child is attending school in another 
district, yet the failure to notify will not relieve the 
school district of the child’s residence of the liability.
The liability becomes fixed upon the requisite permission 
being granted by the county superintendent of the county 
of the child’s residence and also of the board of trustees 
of the district educating the child* It is to be noted 
the board of trustees of the school district in which the 
child resides is not required nor has it the authority to 
grant or deny permission for the attendance of a child in 
another district.
Section 1022, R. G* M., 1935, provides a school district 
"may sue arid be sued."
It is, therefore my opinion a school district may 
recover under the law the amount of the cost of educating 
a child in the elementary school from the school district of 
the child’s residence when the requisite permission for atten­
dance had been given.
Under the facts given in your second question, the 
county superintendent of the county of the child’s residence 
did not give permission for attendance in the elementary 
school located in your county# Such permission is a condi­
tion precedent to the liability rnd also to attendance under
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Chapter 203*
Under certain conditions enumerated in Chapter 203, 
”pemission must be granted for such attendance in another 
district.” It is the duty of both the county superintendent 
of"' the county of the child’s residence and the board of .
Itrustees of the school to be attended to gr̂ n̂t permission 
for attendance in another district when such conditions are 
met and an appeal may be trken to the state superintendent 
of public instruction to remedy any unwsrrrnted refusal to 
grrnt permission*
It is, therefore, my opinion a school district Is not 
required to permit the attendance of a child resident in 
another district at its elementary school when the child has 
not received the requisite permission for transfer from the 
county superintendent of the county of the child’s residence*
Sincerely yours,
R. V. BUTTU4LI
Attorney General
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Opinion 73 - 1947 ' %
Held; A ffamily which moves from^one county to another county 
which change of habitation is the ssme ranch, results in the 
family becoming residents of the letter county end the 
children should be included in the latter county*
Octbber 31, 1947
Mr* Chester S* Onstad 
County Attorney 
Powder River County 
Broadus, MontanaI
Deer Mr,'Onstadt
You ihave requested my opinion concerning the residence
Iof a family which lives on a ranch located in both Powder
River County and Rosebud County, You state that the family
resided on that portion of the ranch which is in Powder
River County for a period of ten years, but in December,
1945, they constructed a #10,000,00 house on the ranch
property in Rosebud County, and have, since December 1945,
lived in the house the"major part of each year* You also
state that the family never intended to change residence
to Rosebud County and the parents consider their residence
to be in Powder River County,
You have also asked in which county the children should
be considered residents for school census purposes.
Section 33, R. C, M,, 1935, states rules for determining
residence. Rule one defines residence as follows;
"It is the place where one remains when not called 
elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose and to which he returns in seasons of repose,"
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\sIf the pbove quoted rule were alone the test, then 
under the facta given habitation in the new ' home would make 
Rosebud County the residence* However, sub-section 7 of 
Section 33 states, “The residence cm be changed only by 
the. Hijinion act ('ud intent.* Prom the facts you give, it 
affirmatively appears that there is no intent to change the 
residence from Powder River County to Rosebud County. V/hile 
this intent must be given great weight, yet in 17 /m, Jur. 
605, the text states, “A raanfe home is where he makes it 
not where he would like to have lt.“
I
The determination o f the residence of a family is not*
a question of law alone, but is in great measure a question 
of fact* Our Supreme Court, in Sommers v* Gould, 53 Mont*
53&, 165 Pac# 5991 recognized that rules for detennining 
residence must be of necessity mere guides and rules of 
assistance. There might well be other facts which will alter 
the conclusion reached.
In the ĉ se State ex rel. Duckworth v. District Court,
107 Mont. 97# BO Pac. (2d) 367# the Court recognizes the
importance of habitation in fixing the domicile and said:
“That place is the domicile of s person in which he 
has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere 
temporary or special purpose, but with a present 
intention of making it his home unless and until 
something, which is uncertain and unexpected, shall 
happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent 
home."
Also, Subsection 9 of Section 574, R* C. M., 1935# in
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relation to residence for the purpose of voting, statesî
”A change of residence can only be made by the act
of removal joined with the intent to remain in
another piece. There can only be one residence*
A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.”
The application of the above to the facts submitted 
results in the conclusion that Rosebud County is now the 
residence of the family. The construction of the new house 
and the habitation within the house constitutes the act of 
removal joined with the intent to remain sufficient to be a 
change in residence.
The holding in Opinion 510, Volume 15* Report and Official 
Opinions of the Attorney General, is contrary to the views 
herein stated in th^t the intent for the purpose of resi­
dence in thzt opinion apperrs to be divorced from the acts
of the parties* The acquisition of a permrnent place of
abode establishes an Intent superior to the intent expressed, 
which amounts to a mere desire to retain a former residence 
from which the person has removed permanently* To the above 
extent, the former opinion is hereby expressly overruled.
The residence of minor children is that of the parents 
and this is true under both Section 33* R. C# M., 1935* ®nd 
Section 1051, R. C* M., 1935* which latter section defines 
the manner of making the school census.
It is, therefore, my opinion under the facts given, 
that a family which moves from Powder River County to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Rosebud County, which ckenge of hebltstlon Is on the spme 
ranch, results In the family becoming residents of Rosebud 
County end the children should be included in the census of 
the school district in Rosebud County*
Sincerely yours
R. V* BOTTOiay 
Attorney General
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Opinion 135 * 1950
HeldI 1# a School Bosrd closes a school In a school
’ district the Dosrd l3 not required to furnish actual trans­
portation by bus or rail, but rather maÿ pry to the prrent 
or guardian the cost of transportation in accordance with 
the schedule of payments provided by law,
2. Sections 75-2901 end 75-2906, R, C. M., 1947, 
provide a procedure for compelling a parent to send 
children within the school age to school,
November 24th, 1950
Mr, Roy W, Holmes 
Bounty Attorney 
Carter County 
Ekalaka, Montana
Derr Mr. Holmesj
You hrve requested my opinion on the following questions
on behalf of the County Superintendent of Schools of your
County*
1* May the Board of Trustees of a school district close 
a school in a district and merely pay the parents of pupils 
for transporting the pupils to another school, or must the 
trustees furnish actual transportation by bus or other 
vehicle?
2. How may a parent who refuses to send his children to 
school be forced to do so?
. . Section 75-3404, R. C* M., 1947, was originally enacted 
as Section 4, Chapter 152, Session Laws of 1941, and provides 
in part as follows %
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"the Bosrd of Trustees shell have the power to 
close any elementary school within the district, 
and transport the pupils to another school or 
schools within th?t district, when the Board 
deems such act to be for the best interests of all the pupils attending school..
It is clemr that the Board of Trustees may close a 
school in a district and the question then arises es to 
what is meant by the word "transport" in the above section.
Section 75-3402, S* 0. M., 1947» which was enacted as
Section 2, Chapter 152, Session Laws of 1941» defines what
is meant by the term "transportation" as that term is used
in Chapter 152 of the Laws of 1941* This section providess
"Unless a different meaning is plainly required,by 
the context, ♦transportation* shall, in this act, 
mean (1) the actual transporting of pupils who 
live three (3) or more miles distant from a public 
school, by bus, rail or otherwise; (2) the pro­
viding of any services whereby the school board is 
relieved of actually transporting such pupils, 
such as paying parent or guardian for transpor­
tation, paying rent or board or any part thereof 
and providing supervised correspondence study or 
supervised home study."
The context of Section 75-3404» supra, clearly indicates 
that the wcrd "transport" as used therein is defined by 
Section 75-3402, supra. Therefore, it is my opinion that 
if the Board of Trustees of a school district closes a 
school it may pay the parent or guardian in accordance with 
the schedule set forth in Section 75-3407» R# G. M*, 1947» 
as amended by Chapter 200, Session Lews of 1949, and need 
not provide actual transportation by bus, rail, or otherwise. 
The purpose of giving the term"transportation"a dual meaning
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In Chapter 152> Session Laws of 1941, was to allow a School 
Board to exercise its discretion and provide for payment to 
parents for transportation when circumstances were not such 
as to warrant the supplying of actual transportation facili­
ties by the school district*
Section 75*2901 to 75-2906> inclusive,make it compulsory 
that children between the ages of eight and sixteen years 
of age be sent to a school in which the basic language 
taught is English* Section 75-2901, as amended by Chapter 
61, Session Laws of 1949, provides in part as follows ;
"*..Any parent, guardian or other person having the 
care end custody of a child between the ages of 
eight (Ô) and sixteen (16) years, who shall fail to 
comply with the provisions of the section, shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
thereof shall be fined not less th^n five dollrrs 
(̂ 5«00) nor more than twenty dollars ($20.00)."
Thus a parent who refuses to send hia child to school
may be found guilty of committing a misdemeanor, and subject
to fine*
However, I believe that Section 75-2905, R* C, M., 1947, 
which provides an alternate procedure in lieu of a fine is 
perhaps a more effective procedure to compel a parent to send 
his child to school. This section provides that the truant 
officer may notify the parent in writing of the nonattendance 
of his child end of the consequences of continued nonattendance, 
and require the parent to cause the child to attend school 
within two days from the date of the notice. The statute then
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provides as follows:
"Upon, failure to do so, the truant officer shall 
make complaint against the parent, guardian, or 
other person in charge of the child, in any court 
of competent Jurisdiction in the district in which 
the offense occurs for such failure, and upon such 
conviction, the parent, gu^rdlan or other person in 
charge sĥ ll be fined not less th.̂ n five dollars nor 
more than twenty dollars; or the court may, in its 
discretion, require the person so convicted to 
give bond in the penal sum of one hundred doliars, 
with sureties, to the approval of the court, con­
ditioned that he or she will cause the child under 
his or her charge to attend some recognized school 
within two days thereafter, and to remain at such 
school during the term prescribed by law; and upon 
failure or refusal ©f any parent, guardian, or 
other person to pay said fine end costs, or furnish 
said bond, according to the order of the court- 
then said parent, guardian or other person shall 
be imprisoned in the County jail not less than 
ten days nor more than thirty days*"
Thus, through the institution of court proceedings
may the County Superintendent coerce parents into sending
their children to school, providing that the children are
within the school age*
Vexy truly yours,
ARHULD H, OLSiiU, 
Attorney General
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Opinion 64 • 1952
Held; That the residence of sn elementary school pupil for 
purposes of payment of tuition and of transportation shall 
be that place where the pupil resides with his family for 
at least eighty days during thé calendar year, when school 
is not in session.
* February Ô, 1952
Miss Mary M, Condon 
Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol Building 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You have requested my opinion concerning the applicable
statute for determining the residence of pupils for the payment,
by school districts, of tuition and transportation.
Section 75-1630, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, as amended
by Chapter 207, Laws of 1951, authorizes the attendance of
pupils of the elementary schools in districts other than that
of residence and states;
’*Por the purpose of determining the residence of 
such child the place where the father resides and 
earns the major portion of the living for his 
family, shall be used.”
This quoted portion of Section 75-1630 was first made a
part of the section byiChapter 203, Laws of 1943# and the 1951
Iamendment to the sectibn did not alter this portion of the
jstatute. f
i
Section 75-3405, C. M., 1947, was amended by Chapter
\IS9, Laws of 1951, and the new matter added to the section
Î
included;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-11& #
"For thé purposes of this fct (transportation 
statute) end also for the purposes of paying 
tuition, residence shall be defined as that 
plrce where the spplicant resides with his family for at least eighty (80) days during 
the calendar year# when school is not in 
session#"
It is apparent th t the l̂ st definition of residence 
for elementary school pupils was given to us by the amend­
ment above quoted to Section 75-340$, R# G# M#, 1947#
While the* 1951 legislature amended both sections, yet 
no change was mrde in Section 75-1630, pertaining to 
residence and this definition must be considered as having 
been enacted in 1943# Recognition of such a construction 
is found In State ex rel# Henderson v* Dawson County, 87, 
Mont. 122, 286 Pac. 126$, where it was said:
"'yChere a section or a part of a section of a lew 
is amended, it is not to be considered as repealed 
and re-enacted in its amended form, but the portions 
which are not altered are to be considered as having 
been the law from the time they were enacted."
A rule thrt is also helpful in construing these con­
flicting statutory provisions, is found in Nichols v.
School District No# 3, 87 Mont. 181, 28? Pac. 624, in which 
case the court stated:
"In the construction of an amendatory Act it will 
be presumed that the legislature, in adopting it, Intended to make some change in the existing law... 
and the court will endeavor to give some effect to 
the amendment."
In view of the fact that the legislature, by its amend­
ment to Section 75-340$ gave a new rule for the determination
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of a child’s residence and the new rule is inconsistent 
with the rule which bed been the law for years before, it 
must be held that the latest definition in time controls, 
and the prior rule was repealed by implication*
It is therefore my opinion that the residence of sn 
elementary school pupil for the purposes of payment of 
tuition snd of transportation shall be that place where the 
pupil resides with his family for at least eighty days 
during the calendar year, when school is not in session
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLŜ N 
Attorney General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-120-.
Opinion 65 - 1952
Held* 1# The trustees of a school district have the power 
to enter into a contract with the psrents of non resident 
students for the payment of tuition*
2» It!is the duty of the trustees of a school district 
to budget for and pay tuition for resident children who 
attend elementary school in another district if the county 
superintendent and the trustees of the school district of 
the school to be attended consent in writing to such atten­
dance*
February 9, 1952
Mr* John M* McCarvel 
County Attorney 
Deer Lodge County 
AnacondaI Montana
Dear Mr* McCarvel* '
You have requested my opinion concerning the validity
of a contract between a school district and the parents of
school children* You advise me that the children attend
elementary school in a district where they do not reside*
and the contract was entered into between the district and
the parents for the payment of tuition by the parents for
the children# You also state the trustees of the district
i
of the residence df the children have refused permission* 
Section 75-I63O, R# C* M*, 1947» amended by Chapter 
267, Laws of 1951» provides for the transfer of funds between 
school districts for the payment of tuition of transfer 
elementary children* This section provides in part:
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“Children may attend public elementary schools In 
districts in the county outside of the district 
in which they reside,#*,,when written permission 
is secured from the board of trustees of the 
district in which they ere to attend school and 
when written peraission has been given by the 
county superintendent of schools of the county 
in which the children reside#
"#ien approval of attendance in another district 
within or without the county has been granted, 
the district in which such child resides shall 
pay to the school district where such child 
attends, an amount based on the following tui­
tion rates,*##“
From the above quoted It Is apparent that the consent 
of the trustees of the district of residence Is not a pre­
requisite for the attendance of the children In another 
district#
Under the facts submitted the consent for attendance 
was secured from the trustees of the district operating the 
school to be attended and of the county superintendent and 
therefore it is the oblig?»tion of the district of residence 
to pay the amount of tuition as fixed in the schedule set 
out in Section 75-1630, as amended# A similar conclusion 
was reached in the case of McOlerkin v. San Mateo School 
District# 4 Cel* (2d) 363, 49 Pac. (2d) S30, 102 A.L.R.
If the county superintendent had not consented in 
writing to the attendance, the trustees of the district where 
the children wished to attend elementary school could enter 
into a contract for tuition, as Section 75-1632, R# C, M., 
1947, 03 amended by Chapter 207> Laws of 1951, grants the 
power to a board of trustees:
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"To deténain© the rate of tuition of non-resident 
pupils according to the provisions of Section 75- 
1630I Ré G* Mé , 1947* ©s amended."
That a school district may charge tuition for non­
resident pupils ©nd exclude ,,them for non-payment was 
recoĵ iisod in Peterson v. School Board, 73 Mont. 442, 236 
Pac. 670#
While the trustees of a school district have the authority 
to charge tuition for non-resident elementary pupils attending 
their district, yet under the facts you submitted the require­
ments of Section 75-1630, R, C* M., 1947, ©s amended, have 
been satisfied* It is the obligation of the district of 
the residence of the pupils to pay the tuition and the parents 
should be relieved of this obligation.
It is therefore, my opinionî
1* The trustees of a school district have the power to 
enter into a contract with the parents of non-resident stu­
dents for the payment of tuition.
2. It is the duty of the trustees of a school district 
to budget for end pay tuition for resident children who attend 
elementary school in another district if the county superin­
tendent end the trustees of the school district of the school 
to be attended consent in writing to such attendance.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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CHAPTER RIPERSWCES
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found in Volume 22 of the Report end Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General»
Opinion 11 - 1947
Opinion 73 1947
The following official opinion of the attorney general 
can be found in Volume 23 of the Report and Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General.
Opinion 135 - 1950
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found in Volume 24 of the Report and Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General. (To be published)
Opinion 64 - 1952Opinion 65 - 1952
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GHAPTSa V
.4
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Opinion 135 - 1946
Held I A high school district which was heretofore created 
under the provisions of Sections 1301.1 to 1301*6, R. C* M., 
1935f as amended* has the power and authority to issue bonds 
for construction purposes*
March 16* 1946
Mr. D* W* Doyle 
County Attorney 
Pondera County 
Conrad, Montana
Dear Mr* Doyle;
You have requested my opinion concerning the following
facts ;
Pondera County has been divided into high school districts 
under the provisions of Section 1301*1 to 1301.6, R* C. M.,
19351 as amended; School District Ho* 10, previous to the 
decision maintained a district high school and the high 
school district of which district Ho. 10 is a part proposes 
to issue bonds. “
In your request for an opinion you called attention to 
Opinion No. 6, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of the 
Attorney General, which held that Section 1301.1 to 1301.6,
R. C. M., 1935, were enacted as Chapter 47 of Sx. Laws of 
1933, end that the act was passed as an emergency measure.
The facts under consideration in the above opinion differ
i ■
«•124*»
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from those presented here in thf*t It wss there proposed to
'a
create high school districts# Tour county has already been 
divided into high school districts and the districts once 
created continue to exist under the statute with the powers 
granted to them at the time of their creation.
Chapter 47 was enacted for the purpose of siding a 
building program and to take advantage of federal aid.
The districts crerted were given the power to incur indebted-* 
ness and there was no limit to the time for the exercise of 
this power. Indebtedness by the issuance of bonds may still 
be incurred by the district.
It is therefore, my opinion that a high school district 
which was heretofore created under the provisions of Sections 
1301,1 to 1301,6, R, C, M,, 1935, as emended, has the power 
and authority to issue bonds for construction purposes.
Sincerely yours,
H. Y, BOTTUÏ'ÎLÏ 
Attomey General
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Opinion 157 - 1946
Held:  ̂corarson school district’s proportionate shere of a
high school building district’s indebtedness must be included 
in the computation of the limit of indebtedness of the common 
school district.
May 16, 1946
Mr. D. W* Doyle 
County Attorney Pondera County 
Conrad, Montana
Dear Mr* Doyle*
You hove requested my opinion whether a comion school 
district which is included in a high school district created 
under Sections 1301.1 to 1301.6, R. C. M., 1933, will be 
limited in incurring indebtedness by its proportionate share 
of the indebtedness of the high school district.
Section 6 of Article XIII of the Montana Constitution, 
and Section 1224*2, R. U. M., 1935, limit the indebtedness 
of a school district to three per cent of the value of the 
taxable property therein* However, it is arguable that the 
indebtedness of the high school district is not that of the 
component common school districts that they are separate legal 
entities. However, in Pierson v* Hendrickson, 9̂  Mont, 244, 3& 
Pec. (2d) 991, our court recognized that common school districts 
were consolidated for a limited purpose and then considered 
the precise problem presented by your question without de­
ciding the point. Thei court said:
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**It 1» next contended that Uh«*pter 47 la In 
conflict with section 6, Article IIll, of the 
Constitution> which limits the indebtedness of 
c school district to three per cent of the 
value of the taxable property therein, boo#use of 
the possibility of Incltrdinj» In the now district 
» comaon school district sire* dy indebted to 
such m  extent that Its proj^rtlon of the pro­
posed bond issue, fdded to Its existing indebted­
ness, would exceed the constititionml limit#
The record discloses without controversy that, 
if the indebtedness proposed by the bond issio 
involved here were divided betwcim the various 
oomKion schoul districts composing the new dis­
trict in proportion to the essessed v lue of the 
property la such districts and Added to the 
existing lndebt«dné?in of ench of such com'̂ on 
districts respectively, the Indebtcdnfss of e%ch 
would still be les* than three per cent of the 
esaesscd v^lue of its taxable property* "ssuming, 
without deciding, that, in dctenaining whether 
nny commn school district W d  exceeded Its con- 
stltvtloncl limit of indebtedness, the indebted­
ness of the proposed bond Isoue must be allocated 
in th* manner above stated, it follws th* t plain­
tiff and no other individual taxpayer of «ry of 
the common school districts here involved and 
none of the common school districts themselves 
c m  re is* the question here attempted to be 
raised, for, #s to them, th® ret is not open to 
this objection* Only those adversely effected 
, by an unconstitutional *ct c m  question its 
Vflidity##*^
Th* reseoa for Section 6 of Article Kill of our Con­
stitution was expressed in Butler v* fndrus, 35 Mont* 575, 
90 fee* 7̂ 5, where th* court said:
*£x4>©rienco has demonstrated tbrt those who con­
trol mmicipAl govemiaonts era not fXw*'ys honest, 
discreet, end conservative citizens, md that 
when there is no restraint upon their .power to 
contract indebtedness, extravagant courses fre­
quently result la imposing intoler? ble birdens 
of ti»x?tloa upon the people of their at.nlcipAlitles*”
The purpose of the section of the Constiti, tloa is to 
limit the burden of tax»»tlon, and to penalt the high school
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district bonded Indebtedness to be excluded from the 
computation of the indebtedness of the common school 
districts would violate the spirit of the constitutionnl 
prohibition*
It is therefore my opinion that e common school 
district’s proportionate share of a high school building 
district’s indebtedness must be included in the computa­
tion of the limit of indebtedness of the ccanmon school 
district.
Sincerely yours,
R, V. BoTTOMlY, 
Attorney General
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Opinion 175 - 1946
Held % High school students who attend high school outside 
of the county of their residence and who reside closer to 
a high school in the county of their residence than the one 
attended are not entitled as a matter of right to permission 
for transfer and resulting payment of such funds although 
the same students may be entitled to transportation,
June 27, 1946
I'lr, Chester E, Onstad 
County Attorney 
Powder River County 
Broadus, Montana
Dear Mr* Onstad: I
ÏOU have requested my opinion asking if funds must not
be transferred by a school district for students who attend
high school in a county adjoining thrt of their residence
when they reside closer to a high school in the county of
their residence than a high school in an adjoining county*
Your question is answered by the provisions of Section
1262,81, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, as amended by
Chapter 217, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 219, Laws of 1943,
* 11
which section providesith^t the transfer of students:
”,,,must be authorized by the county superin­
tendent of schools of the county of his residence when a pupil lives more thm three (3) miles 
from the nearest high school in the county of his 
residence and more than one rnd one-half (1 1/2) 
miles from an established bus route operated by such 
high school, and closer to a high.schoûl of 
adloining county th-n to any high school located 
in  une county of his resldmicep and when proper 
application has been made to the county super­
intendent of schbols, not Irter than October 15th, 
by the parent or guardian of the pupil for who such 
transfer is desired (Emphasis mine,)
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The emphasized portion of the Above quoted section 
indicates that it is not mandatory for the County superin­
tendent of Schools to authorize the transfer unless there 
is a high school In the adjoining county closer to the 
student*3 residence than in the county of residence.
Section 9 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by 
Chapter 116, Lews of 1945, states the rules for eligibility 
for transportation and contains similar distance require­
ments for transportation to those above quoted, but does 
not have the prohibition that if a high school in the 
county of residence Is closer than the one in the adjoining 
county, it is not mandatory to furnish transportation*
It is therefore ray opinion that high school students 
who attend high school outside of the county of their 
residence and who reside closer to a high school in the 
county of their residence than the one attended are not 
entitled as a matter of right to permission for transfer 
end resulting payment of such funds although the same 
students may be entitled to transportation.
Sincerely yours,
R. y* düîïu-iLï
Attorney General
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Opinion XX5 - X94Ô
Held; The commission which divides th© county into high 
school building districts under the provisions of Chapter
I
275* Laws of 1947; must divide the whdb county without 
omitting any portion and may create high school building 
districts which, at the timeof the division, do not have 
high schools»
April 27, 1948
Mr» Denzil R. Young 
County Attorney 
Fallon County 
Baker, Montana
Dear Air. Young,
You have requested my opinion as to whether a portion
of the county may be left out of the division of the county
into high school building districts by the commission which
proceeds under the provisions of Chapter 275, Laws of 1947.
You advise me that the citizens in a part of your county
object to the inclusion of the area in which they live in
either of two proposed high school building districts, as
the citizens contemplate the re-establishment of a high
school in that area»
Section 2 of Chapter 275, Laws of 1947, states in part;
«In all counties having a high school, or high schools, 
a commission consisting of the county commissioners 
end the county superintendent of schools shall at the request of any high school board of trustees 
in the county,! divide the county into high school 
districts for the purpose of this act, after 
hearing»”
It is to be noted that the above quoted provides that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-132-
the commission shall "divide the county into high school 
districts," snd the use of such phrase means the whole 
county without omission must be divided. To permit a 
portion of the county to be left out of the division would 
lead to abuses end in many instances, unfair taxation.
1̂1 of the provisions of Chapter 275 give the commission 
broad powers and while the initial step for the division 
of the county is instituted by the trustees of a high 
school within the county, yet there is no requirement 
that all of the districts created by the commission have a 
high school in existence at the time of the division.
In your letter you state that e high school wrar in 
existence in the area from which protests arise and that 
the electors in such portion of your county desire that 
their community be designated as a high school district 
with the view thrt a high school will be established# As 
was observed in fierson v. Hendrickson, 9^ Mont. 244* 3&
Pac# (2d) 991» the purpose of the school building district 
law is to permit consolidation of common school districts 
for construction purposes. Section 5 of Chapter 275 states 
specifically th^t one of the purposes of the ret is to permit 
construction of high schools* The creation of  ̂high school 
building district which does not have a high school in 
existence et the present time would encourage the establish­
ment of B high school in th^t the construction .would be' 
made easier# In fact it appears that a liberal interpretation
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of this law would encourage the improvement of our school 
system*
The previously quoted portion of Section 2 of Chapter 
275, indicates the legislative intent that an existing high 
school is not necessary for each high school district* The 
section reads, in part, that *In all counties having a high 
school,,*a commission*,* shall,,,divide the county into high 
school district*,,” In other words, the language used 
contemplates that counties having only one high school shall 
be divided, If the proper request is made, end the fact 
that there is only one high school would not preclude such 
division.
In determining the boundaries of a high school building 
district, since the entire county is being divided, a 
district may be created wherein no high school at present 
exists, and no immediate plans to build have been formu­
lated, but which building district is to be utilized when 
conditions warrant a building program.
The prohibition found in Section 1022, Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1935, against the creation of school districts 
between March and July applies to the districts authorized 
by Chapter 275,
The legislature has given us this law and it Is 
mandatory on the part of the commission. The law as it 
stands may not be desirable, but the relief is to apply 
to the legislature to emend or repeal.
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It la therefore, ay opinion thft the coTOiilsalon which 
divides the county Into high school building districts 
under the provisions of Chapter 275i Lsws of 1947» must 
divide the whole county without omitting any portion and 
may create high school building districts which, at the 
time of the division, do not have high schools*
«
Sincerely yours,
R* V. BUTTÙÜLÏ 
Attorney General
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Opinion 29 - 1949
Held: The boioidsries of a high school building district ere
not altered hy the merger of two common school districts end 
the boundaries of an established high school building district 
can be altered only in the manner provided in Section 1, 
Chapter I3O, Laws of 1949#
June 27, 1949
l-îr» Charles L* O’Donnell
County Attorney
Chinooki Montana 
* , 1
Dear Mr# O’Donnell:
You have requested my opinion concerning the boundaries 
of high school building districts within your County. You 
advise me that several common school districts were consoli­
dated subsequent to the division of your County into high 
school building districts with the result th-1 the two 
common districts are in two high school building districts#
As your County was divided into high school building 
districts by an order of the commission made on the l8th 
day of JulyI 193&» the statutes which were applicable at that 
time were Section I3OI.I to 1301.6, Revised Codes of Montana, 
1933, as amended by Ch'pter 16, Laws of 1937# Section 1301.2 
as amended, provided in p'rt;
"No common school districts shall be divided for the 
purposes of this act but must be made a part of a 
high school, district in its entirety."
The above quoted prohibition of the statute was not
violated at the time of the creation of the high school
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
*•136"*
building districts* The subsequent consolidation of two
A
common school districts or the annexction of one common 
school district to another might well result in one common 
school district being located in two high school building 
districts. Chapter 275, Lows of 1947, by providing that 
common school districts shall hot be divided, does not pre­
clude the subsequent merger of districts and the chapter 
does not provide for the change of the boundaries of the 
high school building district once it is established*
In McrJair v. School District No# 1, 87 Mont. 423, 288 
Pac* 188, our court held that the Bo rd of Trustees of a 
school district may exercise only those powers expressly 
conferred upon them by statute and such as fre necessarily 
implied. The court said:
"The statute gr'nting e power must be regarded both 
eg a gr^nt and a limitation upon the powers of the Board."
The quoted rule applies with equal force to the com­
mission which acts under the provisions of Chapter 275, Laws 
of 1947* No provision was made for the redivision of a 
county end the eltorrtlon of high school district boundaries 
until the en-ctment of Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, which author­
izes the commission to meet in accordance with the procedure 
found in Chapter 275 end alter the boundaries previously 
established*
It is thus apparent from this legislative history th;t the
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boundaries of high school districts, once hrving been estab­
lished, cm be altered only by the commission acting under 
Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, and that the merger of common 
school districts will not result in a change in the .boundaries 
of established high school building districts*
In your letter you call attention to Section 3, Chapter
11
130, Laws of 1949; which provides thPt the trustees of a
school district within which a high school is located may call
a meeting composed of the Board of Trustees of the high school
district and the chairmen of the boards of all common school.
districts included within the high school district for the 
purpose of considering the calling of an election to vote upon 
the question of an extra levy for the maintenance and opera­
tion of the high school* It would appear that the chairman 
of a common school district, located In two high school build­
ing districts, might be asked to attend two such meetings.
Such a situation would not invalidate either of the elections 
and there Is nothing to prevent a chairmen of such district 
from acting in two of such meetings on the extra levy problem 
aa he would represent an area affected by each of the two 
meetings.
The preparation of an assessment roll for a high school 
district which shares a common school district with another 
high school building district will be complicated and require 
additional work on the part of the assessor* However, it will
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be necessary to prepare such an assessment roll so that a 
proper computation can be made for the purpose of voting on 
the question of an extra levy as the records on hnnd would 
not give this information, also the valuation of the high 
school district must be ascertained for the determination 
of the levies on the area end the assessment roll will give 
the valuation.
It is therefore, my opinion that the boundaries of a 
high school büiidiag district are not altered by the merger 
of two common school districts and that the boundaries ofA
an estcbliched high school building district can be altered 
only in the manner provided in Section 1, Chapter 130, Laws 
of 1949.
Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H. OLSON 
Attorney General
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Opinion 34 ~ 1949
Held I 1, Coiinty High Schools come imder the provisions of
?
Section % 0Î  Chapter 130j Laws of 1949» providing for 
special tax levies for high school purposes.
' July 8th, 1949
Mr, Robert F, Swanberg 
County Attorney 
Missoula, Montana
Dear Mr. Swanberg J
You have requested my opinion concerning the manner 
of holding an election for an extra levy for the maintenance 
and operation of a County high school*
In considering your problem it is important to note 
the statutory background for such a levy, hrior to 1947 
no provision was made by the Legislature for an extra 
levy, for County high schools, although trustees of 
- district high schools could under Section 1263,5, Revised 
' ‘Codes of Montana, 1935, amended, call an election In the
district for such an extra levy. However, in 1947, the
Legislature enacted Chapter 274, Laws of 1947, which 
authorized a special election for an extra levy for County 
high schools for the following two school years. Chapter 
274, by the specific language contained in Section 4 of 
the act would not apply to budgets for school years sub­
sequent to June 30, 1949• The result is that an extra
levy for the maintenance of county high schools must be 
found in subsequent legislation if there is to be such a 
tax. Section 3, Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, reads as follows ;
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"Whenever the Board of Trustees of the local school district within which the high school is situated 
shall deem it necessary to raise money for high 
school purposes in addition to its revenues from 
County and State apportionments| s meeting of the 
Board of Trustees of the high school district 
together with the chairmen of the Boards of Trustees of all common school districts included within 
the high school districts shall be called end held 
to consider the calling of an election to vote 
upon the question of approving a special levy for high school purposes. Provided* that any other 
member designated by the Board of Trustees of any 
such common school district may represent such 
district in place of the chairman thereof. If a 
majority of the Board of Trustees of the high 
school district and the designated representatives 
of said common school districts attending such 
meeting shall determine that the proposed expendi­
tures are necessary for the proper maintenance and 
operation of such high school* said trustees of 
the high school district shall ascertain and 
determine the number of mills required to be 
raised by special levy* and shall call an election 
for the purpose of submitting the question of 
making such additional levy to the qualified 
electors who are taxpayers upon property within 
the high school district, and if approved by a majority vote of all the taxpayers voting at 
such election, the result of said election shall 
be certified to the Board of County Commissioners 
end the levy approved by such majority vote shall 
be made upon all property within said high school 
district."
The first sentence of the above quoted, seemingly 
limits the extra levy to district high schools situated in 
high school building districts, but such a limited inter­
pretation would preclude County High Schools and it was 
such County high schools the Legislature had in mind in 
enacting Chapter 274* Laws of 1947* district high 
schools have always had available rn extra levy as 
authorized by Section 1263*5* Revised Codes of Montana, 
as amended* To construe Section 3 of Chapter 130, Laws
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of 1949» as limited to district high schools located in 
high school building districts would constitute a complete 
reversal of Legislative intent as previously evidenced 
by the enactment of Chapter 274, Laws of 1947# It is in 
reality the County high schools which hrve needed appro­
priate legislation for calling an election to authorize 
an extra levy, and it is reasonable to hold that the author­
ity is to be found in Chapter 130, Laws of 1949, The 
latter portion of Section 3, Chapter 130, which states,
"If a majority of the Board of Trustees of the high school 
district and the designated representatives of said common 
school districts,,.shall determine that the proposed ex­
penditures are necessa%y.,#said trustees of the high school 
district shall ascertain the number of mills required,,. 
and shall call an election,*," is broad enough in the 
language used to cover County high schools as well as 
district high schools,
A rule of construction that is helpful in arriving in 
the meaning of Section 3» Chapter 130, is found in the case 
of: In re Wilson’s Estate, 102 Mont, 17&» $6 Pec. (2d) 733:
"The intention of the lawmaker is to be deducted 
from a view of every m terlal p̂ rt of the statute."
/pplicrtion of this rule to the statute under considera­
tion must logically le^d to the conclusion th't trustees of 
a high school, whether it be a County or e District high 
located within a high school building district shall have
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the right to call 9 special election in the manner provided 
by law for an extra levy for support and maintenance of the 
high school*
It is therefore, my opinion that an election mry be 
called for the purpose of submitting the question of an 
extra levy for the support and maintenance of a County 
high school located within a high school building district 
under the provisions of Section 3# Chapter 130, Laws of 
1949.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 37 - 1949
Held: Chapter 273, Montana Session Laws of 1947, which
provides for creation of High School Districts is mandatory in 
terms and leaves no discretion in the Commission, consisting 
of the Board of County Commissioners and the County Super­
intendent of Schools, as to the creation of such Districts*
The Districts must be established if requested by a High 
School Board of Trustees in the County*
July 21st, 1949
Mr* John J* Cavan .
County Attorney 
Wheatland County 
Harlow ton, Montana
Dear Î-Ir* Cavan:
You have requested ray opinion upon the following
question:
”lnder Chapter 275, Montana Session Laws of 1947, 
providing for the establishment of High School 
Districts, may the Commission consisting of the 
Board of County Comffdssioners and the County 
Superintendent of Schools exercise discretion 
as to the creation of such High School Districts?"
Chapter 275, Montana Session Laws of 1947, repealed
Sections 1301*1 to 1301*6, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935,
as amended, and contains the present law as to the creation
;
of High School ̂ Districts, Section 2 of Chapter 275 rê ds 
in part f s follows;
"In all counties h ving a high school, or high 
schools, a Commission consisting of the County 
Commissioners and the County Süpèrihtéhdeht"6f 
t>cnooIs”shf'li Ft the request̂  of any High ochôdl 
Bor rd of Trustees in the County , divide thd 
County into High :'">chool Districts for tne pur­
pose of this /ct, after heyrXn^ That the
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Commission, shall fix the time, date and place, 
end at such time, date and place hold a public 
Kearing of the requested division of the County 
into High School Districts, at which hearing 
any Interested person may rppear and be heard 
concerning the requested 'divislon*«*{Emphasis mine.)
If the above quoted Section is held to be mandatory 
in its terms then the Board of County Commissioners and the 
County Superintendent of Schools cannot exercise any dis­
cretion as to the creation of the High School Districts.
The wording of the statute is that the Coimnission "shall” 
divide the County into High School Districts at the re­
quest of any high school board of trustees.
The question as to how the courts will interpret the
word "shall" in a statute has arisen many times in the past.
The general rule is stated in 50 /m, Jur», Statutes, Section
2Ô, p. 49-50, 83 follows:
"The intention of the Legislature as to the man­
datory or directozy nature of a particular 
statutory provision is determined primarily from 
the language thereof. Words or phrases which are 
generally regarded as making a provision mandatory, 
include "shall” and"must"..
Further, in Section 30 under Statutes at pp. 51-52 of 50
fm, Jur. it is said!
"...However, it should be helpful to keep in mind 
the fundamental ihile that ordin rily the words "m?y" 
and "shall" or "must" are not used interchangeably 
or synonymously, but are given their ordinary meaning. 
When the use of the words in other than their ordinary 
meaning is Intended, the intention to do so must 
clearly appear."
In the case of State ex rel. McCfbe v. District Court,
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106 Mont* 272, 76 Pec* (2d.) 634* the Montana Supreme Court
had under consideration the interprétation of the word "must”
in a statute holding that the District Judge must appoint
a special administrator under certain circumst-nces* While
the court in that case held that "must” was not mandatory
but only permissive, it was made clear that the case fell
into the exception to the general rule* On page 277 of the
decision the court said:
"We are reluctant to contravene or construe away 
terms of a statute which in themselves are man­
datory upon their face, except where the intent 
and purpose of the legislature are plain and un­
ambiguous end clearly signify a contrary constructionj 
the synonymous terms ’must’ and shall* in that connection, being generally interpreted as man­
datory, and the term *raay* being generally construed 
as permissive or directory only.”
The latest consideration by the Montana Supreme Court as 
to whether a statute is mandatory or directory is the case of
State ex rel* Sullivan v* District Court. Mont* ,196
Pac* (2d) 452* The court construed Section 11702, Revised 
Codes of Montana, 1935, dealing with removal of public 
officers, and held that the portion of Section 11702 which 
said "the court must cité the party charged to appear before 
the court at a time not more than ten or more than ten nor 
less than five days from the time the accusation was pre­
sented” was directory and not mandatory* The court gave two 
reasons for its decision, (1) that statutory provisions as to 
precise time are many times not regarded as of the essence 
but are regarded as directory merely and (2) a statutory
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provision is generally regarded es directory where a failure
!
of performance will result in no injury or prejudice to the 
substantial right of the interested persons, and as manda­
tory where such injury or prejudice will result. The 
Sullivan case is distinguishable from the instant situation 
on both counts• Her® we are not concerned with a statutory 
provision as to time, and secondly it cannot here be said 
that a failure of performance will not result in injury or 
prejudice to the parties requesting the division into High 
School Districts* Thus the Sullivan case is not controlling 
in the question at hnnd and need not govern the decision in 
this opinion*
Accepting as a general rule the proposition that "shall" 
is mandatory in,nature unless it clearly appears from the 
remainder of the statute that a permissive use was intended, 
all that remains to be done is to determine if anything in 
Chapter 275, Montana Session Laws of 1947» indicates that 
the Commission is to have any discretion in the establish­
ment of High School Districts*
I find nothing in Chapter 275 to take it out of the 
general rule* While the Commission does have discretion 
as to the territorial aspects of the division, i« e., how 
many districts shall be created and how much land sĥ ll be 
placed in erch one, it has no discretion as to whether or 
not it will create the districts* Chapter 275 makes the 
creation mandatory*
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Therefore, It is my opinion that the direction In Chapter 
275, Montana Session Laws of 1947» to the Commission consisting 
of the Board of County Commissioners end the County Superin­
tendent of Schools to divide the County into High School 
Districts at the request of any High School Board of Trustees 
is mandatory and not permissive and therefore such Commission may 
not*'̂  ̂exercise any discretion as to whether or not such districts 
shall be created*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSiiH, 
Attorney General
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Opinion 141 - 1950
Held!. The Board of Trustees of a school district maintaining 
a district high school hns the power to request the division 
of the County into high school building districts under 
Section 75-46021 Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
December 21st, 1950
Mr# Charles B# Sand®
County Attorney Yellowstone County Billings, Montana
’ Dear Mr# Sande:
You hcve requested my opinion concerning the right of
the Board of Trustees of a school district maintaining a
district high school to petition for the formation of high
school building districts within your County.
Your problem is the result of the language used in
/ Section 75-4602, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, which reads
as follows!
**In all counties having a high school, or high schools, 
a commission consisting of the County Commissioners and 
the County Superintendent of Schools shall at the re- 
. quest of any High School Board of Trustees In the 
County divide the County into high school districts 
for the purpose of this act, after hearing.”
It would appear at first blush from the above emph sized
portion thrt the power to request the division of ® County
into high school districts is limited to the trustees of a
■j
County High School as Section 72-4103, Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1947, provides for an Independent Borrd of Trustees 
for County High Schools. District High Schools do not hf>ve 
trustees designated ”High School Board of Trustees,” as school
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districts maintaining high schools are under the control of 
trustees for the district which includes elementary schools, 
Section 75-4101, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947* However, 
the history of the High School District law throws light on 
the meaning of Section 75-4602* The first statutory author- ' 
ity for the creation of high school building districts is to 
be found in Chapter 47 of the Extraordinary Session of 1933-34* 
Section 2 of this Act limited the division of a county into 
high school districts to those counties having County High 
Schools* Chapter 16 of the Lews of 1937 amended Section 2 
of the original act to pemlt the establishment of high 
school districts "in all counties having a high school,"
The crse of Pierson vs* Hendrickson, 9B Mont, 244,3& Pac,
(2d) 991, held that Chapter 47, Extraordinary Sessions 1933-34, 
was valid as an emergency measure and Chapter 275, Laws 
of 1947, reenacted the High School Building law to make it 
a permanent part of our school law, with amendments which 
ere not material here. The Legislature in amending wh t is 
now Section 75-4602 by permitting the creation of high school 
districts in counties which do not have County High Schools 
must have intended that the initial petition for the divi­
sion of a county into high school districts could come from 
the trustees of any district maintaining a high school, other­
wise, the amendment would h"Ve been a nullity* The majority 
of the counties in Montana do not have County High Schools*
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A rule of construction that is pertinent to the problem
presented is found in Mitchell vs# Banking Corporation, 9$
Mont# 23, 24 Pac# (2d) 124» where the court said:
”It will be presumed that the Legislature in amending an existing law intended to make some change therein, 
and therefore, the courts will endeavor to give some effect to the amendment*”
Also, it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend
to limit the power to request creation of High School Districts
to the Boards of Trustees of County High Schools from the use
of the phrase in the statute, "any High School Bo^rd of
Trustees in the County#” The word ”any” is often construed
to mean ”all” or "every”, 3 S. J# 232, and such construction
would indicate that trustees who administer a district main*
taining a high school could petition because there can be
only one County High School and the comprehensive word "any"
grants authority to more then one school governing body*
It is, therefore, my opinion that the Board of Trustees
of a school district maintaining a district high school has
the power to request the division of the County into High
School Building Districts under Section 75-4602, Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 38 * 1951
Held* Upon the abolishment of a county high school the property 
0^ the county high school should be conveyed to the school 
district which establishes a high school rather than to the 
high school building district# The conveyance of the property 
should be to the board of trustees and to their successors 
in office,
August 29th, 1951
Mr* Howard W# Heraan 
County attorney 
Teton County Choteau, Montana
Dear Mr* Heman*
You have requested my opinion concerning the title to 
school property* You advise that the county high school in 
your county was abolished and a district high school estab­
lished. You also advise me that the district high school is 
located within a high school building district which letter 
legal entity by means of a bond issue furnished a large por­
tion of the funds to purchase the property of the county high 
school# Your specific question is whether or not the con­
veyance of the property should be mads to the high school 
district or to the school district#
In answering your question it is necessary to consider the 
statutory procedure for the creation of a high school. Section 
75-4183, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947» provides that the 
trustees of the district may establish a high school with the
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approval of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Section 
75*4139 states what should be included in the petition of the 
trustees to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and defines 
tke necessary* steps in the initial steges of establishing a
high school. There is no statutory authority for the estab­
lishment of e high school by a high school building district.
In fact, the high school building districts were first estab­
lished for a limited purpose and this is stated in Section 
75-4605, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, which rerda in prrt 
as follows ;
"This act she'll not prevent the exercise of powers
as elsewhere in the statutes of this state provided.
It shall constitute an additional and cumulative 
method of borrowing money and of carrying out the 
powers herein authorized. The high school districts created under the provisions of this act are for 
construction, repair, improvement and equipment 
purposes only, and it shall not be construed so as 
to interfere »kth or repeal any existing laws 
relating to the maintenance or operation of high 
schools within the county.”
Also, it is to be observed th t Section 75*4601 provides 
in part:
”In any county having a high school the board of 
trustees of the county high school, if there be one, 
and the bords of trustees of any school districts 
maintaining the high schools, are hereby designated 
as the boards of trustees of the respective high 
school districts established under this act.”
As is mde apparent by the above quoted portions of our 
statutes high school districts were originally created for 
"construction, repnir, improvement n̂d equipment purposes only."
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A condition precedent to the incurring of eny indebtedness
or the expenditure of tny money by a high school district
is the existence of a high school# When a high school is
in operation in a high school district the trustees who govern
the school district in which the high school is located or the
county high school, by virtue of their official position,
become the high school district trustees# To convey property
to a high school district would be inconsistent with the
limited powers granted to such districts by our legislature#
In Finley vs# School District No. 1, 51 Mont# 411, 153 Pac#
1010, the court said;
"A school district is a public corporation, but 
with very limited powers# It may, through its 
board, exercise only such authority as is con­
ferred by law, either expressly or by necessary 
implication#**
There is no express grant of authority for a high school 
district to hold property in its corporate name* Section 
75-4605, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947» previously quoted 
in part, designates the purposes for the creation of high 
school <3. stricts, however, this enumeration does not include
the ownership of property# In fact a presumption is raised
against such power by the omission#
Chapters 130 and 199# Laws of 1949, ^nd Chapters 20C
and 210, Laws of 1951, use high school districts for levies
for the maintenance and operation of the high school located 
within high school districts which is a variance from and
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en Implied amendment to Section 75-4605§ Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1947# but not such an increase in the powers that 
it might be concluded a high school district may be the 
grantee of real property#
Section 75*1624# Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, grants 
to the board of trustees of each school district broad powers 
over property of the district. This section states, ** all 
conveyances of real estate made to the district or to the 
board of trustees thereof shall be made to the board of 
trustees of the district and to their successors in office."
It is not of m-terlal importance which district holds
school property as the case of Pierson vs. Kendricksen, 96
Mont# 244, 36 Pac. (2d) 991# held;
"The beneficial title of the school property Is in 
the state.”
It is, therefore my opinion that upon the abolishment of 
a county high school the property of the county high school 
should be conveyed to the school district which establishes 
a high school rather than to the high school building district. 
The conveyance of the property should be to the board of trustees 
and to their successors in office.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion IDS - 1952
Held: A high school district c»nnot be established in that
area of a joint district in which the high school is not 
located»
August 13th, 1952
Kiss Mary M» Condon 
Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Capitol Building 
Helena> Montana
Dear Miss Condonî
You have requested my opinion concerning the creation 
of a high school district consisting of the area of a joint 
school district within One county where the high school of 
the joint district is located in the aPea of the joint 
district within the adjoining county*
Under the provisions of Section 75-1̂ 14* Revised Codes 
of Montana, 1947» a joint district is defined as being a 
school district which lies partly in one county and partly 
in another# High school districts are established under 
the provisions of Chapter 46, Title 75» Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1947* Section 75-4602, Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947» as amended by Chapter ISÔ, Laws of 1951» provides 
that the commission shall divide the entire county into high 
school districts, ”providing, that each high school district 
so formed must have one (1) or more operating, accredited 
high schools within its boundaries.” This section also pro­
vides thrt if a high school district shall cease to have 
within its borders an operating high school then it shall be
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annexed to one or more high school'districts*
The commission which divides a county into high school 
districts is limited in its authority and jurisdiction to the 
area of the county* Specific directions are given in regard 
to joint districts as In Section 75-4602, as amended, It is 
stated, "the entire portion of a joint school district within 
the county shall be included within a high school district*" 
This provision coupled with the provision that there must 
be an operating high school in each high school district 
precludes the coiarflission from considering a high school 
which is not within the exterior boundaries of the county*
I realize that an additional tax burden will be placed 
on the taxpayers within the joint districts as they must 
contribute to the support of two high schools* Yet, the 
legislature in enacting the high school district law confined 
the authority of the coimnission to each county without regard 
to joint school districts operating high schools*
It is therefore, my opinion that a high school district 
cannot be established in that area of joint district in which 
the high school Is not located*
Very truly yours,
AMULD H. OLSm
Attorney General
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Opinion 130 - 1952 
Held* A high school which has been declared to be an 
isolrted high school by the Hoard of Budget Supervisors 
is not entitled to state aid unless such high school has 
been accredited by the State Board of Education end desig­
nated by the board ss a high school which should receive 
state aid»
The fact that state aid is not available to a non­
accredited high school does not preclude the district from 
voting an extra levy for the purpose of maintaining a high 
school under the provisions of Section 73-3801, Revised Codes 
of Montana, 1947# as last amended by Chapter 210, Laws of 
1951*
December 24$ 1952
Mr» Norman R. Bamcord 
County Attorney 
Wheatland County Harlowton, Montana
Dear Mr* Bamcord s
You have requested my opinion concerning the eligibility 
of a non-accredited high school in your county to receive 
state aid* You advise me that the high school in question 
has been approved as an isolated high school by the budget 
board of your county*
f
In answering your question it is necessary to consider 
Section 2 of Chapter 199# Lews of 1949# which provides for 
state aid to the public schools throughout Monten''* Section 
1 of Chapter 199 specifies that the state*3 contribution 
shall be determined on the basis of need for assistance of
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the various school districts. This financial aid is allocated 
on the basis of “average number belonging” which in substance 
is the attendance for the previous year. Section 2 of Chapter 
199, as amended by Chapter 10?, Laws of 1951, precludes the 
inclusion of pupils in a non-accredited school in the compu­
tation of the amount of state aid to a school dlstiict. The 
portion of Section 2 of Chapter 199, as amended which prevents 
state aid to non-eccredited schools reads as follows :
“The average number belonging of secondary pupils 
of a school district does not include the pupils 
of any high school which has not been accredited 
by the State Boc rd of Education.” r
A high school which has an average number belonging(ANB)
of less than twenty-five pupils receives state aid only if
the State Board of Education has both accredited the high
school and designated it es one which should receive state
aid* This is specifically set forth In Section 3, Chapter
199, in the following provisions
“A school h'ving an AKB of loss than twenty-five 
(25) pupils shall not receive any state aid unless 
it has been accredited by the State Board of Educa­
tion end is desi^arted by said board es a school 
which should receive state aid.”
While it is true that under Section 16, Chapter 199,
Laws of 1949, a high school with an average number belonging 
of twenty-four pupils or less mry be approved as an isolated 
high school by the County Budget Board yet such a declaration 
does not itself alter the provision of Section 3, Chapter 199
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Lews of 1949I that a high school having an AHB of less than 
twenty-five pupils must be both accredited and designated 
by the State Board of Education as being entitled to state 
aid.
It must be remembered that Section 75-107, Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, as amended by Chapter 92, laws of 1951,
specifically grants to the State Board of Education the power:
*»To prescribe standards of promotion to the high 
school department of all public schools of the 
state, and to accredit such high school as main­
tain the standards of work prescribed by the board 
on all such matters of promotion and accrediting#
The board shall act upon recommendation given to it 
by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction,”
If it were held that the Board of Budget Supervisors 
of a county by designating a high school to be Isolated 
could thus accredit the high school then the above quoted 
portion of section 75-107, a@ emended, would be so modified 
as to take away the powers of the State Board of Education# 
Also, such an interpretation would violate the expressed 
language of Section 3, Chapter 199, which requires that a 
high school with an ANB of less than twenty-five pupils be 
accredited and designated as a school entitled to state aid#
However, the fact that state aid is not available to a 
non-accredited high school does not preclude a district from 
voting an extra levy for the purpose of maintaining a high 
school under the provisions of Section 75-3̂ 01, Revised Codes 
of Montana, 1947, as last amended by Chapter 210, Laws of 1951
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It is therefore my opinion thst a high school which
has been declared to be an isolated high school by the
Board of Budget Supervisors is not entitled to state aid 
unless such high school has been accredited by the State 
Board of Education and designated by the Board as a high 
school which should receive state aid.
It is further my opinion that whenever aid is not 
available to a non-accredited high school district, this 
does not preclude the district from voting upon an extra
levy for the purpose of maintaining a high school, under
the provisions of Section 75-3̂ 01, Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947t as last amended by Chapter 210, Laws of 1951.
Very truly yours,
/.RiVOLD H, OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 36 - 1953
Held: The act of a commission In establishing as a high
school district the area of a joint district in one county 
does not result In creating as a high school district the 
area of the joint school district in the adjoining county#
A high school district in the latter county can be estab- 
lished only by a commission acting in the letter county*
July 31 1933
Mr# Walter T* Murphy 
County Attorney 
Mineral County 
Superior, Montana
Do?r Mr# Murphy1
You have requested my opinion concerning a joint school 
district which maintains a high school within your county#
You advised me that Mineral County has been divided into high 
school building districts i nd one of such districts is composed 
of a common school district and that portion of a joint district 
lying in Mineral County# You asked specifically the effect of 
Chapter 237, Laws of 1953* which is the last smendmcsit to 
Section 75-4602, S. C# M., 1947 and whether It is self exe­
cuting so as to incorporate the area in the adjoining county 
into a high school district#
Section 75-4602 as amended, defines the method of dividing 
a county into hi^ school district* The amendment to the 
section by Chapter 237, L ŵs of 1953, reads as follows:
*•# ##provi<Jed, further, that both parts of a joint 
district maintaining a high school may be con- ■ 
sidered as maintaining an operating high school, 
end as such each part of the joint district may, 
together with one or more adjacent common school
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districts whose pupils sttend the high school 
in the joint district, be set ©side ©s a high 
school district* Provided, that, such result­
ing high school district in the county where 
the joint district high school is not located, 
shall be responsible for its share of the joint 
district high school budgets as is arrived at 
by the following of the procedure outlined in 
Section 17, Chapter 199, Laws of 1949 (75-3610), 
and shall also be considered as a single high 
school district with the high school district 
of the joint district, wherein the high school 
is located for purposes of bonding as pro­
vided in Sections 75-4601 -46O5, R# C# M.,
1947» amended by Chapter 188, Laws of 1951* and also for purposes of selecting additional 
trustees as provided for in Section 75-4601,
R* C, Mè, 1947, a8 amended by Chapter 188,
Laws of 1951#,***
I.
This new statut»© in substance authorizes the commission 
which divides a county into high school districts to estab­
lish as one of the high, school districts'the area of a 
joint school district in the county together with adja­
cent school districts*
As your county has been divided into high school 
districts, one of vdiich is the joint school district with 
an operating high school, there is no problem within the 
county* However, the adjacent county in which the other 
part of the joint district is located h^s not been divided 
into high school districts and the amendment does not 
effect this area by establishing a high school district 
without the action of a comiaission dividing the county*
The pertinent portion of Section 75-4602, as amended states:
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"In all counties having a high school, or high 
schools a commission consisting of the county 
commissioners and the county superintendent of 
schools shall at the request of any high school 
board of trustees in the county, divide the 
entire county into and establish one (1) or more 
high school districts for the purpose of this 
act, after hearing} provided, that each high 
school district so fonaed must have one (iT or 
more operation, accredited high schools within 
its boundaries;*#*,"
It is to be noted that there must be one or more 
operating high schools in each high school district* The 
amendment which we have under consideration makes an ex­
ception to this requirement for the area in each county 
of a joint school district. This statutory provision 
which permits the part of a joint school district in each 
county to be created into a high school district Is not 
self executing so that If one county does establish such 
a high school district such act will result in the area of 
the joint district in the adjoining county being formed 
into a high school district. Such a conclusion would 
violate the express language of the act that "...each part 
of the joint district may, together with one or more ad­
jacent common school districts whose pupils attend the high 
school in the joint district, be set aside as a high school 
district.Permission, not a mandate, is granted to the 
commission in each county to establish as a high school 
district the county’s portion of a joint district whether 
or not a high school is in such area.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It is therefore, my opinion that the act of a commission 
in establishing as a high school district the area of a joint 
district in on© county does not result in creating as a high 
school district the area of the joint school district in the 
adjoining county. A high school district in the latter 
county can be established only by a commission acting in 
the latter county.
Very truly yours,
ARNuLD H. ULSm 
Attorney General
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Opinion 91 * 19$4
Heldï That a non-accredited high school is not entitled 
to receive an apportionment of the county ten mill special 
tax for high schools #
August 21, 1954
Ihr» Edward J* Ober, Jr#
County fttomey 
Hill County 
Havre, Montana
Dear Mr# Ober;
You have requested my opinion concerning the eligi­
bility of B non-accredited high school to receive an 
apportionment of the county ten mill special tax for high 
schools.
In Opinion No* 130, Volume 24, Report and Official 
Opinions of the Attorney General, this office held that a 
non-accredited high school is not entitled to state aid 
under the foundation financial program as defined in Chapter 
36 of Title 75f Revised Codes of Montana, 1947# In arriving 
at the opinion reliance was placed on that portion of Sec­
tion 75-3611, R# C# M#, 1947, which reads as follows;
”#*..The average number belonging of secondary 
pupils of a school district or of elementary 
pupils of a school district does not include 
the pupils of any high school or of any elemen­
tary school which has not been accredited by 
the state bo^rd of education##
Under Section 75-3610, H. C# M#, 1947, the str.te»s 
contribution to the various schools is determined on the 
basis of financial need which is computed upon the basis 
of the average number belonging. In other words, the
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measuring device for allocating money to school districts
S'
under the foundation program is "the average number be­
longing" of the school* The above-quoted portion of 
Section 75-3011, H* C. M*, 1947, removes pupils of a 
school which has not been accredited from consideration 
under the foundation program* Similar reasoning prevents 
a non-accredited high school from receiving an apportion­
ment of the special county high school tax as Section 
75-3618, R# C, M., 1947, provides in part as follows :
"After the deduction of transportation re­
imbursements provided by law, the proceeds of the 
county ten (10) mill common school levy and 
the proceeds of the county ten mill special 
tax for high schools shall each be separately 
distributed by the county superintendent to 
the respective districts in the county, end 
the county high school if there be one, in 
proportion to their needs under the founda­
tion financial program..
By the terms of this section, the county high school
funds are distributed to each high school in proportion to
their needs under the foundation financial program. As
the foundation financial program is based on "the average
number belonging" of each school and a non-accredited high
school is precluded from receiving county apportionment of
the special county high school tax. The ten mill levy is
provided for in Section 75-4516,1, R, C. M., 1947,
It.is, therefore, my opinion that a non-accredited high
school is not entitled to receive an apportionment of the
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county ten mill special tax for high schools,
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSiiN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 36 * I955
Held; 1* Territory of one high school district may bo 
transferred to another high school district» notwith­
standing that there is outstanding bonded indebtedness 
as the territory trphSferred may be taxed for the payment 
of the bonds.
2, The legislature may provide a method for the change 
of boundaries of-high school districts» as there is no 
constitutional restriction limiting the legislative power 
to enact a statute.
August 26, 1955
Mr. Leo H. Murphy 
County /ttomey 
Teton County 
Choteau, Montana
Dear Mr. Murphy;
You hnve requested ray opinion as to the legality of the 
transfer of territory of a high school district to another 
high school district when the high school district from which 
the land is taken has outstanding bonded indebtedness. You 
have also asked if the transfer of territory is a violation 
of the corporate rights of a high school district.
In answering your first question the provisions of Section 
75-4607» R. C. M., 1947, must be observed. This section per­
mits the re-division of a county into high school districts 
Including the alteration of the boundaries of existing 
districts. The authority of the legislature to mrke such
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statutory provisions was recognized In State ex rel Redman 
vs* Meyers, 65 Mont. 124# 210 Pec* IO64# where the coirt 
stated;
"A school district is merely a political subdivision 
of the state, created for the convenient dispatch 
of public business. In the absence of constitu­
tions! limitations# the legislature may create 
or abolish a district, or change or rearrange 
the boundaries of an existing district# end by 
the same token it may create joint districts from territory lying in adjacent counties..."
The above quoted principle has been recognised by our 
court in many subsequent cases.
Your second question is answered by the case of Fitz­
patrick vs. State Board of Examiners# I50 Mont* 234, 70 Pac* 
(2d) 285, where It was held that counties and school districts 
can not rely on constitutional provisions available to pri­
vate corporations in the following language;
"These political subdivisions of the state may 
not claim the constitutional protection of the 
due process clause, or the provisions prohibit­
ing the impairment of the obligation of existing 
contracts by législative Act found in the federal 
and. state Constitutions..."
However, where there are outstanding bonds of a high 
school district, the chf-nge of boundaries of the high school 
district will not relieve the territory which was within the 
high school district at the time of the Issuance of bonds, 
from being taxed to retire the bonds. Section 11 of Article 
111 of the Montana Constitution precludes the impairment of 
contracts of Individuals. The contracts of bond holders
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would be impĵ êd if all the area included in the district 
at the time of the issuance of the bonds would not be 
subject to tax for the payment of the bonds. The larger 
valuation and taxing area gives greater protection for the 
peyment of bonds. See Pass School District vs. Hollywood 
City School District, 146 Gal, 416 105 Pac. 122, and 
Geweke vs. Niles, 36Ô 111. 463, I4 N. 2. (2d) 4Ô2, Ex­
press statutes may change this rule, providing adequate 
protection is given for the payment of bonds, but there is 
no statute covering the indebtedness of high school districts 
when boundaries ere changed.
The fact that the original area of a high school district 
will be subject to tax for payment of bonds does not pre­
clude the change of boundaries of a high school district 
as provided in Section 75-4607, R. C. M., 1947# Obviously, 
the change of boundaries does not impair the contractual 
rights of bond holders if all of the area which was in the 
high school district at the time of the issuance of bonds 
remains liable for the payment of the bonds.
It is therefore my opinion that territory of one high 
school district may be transferred to another high school 
district, notwithstanding that there is outstanding bonded 
indebtedness as the territory transferred may be taxed for 
the payment of the bonds.
It is also my opinion that the legislature may provide
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a method for the change of boundaries of high school districts, 
as there is no constitutional restriction limiting the legis­
lative power to enact such e statute.
Very truly yours,
AMüLD H. OLSm 
Attorney General
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CHAFTSR VI 
PROFESSIONAL STAFFOpinion 6 « 1947
Held; A county superintendent of schools cannot occupy such 
office end also hold the position of teacher,
January 4» 1947
Mr, Cecil? N» Brown 
County Attorney 
Prairie County 
Terry, Montana
Dear Mr& Brown;
You hrtve requested my opinion as to whether the newly
elected county superintendent of schools may continue in
her job as a primary grade teacher.
Section 955» Revised Codes of Montana, 1935» provides;’
"The county superintendent shall hove the general 
supervision of the Public schools in his County*"
This supervisory power precludes the county superintendent
of schools from being also a teacher in the schools in her
county* In the cesg of Llinck v* Wittmer» 50 Mont* 22
144 Pac* 64#» our Court said;
"
"Offices are *incompatible* when one has power of removal over the other,*.when ono Is in any way 
subordinate to the other**.when one has power of 
supervision over the other***or when the nature 
and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper» from considerations of pub­
lic policy» for one to retain both."
I
It is apparent.that» under the above rule given us, 
the two positions are incompatible* However, the County
Superintendent is an officer and a teacher is sn employee
!and thus the epplioftion of the above rule might be
i
questioned* In State ex rel* Br mey v, Hawkins, 79 Mont*
- 173̂ ^
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5Q6|257 PPC* B̂ nd in St?te ex rel* Nagle vs* Kelsey,
102, Mont* S, 55 P&c# (2d) 685, our Court considered s1ml1er 
siturtlons end the determining point in each case wes whether 
the second position was In fact an office* In the Hawkins 
case the court held the auditor of the board of railroad 
commissioners was not a civil service officer and therefore 
the position could be held by a member of the legislature*
In the Kelsey case the Court held that a member of the
Montana Kelief Commission was an officer end therefore the
*
office could not be held by a member of the legislature*
In neither of the cases was there a conflict as to the 
time element necessary to the performance of the duties 
involved and a violation of the rule of public policy stated 
in the above quoted portion of the case of Klinck v. Wittmer.
Section 430, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, requires
all officer» to take an oath of office which is in pert;
will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.*
Section 974, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, provides;
*The county superintendent of schools shall keep 
his office open every day when he is not engaged 
in the supervision of schools except holidays, 
provided when he has a deputy or clerk, his 
office shall be kept open every day in month 
except holidays."
If the county superintendent maintains her office as 
required, then she would not be able to teach because of 
her inability to be in two places at once. Also the
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supervisory duties of the superintendent conflict with the 
duties of the teacher as « superintendent cannot, with 
logic, supervise herself in the performance of the work of 
a teacher* The conflict in duties renders it împroper"
from consideration of public policy, for one to retain both*"
,
It is therefore my opinion that a county superintendent 
of schools cannot occupy such office and also hold the 
position of a teacher*
Sincerely yours,
R. V* BOTTüMLÏ 
Attorney General
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Opinion 23 - 1949
&
Held: Under the provisions of the Teachers Retirement System,
a member is compelled to retire on the 1st day of September 
following his or her seventieth birthday*
May 13thj 1949
Mr* R. W, Harper 
Executive Secretary 
Teachers Retirement System Helena, Montana
Dear Mr* Harpers
You have presented the following factual situation for
my opinion î
’S” a superintendent of schools, reaches the age of 70 
years on July 9, 1949. The local Board of School Trustees 
desire to employ '̂Ŝ for another year.
The questions presented by you are as followsx
(1) Is the school district in error in re-employing '̂S'?
(2) If they decide to re-employ him, what penalties 
could be invoked against the school district?
(3) Are there any other duties to fall upon the 
Retirement Board in this particular case, other than noti­
fication of both the teacher end school district?
(4) Should "S" be continued in employment, would he be 
required to continue payments to the System and would his 
salary for the last year be actuiowledged in our records?
In answer to your first question, Section 6 of Chapter 
By, Montana Session Laws of 1937, ®s amended by Section 2
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of Chapter 137, Montana Session Laws of 1945, and Chapter
23, Montana Session Laws of 1949, must be considered* The
amendment reads as followsî
*Thet from and after the passage and approval of 
this act, any member in service who has attained 
the age of seventy years, during any school year 
shall be retired by said Retirement Board on the 
first day of September following his or her seven­tieth birthday*”
The provisions of this Section are mandatory in that 
the Board of Administration of the Teachers Retirement ĉt 
must retire a member when such member reaches the age of 
seventy years* The word ”shall” is generally construed as 
mandatory in its ordinary and common use. See 50 Am. Jur* 
(Statutes) Section 23» It is also a well recognized prin­
cipal of law that the word "shall” is construed as must when 
a public body is directed to do certain acts. See 25 R.C.L* 
Section 15, (Statutes), p. 7&9.
Furthermore it is my opinion that the clrar import of 
of Section 2, Chapter 137, Supra, indicates that the Retire­
ment Board must retire a member of the System on September 
first following said member’s seventieth birthday.
Assuming that & member Is compelled to retire in light 
of the above statute and discussion, the next question is 
whether or not, under the hypothetical set of facts, 
reached the age of seventy "during the school year*"
Section 1061 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, states
that :
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"The school year shall begin on the 1st day of July 
end end on the 30th day of June#"
It is my opinion that ’S" reached the age of seventy 
during the school year, namely July 9# 1949, consequently 
he must retire on September 1, 1949, and the school district 
would be in error to employ "S’ after September 1, 1949» '
See also Volume 22 Attoniey General*s Opinions 52, page 70, 
for a further discussion of Section 6, Chapter S?, Montana 
Session Laws of 1937, as amended by Section 2, Chapter 137, 
Montana Session Laws of 1945#
In answer to your second question, the act itself does 
not provide for any penalty for a failure to observe the prô  
visions thereof. However, under Section 1015, Revised Codes 
of Montana, 1935, as amended by Chapter 103, Montana Session 
Laws of 1943, the duties of a trustee ere prescribed as 
follows :
"Every school board unless otherwise specifically pro­
vided by law shall have power and it shall be its duty:
1. To prescribe and enforce rul̂ '̂S not inconsistent 
with law...
14# To require teachers to conform to the law."
Section 999, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, prescribes
the method for the removal of school trustees and is as follows:
"Any school trustee mry be removed from office by a 
court of competent jurisdiction by law for removal 
of elective civil officers; provided, however, that 
upon charges being preferred and good cruse shown, 
the board of county commissioners may suspend a 
trustee until such time as such charges can be heard 
in the court having jurisdiction thereof."
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If the school trustees, or eny member thereof, violates 
the provisions of the Retirement Act to the extent that such 
violation results in misconduct or malfeasance in office, 
then such trustees, or any one member, may be removed from 
office in the method prescribed by law.
In answer to your third question, Section 3, Chapter Ô7, 
Montana Session Laws of 1937, provides that it is the duty 
of the Retiraient Board to assume responsibility for the 
general administration and proper operation of the retirement 
system.
In order to make effective the provisions of this act, 
it is my opinion that the Retirement Board has fulfilled its 
duty when both the school district end the teacher ere 
notified in the manner provided for by law of any action 
taken by the Board.
Answering question Number four, it is my opinion that 
if a member is lawfully compelled to retire under Section 6 
of Chapter Ô7, Session laws of 1937, as emended by Section 2 
of Chapter 137, Session Laws of 1945, and such retirement is 
ignored by the school trustees, the retired member cannot be 
compelled to continue payments to the retirement system, nor 
can his salary, after he has been lawfully retired, be 
acknowledged in your records.
In passing, I wish to bring to your attention the fact 
that I am aware that there still exists in Montana a shortage
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of competent teachers In our public schools, and I am also 
aware that there are many employees of the system who are 
as competent after reaching seventy (70) years of age as 
many of the younger employees* However, the Legislature 
fixes the policy and enacts the laws under which the members 
of the Teachers Retirement System are to bound* Many of the 
provisions of the Retirement Act may seem to be unsound, 
especially in light of the economic conditions of today, 
but neveîrthôlèss the Attorney General’s Office must interpret 
the law as the Legislature has passed it*
?
Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H. OLSJaî 
Attorney General
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Held; That by virtue of Section 7# Chapter 142» Laws of 1949» 
teachers who held state secondary certificates on May 1» 1949, 
are entitled to recf̂ iive life certificates providing they 
meet the statutory requirements fixed by Section 75-2504» 
Revised Codes of Montana» 1947» and the rules and regulations 
of the State Board of Education#
 ̂ August S» 1950
Miss Mary Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You have requested my opinion concerning the application
of Chapter 142, Laws of 1949 to the holders of State Teaching
Certificates on May 1, 1949* You have asked in particular
whether such teachers would be entitled to the type of
certificates authorized under Section 75-2504* Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, which was repealed by Chapter 142, Laws of
1949.
Chapter 142, Lews of 1949, was approved by the Governor, 
March 1, 1949, and contained no recital that it would be 
effective on its passage and approval and as a consequence 
the provisions of Section 43-507» Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947, applies and the act was not effective until July 1,
1949* Chapter 142 enumerates the classes of certificates 
for teaching which the State Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion may issue and does not authorize the issuance of life
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certificates* Section 75-2504, Revised Codes of Montana,
1947, ves repealed by Chapter 142 and prior to its repeal 
and by its terms the State Superintendent was authorized to 
issue life certificates* Requirements for life certificates 
ere similar for both elementary and secondary schools* ,Jn 
sub-section 6 of Section 75-2504, Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947, the statute reads as follows:
Candidates for elementary life certificates must be 
holders of an elementary state certificate in full force 
and effect and must present satisfactory evidence of at 
least thirty-six (36) months of successful teaching ex­
perience in Montana during the life of a Montana elementary 
state certificate and satisfactory evidence of having secured 
subsequent to the issuance of the elementary state certifi­
cate such approvaed academic and professional training as 
may be prescribed and required by the rules and regulations 
of the State Board of Education.
Section 7 of Chapter 142, Laws of 1949, contains the 
following limitation on the provisions of Chapter 142;
No provision of this act shall affect or impair the 
validity of any certificate for teaching in force on May 1, 
1949, or the rights and privileges of the holders by virtue 
thereof, save that any certificate may be suspended or revoked 
for any of the causes end by the procedures specified by law*
The question presented is the effect of Section 7, Chapter
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142, Laws of 1949# end it is necessary to determine whether 
the types of certificates authorized by Section 75-2504, 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947# which was repealed are 
available to holders of teaching certificates in force on 
May 1, 1949* The phrase "or the rights and privileges of 
the holders by virtue thereof" is the language to be construed# 
It is reasonable to assume that the purpose of Section 
7 was to preserve the right of a teacher who had taken 
additional academic training in order to receive a teaching 
certificate of a higher grade* The protection of the rights 
of those practicing a profession at the time of enacting 
a statute with different standards is in accord with general 
legislative practice* This was recognized in State v. Bays 
100 Mont*. 125, 47 Pac* (2d) 50» wherein our Supreme Court 
approved a statutory provision that barbers who were prac­
ticing their profession at the time of the enactment of a 
statute requiring examination were exempt from taking the 
examination. The court quoted from an earlier Montana 
case 63 follows:
"The principle la the same as that involved in the 
multitudinous laws governing the right to practice 
professions and to engage in numerous specialty 
regulated lines of business activity# The erection 
of new standards of qualification by laws relating 
to them seldom contemplates the re-examination and 
re-licensing of those previously licensed and 
actually operating tinder the terms of a law in 
effect at the time of the issuance of the original license. The provision is not obnoxious to, but 
rather consonant with, generally recognized prin­
ciples of fairness and justice,"
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The rule quoted above which recognizes the power of the 
legislative body to permit the granting of a license without 
examination to a practicing member of a profession is ana­
logous to the rights granted to teachers by Section 7 of 
Chapter 142, Laws of 1949# The teachers who had taken addi­
tional academic training and who had complied with the rules 
of the State Board of Education in order to obtain a life 
certificate as provided in the law prior to Chapter 142,
Laws of 1949, would be deprived of a valuable privilege if 
such were denied to them* It would be just and fair to grant 
a life certificate to those who held on May 1, 1949, state 
certificates and met the statutory requirements and rules 
for life certificates*
It is to be noted that Section 75-2504, Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1947, grants to holders of both elementaiy and 
secondary state certificates the right to secure life 
certificates*
It is, therefore, my opinion that by virtue of Section 7, 
Chapter 142, Laws of 1949, teachers who held state certificates 
on May 1, 1949, are entitled to receive life certificates pro­
viding they meet the statutory requirements fixed by Section 
75-2504, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, and the rules end 
regulations of the State Board of Education*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Held! School listrict employees with the exception of school 
teachers are entitled to vacation leave in accordance with 
the provisions of Chapter 131, Lews of 1949*
September 5th, 1950
Mr# James D# Freebourn 
County Attorney 
Silver Bow County 
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr# Freebourn:
You have requested my opinion whether the employees of
a school district are entitled to vacation leave under the
provisions of Chapter 131, Laws of 1949*
The sections of Chapter 131, Laws of 1949, which are
pertinent to the question you have asked are as follows ;
•̂ Section 1$ Sach employee of the State, or any 
County or city thereof, Is entitled to end shall 
be granted annual vacation leave with full pay 
at the rate of one and one-quarter (1 1/4) working 
days for each month of service, such service to be 
computed from the date of employment*#.*
Section 3* An employee, who is separated from the 
service of the State, or any County, or city thereof, 
for reason not reflecting discredit on himself, or 
any employee transferred to or employed in another 
division or department of the State, or any County 
or City thereof, shall be entitled upon the date 
of such separation from transfer to or acceptance 
of new employment within the State, County, or 
city thereof, to cash compensation for unused 
vacation leave*##
Section 7* The term ’employee,* as used herein, 
does not refer to or include elected State, County, 
or City officials, or school teachers*”
Section 1, above quoted refers to employees of the State,
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o r any County or city thereof. The question to be resolved 
then is whether or not employees of a school district can 
be considered as employees of the State or any County or 
city thereof.
It is at once apparent that a school district is an 
entity separate and distinct from any County or city and 
therefore a school district employee could not be considered 
an employee of either a County or city.
Howf̂ ver, the rule in Montana is that a school district 
is a political subdivision of the State and as such is 
at all times subject to Legislative regulations and con­
trol, except in so far as the Constitution has placed 
limitations upon the Legislative department. Fitzpatrick 
V. State Board of Examiners, et al., 105 Mont. 234i 70 Pac. 
(2nd) 4̂ » State ex rel. City of Missoula v. Holmes, 100 
Mont. 256, 47 Pec. (2nd) 624.
Since the school district is a political subdivision of 
the State it is only reasonable to assume that the Legis­
lature intended that the employees of a school district 
were included in the category of State employees as pro­
vided in the Act. That assumption is strengthened by the 
language of Section 7 of Chapter 131 wherein the Act speci­
fically excludes school teachers from the operation of the 
Act. Since the law makers deemed it necessary to specially 
withhold the benefits of the Act from school teachers, it
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follows therefrom that ib was their intention that the re­
maining employees of school districts should be entitled to 
vacation leave.
It is therefore my opinion that school district employees 
with the exception of school teachers are entitled to vacation 
leave in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 131, Laws 
of 1949.
Very truly yours *
ARNOLD H. QLSiM 
Attorney General
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Opinion 129 - 1950
Held: Thfit if an election is not made by affirmative action
by a member of the Teachers* Retirement System, who has ten 
years or more of service, to withdraw his accumulated con­
tribution within six months after termination of service, 
otherwise than by death or retirement, such member cannot 
withdrew his contributions. Such member upon reaching 
retirement age will be entitled to a pension.
October 2, 1950
Mr. R. 'Af* Harper, Executive Secretary 
The Teachers* Retirement System 
State Capitol 
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr. Harperi ,
You have requested my opinion concerning the status of
the account of a teacher with ten or more years of service
whose service is discontinued otherwise than by death or
retirement and who takes no action in regard to his retention
of membership in the retirement system within six months
after discontinuance of service.
. In considering your question it is necessary to examine
Section 4, Chapter Ô7, Laws of 1937» as amended by Chapter
215, Laws of 1939, Chapter 15» Laws of 1945 and Chapter 2S,
Laws of 1949, which section reads in part as followsî
"The membership of any person in the retirement 
system shall cease;,..
(b) If he withdraws his accumulated contributions 
or retires on a pension or dies, but not otherwise,
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except that the membership of a teacher who has 
not withdrawn his contributions and who has not 
had sufficient service to be eligible for disabi­
lity retirement shall not be cancelled, provided 
the member shall prove to the satisfaction of the 
retirement board that absence from service was 
caused by personal illness constituting disability, 
or service In the Armed Forces of the United States 
which includes all members of the Army, the Navy, 
the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, or service 
in the American Red Cross end Merchant Karine 
during time of war, and provided any member with 
ten (10) or more years or îTerviceV whose service 
is discontInued btherwise than by death or retire­
ment. shall have the right to elect within six (6) 
months after such termination of service, end with­
out rlEhïT or^revocation. whether to allow his 
accumulated contribu'tlbns to remein in the retire­
ment fund# Upon the qualifiĉ etionjfor retirement by 
reason of age or disability of a member who has 
elected to allow his accumulated contributions to 
remain in the retirement fund, he shall receive 
a retirement allowance in accordance with the pro­
visions of the teachers* retirement act*"
The emphasized portion of the above quoted section
indicates that those members with ten or more years of service
are in a different category than those members with a shorter
service record* The reason for the distinction is apparent
when subsection 1 (a) of Section 6, Chapter 3?, Laws of
1937, as amended by Chapter 137» Laws of 1945» and Chapter
23, Laws of 1949, is considered as it provides :
"Any member in service who has completed ten years 
of creditable service, the lest ten years of which 
shall have been in this State, end who has attained 
the age of Sixty may retire from service, if he 
files with the Retirement Board his written appli­
cation setting forth the fact of his retirement,"
The result of ten years of service is that the member 
has satisfied the minimum reouirements for a pension* As
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expressly stated in the last sentence of Section 4» Chapter 
Ô7, Laws of 1937# fis amended, and first quoted above, a 
member of the retirement system who has completed ten years 
of service and who has left his contributions in the retire­
ment fund shall receive a pension upon qualification for 
retirement by reason of age or disability.
If a member does not take any affirmative action by 
either withdrawing his contribution or advising the Board 
of the retirement system that he will leave his contribution 
in the retirement fund within the six months period, then It 
is reasonable to assume that by inaction the member has lost 
his right to withdraw. An obvious ambiguity is found in 
the statute under consideration as to such members, but the 
fact he has acquired a right to a pension by his ten years 
of service should result in its retention as a matter of law* 
Analogous situations have occurred in the construction of life 
insurance policies such as the case of Jeske v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 113 Pa. Super. Ct. IIS, 172 A. 172, wherein 
the Court held that after the death of the insured, '"the 
lew will apply the option most advantageous to the insured, 
or his beneficiary."
See also: McSacheron v* Mew York Life Ins, Co., 15 Ga.
App, 222, É2 S. S, 020, Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 100 
Neb, 045* 109 N.W, 300, 29 A.S.R. 1507.
The fundamental principle found in all retirement systems
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is the protection of the participating member during hla 
declining years, and the construction given to the Montana 
statute under consideration which will further such principle 
is more beneficial to the members as a whole*
It is therefore ray opinion that if an election is not 
made by affirmative action by a member of the teachers* 
retirement system, who has ten years or more of service, to 
withdraw his accumulated contributions within six months 
after termination of service, otherwise than by death or 
retlremait, such member cannot withdraw his contributions. 
Such member upon reaching retirement age will be entitled 
to a pension.
Very truly yours,
jm o w  H. O L S i î J Ü  
Attorney General
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Opinion 4.7 - 1951 <
Held: A teacher who has three years of prior service end
whose contract was not renewed must appeal to the county 
superintendent of schools end then to the state superintendent 
of public instruction before resorting to the courts for a 
preview of the trustees action*
November 13* 1951
Mr# Michael J* O’Connell 
County Attorney 
Gallatin County 
Bozeman* Montana
Pear Mr* O’Connell:
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority 
end jurisdiction of a county superintendent to hear an appeal 
by a teacher from the decision of the board of trustees re­
fusing to renew the teacher’s contract for the ensuing year. 
You advise me that the teacher had been employed for more 
than three years. You also state that the teacher was 
granted a rehearing by the trustees who refused to change 
their previous decision*
Section 75-151Ô* Revised Codes of Montana* 1947* defines 
the authority of the county superintendent to decide school 
disputes and hear appeals as follows:
”Ke shall decide all matters in controversy 
arising in his county in the administration 
of the school law or appealed to him from 
the decision of school officers or boards.
An appeal may be taken from his decision* in 
which case a full written statement of the 
facts* together with the testimony and his 
decision in the case, shall be certified to
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* . state superintendent for his decision In the
matter* which decision shall be final* subject 
to adjudication or the proper legal remedies 
In the state courts*"
In Kelsey v. School District* 84 Mont* 433, 276 Pac* 26,
the court considered the case of a teacher who was dismissed
without cause end said:
^?rom the action of the board In discharging 
the plaintiff she had a plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy--by appeal first to the 
county superintendent, and having been un­
successful in that, to the superintendent 
of public instruction* (Peterson v. School 
Board, 73 Mont * 442, 236 Pac* 670; KInzer 
V* Directors of Independent School Teachers 
of Marion, 129 Iowa 441, 6 Ann* Css* 996,
3 I,*R.A. (n*x*) 496, 105 N.W* 686.) It is 
unquestionably the policy of this state, as 
declared by the legislative assembly, that 
ordinary school controversies shall be ad­
justed by those who are specially entrusted 
with that duty* It is not the policy to en­courage resort to the courts in such matters.
So long as the school officers act legally 
and within the power expressly conferred 
upon thma the courts will not interfere*(State ex rel. School District v* Trumper,
69 Mont* 468, 222 Pec. 1064*)"
In the more recent esse of Eastman v* School District
Ko* 1, 120 Mont « 63, I80 Pec* (2d) 472, the rule ennounced in
the Kelsey case was quoted with approval end it was statedî
’̂The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction 
that resort may not be had to the courts until 
adequate remedies by administrative boards have 
first been exhausted."
An appeal by a teacher who was dismissed for cause before 
the expiration of a written contract must be taken to the 
county superintendent of schools under the provisions of
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Section 75-2411  ̂Revised Codes of Montana, 1947* This section 
would not apply to the facts under consideration as it was 
the refusal to renew her contract which raises the question, 
end the appeal must be taken under the authority of Section 
75-151Ô, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947# However, the 
teacher haa the right to demand that the reason or reasons 
for dismissal be stated and a rehearing and reconsideration 
had, under Section 75-2401, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, 
as amended by Chapter 166, Laws of 1949* before taking an 
appeal•
It is, therefore, my opinion that a teacher who has three 
years of prior service end whose contract was not renewed must 
appeal to the county superintendent of schools and then to the 
state superintendent of public Instruction before resorting to 
the courts for a review of the trustees action*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSÆ 
Attorney General
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Opinion 51-1951
»
Held* A deputy county superintendent of schools is not 
required to heve the same qualifications as those required 
by law for the county superintendent of schools#
December 21, 1951
Kr# Robert Hurly 
County Attorney 
Valley County 
Glasgow, Montana
Dear Mr# Hurlyî ^
You have requested my opinion concerning the qualifications 
of the deputy county superintendent of schools# You ask in
-i
particular if the deputy tonst haye the same qualifications 
as the county superintendent*
Section 75-1502, H# C* M#, 1947» defines the quali- 
fications for county superintendents of schools, which are 
in substance that the superintendent must meet the Consti­
tutional requirements for an office holder, have a teaching 
certificate, and three years experience# A deputy super­
intendent of schools may be appointed under the authority 
of Section 75-152S, but his statute does not fix any speci­
fic qualifications for the deputy# However, this has not 
always been true as in 1947 the legislature in Chapter 194 
amended what is now Section 75-1528, by eliminating the re­
quirement that ”Such deputy shall hold a Montana certificate 
not less in value than a professional grade certificate."
The fact that the legislature struck from the statute the
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requirement thet the deputy hold « teaching certificate.
Is very persuasive that e certificate is not now a quali­
fication for a deputy superintendent of schools# Such a 
principle was recognized in State ex* rel. Federal Land 
Bank v. Hays, 66 Mont* 56, 262 Pac. 32, where in the 
court said*
"It will be presimed that the legislature, in 
adopting the amendment, intended to make some 
change in the existing law, and therefore the 
court will endeavor to give some effect to the amendment."
There is no express statutory authority requiring all
deputies to have the same qualifications as those of the
public officer by whom they are appointed. In 43 Am.
Jur. 219, the text states:
"But when the law provides that a ministerial 
officer may appoint a deputy, for whose acts 
he end his sureties are responsible, and does not limit or restrict him as to whom he appoints, 
he has authority to appoint whomsoever he pleases."
As the primary responsibility of the faithful performance 
of the duties of the office falls upon the county superin­
tendent, it will be to the best interest of the superintendent 
to appoint a capable person which is a safeguard to the public.
It is therefore my opinion that a deputy county super­
intendent of schools is not required to have the same quali­
fications as those required by law for the county superintendent 
of schools. Very truly yours,ASU'iULD H. OLSÆ 
Attorney General
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Opinion 9 m 1953
Held: That a board of trustees of a school district which
elects to close its school during the annual session of the 
state teachers* association does not have authority to 
withhold the pay of its teachers during the days school 
is closed for such meeting, regardless of the teachers* 
membership in the association or attendance at its annual 
session.
March 11th, 1953
Mr, Edward C. Schroeter 
County Attorney 
Flathead County 
Kalispell, Montana
Dear Mr, Schroeter:
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority
of the board of trustees of a school district to withhold
the pay of a teacher who is not a member of a state teachers*
association on the days school is closed for the convention
of the association.
There are two statutory provisions which pertain to the
closing of schools for conventions of teachers. Subsection
22 of Section 75-1632, R.C.M,, 1947* as amended by Chapter
207* Dews of 1951» authorizes school trustees:
"To close school at their discretion during the 
annual session of the state teachers* association 
end to allow teachers to attend the same without 
loss of salary."
Similar authority is given to the trustees of districts main­
taining high schools and trustees of county high schools in
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Subsection 12 of Section 75-*4231» R* C# M*, 1947» as amended
by Chapter 106, Laws of 1951» which grants the power:
*To close the high school at its discretion 
during the annual session of the state teachers* 
association end to allow the principal or 
trict superintendent and teachers to attend such annual session without loss of salary*”
It is to be observed that the above quoted statutes pemit 
the closing of schools for the meetings of the teachers* 
association without loss of salary* there is no requirement 
thet the teachers attend the meeting to avoid a deduction in 
salary, but the trustees are merely given the discretionary 
power to close the school during the session. The teachers 
in entering into contracts for their services with the 
trustees agree to teach school for those days school is open.
It is the act of the trustees which closes the schools and 
prevents the teachers from teaching on the days the schools 
are closed. The discretionary power granted to the trustees 
by the statutes is limited to the closing of schools for the 
convention. The statutes expressly preclude the loss of 
salary if the schools are closed and there is no discretion 
given to the trustees to withhold salary payment*
It is not made a duty of the teachers to attend a conven­
tion, but the terns of the statute make it possible for the 
attendance at the convention without salary loss. The intent 
of the statute is to remove obstacles to attendance, but 
there is no suggestion of compulsion that would result from
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a loss of salary.
An analagous provision is found in Section 75-2202, R.
C. M., 1947» which states that^no teacher shall be required 
to teach school on a legal holiday#•..and no deduction from 
the teacher's time or wages shall be made by reason of the 
fact that a school day happens to be a legal holiday.”
It is therefore, my opinion that a board of trustees of 
a school district which elects to close its school during 
the annual session of the state teachers' association does 
not have authority to withhold the pay of its teachers 
during the days school is closed for such meeting, regardless 
of the teachers* membership In the association or attendance 
at its annual session.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSm 
Attorney General
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Opinion IDS - 1954
Held: 1. There may be one or more teachers* associations
within this state and the members of one association have 
equal rights with those members of a similar state-wide 
teachers* association.
2. Where a school is closed for any teachers* aSso- 
elation convention, all teachers in the school are entitled 
to receive pay for such days.
December 16, 1954 '
Mr. Irving C. Pearson County Attorney
Deer Lodge County '
Anaconda, Montana
Dear Mr. Pearsons
You have advised me that the trustees of your school 
district closed the school for one day to permit teachers 
to attend the annual convention of the Montana Federation 
of Teachers, and you request my opinion as to whether mem­
bers of this group have the same rights as members of the 
Montana Education Association.
In Opinion No. 9, Volume 25, Opinions of the Attorney
General, it was held:
**A board of trustees of a school district which 
elects to close its school during the annual session of the state teachers* association does 
not have authority to withhold the pay of its 
teachers during the days of school the school 
is closed for such meeting, regardless of the 
teachers* membership in the association or 
attendance at its annual session.**
While it is true that the Montana Education Association
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
• • 2 0 X * »
has been operating and in existence in this state for a
greater number of years than the Montana Federation of
TeachersI yet both are similar in nature and purpose, and
both are state-wide organizations* Sub-section 22 of Section
75-1632, R# G, M., 1947» as amended by Chapter 207, Laws
of 1951, grants the power to school trustees?
"22, To close school at their discretion during 
the annual session of the state teachers* asso­
ciation, and to allow teachers to attend the 
same without loss of salary,"
This statute does not name any particular association
of teachers and if it did, there would be some doubt as to
its constitutionality as Section 26 of Article V of the
Montana Constitution requires that where a general law can
be made applicable, no special lew shall be enacted. In
State ex rel* Redman vs. Meyers 65 Mont* 124, 210 Pac, IO64,
our court said of this constitutional provision:
"..,.Interdicted class legislation includes all 
laws that rest upon some false or deficient 
classification, and the vice in such laws is
that they do not embrace all of the class to
which they are naturally related*.
Also sub-section 22 of Section 75-1632, supra, is in 
general terms and the construction of this law to the effect 
that some particular teachers* association was intended to 
be the only organization recognized by this act would violate 
the express words of the statute.
In Srultable Life Assurance Company vs. Kart, 55, Mont* 
76, 173 Fee, 1062, the case stated thet; "..a supposed
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unexpressed intention cannot override the clear import of the 
language employed-•
It is therefore, my opinion thet there may be one or more 
teachers* associations within this state and that the members of 
one association have equal rights with those members of a similar 
state-wide teachers* association.
It is also my opinion that if school is closed for any 
teachers’ convention, all teachers in the school are entitled 
to receive pay for such days*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* QlSm 
Attorney General
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Opinion 11 - 1955
Held: 1# The trustees of a school district have the authority
to employ any teacher they see fit and have a discretionary 
power in the employment of a married teacher providing the 
teacher does not have tenure rights*
2* School trustees do not have the authority to provide 
In a contract that a teacher must relinquish her position 
should she marry during the term of the contract*
3* No provisions may be included in teachers* contracts 
discriminatory to married teachers*
4* School trustees do not have the power to employ 
married teachers on a day to day basis for the purpose of 
evading the teachers* tenure law, nor do they have the power 
to employ single teachers in such a manner.
May 12, 1955
Miss Mary M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol Building 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon:
You have submitted for my consideration the following
questions î
1. May a school board in hiring teachers discriminate 
against married teachers, all other qualifications being equal?
2. May a school board write a contract between the district 
and a teacher and include therein a provision that a teacher 
must relinquish her position should she marry during the term
of the contract?
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3# Msy a contract between a teacher and a school board 
contain any provisions discriminatory to married teachers?
4. May a school board, In order to evade the tenure law, 
hire married teachers or any other teachers on a day to day 
basis?
In answering your first question, it is necessary to 
consider subsection 2 of Section 75-1632, , 1947, which
grants the power to a board of trustees "to employ or dis­
charge teachers, mechanics, or laborers, and to order paid
their wages," This statute gives to the board of trustees 
the authority to employ any teacher who is qualified to 
teach; and in the exercise of this power the board may refuse 
to employ a married teacher, providing the teacher does not 
have tenure rights. The reason for this conclusion is that 
the trustees have an absolute discretion to employ initially 
those teachers who appear to be suitable for a teaching 
position* Whether the teacher is married might be considered
by the trustees in tendering a contract.
' Your second question is directed to the power of a board
of trustees to include in a teacher’s contract a forfeiture
provision which will terminate the teacher’s rights prior
to the expiration of the contract. Section 75-2411, R.G.M.,
1947, provides:
"In the case of the dismissal of any teacher 
before the expiration of any written contract 
entered into between such teacher and board of 
trustees for alleged immorality, unfitness,
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incompetence, or violation of rules, the teacher 
may appeal to the county superintendent; and if 
the superintendent decides that the removal was 
made without cause, the teacher so removed must 
be reinstated, and shall be entitled to compensa­
tion for the time lost during the pending of the appeal»**
This statute was held, in Kelsey vs* School District 
No. 25, 64 Mont* 453» 276 Pac. 26, to be ”a condition of the 
contract as effectively as if expressly written therein,**
It is obvious that marriage does not make a teacher either 
unfit or incompetent to teach.
In Richards vs* District School Bd., 7̂  Or. 621, L.R.A. 
19160, 769, 153 Pec* 4Ô2, Ann* Cas. 1917D, 266, a school 
board attempted to enforce a rule providing that the mar­
riage of 8 woman teacher automatically terminated her service. 
The reason advanced for the rule adopted by the board was
that after marriage a woman might devote her time and attention
to her home, to the neglect of her school work. In discussing 
the reasonableness of the rule, the court said;
",.*It would be just as reasonable to adopt a
rule that if a woman teacher joined a church it
would work an automatic dismissal from the schools 
on an imagined assumption that the church might 
engross her time, thought'and attention, to the 
detriment of the schools; but such a regulation 
as the one supposed would not even have the sem­
blance of reason. It must be conceded that quite 
a different case is presented where the act ruled 
against is inherently wrong. The Act to which the instant rule relates does not involve a single 
element of wrong, but, on the contrary, marriage 
is not only protected by both the written and 
unwritten law, but it is also fostered by a sound 
public policy,..**
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Accordingly, it was held that the rule was unreasonable 
and that the marriage of a woman teacher was not a ground for 
dismissal under a statute providing that teachers might be 
dismissed only for good cause shovm. See also: Elwood vs.
State ex rel. Griffin, 203 Ind. 626, ISO N.£. 471, end 
Jameson vs. Board of Education, 74, W. Va. 3̂ 9, 61 S. E* 1126,
In State ex rel. Saxborph vs. District Court, Mont.
275 ï*ac. (2d) 209, 11 St. Rep* 460, it was held that the
provisions of Section 75-2411, R.C.M,, 1947, which provide for■f- the dismissal of a teacher for alleged **Immorality, unfitness, 
incompetence, or violation of rules” states the only grounds 
for the removal of teachers who have written contracts. In 
the Richards case cited above, it was held that a rule pro­
viding for the termination of a contract, if the teacher mar­
ried, was not a reasonable rule, Such holding establishes the 
public policy that marriage is not a ground for dismissal. In
Abshirs vs. School District Ro. 1, 124 Mont, 244, 220 Pac, (2d)
1056, it was held that the Teachers* Retirement Act declared 
the public policy that the compulsory retirement eg® in Montana 
is seventy years and the trustees do not have the power to 
adopt 8 rule contrary to public policy, it must be concluded 
in answer to your third cuestion that there may be no dis­
criminatory provisions in contracts with married teachers.
In your fourth question you ask if school trustees in 
order to evade the tenure law may hire married teachers or
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any other teachers on a day to day basis* Subsection 2 of 
Section 75-1632, 1947# makes It the duty of a school
board to enter into written contracts with all teachers*
Section 75-2401* R.C.M*, 1947* establishes the public policy 
in this state that a teacher shall acquire tenure rights 
after having taught for three consecutive years in any school 
district in the state* In McBride vs* School listrict No* 2
\
Ô6 Mont* 110, 290 Pac. 252, it was held that the provisions of 
the tenure law ’̂became a part of the contract of employment and 
were binding upon both the teacher and the board of trustees.**
In Public School District vs. Holson, 31 Ariz. 291, 252 Pec. 509, 
it was held that the trustees of a school district did not 
have the power to write into a contract a provision for dis­
missal at pleasure*
It is therefore my opinion?
1* The trustees of a school district have the authority 
to employ any teacher they see fit and have a discretionary 
power in the employment of a married teacher providing the 
teacher does not have tenure rights.
2, School trustees do not have the authority to provide
in a contract that a teacher must relinquish her position should 
she marry during the term of the contract*
3. No provisions may be included in teachers’ contracts 
discriminatory to married teachers*
4* School trustees do not have the power to employ 
married teachers on a day to day basis for the purpose of
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evading the,teachers’ tenure law, nor do they have the power 
to employ single teachers In such a manner#
Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H# OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 15 - 1955
Held; A district superintendent of schools who hea served 
two successive terms in a district may thereafter be appointed 
to a three-year term by the board of trustees» Section 75- 
4140, 1947# does not limit succeeding terms to one
year.
May 2S, 1955
Miss Mery M, Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol Building 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You have asked my opinion on the following question;
"If a District Superintendent of Schools has 
served two successive terras, may be thereafter 
be appointed for a three-year term, or are 
succeeding terras limited to one year by Section 
75-4140, R.C.M,, 1947?”
The section in question, Section 75-4140, supra, provides;
"District Superintendent of Schools. The board of 
trustees of any school district may appoint a 
superintendent of schools for a terra not to exceed 
three years* After his second successive election, 
his contract shall thereafter be deemed renewed 
for a further terra of one (1) year, and successively 
thereafter for like terras of one (1) year each, 
unless the board of trustees shall by majority 
vote of its members give written notice to such 
superintendent on or before the first day of Feb­
ruary of the last year of his current terra that 
his services will not be required after the expir­
ation of his existing contract.”
Your inquiry primarily is whether the provision for 
successive one-year renewals is a limitation upon the terra 
for which contracts may be granted by the board of trustees
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
■«210—
or only a tenure provision giving the superintend®rt « right 
to renewal of his eontrüct»
The present form of Section 74*4140, supra, was enacted
by Chapter 66, Lews of 1943. Prior to that time, the statute
(originally passed es Section 39, Chapter 14S, tews of
1931,) reed as followsi
**listrlct Superintendent of Schools* The board 
of trustees of any school district may appoint 
a superintendent of schools his contract shall 
thereafter be deemed renewed for a further term 
of one (1) year, and successively thereafter for 
like terms of on® (1) year, each, unless the board 
of trustees shall by a majority vote of its 
members give written notice to such superintendent 
on or before the 1st é ry of F*@bruary of the last 
year of his current term that his services will 
not be required after the expiration of his existing contract***
The 1943 ĉt made two basic changes *
(1) It extend®̂ ! the permissible term for which contracts 
could be granted by the board of trustees to three years.
(2) It provided that the superintendent * s rights to « 
renewal of his contract should not be effective until he had 
served two consecutive terms instead of one as bad been 
provided by Chapter 140, taws of 1931*
In connection with the second point, it should be noted 
that èt the time the 1943 law was passed, the case of State 
ex rel. Howard vs. Ireland, 114 Hont# 406, 136 fac. (2d)
569, was before the Supreme Court of tMontana. The relator 
in that action contended, and was upheld in his contention 
by the Court, that the contract renewal provision of Section
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the contract renewal provision of Section 75-4140, supra 
granted him tenure and that although it was not specifically 
so stated in the law, he could not be discharged without formal 
notice end hearing.
Although the Supreme Courtes decision was not handed down 
until after the legislature had adjourned, It is evident that 
the law was passed in anticipation of the result. The change 
in the contract renewal provision was quite plainly designed 
to withhold the tenure right until the superintendents had 
completed two terms in the district instead of the previous 
one term.
In the light of its history, it is evident ."that the one- 
year renewal provision was originally enacted and thereafter 
ontinued by the legislature as a right and privilege of the 
superintendent and not es a limitation on the terra of the 
contract which could be given him by the board of trustees 
after hia second successive contract had expired.
The first sentence of Section 75-4140, supra, is the only 
limitation on the contracting power of the board of trustees, 
and provides that the maximum permissible length of the con­
tract shall be three years. The trustees, if they see fit, 
may grant a three-year contract to any district superintendent 
regardless of the number of previous terms he has served in 
the district.
It is therefore my opinion that a district superintendent
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of schools who has served two successive terms in a district 
may thereafter be appointed to a three-year term by the ' 
board of trustees* Section 75-4140| R.C.M*, 1947» does not 
limit succeeding terms to one year#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# OLSm 
Attorney General
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Opinion 26 - I955
Reldî 1* A teacher or principal who has acquired a tenure 
right by virtue of employment for three consecutive years 
may be deprived of this right only for legal cause*
2. A school board in taking the right of tenure from a 
teacher must observe the following provisions of the law;
a. The school board shall, on or before the first day 
of April, give notice in writing to the teacher 
that his (or her) services will not be required 
for the ensuing year;
b# The school iboerd, if requested by the teacher, shall 
declare clearly and explicitly the specific reason 
or reasons for the failure to re»employ such teacher;
e* The school board, If requested by the teacher, shall 
grant a hearing and reconsideration **of such dis­
missal" to such teacher;
d. The school board must hold such hearing and reconsider 
its action within ten days after receipt of such 
request*
3* At the hearing before the board of trustees, evidence must 
be offered to substantiate the written charges with the right 
of cross examination on the part of the teacher and the teacher 
given the right to present evidence to refute the charges*
4# On an appeal to the county superintendent, an additional 
opportunity of presenting evidence with the right of cross 
examination is granted to both parties and a written record 
should be made of all testimony, including a written decision 
on the part of the county superintendent, which record may be 
used on an appeal to the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction*
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Mr, S, Gardner Brownlee County Attorney 
Ravalli County ‘
Hamilton, Montana
Dear Mr, Brownlee:
You have requested my opinion concerning the rights of a
teacher and the power of the board cf trustees in the discharge
of a teacher with tenure rights# You also ask how hearings
shall be conducted both before the board of t mstees and on
an appeal to the county superintendent of schools#
The statute which gives to a teacher tenure rights is
Section 75-2401, R#C.M., 1947» which reads in part as follows:
^After the election of any teacher or principal 
for the third consecutive year in any school 
. district in the state, such teacher or principal 
so elected shall be deemed re-elected from year 
to year thereafter at the sane salary unless the 
board of trustees shall by majority vote of its 
members on or before the first day of April give 
notice in writing to said teacher or principal 
that he has been re-elected or that ' his services 
will not be required for the ensuing year, but 
in this written notice, the board of trustees 
if requested by the teacher or principal, must 
declare clearly and explicitly the specific reason 
OP reasons for the failure of re-employment of 
such teacher. The teacher or principal, if he so 
desires, shall be granted a hearing and re-con­
sideration of such dismissal, before the board 
of trustees of that school district. The request 
for a hearing and reconsideration must be mad© 
in writing and submitted to the board of school 
trustees within ten (10) days after receipt of 
notice of dismissal. The board of trustees must ' 
hold a hearing and reconsider its action within 
ten days after receipt of such request for a 
hearing and reconsideration,
A recent Montana case, State ex rel, Saxtorph vs. District
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Court, Mont# 275 fac* (2d) 209, 11 St* Rep* 4̂ 0, considered 
end interpreted the ebove-quoted statute and said*
«In taking the right of tenure frcsa a teacher 
the law provides that certain steps shall be taken:
(1) The school board shall, on or before the last 
day of April, give notice in writing to the teacher 
that hi#.(or her) services will not be required for the ensuing year;
(2) The school board, if requested by the teacher 
shall declare clearly end explicitly the specific 
reason or reasons for the failure to re-employ such teacher;
(3) The school board, If requested by the teacher, 
shall grant a hearing end reconsideration »of such 
dismissal* to such teacher;
(4) The school board must hold such hearing and 
reconsider its action within ten days after 
receipt of such request*"
The court also made the following statement which Is
pertinent to the questions presented by you:
"The right of a school teacher to teach in a school, or 
school district from year to year, after having taught 
in such school or school district for three consecu­
tive years, is called tenure* A teachers tenure is a 
substantial, valuable and beneficial right which 
cannot be taken ®v;ay except for good cause*"
In State ex rel* TJagle vs* Sullivan, 9̂  Mont* 425, 40 Pac* (2d
995, our court construed cause for removal of a public officer
in the following language:
«This phrasé *for cause,* as used in this connection, 
means for reasons wî̂ ich the law and sound public policy 
recognize as sufficient warrant for removal..,that is 
*legal cause*,,.and not merely a cuaae which the 
appointing power, in the exercise of discrection, 
may deem sufficient.,*"
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The manner ojf th© hearing before the bverd of
troateod lor the dismissal of » superintendent of schools wes 
discussed in the css® of Howard vs* Ireland# 114 »*4ont* 4SÔ, 13d 
l̂ ac* (2d) 569* In this eas© th® court expressed the following 
guiding principle®!
*At a hearing# if such is required# there would
need to be chargee preferred so that the subject 
of inquiry be known# end adequate notice to give 
the accused opportunity to prepare for and attend 
the meeting to refute the charge® made# t̂ such 
hearing# evidence should be taken; witnesses should 
be interrogated# with opportunity ;for cross examina* 
tioaj all to the purpose of determining in a manner 
Judicial the truth or falsity of the charges made*#*"
As Section 75-2401, E.C#n## 1947# provide® that# *#, 
the board of trustee® # if requested by the teacher or principal# 
au3t dealer® clearly and explicitly the specific r̂ .ason or 
reasons for the failure of re*e%ploymmt * # .** # this provision 
furnishes the written charges against the teacher and the 
hearing m3s% be held within ten days after receipt of « request 
for & hearing* The charges made must be substentirted by 
evidence with the rlqfet In the teacher to relute the cherisa 
with evldenc® offered In defense#
The hearing before the county superintendent # which is 
authorised under Section 75-151Ô# 1947# is in the nature
of « review or m  appeal# This wes recognised in Howcrd vs# 
Ireland# supra# Section 75-151^# supra# authorizes an appeal 
from the decision of the county superiatendmt to the Stcte 
Superintondont of Publie Instruction, This statute defines the
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r©cor<ît which is corttfiâd to tbs Steto Sypsrintondont, es 
« full wrltt©» et®te*8ent of the facts# togjathcr with the tes-» 
timony end the décision of the county miperlntmdent. There­
fore it is the duty of the comty superintendent to have made 
s complete stenographic trenecript of ell testimony end s 
copy of «11 papers end exhibits used et the hearing*
The fact that the hearing before the board snd the appeals 
era before m  sdmlnlstretlve board end edministretive officers 
precludes the application of judicial procedure end rules of 
evidence# However# the burden of substsntlsting the chergcs 
before the board is m  the board# end the burden of proof 
on ApiMPl Is cm the appellent# These conclusions ere la 
accord with the general pTectlce of the courts end may be used 
as guides la the p*oce©dings before school authorities#
It is therefore my opinion î
1. A teach, r or principal who he# esquired a tenure
right by virtue of employment for tbreo coosecutivo years
msy be deprived of this right only for legal cause#
2# A school board in taking the right of tenure from a
teacher must observe the following provisions of the lew;
a* The school board shall# on or before the 1st day 
of April# give notice in writing to the teacher that 
that his {or her) services will not be required for the 
ensuing yesr|
b# The school boerd# if requested by the teacher# 
shall declare clearly and explicitly the specific 
reason or reasons for the failure to re-employ such teacher;
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:
I'c. The school boord, if requested by the teacher, 
shall grant a hearing a reconsideration "of such 
dismissal** to such teacher: ;
d* The school board must hold such hearing and 
reconsider its action within ten days after receipt 
of such request*
3* At the hearing before the board of trustees, evidence 
must be offered to substantiate the written charges with the 
right of cross examination on the part of the teacher and 
the teacher given the right to present evidence to refute the 
charges*
4* On an appeal to the county superintendent, an addi­
tional opportunity of presenting evidence with the right of 
cross examination is granted to both parties end a written 
record should be made of all testimony, including a written 
decision on the part of the county superintendent, which record 
may be used on an appeal to the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction*
Very truly yours,
ARMQLD H* OLŜ i
Attorney General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTiSH RSFERSKCfîS
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found In volume 22 of the Beport end Official Opinions 
of. the Attorney fienerJl#
Opinion 6 1947
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found In Volume 23 of the Report and Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General*
Opinion 122 # 1950 
Opinion 127 1950
Opinion 129 ^ 1950
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found in Volume 24 of the Report end Official Opinions
of the Attorney General. (To be published)
* Opinion 47 1951Opinion 51 ^ 1951
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found In Volume 25 of the Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General. (To be published}
Opinion 9 - 1953 Opinion 108 • 1954
The following official opinions of the attorney general 
can be found In Volume 26 of the Report and Official Opinions
oH the Attorney General. (To be published)
Opinion 11 1955
Opinion 15 3.955Opinion 26 1955
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
c u m r n  VII
BUDGETS MD LEVIES
Opinion 112 - I946
Held* The ten-mill levy provided for in Section 1203,
1935; as emended by Chapter 51, Laws of 1945, does not relate 
to high schools end may not be levied for high school purposes.
January 5, 1946
Kr. Thomas Dignan 
County Attorney 
Valley County 
Glasgow, Montana
Deer Mr, Dignan:
You have requested my opinion concerning the application
of the ten-mill levy provided for in Section 1203, R.C.M.,
1935, es amended by Chapter 51, Laws of 1945, to the budget
of the Glasgow high school.
Section 1203, as ©mended, supra, provides for a "reserve '
fund for maintaining the elementary and high schools of the
district from July first to November thirtieth, of the next
succeeding school year." The section also states:
"The board of county commissioners shall thereupon 
levy a special tax for such purposes, not exceeding 
ten mills per dollar on the taxable property of the 
district.**"
This section was construed by this office in Volume 15, 
page 1G6, Report end Official Opinions of the Attorney General, 
wherein it was held that the ten mill levy does not relate 
to high schools and does not become available to such schools 
as a source of revenue. I refer you to that opinion for the
-221m '
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reeaonlng therein contained with which I agree*
A high school is also preclWW from such levy by the 
high school budget act which fixas the limitâtion on the 
hi(sh school budget end also oa the county-wide high school 
levy# In Volume 20, pegs 254# Beport end Ofrieiel Opinions 
of the Attorney General, high school budgets end the levy 
for high schools were considered by this office» The above 
cited opinion covers the budgets for the school years 1943- 
1944 end 1944^1945» sad the budgets for the school years 
1945-1946 and 1946-1947 will have the ed vent age of Chapter 
133, Laws of 1945»,which permits s thirty per cent increase 
of the limitation on a high school budget and a resulting 
increase of the special high school tax as provided by Section
1 2 6 3 #11» » 1 9 3 5 »  a s  am en d ed #
It is to be noted that Section 1263*5, R#3*W#, 1935» 
as emended fixes the limitations on high school budgets, but ' 
these limitations are increased for the years 1943-1944 end
1944-1945 by Chapter 191, laws of 1943, and for the yeors
1945-1946 and 1946-1947 by Chapter 133, Laws of 1945. Any 
increase of a high school budget beyond the above noted limita­
tions fâtast be met by an additional levy for high school purposes 
after submitting the question at ©a election as Section 1263,5 
as amended » proddes in p:?rt:
*’*• •provided further, that nothing herein contained 
shall be constried as preventing any school district 
fr<m voting upon itself an additional levy for high 
school purposes, la accordance %dLth the general school 
laws pertaining to the voting of additional levies by 
by school districts,®
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It is therefore SQT opinion the tm-mill levy 
provided for in Section 1203, 1935t ea emended by
Chapter 51, laws of 1945# doe# not relate to high schools 
end not be levied for high school purposes*
Sincerely yours,
a. V, büTTUE'ïLY,
Attorney General
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Opinion lU - 1946
Held* The reserve fund for meintalning high schools from 
July 1 to December 1 of each year is to be considered as e 
part of, and included in the maximum budget es fixed by 
Section 1263*5» R*C*M*, 1935, ®s amended by Chapter 64,
Laws of 1941, end the two-year increase of 30^ allowed 
under Chapter 133, Laws of 1945#
April 25, 1946
Mr* Ernest Z# Fenton 
County Attorney 
Treasure county Kyshsm, Montana
Dear Mr* Fenton*
You have requested my opinion on the question of whether 
or not the amount of the reserve fund for maintaining a high 
school from July 1 to December 1 must be included in the 
maximum budget for high schools*
In your letter you point out that if the reserve fund 
is not included in the maximimi ©mount allowed for high 
schools under the provisions of Section 1263*5, R*G*M*,
1935 88 amended by Chapter 64, Laws of 1941, and the emer­
gency Increase of thirty per cent permitted by Chapter 133, 
Laws of 1945, ® substantially larger amount of money vdll be 
availeble for the operation of your high school*
Section 1263.2, R.C.M*, 1935, sets out the preliminary 
budget form, and in Part I of the form appears the item
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«Cash Reserve Required to Maintain High School from July 1 
to December 1 of Following Tear*** Section 1263*5, R.C*M,, 1935, 
as amended, provides the totâl amount appropriated in Part I 
of the preliminary budget shall not exceed the maximum fixed 
by that section# As the reserve fund is a portion of Part 
I, it necessarily follows the reserve fund is to be included 
in fixing the maximum budget for a high school*
You call attention to Section 1203, R,C#M#, 1935, as 
amended by Chapter 51, Laws of 1945, which provides school 
trustees shall certify the amount needed by the district 
schools to the county commissioners, and it Is specifically 
stated the amount of money needed as a reserve fund shall be 
separately certified by the trustees* You suggest this 
section means the reserve fund is to be included in the final 
budget and not the preliminary* The purpose of Section 
1203, as amended, as I view It, is to assure that a school 
levy will be made each year by having before the county 
comml8sloners certificates of the amounts necessary to be 
raised by taxation. Such certificates would take the place 
of the final budget, If the latter were not presented on or 
before the second Monday in August, the final date for it to 
be filed with the commissioners* That the final budget la 
controlling,is recognized by Section 1203, es amended, in 
that section recites;
«That the budget of any school district, after the
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same la finally approved and adopted, shall be deemed 
end considered to be In lieu of and to take the place 
of such certificates* Such reserve fund shall not 
exceed thirty five per centum (35̂ ) of the amount 
appropriated in the final end approved budget of the 
district for the then current school years.**
It is therefore my opinion the reserve fund for main­
taining high schools from July 1 to December 1 of each year 
is to be considered as a part of, and included in the maximum 
budget 83 fixed by Section 1263*3, R.C.M*, 1933, as amended 
by Chapter 64, Laws of 1941, and the two-year Increase of 
thirty per cent allowed under Chapter 133, Laws of 1943*
Sincerely yours,
H. V* BOTTOmi
Attorney General
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Cpinion Ro. 171 -
H«Idf yuads fitf W  trmtt̂ rrml irm thd bulXrfia* mû 
elteretloA#* Itm ©f « #ehool biMgat, to the lat#r#tt mû ©inking 
fund d̂ 5rle,î tbe flmoal ye#r*
jfuak* ati#
Kf# lYod C. 0«,bri#l
Gwmty Attorney 
lliilllp» SoîJity Kelt© I Kontm#
tm r Kr# Gabriel i
Too have reoueeted «y oploloa e#*lag if fmda may b&
treaeferrsd from # #ohool f̂ letrlet h n i l i in g  fund to the Interest
and «Inking fund.
In your letter you refer to Gestion» 120# to 1210,
1935, wblob seetions provide for e buildioî  mû r̂ mlshlnj?
füM end treaefer of funds. Thase section» were enaotod
prior to the budget lew fur schod district», end insofar as
there I» » conflict the budget law would cwtrol end work tn
Implied rejseal of tfê  «erlier section»# .Section 1019#3,
1535, set» cut the feu«'!s»t form lor school district» end provMea
for ̂ new billdlaig» end elter-fctlou® (not financed fr.# s»l® of
bond».}"
Gvctloa 1019.17, K.J.:4., 1935, provide» epproprirtluna 
shell elapse at the <r$d of the echo ̂1 ye&T# Thu» t!ï©re Is no 
building fund which »ccLmul<,te@ frÆ yeer to yecr, t :t only 
such Wilding fu'wl. an Is provi<.cf" in each h';df;et fwr one
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fiscal year* (See Opinion Ko* 235» Volume 20, Report end 
Official Opinions of the Attorney General*)
Section 1019*15# R*G#M,, 1935# authorizes the transfer of 
ft part of the appropriation from one item to another, but this 
can be done only during the fiscal year when it appears that 
there is an excess appropriation for one item and a deficiency 
in another* (State v* District Court, 95 Mont* 230, 26 Pec.
(2d) 345.)
It is well to keep in mind the provisions of Section 3
of Article XIII of the Montana Constitution, which provides
”A11 moneys borrowed by or on behalf of the state 
or any county, city, town, municipality or other 
subdivision of the state, shall be used only for 
the purpose specified in the law authorizing the 
loan*”
This provision of our constitution would preclude any transfer 
being made fi*oia the funds realized from the sale of bonds.
It is therefore my opinion, excess funds may be transferred 
from the "new buildings and alterations" item of a school 
budget to the Interest end sinking fund during the fiscal year.
Sincerely yours,
E. V* SUÎTUMLI,
Attorney General
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Opinion 177 - 1946
Held* A school district does not have the power to use the 
proceeds of â bond issue which was issued for the purpose of 
constructing a workshop to be used in conjunction with the 
schools of the district in the remodeling of m  old swimming 
pool Into a workshop and the construction of a new swimming 
pool,
July 1* 1946
Mr* Ernest A, Peterson 
County Attorney 
Gallatin County 
Bozeman, Montana
Dear îhr* Peterson;
You have requested my opinion asking If funds realized
from the sale of school district bonds issued for the purpose
of enlarging a schoolhouse may be used to convert a swimming
pool into a workshop and build a new swimming pool in the
place of the old* The construction of the workshop was the
original purpose of the bond issue. Section 3 of Article
XIII of the Montana Constitution provides;
"All moneys borrowed by or on behalf of the state or 
any county, city, town municipality or other sub­
division of the state, shall foe used only for the 
purpose specified in the law authorizing the loan,"
The above quoted would prohibit the use of the money for
any other purpose than the construction of the workship.
Section 1224,22, 1935, contains the same provisions as
the Constitution, and said section reads in part as follows:
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"All moneys ©rising from the sal© of such 
bonds shall be paid to the county treasurer 
and by him credited to the school district 
issuing the same, end shall be immediately 
available for the purpose for which the 
bonds were Issued and no other purposes*"
While the indirect result of the proposed plan would 
result in the construction of a workshop, yet a portion 
of the money would be diverted to the construction of a 
swimming pool, and thus violate both the Constitution and 
the statutory prohibition against the use of the proceeds of 
a bond sale for a purpose other than that for which the bonds 
were issued*
The fact that the contemplated action may be in the best 
interest of the county or school district is not an admissible 
argument* The doctrine of expediency does not enter into the 
construction of statutes. (Freaizke v* Fergus County, Kont* 
150, 15a, 245 Pec, 962*>
It is therefore ray opinion that under the constitutional end 
statutory provisions a school district does not have the power 
to use the proceeds of a bond issue which was issued for the 
purpose of constructing a workshop to be used in conjunction 
with the schools of the district in the remodeling of an old 
swimming pool into a workshop and the construction of a new 
swlauning pool* Sincerely yours,
R. V. huTTuMLY
Attorney General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
^23X«
Opinion 17Ô • 1946
Held* The schedule found in Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws 
o f 1941f as emended by Chapter 169, Laws of 1943, and Chapter 
116, Lews of 1945, applies only to the computation of the 
amount paid to parents or guardians of students who receive 
such payments instead of bus transportation and the portion 
of budgets for bus transportation paid by the county end the 
school districts if fixed by the actual amounts called for 
in the budgets*
July 5, 1946
Mr* R* McKenna 
County Attorney 
Fergus County 
Lewistown, Montana
Deer Mr# McKenna*
You have requested my opinion asking if the transportation 
budgets shall be computed according to the schedule fixed by 
Section 7 Chapter 152, Laws of 1941» as amended by Chapter 169, 
Lews of 1943, end Chapter 116, Laws of 1945# You advise me 
that the county commissioners have made levies in accordance 
with the above schedule and that the amounts so provided have 
not been sufficient to meet the requirements of the transpor­
tation budgets as submitted by the various boards of school 
trustees within your county*
Under Section 14, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by 
Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, It is made the duty of school trustees 
to provide complete transportation budgets for both elementary
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end high schools*
Ssch school district and each county high school is
reimbursed *̂ in an aaount not to exceed one-third (1/3) of
the actual cost of transportation from the state public school
general fund, under the provisions of Section I3 of Chapter
152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943*
This provision of the law was construed in an opinion of this
office,, 1* e*. Opinion Ho* 120, Volume 21, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, wherein it was held:
"The State of Montana must pay to the school 
district one-third the cost of transportation 
by school buses in accordance with the schedule 
fixed by the Board of Education as provided in 
. Section 1200*0, R.C.M*, 1935* and also the state 
must pay to the district one-third of the amount 
paid to parents or guardians in lieu of bus 
transportation as provided in Section 7 of 
Chapter 152, Laws of 1941* ®s amended by Chap­
ter! G9, Laws of 1943# and Chapter 116, Laws of 
1945, end the fact the per capita cost is 
higher in one class than the other will not 
change the method of computing the amount of 
the state’s reimbursement to the school 
district*"
From the above quoted it is apparent the contribution by 
the state for bus transportation is limited and fixed by the 
schedule promulgated by the State Board of Education. The 
amount thus paid by the state as reimbursement for bus trans­
portation might well differ from one-third the actual cost 
because of the use of the schedule referred to#
School districts which furnish transportation for ele­
mentary schools are entitled, under Subsection (b) of Section
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13» Chapter 152, Lswa of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1#9, 
iawa of 1943, to reimbursement of one-third of the actual 
cost of transportation from the common school fund provided 
by the tax levy made in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 1202, Revised Codes of Montana, I935. The levy 
provided by Section 1202 is a county-wide levy of not more 
than eight mills and in the event such levy is not sufficient 
to meet the requirements of the various district budgets, 
the county commissioners are not arthorized to make en 
additional levy. Opinion No. 243, Volume 20, Report end 
Official Opinions of the Attorney General.
The foregoing sets out the provisions for two-thirds of 
the elementary school transportation budgets, end the re­
maining one-third, end any deficiencies from the State of 
Montana and the common school fund, are met by the school 
district under the provisions of Subsection 1, Section 14 of 
Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 
1943, which allocates the funds realized from a maximum levy 
of ten mills authorized by ChsjÆer 51, Laws of 1945, to such 
purposes. If the amount available from such ten mill levy is 
not sufficient, then, under Subsection 2, Section I4, of Chapter 
152, Laws of 1941, S3 amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, 
an additional levy against the property of the district may 
be authorized by the qualified electors of the district.
Both district and county high schools receive reimbursements
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1 -, 
from the state for one-third of ,their transi>ortstion budgets
as computed according to the previously indicated manner. The
balance of high school transportation budget is provided by
a county wide tax levy which is not limited in amount as
Subsection (b) of Section 14, Chapter 1$2, Laws of 1941, as .
emended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943 reads:
"...The county commissioners, except as herein­
after provided, shall make a county-wide levy 
of such number mills as will raise such total,*
The schedule found In Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 
1941, as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, has no appli­
cation to the cost of operating school buses as Section 7 
provides in part:
"The board of trustees may pay to the parents 
or legally appointed guardian of each child, 
eligible to transportation under this act, 
board or rent or provide transportation under 
for the child, the amount called for under the 
following schedule in lieu of fumishiniT bus 
transportation,*
From the emphasized portion of tho above quoted, it is 
apparent that the schedule found in Section 7 fixes the amounts 
paid to parents or guardians of students who do not receive 
transportation on the school buses, but receive such cash 
payments as a substitute for actual transportation.
It is therefore my opinion that the schedule found in 
Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 
189, Laws of 1943, and Chapter 116, Laws of 1945, applies only 
to the computation of the amount paid to parents or guardians
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of students who receive such payments instead of bus trans­
portation paid by the county and the school districts and 
the portion of budgets for bus transportation paid by the 
county and the school districts if fixed by the actual 
amounts called for la the budgets»
Sincerely yours,
a, V, BLMiiauur,
Attorney General
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Opinion I85 - 1946
Hold} The board of trustees of an elementery school district 
may finance the purchase of a school site, which has been 
epproved by the electorate, by either providing in the school 
budget for such an appropriation item, or by using the funds 
realized from the compensation paid for the destruction of 
the school to be replaced*
July 31, 1946
Mr# Frank J# Roe 
County Attorney 
Silver Bow County 
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr. Roe:
You have requested my opinion concerning the following 
facts which were thoroughly discussed at a conference in this 
office on July 29, 1946. There were present at this conference 
representatives of the budget board and school trustees of 
School District Ko. 1, Silver Bow County, the county super* 
intendant, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
representatives of interested citizen of Silver Sow County.
The procedure herein sot forth was suggested at this meeting 
by this office as proper under the pertinent statutes involved, 
and agreed to by all parties present.
School District Ko. 1 of Silver Bow County contemplates 
the purchase of a new elementary school site, the acquisition 
of iifhich.aita was approved by the qualified voters at an election. 
The necessity for acquiring the site arises from the fact that
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two schools were destroyed due to the undermining of the schools 
end shifting of the buildings so that they, together with 
their lands, must be abandoned# Compensation was paid for 
the injury to the schools and thè money so paid is held as a 
trust fund* The trustees asked the manner of payment for the 
new school site*
While negotiations for the purchase of the new school 
site were entered into prior to June 30th, yet payment could 
not be made under the school budget in force at the time of 
such negotiations as there was no appropriation made in the 
budget for this purpose. (Section 1019*16, R*C*M*, 1935*)
An emergency was declared by the board of trustees, but 
there was not sufficient compliance with Chapter 134» Laws 
of 1945, which emended Section 1019*16, R.C.M., 1935» to per­
mit such an appropriation*
The new budget which is now being prepared could provide 
for the purchase of the new school site, which has been 
approved by the qualified electors* Item II of Section 1 
of the school budget which is set out in Section 1019*3» R.C.M*, 
1935, provides for "new buildings and alterations (not 
financed from sale of bonds)." This has been construed by 
this office to be broad enough to include the purchase of 
additional land for school purposes* (Opinion No. 118,
Volume 21, Report end Official Opinions of the Attorney 
General*} Any surplus available from the previous budget
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
would be available in the new budget to pay this item end thus 
not filter the necessary appropriations In the new budget*
Another alternative - and perhaps the best • for the payment 
for the new school site Is to utilize a portion of the funds 
realized from the settlement for damages to the schools 
that were destroyed* The funds in question are analogous 
to the moneys realized from insurance on a school which has 
been destroyed by fire. In the case of State ex rel* Diederichs 
V* Board of Trustoes, 91 Mont. 300, 7 Pec, (2d) 543» the Court 
said:
"Her© the Indebtedness Incurred for a county high 
school buMing by the issuance of bonds was regu­
larly approved by the people and the indebtedness 
so incurred is drawing interest* In consequence 
of the fire, the county is now without benefit*
The fire converted the building into money avail­
able only for the reconstruction of the high school*•
"The fire has resulted in reconverting the 
building into money* Instead of the building, the 
county now holds the ruins o f the building and the 
insurance money collected**,and in the meantime un­
til the building is reconstructed, the county is 
put to expense and inconvenience in maintaining 
its high school#*
The money realized from the settlement is trust funds, 
earmarked for the construction of a school to replace the 
schools destroyed* The land on which the old schools were 
located is valueless for the construction of a new school, 
end in order to build a new school it will b© necessary to 
procure a new site* The use of the trust funds for the pur­
chase of s new sit© would carry out the purpose of the trust 
end be in no way a variance from the obligations of the trust*
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Th« Supreme 06urt of Georgle In tho esse of Conley v# 
Rô orof 169 G»* $$p 149 3,&« 699, considered a similar problm 
and ©aid*
is strongly urged by able counsel for thedefend enta that the aum of 1̂ 21,000, resulting 
from the removal and destruction of tho school 
building, cm properly be uaed by the trustees 
of Reidsville school district in discharging 
any proper and just obllgetloo of that district*
We cannot concur In that argument, but are con­
strained to hold that the proceeds accruing from the destruction of the building, whether 
consisting of insurance or any salvage that 
might have been saved from the Wilding, Is 
by Inw placed in special trust of the trustees 
of the school district, for the sole purpose 
of replecing « school building for that dis­
trict, either upon the site wnere the building 
formerly stood or some other site purchased 
by the board of trustees as the location of ® 
nmf school building*.***
. Under the present budget, law it is oontwplated that 
expenditures for the construction of school buildings shall 
be financed by the issuance of bonds with the result that the 
tax burden will be spread out over a period of years and not 
constitute an unreasonable tax bidden for any one yê -r# If 
the purchase of tho school site la made from the trust funds 
and the balance of the mon ys necessary for the construction 
of the schools raised by a bond issue, the tax burden will b̂  
distributed over the period of the terras of the bonds* Also 
such use of the trust funds will permit the funds available 
in the new budget to be used to better advantage as the cost 
of malnt^ance md opérât 1)0 of schools has greatly increased*
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The teachers, officers end employees of schools, due to the 
increased cost of living, are entitled to additional compen­
sation for their services, with the result that school budgets 
must meet such justifiable demands*
It is therefore my opinion that'the board of trustees 
of an elementary school district may finance the purchase 
of a school site, which has been approved by the electorate, 
by either providing in the school budget for such an appropda- 
tion item, or by using the funds realized fpom the compensation 
paid for the destruction of the school to be replaced*
Sincerely yours,
H* V* BUTTvlILY
Attorney General
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Opinion 191 - 1946
Heldî Funds for the operetion and maintenance of Junior 
colleges may be provided for under Chapter 153, Laws of 
1939, by inclusion of the necessary amount in the high 
school budget/ or by charging tuition for each student, which 
tuition should not exceed $125.00 per year. Both of these 
methods may be followed simultaneously in raising the neces­
sary funds.
August 9, 1946
Mr. W. Popham 
County Attorney 
Dawson County 
Qlendive, Montana
Dear Kr. Pcphamj
You have requested ray opinion concerning the method of
providing for the annual expenses of a Junior college.
Junior colleges may be established under the provisions of
Chapter 15&, Laws of 1939. Section 9 of Chapter 153 reads
as follows:
’’The county high school board or district high 
school board shall be authorised to include in 
their budget a sufficient sum to operate and 
maintain the Junior college departments as herein 
provided, the amount of such budget to be left to 
their determination. Such boards are also em­
powered in their discretion, when they shall deem 
it necessary, to charge tuition at a maximum rate 
of not exceeding one hundred twenty-five and no/lOO 
($125.00) dollars per year for attendance at Junior 
colleges established under the terms of this act."
From the above it is apparent thatbvo sources of revenue
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- i«r« evellebie far th# operftlcm end îseinteïîencô of the junior 
eolX«ga ilepertmmt# Flrat* the boerd of trustee® of the high 
school may provide la their budget for such expenses end a 
levy made la the seme manner as e levy for high echool pur­
poses* The second method la to charge tuition which cannot 
exceed |I25*00 per year for each pupil attending the junior 
college*
The use of the phrase **tne amount Oi such budget to be 
left to their determination* indicates that tho legislature 
does not contemplate limiting the neoesaary funds for the 
operation and maintenance of the junior college end gave 
broad discretionary powers to the board in fixing the budget 
for junior colleges*
It Is therefore my opinion that funds for the operation 
and mslntenaoee of junior colleges may be provided under 
Chapter 15&, Lawe of 1939, by inclusion of the necessary 
amoimts in the high school budget and/or by charging tuition,which 
shall not exceed $123*00 for each student per year# Both of 
these methods may be followW simultaneously in raising the 
necessary funds*
Sincerely yours,
&* V* iîoTt'UïlY
Attorney Oeneral
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Opinion 200 - 1946
*.
Heldî Outstanding warrants of a school district at the end 
of a fiscal year which have not be^n presented for payment, 
although there are sufficient funds, are paid from the funds 
of the budget of the prior year and not included in the
subsequent budget as an item of expense*
August 2Ô, 1946
Mr* Edison W* Kent 
County Attorney 
Granite County 
Philipsburg, Montana
Dear Mr* Kent;
You have requested my opinion concerning the Inclusion 
in a current elementary school budget of the amount of out­
standing warrants issued prior to the end of the last fiscal 
year. You advise me that there were ample funds to pay the
warrants, but the warrants were not paid because they were
not presented prior to the end of the fiscal year*
Section 1019*22, R,C*M., 1935» provides the clerk of the 
district must issue warrants in triplicate and the warrants
4
must show one their faces the appropriation against which 
they are drawn* One copy is delivered to the county treasurer 
end the treasurer, on receiving the copy of the warrant, 
under Section 1019*23* R.C*M*, 1935» must enter the amount 
of such warrant under the proper item of the appropriation 
so that the unexpended balance will show at all times.
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Such procedure résulta In a partial assignment of the funds
as the treasurer who holds the funds has notice the warrant
has been Issued prior to the presentment of the warrant end
allocates the money for the payment of the warrant by his
bookkeeping entries*
Under Section 1019,10, R.C. M,, 1935, the treasurer
shows the cash on hand at the end of the fiscal year, and
such information is taken from his records. The surplus or
cash on hand would be the unexpended balance from the prior
year end would not include outstanding warrants for which
money for their payment had been allocated.
Our Supresne Court in State v. State Board of Examiners,
74 Mont, 1, 23Ô Pac, 316, gave the following definition:
**However, a warrant is merely *sn order by which 
one of competent authority authorizes another to 
pay a particular sum.*"
In 14 Am, Jr. 295, the text states:
"Under the prevailing rule in equity, an order 
drawn on 0 part of a particular fund then due 
or to become due from the drawee to the drawer 
will operate as an assignment of the fund pro 
tanto and will make the drawer equitably answer­
able to the payee for a failure to comply with 
the order after notice thereof, irrespective of 
acceptance."
Applying the above rules, it is apparent the outstanding 
warrants of which the treasurer has notice and for which de- 
ductlon has been made, constitute an assignment of the funds, 
which funds are those of the budget of the prior year.
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It la therefore my opinion outstending warrants of a 
school district at the end of a fiscal year which have not 
been presented for payment, although there are sufficient 
funds, are paid from the funds of the budget of the prior 
year and not included in the subsequent budget as an item 
of expense#
Sincerely yours,
R# V# BvTTumi,
Attorney General
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Opinion H  - 1947
Helds 1# A board of school budget supervisors has no authority 
to assign to a county superintendent of schools the power 
to approve or disapprove transfer of school district budget 
items*
2» A board of trustees has authority to transfer surplus 
money In the teachers* salary item to another item in which 
there is a deficiency*
3* After the adoption of the final budget, expenditures are 
solely within the authority of the board of school trustees, 
subject only to the provisions of the budget act, and no 
authority exists in the board of budget supervisors or the 
county superintendent to supervise or control expenditures*
March 7, 1947
Mr* James D# Freeboum 
County Attorney 
Silver Bow County 
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr* Freeboum:
You have submitted for my opinion the following questions:
1. Has a board of school budget supervisors the authority 
to assign to a county superintendent of schools the power to 
approve or disapprove the transfer of school district budget 
items?
2. Has a board of trustees the authority to transfer 
money budgeted for high school teachers* salaries to another
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item during the school year?
3» What power or check has e board of school budget 
supervisors and the county superintendent as clerk of said 
board over the extravagant or wilful spending of budget 
items by a board of school trustees before the current school 
year is completed?
four first question Is answered by Section 1019.15,
1935# 83 to elementary budgets, and by Section 
1263.15# 1935# 83 to high school budgets. The pro­
visions of these sections are clear end unambiguous. Section 
*1019.15# 1935» relative to element©ry. budgets# provides :
”iShenever it appears to the clerk of any school 
district that the amount appropriated for any 
item in the final budget is in excess of the 
amount actually required to be expended for such 
item during the year for which such budget was 
adopted, end that the amount appropriated for 
any other item in such final budget, and payable 
from the same fund, is less than the amount 
which will be actually reauired for such item 
during such school year, the clerk of such 
school district may notify the county treasurer 
in writing to transfer the excess appropriation, 
or so much thereof as may be necessary, from 
one (1) item to the item for which the appropria­
tion is deficient, and the county treasurer must 
thereof make a transfer of such amount.**
Section 1263.15# R.C.M., 1935# as the high school 
budgets, provides:
"Whenever it appears to the board of trustees of any 
school district maintaining a high school district, or of a 
county high school, that the amount appropriated for any Item
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in the flnel high school budget is in excess of the amount 
actually required to be expended for such item during the 
year for which such budget was adopted, and that the amount 
appropriated for any other item in such final budget, and 
payable from the same fund, is less than the amount which 
will be actually required for such item during such school 
year, such board of trustees may direct the clerk to notify 
the county treasurer in writing to transfer the excess 
appropriation, or so much thereof as may be necessary, from 
such item to the Item for which the appropriation is deficient, 
and the county treasurer must thereupon make a transfer of 
such amount* Provided, however, that no transfer shall 
ever be made by a county treasurer betv;een any appropriation 
made in a budget for maintaining a high school or high 
schools and any budget appropriation for maintaining elemen­
tary grade schools in the same district*”
The only difference in the two sections, as to who shall 
make the transfer, is that as to elementary budgets the clerk 
is authorized upon her otah initiative to order the transfer, 
while in the high school budget the board of trustees must 
order the clerk to notify the treasurer to make the transfer*
It will be noted the only authority to cause a transfer is 
placed in the clerk or the board of trustees, and upon notice 
by the clerk to the treasurer, it is made mandatory on the 
treasurer to make the transfer* There is no provision in
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either statute for the approval of such transfer by the 
board of budget supervisors; such board not having the 
authority could not authorize anyone else to exercise such 
authority* Without statutory provision, the budget board 
or county superintendent would have no such authority*
As to your second question, Section 1263*15, R*C*M*,
1935I applicable to high school budgets, is controlling.
It authorizes the board of trustees to order the clerk to 
notify the treasurer to make the transfer. The only . -
restriction is that a transfer may be made only when it 
appears that there is a surplus or excess in one fund and 
a deficiency in another, and that no transfers may be mad© 
between any items of the elementary budget to those of the 
high school budget* Therefore, the board of trustees would 
have the right to transfer from the item of teachers* salaries 
in the high school budget, when there is a surplus in such 
item, to any other item In such budget where there is a 
deficit*
As to your third question, whatever power or check the 
board of school budget supervisors or the county superintendent 
as clerk of said board may have over the spending of budget 
items by a board of school trustees before the current school 
year is completed, if any, must be found in the provisions of 
the budget act*
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Section 1019,2, 1935# dsslgnatea the board of
county connaissioners as the board of school budget supervisors 
and the county superintendent as clerk of such board, Under 
Section 1019.13* R.C.M,, 1935* th e budget board has authority 
to make changes or corrections in the elementary budget deemed 
necessary or proper In any item or amount contained In Sections 
L, II, or III of any budget* either by eliminating or striking 
out any Item or amount, or by increasing or reducing the 
amount proposed to be expended for any item, and when it 
appears to the budget board that any item is in excess of the 
amount actually required to be expended for such item, the 
board must reduce such amount to the amount actually re­
quired* However, this section then provides as follows:
"•••provided, that the budget board must, before 
making any such change or correction in the pre­
liminary budget of any district, afford the 
trustees and clerk of the district an opportunity 
to be heard thereon, and provided further, that 
if et any such hearing the trustees of any district 
and the budget board are unable to agree on the 
amount to be expended for any such item, the 
board of trustees by majority vote of all mem­
bers of the board, may finally fix end deter­
mine such amount, and the amount so fixed 
cannot thereafter be changed by the budget 
board."
Section 1263.13, 1947* provides that at the
meeting of the board of school budget supervisors held on the 
fourth Monday in July, such board shall have the power "to 
make any change or corrections it may deem necessary or proper 
in any item or amount contained in any high school budget, 
either by eliminating or striking out any item or amount 
contained therein, or by increasing or reducing the amount
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end when It appears to the budget board that the amount 
proposed to be expended for any item, as shown by a pre­
liminary high school budget, Is in excess of the amount 
actually required to be expended for such item, the board 
must reduce such amount to the amount actually required to 
be expended therefor*" This section then provides:
"#•.provided, however, that in the event the 
board of budget supervisors shall reject any such 
budget in whole or in part it shall cause the 
reasons for its rejection to be spread upon its 
minutes and a copy thereof to be immediately 
furnished to the chairman of the board of trustees 
which has submitted the budget, and provided 
further, that no final action on said budget shall be taken by the said board of budget 
supervisors until after a hearing thereon 
shall have been had, which hearing shall be 
held by said board of budget supervisors on the 
first Monday in August after said budgets shall 
have been submitted* At said hearing the 
chairman of the board of budget supervisors 
or a member of that body appointed by him; the 
chairman of the board of trustees of the dis­
trict or coimty high school submitting such 
budget or a member of the board appointed by 
him; and the county superintendent of schools 
shall constitute a board of review* This 
board of review shall have the power and it 
shall be its duty to consider such rejected 
budget and to arrive at a budget by a major­
ity vote which shall not be subject to further 
review,"
It is therefore clear that, as to elementary budgets, the 
board of trustees has the final say as to the amount to be 
included in such budget, while In the high school budgets, 
the board of budget supervisors, subject to review by the 
board of review, composed of the chairman of the budget board, 
chairman of the board of trustees of the district submitting
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the rejected budget end the county superintendent of schools, 
has the final say.
However, it must be noted that the above procedure!.has 
to do only with the making and adopting of the budgets and 
not to expending of the amounts finally adopted in the several 
budgets. The expenditure of the budgetary itemized amounts 
is exclusively within the power of the board of trustees, 
subject only to the restrictions of the budget act. Neither 
the board of budget supervisors, nor the county superintendent
v ; / .  ,
as such, or as the clerk ofysaid board, Is given any statu­
tory authority to supervise or control expenditures.
It is therefore my opinionî
1. A board of school budget supervisors has no authority 
to assign to a county superintendent of schools the power 
to approve or disapprove transfer of school district budget 
items*
2# A board of trustees has authority to transfer surplus 
money in the teachers’ salary item to another item in which 
there Is a deficiency.
3* f i l t e r the adoption of the final budget, expenditures are
solely within the authority of the board of school trustees,
subject only to the provisions of the budget act, and no
authority exists in the board of budget supervisors or the
county superintendent to supervise or control expenditures
Sincerely yours,
R. V. BuTTUiUY 
Attorney General
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Opinion 20 - 1947
Held: Chapter 274# lews of 1947# suthorizes the meximum 
budgets for high schools to be Increased during the next 
two fiscal years by fifty per cent of the amount fixed by 
Section 1263*5# R*C*M*# 1935# ®s amended by Chapter 166,
Lews of 1939, and Chapter 64, Lews of 1941, without a 
special levy approved by the qualified electorate*
Funds in addition to the maximum budget above noted 
may be granted by the qualified voters at an election sub­
mitting the question of such additional levy# In districts 
maintaining high schools such question would be submitted 
to the qualified voters of the districts# The additional 
levy for county high schools, in counties not divided into 
high school building districts would be submitted to the 
qualified voters of such building district#
April 2, 1947
Mr. W# W# Lessley 
County Attorney 
Gallatin County 
Bozeman, Montana
Deer Mr* Lessley:
You have requested my opinion as to the effect of Senate 
Bill 101, which has been designated Chapter 274, Laws of 1947, 
in regard to high school budgets*
Chapter 274 provides the maximum for high school budgets 
for the school years 1947-1948 and 1948-1949 may be increased
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fifty per cent at the discretion o f the trustees and the 
budget supervisors* By the terms of the act the computation 
is based on Section 1263*5» R#0*M.» 1935, as amended by 
Chapter 64, Laws of 1941# The trustees in fixing the 
maximum amount will determine the permisssble maximum under 
Section 1263*5, as amended, end then add an additional 
fifty per cent. Funds received from the federal government 
are excluded from the computation of the authorized maximum.
The maximum budget above mentioned is the amount that 
may be expended by the trustees of a high school without 
resorting to a special levy authorized by a vote of the 
qualified electors. Funds realized from a special levy would 
in fact increase the amount of money available for the opera­
tion and maintenance of the high schools during the next 
fiscal year.
Authority for the extra levy for districts maintaining 
high schools is found in Section 1263*5, R*C,M*, 1935, as 
amended by Chapter 166, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 64, Laws 
of 1941, which provides In parti
nothing herein contained shall be construed 
as preventing any school district from voting 
upon itself an additional levy for high school 
purposes, in accordance with the general laws 
pertaining to the voting of additional levies 
by school districts.”
Previous to Chapter 274 (Senate Bill 101) there had been 
no provision for an additional levy for county high school to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-255*
supplement the msxlmm budgets aiîthorised hy Sectioa 1263,5,
$9 amended. Sow, under Section 2 of Chapter 274, if the trustees 
of É county hi^ school find it necessary end advisshle e 
special levy may be authorised by the qualified electors of 
the county if such county high school is not in « county di­
vided into high school building districts. The extra levy 
for county high school building district must be submitted to 
the qualified electors of such high school building district.
‘ In your inquiry you raised acme cuestlon cmcemlng the 
effect of Section 3 of Chapter 274. The purpose of this 
section is to permit n special levy for high schools to raise 
the amount necessary for the maximum budgets as fixed by 
Section 1263.5, as amended, end Section 1 of Chapter 274*
Under Section 1263.11, es amended, a special seven mill high 
school levy is authorised, which seven mill levy may be in­
creased if seven miHs will not raise #125.00 per pupil, 8qc- ^
tim 3 of Chapter 274 is broader than Section 1263.11, as 
amended, in that there is no limitation of seven mills md 
such omission is necessary because of the fifty per cent 
increase in the maximum budgets. Section 3 is not to be con­
strued as penaittlag any additional increase in funds for 
high school budgets other than those previously mentioned in 
this opinicHi.
It is therefore sy opinions
1. Chapter 274, taws of 1947, authorises the mnxlmiaa 
budgets for high schools to be increased during the next two 
fiscal!years by fifty per cent of the amount fixed by Section
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1263,5, R,O.M., 1935, «s amended by Chapter 166, Laws of 
1939, find Chapter .64, Laws of 1941, without a special levy 
approved by the qualified electorate,
2, Funds in addition to the maximum budget above noted 
may be granted by the qualified voters at an election sub­
mitting the question of such additional levy. In districts 
maintaining high schools such question would be submitted 
to the qualified voters of the districts. The schools 
additional levy for county high schools, in counties not 
divided into high school building districts would be sub­
mitted to all of the ruallfied voters in the county, while 
the cuestlon for the levy for county high schools situated in 
high school building districts would be submitted to the 
qualified voters of such building district.
Sincerely yours,
R. V, BÜTTOMLT
Attorney General
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Opinion 29 - 1947
Heldî 1# Section 1204, 1935, «s emended by Chapter
272, Lews of 1947, does not apply to the apportionment of funds 
realised from Section 1202, 1935, for the school year
1946-1947,
2. Funds apportioned under Section 1204, 1935, as .
emended by Chapter 2?2, Lews of 1947, are distributed to the 
elementary school only, and attendance in the elementary schools 
serves as the basis for such apportionment#
3* Reimbursement to elementary schools for their transportation 
budgets ia made from the funds realized from the levy provided 
by Section 1202, R,G*M#, 1935, as amended by Chapter 273, Laws
of 1947, before the apportionment of such funds under Section
■ •
1204, R,C*M*, 1935, as amended*
4. The period to be used in computing the ”average number 
belonging" In determining the apportionment of funds for elemen­
tary schools under Section 1204, 1935, as amended by
Chapter 272, Laws of 1947, is the previous school year,
April 24, 1947
Kiss Elizabeth Ireland
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol Building 
Helena, l̂ontena
Dear Kiss Ireland;
you have requested my opinion concerning the Section 1204,
1935, as amended by Chapter 272, Laws of 1947, and have
asked the following questions;
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1# Does Section 1204f as amended, apply to the apportion­
ment of the common school tax for the last half of the school 
year 1946-19472
2« Are the funds apportioned to both elementary schools 
and high schools under Section 1204, as amended?
3» Does Section 1204, as amended affect the reimbursement 
to school districts for transportation from the proceeds of the 
levy authorized by Section 1202, 1935, as amended?
Section 1204, , 1935, as amended by Chapter 272, Lavrs
of 1947, provides*
’’All school moneys apportioned by county superintendents 
of coomon schools shall be apportioned to the several 
districts in proportion to the average number belonging*
In computing the average number belonging in each school 
district, the gum of the aggregate attendance and the 
aggregate days absence shall be divided by the number 
of days school is in sessioniin the school or schools 
of the district, provided however, that in computing 
the aggregate days absence, pupils absent more than 
three days shall be dropped from the rolls and shall 
not be considered as belonging*”
In answering your first question concerning the application 
of the amendment to the present school year, it is necessary to 
consider the results which would follow if it were made immediately 
effective*
The preliminary budget for elementary schools is prepared 
and adopted in June and the final budget is prepared and adopted 
in July* Under Section 1019*12, R.C.M*, 1935, the tax levies for 
each school district are fixed not later than the second Monday in
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Auguÿt* The school district budget and all appropriations are 
based upon the estimated revenue, Section 1019*4* R*C#M*, 1935,
« portion of which Is the funds realized from the levy provided 
in Section 1202, , 1935, as amended by Chapter 273, laws
of 1947, If the method of computing the amount available for 
each school district were altered during the current school 
budget the result would be in many school districts that they 
would be unable to meet their contractual obligations with 
teachers, bus drivers, and other persons with whom the districts 
had entered into contracts in anticipation that the method of 
apportionment of revenue would not be changed*
The Montana Constitution prohibits the impairment of con­
tracts by legislation as Section 11 of Article 111 provides;
*Ko ex post facto law nor law impairing the obliga­
tion of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant 
ofspecial privileges, franchises, or immunities shall 
be passed by the legislative assembly,**
Taking away all or a part of the means of the payment of the
school district’s contracts would Impair the obligation of the
contracts. This principle is recognized in 12 Am, Jur, 21, where
the text states;
"When ever the law is so changed that the means of 
enforcing the duty imposed by the contract are ma­
terially impaired the obligation of the contract no 
longer remains the same. Therefore, a Conëitution 
or a statute impairs the obligation of a contract if 
it prevents enforcement, or seriously interferes 
with the enforcement of the contract, While it is 
undoubted that the legislature may make changes in 
the remedy, it is necessary that the contract be 
left with the same force and effect, including the
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substantial means o f enforcement which existed 
when it was made*®
Your second question is answered by reference to the budget 
acts for both elementary and high schools, Section 1019*4* ,
1935, provides a form for the estimate of the revenue for ele­
mentary schools* One of the Items is the ®County Apportionment, 
six (6) to eight (Ô) mill levy,® which is the levy provided by 
Section 1202, S*C.M*, 1935, Chapter 2?3, Laws of 1947, has In­
creased the levy to eight to ten mills, but the reference would 
be the same*
The estimate for high schools found in Section 1263*3, a«C*M*, 
1935, does not contain any reference to the six to eight mill 
levy, but does provide for the apportionment of the county high 
school levy* Section 1263*11, 1935, as amended, provides
for a county wide high school levy and this is a special levy 
for high school purposes which takes the place for high schools 
of the levy provided la Section 1202, as amended* The statutory 
method for financing high schools does not contemplate that funds 
realised from Section 1202, as amended, shall be available for their 
budgets* Chapter 272, Laws of 1947, %diich amended Section 1204, 
1935, does not alter the disposition of the funds appor­
tioned, but merely changes the method of computation of amount 
distributed to each district*
Your third question is answered by Opinion No* l&O, Volume 
20, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General, which 
held that;
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"School districts maintaining elementary schools, 
or which provide transportation to a-school in 
another district, are entitled to reimbursement 
from the fund provided by the tax levy author­
ised by Section 1202, R.G.M*, 1935, in the 
amount of one-third of the actual cost of trans­
portation prior to the apportionment of the fund 
under the provisions of Section 1204, 1935*"
The fact that Section 1202 has been amended by Chapter 273, 
Laws of 1947, and Section 1204 has been amended by Chapter 272,
Laws of 1947# does not alter the application of the above quoted 
opinion•
four fourth question concerning the period to be used in 
the computation of the "average number belonging" must be 
answered by reference to the practical matters which affect the 
determination of daily attendance of the pupils *
In State v* Millls, Si Mont* 66, 261 Pac* 6&5, our Court saids
"Statutes are to be construed so as best to effectuate 
the object of the legislature*"
was observed before in this opinion, budgets are made 
for school districts in June and July and information concerning 
the amount of funds from the levy provided in Section 1202, as 
amended must be available at that time. Therefore, the appor­
tionment by the county superintendent must be based on the records 
of attendance for the previous school year* If the apportionment 
were based on the attendance for the current school year, there 
would be no records available on which to compute the amount 
distributed*
Section 1076, 1935, makes it the duty of all teachers
to file an annual report with the county superintendent on or
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before the 10th day of July after the close of the school year#
This report would supply the basis for the computation of atten­
dance and is the only adequate report which would meet the need 
for the determination of the apportionment of the funds for the 
various elementary districts#
It isI thereforeI my opinion:
1# Section 1204, R#C#M,| 1935» &s amended by Chapter 272, Laws 
of 1947» does not apply to the apportionment of funds realized 
from Section 1202, 1935» for the school year 1946-1947#
2, Funds apportioned under Section 1204» R#C*M,, 1935» as amended 
by Chapter 272, Laws of 1947» are distributed to the elementary 
schools only, and attendance in the elementary schools serves as 
the basic for such apportionment#
3* Reimbursement to elementary schools for their transportation 
budgets is made from the funds realized from the levy provided 
by Section 1202, 1935» as amended by Chapter 273» Laws of
1947» before the apportionment of such funds under Section 1204» 
R.G*H#, 1935» as amended*
4, The period to be used In computing the ^average number belong­
ing" in determining the apportionment of funds for elementary school: 
under Section 1204, R.C#M., 1935» as amended by Chapter 272, Laws 
of 1947, is the previous school year# Sincerely yours, a. V# BOTTom 
Attorney General
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Opinion 34 - 1947
Hôldî Tho board of trustees of a county high school is not 
authorized to pay insurance premiums in an amount in excess 
of the amount appropriated for such item unless a transfer of 
funds may be made in an amount sufficient to pay the premium 
charge.
May 14, 1947
Mr* W, G. Gilbert, Jr.
County Attorney 
Beaverhead County 
Dillon, Montana
Dear Mr. Gilbert :
You have requested my opinion as to whether the board of
trustees of a county high school may pay insurance premiums
for insurance on the county high school buildings in excess
of the appropriations for the same contained in the budget.
You advised me that the county comriiissioners of your
county had renegotiated the county insurance policies end
the amount of the premiums exceeds the appropriation for
insurance in the current budget by $600.00.
Under sub-section 16 of Section 1262,03, E.G.M., 1935»
as amended by Chapter 207, laws of 1939, the board of trustees
of a county high school is given the power, and it is its duty
to transact all business and to make and execute all contracts
in the name of the county. This section gives to the trustees
the power to make all insurance contracts.
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If we assume that the trustees of the high school should 
ratify the contract for additional insurance and make the con­
tract that of the board of trustees, the prohibition of SectionI
1263*14, 1935, must still be considered* This latter
section limits expenditures or incurring of liabilities to 
the amount of detailed appropriations as contained in the 
budget* However, Section 1263*13, S*C*M*, I935 authorizes 
excess moneys in one item of the budget to be transferred to 
an item for v/hich the appropriation is deficient, If these 
two items are payable from the same fund# This means that 
transfers may be made to the insurance item from other items 
contained in Section 6 of part 1 of the high school budget.
The payment of the increase in insurance premiums does 
not constitute an emergency within the meaning of Section 1019*16, 
R*̂ *M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 193, Laws of 1943, and Chap­
ter 134, Laws of 1945, as certain emergencies are enumerated 
therein, and an increase in insurance rates is not designated 
as justifying an emergency expenditure#
It is therefore, my opinion that the board of trustees of 
a county high school is not authorized to pay insurance premiums 
in an amount in excess of the amount appropriated for such item 
unless a transfer of funds may be made in an amount sufficient 
to pay the premium charge. Sincerely yours,
K. V# BOTTüKLY
Attorney General
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Opinion 42 - 1947
Helds the excess fund In the sslsries item of an,elementary 
school budget cannot be transferred to the transportation 
budget* end any excess in the transportation budget cannot 
be transferred to any item in the general fund,
Juno 23, 1947
Mr, Patrick t, Donovan 
County Attorney 
Toole County Shelby, Montana
Dear Mr# Donovan:
You have requested my opinion as to whether funds in the
salaries item of an elementary budget may be transferred to the
transportation budget#
Transfer among appropriations is authorized by Section
1019,15, H*G,M#, 1935, which provides:
Whenever it appears to the clerk of any school 
district that the amount appropriated for any 
item in the final budget Is in excess of the
amount actually required to be expended for
such item during the year for which such bud­
get was adopted, end that the amount appro­
priated for any other item in such final budget, 
and payable from the same fund, is less than 
the amount which will be actually required for such item during such school year, the 
clerk of such school district may notify 
the county treasurer in writing to transfer 
the excess appropriations, or so much there­
of as may be necessary, from one (1) item 
to the item for which the appropriation is 
deficient, and the county treasurer must 
thereupon make a transfer of such amount,**
It is to be noted that an excess in one appropriation
may be transferred to another when they are **payable from
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th« ftmd#*» Under Section 1019*3# R#G#̂ *, 1935 the item 
of «8slJ*ri08” is found In Section 1 déaignetod ^'gmorel fund 
expottsod**'
A Wdgat for tronoportation la re<juir«d to be provided
under Section 14 of Cbepter 15%, lewa of 1941, «9 emended by
Chapter 169# of 1943# This eection, ee amended recognicea
the feet that the transportation budget Is a eepsrete budget
in that Section 14, e# emended, states in parti
"When a copy of the final elenentery budget for m y  
school district is trensmitted by the county supers 
Intondent of schools to the state superintendent 
of schools, #9 required by Section 1019*20, It 
shell be eccompenied by « copy of the treospor# 
tstlon budget, if my, edopted for ouch school 
district**
%il@ it is true that Section 14 of Jhspter 152, lews 
of 1941# #9 amended, requires the amount of the trsnspor# 
tstion budget to "be shown end included in Section 1" of the 
budget, yet this does not mean that they ere "'payable from 
the seme fund*" Prior to the enactment of Chapter 152,
Lews of 1%1, trensportetlon expenses were paid from the 
"general fund" but by the enectment of Chapter 152, Lews 
of 1941, e new fund was crested to pey trenaportotion 
charges* thider Chapter 152 end Its amendments, additional 
sources of revenue were made availible for trâ isportstion 
which included reimbursements from the state public school 
fund. Section 13 of Chapter 152, se emended, end an eddl-* 
tionsl levy authorised by ®ufe»8octlon 2 of Section 14, Ch«p* 
ter 152, Lews of 1941, es emended* In other wonîs, the
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the transportation fund is made up in an independent manner 
from the general school fund and thus cannot be considered as 
the same fund*
If transfers between the general fund and the transportation 
budget were permitted» the limitations of the budget system 
would be defeated in that the additional levy authorized for 
transportation would be utilized for operation and maintenance 
contrary to the purpose for which the extra levy was granted*
Also state funds earmarked for transportation would be diverted 
to other school purposes.
It is therefore my opinion that the excess funds in the 
salaries item of an elementary school budget cannot be trans­
ferred to the transportation budget # and any excess in the 
transportation budget cannot be transferred to any item in the 
general fund*
Sincerely yours,
R. V# BuTTuiaX
Attorney General
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Opinion 45 1947
Helds Free Textbooks must be furnished in elementary schools, 
but there may be no special textbook levy as Section 1199, 
R*C*M., 1935, was repealed by Chapter I46, Lews of 1931, the 
elementary school budget act. Section 119̂ , 1935,
was not affected by passage of the budget act. Therefore, 
the item for free textbooks should be included under Item 13 
of Section 1 of the budget,
July 12, 1947
Miss Elizabeth Ireland 
Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol Building 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Ireland:
You have requested my opinion as to whether a special ' . ?
3a vy for textbooks may be made for elementary schools under the
provisions of Section 1199, R, C. M,, 1935*
Section 119&, R,C*M,, 1935, requires all school districts
to furnish free textbooks in all schools* Section 1199
authorizes a special tax which will raise an amount not in
excess of $3,50 per pupil for free textbooks if the general
fund of a school district is insufficient for that purpose.
Section 1199 was enacted in 1913 and lest amended in 19&5#
However the budget system for elementary schools was adopted
in 1931, and Section 1019,3 includes textbooks as one of the
items of the general fund expenses.
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Section 1019.14 of the budget set prohibits expenditures 
in excess of the final amounts fixed in the general fund of the 
budgets.
The estimated revenues for each school district is made 
by the county superintendent under the provisions of Section 
1019.4 and the enumeration of the sources of revenue does 
not include a textbook levy. It therefore is to be concluded 
that the budget act, having been enacted subseouent to Section 
1199, the latter act was impliedly reperd and textbooks 
must be considered as any other item of the general fund.
Also, Section 1019*7 limits the revenue for the general 
fund to the estimated revenue as shown by the county super­
intendent’s estimate, and any extra levy voted by the qualified 
electors of the district. This section does not recognize 
the textbook levy as a possible source of income and by the 
Omission eliminates it as an extra levy. A like conclusion 
was reached in Opinion Mo. 199» Volume 20, Keport and 
Official Opinions of the Attorney General in regard to a 
special levy for textbooks for high schools.
It is, therefore my opinion that free textbooks must be 
furnished in elementary schools, but there may be no special 
textbook levy as Section 1199, R.G.M., 1935» was repealed 
by Chapter 146, Laws of 1931, the elementary school budget 
act. Section 1196, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935» was not 
affected by passage of the budget act. Therefore, the item
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for fro® textbook# ohouXé bo inoludod under Item IJ of 
Section 1 of the budget#
Sincerely yotirs,
R# V# mmiiv£ 
Attorn^ Generel
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Opinion 124 ~ 1948
Hold I Fund» re&llmed from the extra levy euthorleed by Section 
2, Cbepter 274, tews of 1947, are for the sole use of the 
county high school end shell not be ep|:ortloned In part to 
any. district hi^h school within the county*
June 30, 1948
Mr# Robert F# Owcnborg 
Joimty Attorney 
Kissouls Oounty Missoula, Montana
fear Mr* Swaabergi
You have rcouestod esy opinion as to whether the funds
realised under Section 2, Chapter 274, lews of 1947, for the
operation mû maintenance of ® county high school shall be
apportioned in part to high schools within the county*
The portion of Chapter 274, laws of 1947, which authorises
an extra levy for coimty high schools reads as follows?
**If it shall api>ear to the satisfaction of the 
Board of Trustees of any county high school that 
it is nocessary or proper to raise money by taxatlm In excess of the mount allowed by law, 
for the purpose of maintaining such county high 
school**«said Board of Trustees of such county high cchool shall determine and fix the smourt 
necessary*••and shall submit the ct̂ estion of an 
additional levy***to the cualiflod electors 
residing in the county where such county high 
school is situated in case of & county high 
without « buildixig district, or to the 
qualified electors residing within such county 
high school building district**#*
The above cuoted portion of Chapter 274 authorises the
/
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additional levy for county high schools and does not mention. 
district high schools and sa an extra levy for such high schools 
is authorized by Section 1263*5» 1935» as amended.
The obvious purpose of the legislature in enacting Section 2 
of Chapter 274 was to provide additional funds for the opera­
tion of "county high schools** as distinguished from ’'district 
high schools}** prior to such enactment, there was no method 
of supplying additional money for "county high schools,**
There is no requirement that the funds realized for county 
high school purposes shall be apportioned to district high 
schools within such county.
In your letter you asked if Section 1263*11,
1935, as amended by Chapter 131, Laws of 1941, would apply 
in the distribution of the money. Section 1263*11, as 
amended, provides for & county wide high school levy and 
prescribes the apportionment of the money to the various high 
schools in the county. There is no specific requirement in 
Chapter 274 that the funds realized from the extra levy shall 
be apportioned to the high schools within the county and to 
distribute the money in accordance with Section 1263,11 would 
result in reading into the statute something that is not 
there. Also, the purpose of Section 2 of Chapter 274 is to 
supply additional money for operation of county high schools 
end not for district high schools. The letter may have 
additional funds as provided in Section 1263*11, as emended.
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Another reason for limiting the use of the funds realized 
under Section 2 of Chapter 274 to county high schools is that 
this section states that the trustees of such county high 
schools fix the amount necessary for the maintenance and 
operation of their school and the additional levy is based 
on such an amount. To apportion a part of the money to dis­
trict high schools would result in a deficiency for the 
county high school. Also, it would not be within the powers 
of the trustees of the county high school to determine and 
fix the amount of additional funds for district high schools 
as they would not come within the jurisdiction of the 
trustees of the county high school*
It is therefore, my opinion that funds realized from 
the extra levy authorized by Section 2 of Chapter 274, Lews 
of 1947, are for the sole use of the coimty high school and 
shall not be apportioned in part to any district high school 
within the county.
Sincerely yours,
R. V. BOTTUMLI
Attorney General
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Opinion 24 « 1949
Held: (1) The cost of maintenance and operation of Junior
Colleges must be included in the County or District High 
School Budget* The maximum mill levy allowed for Junior 
Colleges Is thereby limited and controlled by the maximum 
mill levy allowed under the High School Budget System.
May 24» 1949
Kiss Mary M* Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Capitol Building 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon:
You have submitted for my opinion the following questions:
(1) What is the legal limit to the number of mills the 
County Commission may levy for the Junior College without a 
vote of the people?
(2), Is Chapter 1$8, Session Laws of 1939» Section 9 the 
only reference to budgets for Junior Colleges?
The enabling act that provides for the establishment of 
Junior Colleges is Chapter 15$, Session Laws of 1939,
In answering your first question, Section 9» of the above
act must be considered and it provides as follows:
«The County High School Board o t District High 
School Board shall be authorized to include in 
their budget a fhifficient sum to operate end 
maintain the Junior College departments as 
herein provided the amount of such budget to 
be left to their determination. Such Boards are also empowered in their discretion, when 
they shall deem it necessary, to charge 
tuitions at a maximum rate of not exceeding
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on# hundred twenty-Jfive and no/lOO (|125»00) 
dollars per year for attendance at Junior 
Colleges established under the terms of this act."
It is apparent from the above section that the Legislature 
Intended that the cost of operation and maintenance of Junior 
College departments be included In the budget of either the 
County High School Board or District High School Board ©a the 
case may be.
The High School Boards, under Chapter I5S, Session Laws 
of 1939, are given wide discretion In providing a sufficient 
sum for operations end maintenance of Junior Colleges, however 
this expense must be included in the High School Budget,
Section 1263*5 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1935» as 
amended, provides for the preparation and adoption of High 
School Budgets, The statute also provides for restrictions 
on the amount of appropriation that will be alla/ed, depending 
on the estimated receipts for the general fund of such high 
school and upon the number of pupils enrolled.
Section 1263,11 of the Revised Codes of Montana, as 
amended by Chapter 131, Montana Session Laws, 1945, Chapter 
274, Montana Session Laws, 1947, end Chapter 199, and Chapter 
199, Montana Session Laws, 1949, la also important in this 
respect as it provides that the County Commissioners may 
levy an annual special tax for high school purposes, amounting 
to ten mills on the dollar of the taxable value of ©11 
taxable property within the County*
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From the above Sections it is evident that the maximum 
mill levy for High School Budgets in each County or District 
will vary# As the Junior College Budget must be Included In 
the High School Budget» it follows that the maximum mill 
levy for Junior Colleges will also vary#
In passing, it should be noted that nothing contained in 
the above mentioned statutes should be construed as preventing 
any school district from voting an additional levy for high 
school purposes or Junior College purposes, In accordance 
with the general school lews pertaining to the voting of 
additional levies by school districts# ;
In answer to your second question, it is my opinion 
that Chapter 15#, Montana Session Laws of 1939, is the only 
law with reference to budgets for Junior Colleges#
Sincerely yours,
fJÜKOUi H,
Attorney General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
•277-
Opinion 39 - 1949
Held; Under the provision of Chapter 131, Laws of 1945, as 
amended by Chapter 161, Laws of 1947, the funds transferred 
into the deferred maintenance fund cannot be spent for new 
building construction and equipment, but the expenditure 
thereof is limited to the maintenance and repair of buildings 
and the maintenance, repair and replacement of school equlpmmt#
July 22, 1949
Mr. Melvin 2* Msgnuson 
County Attorney 
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr. Magnuson;
You have requested my opinion on the following matter;
"We have been asked whether, under the provisions 
of Chapter 131, Laws of 1945, as amended by Chapter 
161, of Laws of 1947, funds transferred into a 
deferred maintenance fund can be spent for new 
building construction during the next fiscal 
year or whether the expenditure of such funds is 
limited to the maintenance and repair of buildings 
and the maintenance, repair and replacement of 
equipment in such buildings."
Chapter 131, Session Laws of 1945 is entitled;
"An Act Authorising the Creation by Boards of 
School Trustees of Reserve Funds for Elemen­
tary Schools, District High Schools, and 
County High Schools; Providing for the Accumu­
lating of Post War Funds, for Maintenance, Re­
pair and Replacement of school Equipment;
Prescribing the Manner in Which Such Funds 
May be Accumulated; Providing the Time When and 
the Purposes for Which Such Funds May Be 
Expended; end the Time During Which This Act 
Shall Be in Effect."
Section 1 creates a special reserve fund for post-war
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"msintensnce and repair of buildings and the maintenance, 
repair end replacemertof @qi%ment
I call attention to Section 3 of the act which states
:
in part:
"Beginning with such first day of July the 
moneys in such reserve funds may be ex­
pended for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of school equipment, but 
for no other purpose,#."
Further, Section 4 of the act states that during the life 
of the act none of the moneys in any such reserve fund may 
at any time be transferred to any other fund or funds and 
provides for transfers within fund itself.
The amendment of the act in Chapter 161, Laws of 1947 
made no substantial change so far as this opinion Is con­
cerned but established the date July 1, 1947 as the date 
of commencement of expenditure of the reserve fund.
The act itself very definitely limits the expenditure 
of the reserve fund to specific purposes. Nowhere in that 
enumeration of purposes does there appear any reference to 
new buildings construction and equipnent. Moreover the 
Legislature was extremely explicit in its limitation of the 
expenditure only to those specific purposes enumerated.
Section 4 of Chapter 131, Laws of 1945 states that no 
transfer to other purpose shall be made during the life of 
the act and that upon its ceasing to have force and effect 
any unexpected amounts may be transferred to the general 
elementary or high school fund by order of the Board of
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Trustees#
The set is to remain in effect, according to Chapter 
161, Laws of 1947, which emended portions of Chapter I3I,
Laws of 1945f "for a period of three (3 ) years after July 
1, 1947, but no longer#"
In Volume 22, Opinions of the Attorney General, Opinion 
Number 10, Attorney General Bottomly, in discussing the pur­
pose of an act similar to the one under consideration stated;
"It was undoubtedly the purpose of the Legislature 
in enacting Chapter 69, Laws of 1945, to provide 
post-war funds for the purpose therein set forth, to take up the slack of employment they felt 
would be in existence upon the termination of 
the war emergency# I think thià is a fair 
deduction from the reading of the title end 
the act as a whole."
"Also it was felt repair work and bridge work,
and other construction during the war years
would be neglected because of the lack offunds and the Impossibility of getting materials#"
At the end of that opinion, he stated that what he had 
dald in regard to Chapter 69, Laws of 1945, applied also to 
Chapter I3I, Laws of 1945#
Thus it is clear that .the fund Is not intended to add new 
capital assets to existing school plants, but to repair and 
renew those assets which exist and could not be properly main­
tained or replaced due to the exigencies of emergency, war­
time shortages#
It is therefore my opinion that under the provisions of
I
Chapter I3I, Laws of 1945, as amended by Chapter 161, Laws of
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1947, the funds transferred Into the deferred maintenance 
fund can not be spent for new building construction and 
equipment, but the expenditure thereof is limited to the 
**m8lntensnce and repair of buildings and the maintenance, 
repair and replacement of school equipment.*'
Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H. OLSÜN, 
Attorney General
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Opinion 76 - 1949
Held: 1# Funds which remain unexpended after the abandon--
ment of a District High School should be transferred to the 
general fund of the elementary schools of the district.
December 29# 1949
Mr* James P. #alsh 
County Attorney 
Rosebud County 
Forsyth, Montana
Dear Mr. Walsh:
You requested my opinion concerning the disposition of
funds which remain after the abandonment of a District High
School.
There Is no statutory provision made for the disposal of 
unexpended funds of a District High School which has been 
abolished. Such is not true in the case of the abolishment 
of a County High School as Section 1262.26, R.G.M.# 1935» (now 
Section 75*4127# R.C.M., 1947) provides for the distribution 
of remaining funds of a County High School. Also Section 970, 
R.C.M., 1935, as amended by Chapter 16S, Laws of 1943 (now 
Section 75-1522, R.C.M., 1947) designated the manner of 
distribution of funds remaining of an abandoned school district, 
In the case of State v. Brandenburg, 107 Mont. 199, S2 Pac.
(2d) 593, the Court considered the manner of disposal of 
funds realized from the sale of a building which had been ac­
quired for the use of the County High School. The Court held
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that the funds should not be allocated to all of the high 
schools In the County but must be held by the treasurer for 
the use of the County High School* The situation of a Dis- ' 
trict High School Is analogous in that the capital expendi­
tures made for a District High School result from a tax on 
the school district* While you did not state the source 
of the money on b^d, yet it is reasonable to assume that 
much of it came from a tax on the district and as a conse­
quence should be so used as to be of benefit to the district* 
It is therefore my opinion that funds which remain 
after the abandonment of a District High School should be 
transferred to the general fund of the elementary schools 
of the district.
Very truly yours,
ARNULD R* OLŜ N,
Attorney General
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Opinion Ô1 - I95O
Held: 1. Any surplus in en elementary school general fund
may be used in the next fiscal year to meet the deficiency 
in the State aid for the foundation program, but such surplus 
cannot be used to pay the twenty per cent permissive excess 
over the foundation program#
2. Any surplus in a high school general fund may be used in 
the next fiscal year to meet the deficiency in the State aid 
for the foundation program and also the fifteen per cent per­
missive excess over the foundation program#
January 13, 1950
Miss Mary M# Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon:
You have requested my opinion concerning the use of the
surplus remaining in the post-war reserve fund for maintenance
and repair of buildings in the school districts and also the
use. of any cash balance In the general fund#
Chapter 131, laws of 1945, as amended by Chapter I6I,
Lows of 1947, provided for the accumulation of a reserve fund
for repair and equipment of school buildings* Section 5 of
Chapter 131, Laws of 1945, ss amended by Chapter I6I, Lews of
1947, provided that the act would be in effect three years
after July 1, 1947, and that any balance on July 1, 1950,
must be transferred to the general fund as provided in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Section 4, Chapter 131, Laws of 1945* This will result In 
many school districts having a cash balance at the end of the 
fiscal year which raises the question of the use of such 
money under the provisions of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949,
Section B of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, provides for the 
distribution of funds to school districts by the State Board 
of Education in the months of December and April of each year 
from the State Public School Equalization Fund op the basis 
of reports made to the State Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion for the maintenance and operation of the schools. The 
standard for the financing of our schools is the foundation 
program found in Section 3 of Chapter 199 end the distribu­
tion of State aid in Section Chapter 199 is limited to 
fifty per cent of the foundation program for those districts 
which qualify for State aid. Section 19 of Chapter 199 
makes it the duty of the State Superintendent of Public Instruc- 
tion to notify each County Superintendent of Schools that 
t h e r e b e  a deficiency of the funds for State aid* If
■S.
the surplus remaining in the reserve fund can be applied to 
meet the deficiency in State aid, there will be no necessity 
for an extra levy to supply these funds.
Section B, Chapter 199 in limiting the maximum aid from
the State to fifty per cent also recognizes the foundation
program as the standard end the phrase ”from all other
sources” justifies the utilization of the surplus to maintain
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the standard end thus meet the State deficiency* This \vould 
apply with equal force to any surplus in the general fund, 
whatever the source, with the exception of the reserves as 
provided for in Sections 10 end 14 of Chapter 199,
The application of the general fund surplus to meet the 
permissive additional expenses of twenty per cent for 
elementary schools, Section 9 of Chapter 199, and fifteen 
per cent for high schools, Section 14, chapter 199, raises 
additional questions* The elementary schools would be pre­
cluded from the use of the surplus to meet the additional 
expense as Section 9 of Chapter 199 contains this limitation:
”*.*but the entire amount of such excess expense 
over the foundation program shall be paid solely 
from levies upon the property in such district,*#”
However, there is not such a prohibition as to high
school budgets as Section 14, Chapter 199 states:
”,,,but the allowance of such excess expense 
over the foundation program shall not in any 
manner increase the amounts to be apportioned 
hereunder from the State Public School Equali­
zation fund,.,”
It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature in making 
the distinction between the elementary and high school budgets 
recognized that the surplus in the high school general fund 
could be used to meet the excess expense over the foundation 
program*
It is therefore my opinion:
1, Any surplus in an elementary school general fund may
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be used in the next fiscal ye»r to meet the deficiency in the 
State aid for the foundation program, but such surplus 
cannot be used to pay the twenty per cent permissive excess 
over the foundation program,
2, Any surplus in a high school general fund may be 
used in the next fiscal year to meet the deficiency in the 
state aid for the foundation program and also the fifteen 
per cent permissive excess over the foundation program.
Very truly yours,
AHHOLD H, OWm, 
Attorney General
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Opinion Ô6 «• 1950
Held! Any surplus remaining that is in the reserve fund for 
post-war maintenance, repair and equipment created by Sections 
75-3710 through 75-3714* 1947, mST be transferred
to school general fund after July 1, 1950.
January 31* 1950t,
Miss Mary M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction State Capitol Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condons
You have asked if it is mandatory that the balance re­
maining in the post-war reserve fund for maintenance and repair 
of buildings of school districts be transferred to the general 
fund of the school districts of this State.
Chapter 131, Session tows of 1945* «s amended by Chapter 
I6l, Session Laws of 1947, ©s now contained in Sections 75-3710 
through 75-3714, H.C.M,, 1947* created and defined the use 
of the reserve fund* Section 75-3713* supra, is as follows 
in part!
■ — **...end provided further that immediately fol­
lowing the date when this act shell cease to 
be of any force or effect* if there shall re­
main in any such reserve fund any amount un­
expended and unappropriated such amount may, 
by order of the Board of Trustees be trans­
ferred to the general elementary school fund., 
or to the district high school fund...or to 
the County high school fund...”
The date of the termination of the act is fixed at July 1,
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1950, sa Section 75-3714» supra, reads as follows;
**Thia act shall be in full force and effect frcan 
and after its passage and approval and shall re­
main in effect for a period of three (3) years 
after July 1, 1947» but no longer."
As the reserve fund is dependent for its existence on
•*
the life of Chapter 131» Session Laws of 1945» as amended, the 
expiration of the act would preclude any expenditure from the 
reserve fund. The reserve fund as such would lapse end not 
be continued as an item in the budget for the next fiscal 
year.
Section 75-1714» R.C.M., 1947, formerly Section 1019.14 
R.O.M., 1935» which is a part of the elementary school budget 
act, limits expenditures to the detailed appropriations fixed 
by the budget* A like provision is found in the high school 
budget act. It is a reasonable conclusion that as the author­
ity for the deferred maintenance reserve fund has been taken 
sway, the provisions of the budget law, referred to above, 
will control.
The Supreme Court of Montana has made numerous rulings 
upon the ouestion of whether the word "msy" in a statute can 
be interpreted ®s "shall" or "must" end the general rule is 
now well established that such interpretation is to be made 
when it is determined that the Legislature intended the word 
to be used in a mandatory sense. Curl and v# frlĉ ett, 9̂ » 
Mont. 399, 39 Pac. (2d) 652; State ex rel. McCabe v. District
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Court, 106 Mont» 2?2, 76 JPac# {2d) 634; Hansen y* City of
Havre, 112 Mont. 207, 114 Pac. (2f) 1053, 135 A.L.B. 1278,
In the Hansen case the court held as follows on page 217 of
the Montana Reports; , ,
"Defendants contend that the word "may" as used in 
Section 5277.3 means "must" or "shall". We think 
this contention must be sustained. We have often 
held that "may" means "must" or "shall", depending 
upon the apparent Legislative intent, (Citing 
Cases)»"
Since any balance remaining in the post-war reserve fund, 
could not be expended after the expiration of the act unless 
such balance was transferred to one of the enumerated school 
funds, the provisions of Section 75-3713» supra, that any 
amount unexpended end unappropriated "may" be transferred 
must be Interpreted to mean "must” be transferred. It 
cannot be said that it was the intent of the Legislature to 
permit such funds to lie idle after the act creating the post­
war reserve fund has expired »
It is therefore my opinion that any surplus remaining in 
the reserve fund for post-war maintenance, repair and equipment 
created by Sections 75-3710 through 75-3714» R.C.M,, 1947» 
èîÜST be transferred to the school general fund after July 1,
1950,
Very truly yours,
ARÜÜLD H» OLSaB,
Attorney General
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Opinion No* 29 ~ 1951
Heldî Levies on high school districts and the county wide 
levies for the maintenance of high schools are valid and 
legal levies#
July 30, 1951
\ Mr, Norman R« Bamcord 
County Attcrney 
j Wheatland County 
Harlowton, Montana
Dear Mr# Bamcordi
You have requested my opinion concerning the levy on 
high school building districts and the county wide levy for 
the maintenance and operation of high schools# Tour questions 
are asked because of the recent opinion of our Supreme Court 
in the case of Rankin vs# Love, et al*, 5 State Reporter 
316, Psc# (2d), which wag decided June 14th, 1951*
The facts which were the basis for the litigation in 
Rankin vs# Love arose from an attempt of a high school dis­
trict to issue bonds# The boundaries of the high school 
district and the elementary district were identical end the 
court directed its attention primarily to the limitation of 
indebtedness for school purposes and stated;
"Contravening section 6 of Article XIII es it 
does. Chapter 275$ Laws of 1947 (R#C#M#, 1947,
75-4601 75-4606), is unconstitutional and is 
invalid#”
This quoted portion of the opinion illustrates that the 
court’s concern was with the problem of school indebtedness 
and this is more apparent in that the decision expressly
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overruled House vs# School District No# 4 of Park County,
120 Mont# 319, 1Ô4 Pec# (2d) 285, which held that a common 
school district could incur indebtedness up to the constitu­
tional limit without regard to the indebtedness of the high 
school district in which it was located# Our court by such
action precluded one piece of property il th being burdened
/
up to the limit of indebtedness of the elementary district 
and then up to the same limit by the overlapping high school 
district#
In the case of Rankin vs# Love the history of school diS"
tricts end in particular the legislation relating to high
schools was reviewed and the court said:
"In accordance therewith, a high school, when 
established, becomes an integral part of the 
public school system in that particular district#
It is under the jurisdiction of the same board 
of trustees as the elementary grades or any 
other department of the public school system 
existing in that particular "school district," 
and financed end maintained by taxation on the 
property lying and being within the exterior 
boundaries of that particular school district.
This was the law of this state prior to and at 
the time of the writing of our Constitution in 
regard to public schools and "school districts," 
and it is still the ̂ law of this jurisdiction."
In making this statement the ease of Pierson vs. Hen­
drick sen, 98 Mont# 244, 38 Pac. (2d) 991, which approved high 
school districts, was not limited or reversed, although it 
was before the Court. The Pierson case considered the first 
high school district law which is almost identical vi th the 
present laws, and said;
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*The state legislature may create or abolish 
districtsI or change or re-arrange boundaries 
fit will# {State ex rel, Rodman vs# Meyers, 65 
Mont* 124, 210 fac# 1064*) It has then by 
Chapter 47 done so with the view of eliminating 
some of the Inequelities pointed out in the 
Henderson case, and with the view of having 
the bonds paid by those who obtain the most 
use of the property benefited by the*improve­
ment* Wo see no constitutional objection to 
the plan as provided in Chapter 47."
While it is true that high school building districts 
were created for the purpose of issuing bonds for construc­
tion, repair, improvement and equipaent of school buildings, 
Section 75-4̂ ’05 R#C.M#, 1947, yet the legislature had the 
constitutional authority to utilize the high school districts 
for maintenance end operation as was done in Chapter 199,
Laws of 1949# Section 1 of Article XI of the Montana Con­
stitution directs the Legislature to provide a school system 
by the provisionî
"It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly 
of Montana to establish and maintain a general, 
uniform and thorough system of public, free, 
common schools#"
This constitutional provision was considered in Evers vs#
Hudson, 36 Mont# 135, 92 Pac, 462, wherein the court approved
a legislative act that authorized the establishment of county
high schools# The Court’s observations concerning this section
of the constitution fire pertinent:
"The evident purpose of section 1, Article XI, 
above, was to insure a system of common schools; 
but there is not anything in that section, or 
elsewhere in the Constitution, which directly
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limits, or by Implication may be said to limit, 
the power of the legislature to provide for other 
schools. As to whether there is m y limitation, 
beyond which the law-making power may not go in 
matters of this character, need not now be con­
sidered, It was said in Koester vs. Board of 
County Commissioners, 44 Kan, 141, 24 Fac, 65ï ♦The concern of the constitution makers does not 
seem to have been to provide against the ûBng&r 
of too many schools, but to secure a common school 
system principally, and also other schools of a 
higher grade,*”
"Section 1, Article XI, is not a limitation upon 
the legislative power, but is e solemn mandate to 
the legislature. That the chiéf concern of the 
framers of the Constitution was directed to free 
common schools is evidenced by the facts that such 
schools are made sole beneficiaries of the public 
school funds. But the declared concern of the 
Constitution framers for & system of public free 
common schools does not in any sense militate 
against the power of the legislature to establish 
other schools, "The matter of education is one 
of public interest, which concerns ell the people 
of the state, and is therefore subject to the 
control of the legislature,”
Thus, approval was granted by our court to an act which
authorized the establishment of county high schools. County
high schools have never been a part of any school district and
their bonds ere those of the county in which they are located.
The language used in State ex rel* Henderson vs. Dawson County,
ê7 Mont, 122, 286 Pac, 125, is of specific application as
the court saidt
"However, a high school education is a necessary 
Intermediate step between the ordinary grade 
schools end the university courses provided for, 
and the term "common” as applied to our schools 
"bears the broadest end most comprehensive sig­
nification, it being equivalent to public, uni­
versal, open to all," It is used in contradistinction
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to private and denominational schools, colleges 
and the like, but has no reference to the grade 
of school or whet may be taught therein, nor the method of rule or government thereof# *********
Thus, under constitutional authority, the legis­
lature may either leave the matter of high school 
education to the several school districts of a 
county or provide a different method of rule or 
government for this class of "common schools#"
For years the first method was followed ; such high 
school education as was afforded was given in 
district school courses or high schools estab­
lished in districts, without legislative.sanction#
"In 1899 the legislative body provided for the 
establishment of free county high schools by a 
vote of the electors of the county, and for 
which trustees were to be appointed by the board 
of county commissioners; these trustees were 
empowered to "bond the county" for the purpose of building and equipping a county hi^ school building."
The conclusion to be reached from the legislative pro­
vision for, and the judicial recognition of county high 
schools end their method of financing is that common school 
districts are not the exclusive means of school financing#
In fact the Court in Rankin vs# Love was not faced with the 
question of levies for maintenance and operation, and such 
problems were outside of the scope of the decision# It is 
most important to remember that the real question decided by 
the court was the limitation of indebtedness as evidenced 
by the fact House vs. School District Ho# 4 of Park County 
120 Mont. 319, 184 Pac, (2d) 28$, was expressly overruled.
Two of the fundamental sources of income for the schools 
of our state ere the county wide levy for common schools, Sec­
tion 75-3706, R.G.M., 1947, and the county wide high school
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levy, Section 15» Chapter 208, Laws o f 1951# If the school 
district is the exclusive **taxing unit*̂  for the support of 
both elementary and high schools then the county wide levies 
of both elementary end high schools then the county wide 
levies would be unconstitutional* This cannot be the intent 
of the court and it would not be reasonable to read into the 
case of Rankin vs# Love problems which were not before the 
Court for consideration and concerning which the Court has 
ruled as set foth above* Historically the county wide levy 
for the support of the common schools antedated the Montana 
Constitutional Convention of 1889 as Section 44 of the Laws 
of 1871 provided for such a levy and the statute was opera­
tive in 1889#
Section 1 of Article XI of the Montana Constitution as 
construed in Evers vs. Hudson, supra, gives legal sanction to 
the legislative creation of high school districts and the 
feet the decision did not overrule Pierson vs# Hendricksen,
98 Mont# 244» 38 Pac# {2d} 991, and Berthot vs# Gallatin 
County High School District, 102 Mont. 356, 58 Pac# {2d) 264# 
permits the conclusion that high school districts are legal 
entities for school purposes#
It is therefore my opinion that levies on high school 
districts and the county wide levies for the maintmance of
high schools are valid and legal levies*
Very truly yours,ARNOLD H. OLSON
Attorney General
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Opinion 33 - 1951
Held: Any deficiency in state aid for the elementary budget
in a joint school is the obligation of the entire area of 
the joint district end a levy must be mad® on such area to 
meet the needé
August 15f 1951
Mr, J, i5, McKenna 
County Attorney 
Fergus County 
Lewistown, Montana
Dear Mr, McKenna:
You have requested my opinion concerning the levy to be 
made on a joint school district to meet the deficiency In 
state aid on the foundation program for the elementary budget. 
You advise me that Judith Basin County, in which part of the 
joint district is located, meets the standard of the founda­
tion program without state aid. You also advise me that 
Fergus County, in which part of the joint district is situated, 
requires state aid in order to achieve the foundation program. 
As there is a 10 per cent deficiency in state aid, you would 
like to know what area of the joint district is subject to 
a levy to supply the funds for the deficiency.
Section 17 of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, as amended by 
Section 1 of Chapter 182, Laws of 1951, contains specific 
directions for the computation of the elementary budgets in 
joint school districts. This statute reads in part as follows: 
"The balance of the budget over the foundation
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program, plus any deficiency in the state equaliza­
tion payment on the foundation program, shall be an 
obligation of all parts of the joint district and 
the levy for this amount shall be determined by divid­
ing the amount required by the total taxable valuation 
of the entire joint school district*”
From the above quoted portion of Chapter 182, Laws of 1951, 
it is apparent that any deficiency in state aid must be met 
by a levy on the whole area of the joint school district*
This results in an inequality to that portion of a joint dis­
trict which is located in a county which does not require 
state aid because the five mill district levy and the appor­
tionment of the tea mill county levy are sufficient to meet 
the foundation program budget requirements. However, the 
legislature by this statute, has fixed the means of meeting 
the standard of the foundation program and we are bound by 
this law.
It is therefore my opinion that any deficiency in state 
eld for the elementary budget In a joint school is the obliga­
tion of the entire area of the joint district and a levy must 
be made on such area to meet the need.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSJN
Attorney General
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Opinion 46 - 1951
Heldî The funds received by the school districts from the 
Federal Government under Public law #74, #lst Congress, shall 
not be used by the school districts In addition to the appro­
priations found in the budgets of the school districts, but 
shall be used to relieve the tax burdens due to the increased 
enrollment resulting from federal Installations in the 
districts.
November 7, 1951
Mr, Ted James 
County Attorney 
Cascade County 
Great Falls, Montana
Dear I4r. James 8
You have requested my opinion concerning the use of
federal funds received by school district #1 of your county
from the federal government by virtue of Public Law #74, You
advise me that there has been a material increase in school
enrollment due to new federal agencies established in your
city. The sum of $34,451.51 was received from the federal
government after June 30, 1951, as assistance to the school
district. Your specific question is directed to the proper
use of this money under our school budget law.
Public Law #74, #lst Congress, reads in part as follows:
«Section 1. In recognition of the responsibility 
of the United States for the impact which certain 
federal activities have on the local educational 
agencies in the areas in which such activities
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are carried on, the congress hereby declares it 
to be the policy of the United States to provide 
financial assistance (as set forth in the follow­
ing sections of this act) for those local educa­
tional agencies upon which the United States has 
placed financial burdens by reason of the fact that—
(1) the revenues available to such agencies from local sources have been reduced as the re­
sult of the acquisition of real property by the 
United States 5 or
(2) such agencies provide education for children residing on federal property; or
(3) such agencies provide education for 
children whose parents are employed on federal 
property; or
(4l there has been a sudden and substantial 
increase in school attendance as the result of 
federal activities#"
The obvious pmp os® of the congressional act is to relieve
in part the taxpayers in your locality frcxn the increased
burden on your schools#
While the federal money was granted to the school district
to relieve the tax load, yet the congressional act did not
alter the operation of our budget laws or school finance
statutes#
From the correspondence submitted with your letter, it 
appears that the federal money was not included in income for 
the current school budget, as the funds were received sub­
sequent to the computation of the budget# It is the proposal 
of the school board to use the money under an additional 
federal funds budget#
The basis of our school finance system is a per capita 
distribution of district, county and state funds for the 
support of the schools allocated on the basis of "the average 
number belonging" or the attendance for the previous school
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year. Sections 1 and 2, Chapter 199, Laws of 1949* This act 
Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, established a **foundation program" 
for our schools which is not only a minimum standard but also 
a maximum standard with certain permissive increases authorized. 
That the total amount of the general fund expenses shall not 
exceed the foundation program, with permissive increases 
and voted levies, is provided in Section 9 and 14 of Chapter 
199, Laws of 1949, as amended by Chapter 208, Laws of 1951,
The items in the budgets which are to be expended during 
the year constitute appropriations end the trustees cannot 
under Sections 75-1714 and 75-4519, R,C.M,, 1947, exceed the 
total of these items. If additional expenses are incurred 
they are not liabilities of the district#
It appears that the trusteed of the school district in 
your county attempted to set up an independent budget for the 
expenditure of the funds received from the federal government, 
although there is not statutory authority for such procedure.
As was previously pointed out, the sum of money received was 
a reimbursement for the additional expense to the district*
If an additional budget to spend the money is created and the 
foundation program is exceeded, then there will be no relief 
to the taxpayers and the purpose of the grant will thus be 
defeated.
It is true that an independent transportation budget is 
adopted each year, but his is done by virtue of Section 75-3414,
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Revléed Codes of Montana, 1947 which specifically states that 
such a budget shall be provided. Similar budgets are used for 
vocational training, and school lunch program, but these 
activities are under the general school laws, as is apparent 
from a reading of Sections 75-4245 and 75-4802, R.C.M, 1947.
As you stated in your letter the funds in question were 
not received until after June 30, 1951, the end of the fiscal 
year for the schools and did not constitute "cash on hand” at 
that time. However it is the lack of appropriations in the 
budget which constitutes the real barrier to the expenditures 
of this money, as was pointed out above* If there has been 
an increase in enrollment so as to constitute an emergency 
within the meaning of the definition found in Section 75-1716 
end 75-4521, R»C*M,, 1947, then emergency budgets may be 
adopted and the cash on hand may be used to pay the appropria­
tions of such budgets. If emergency budgets are not adopted, 
the funds will be available for us in the following fiscal year, 
As these federal funds are to be used to relieve the 
local taxpayers from the increased load, the money should be 
allocated to all of the funds in the budget, including the 
independent, budgets which are supported by levies on the 
property in the district, in the proportionate amount each 
bears to the whole*
It is therefore, my opinion that the funds received by 
the school districts from the Federal Government under Public 
Law Ô74, 81st Congress, shall not be used by the school
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districts in addition to the appropriations found In the 
budgets of the school districts, but shall be used to 
relieve the tax burden due to the increased enrollment 
resulting from federal installations In the districts
Very truly yours.
AimOlD H. OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 73 -* 1952
Held! The failure to levy the full ten mill county wide levy
for the high schools of a county# due to a clerical errotj
cannot be corrected by a levy in excess of ten mills on all
the property in the county in the next fiscal year#
March 29, 1952 
«
Mr# John Michael McCsrvel 
County Attorney 
Deer Lodge County 
Anaconda, Montana
Dear Mr# McCarvelS
You have requested my opinion concerning an error made
in the high school levy in your county# You advise me that
1
the high school budget provided for a ten mill county wide 
levy, but a clerical error was made end the actual levy mad# 
by the county commissioners was a four mill levy# You ask 
if a sixteen mill county wide levy may be made for the next 
fiscal year#
Section 15, Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, as amended by 
Chapter 20&, Laws of 1951, provides for an annual county vd.de 
levy of ten mills for the support of the high schools of the 
county# This section limits the county wide levy to the 
fiscal year for which the levy is made# Also, the founda­
tion program for the current year is a limitation for the 
levy# To permit the levy for one year to be increased above 
the authorised amount for the purpose of realizing funds to 
restore moneys due to an erroneous levy for a previous year
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is not within the contemplation of the statute* The applicable
rule is found in 51 An* Jr* 621, where it is said!
"It is essential to the validity of a tax that it 
be of no f;reater amount than was authorized by the 
legislature, and any excess over the amount so 
authorized will render the assessment void, however, 
trivial the excess may be*"
See! State ex rel* Tillman v, 11strict ôurt,
101 Mont* 176, 53 P, (2d) 107, 103 A,L.R. 376
During this current fiscal year there are sufficient
appropriations in the budget to meet the needs of the high
school, but there are not funds to meet the appropriations*
The only solution Is to register warrants as permitted by
Section 16-2604# E.G.M*, 1947, as Section 75-4532, R*C*M*,
1947, limits the payment or registration of warrants to the
amount of the appropriation* The registered warrants will be
an item for payment in the budget for the following year*
Because of this additional expense, it may be necessary
to vote an extra levy on the school district for the budget
for the next fiscal year*
It is therefore my opinion that the failure to levy the
full ten mill county wide levy for the high schools of a county,
due to a clerical error, cannot be corrected by a levy in
excess of ten mills on all the property in the county in the
next fiscal year* Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSLN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 101 - 1952
Heldî Kindergarten pupils, in an established kindergarten 
upon reaching the age of six years, may be included in the 
A,N.B. of the school districts end their daily attendance 
considered in determining the amount of state financial 
aid for the schools of their district*
July Ô, 1952
Miss Maiy M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction State Capitol 
Helena, Montana
fear Miss Condon:
You have requested my opinion as to whether or not kinder­
garten pupils, upon reaching the age of six years, may be 
included in the A.N.B. of the schools involved in determining 
the foundation program.
Section 7 Article I of the Montana Constitution 
provides, "The public free schools cf the state 
shall be open to all children and youth between 
the ages of six and twenty«-one years."
From this constitutional provision it is apparent that 
any child who reaches his sixth birthday is entitled to attend 
school as a matter of right and should be considered in deter­
mining the number of enrolled pupils. The fact that the 
child is in kindergarten would not preclude him from being 
considered as a student in the public schools for the reason 
that Section 75-2001 defines a public school so that it in­
cludes an established kindergarten in the following language î
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"A public school Is a school established! end 
maintained under the laws of this state at 
public expense and comprising the elementary 
grades, and, when established, the kindergarten 
and the high school including all the junior 
and senior grades of high school vo rk,«
The distribution of state aid to the public schools is 
made under the provisions of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, as 
amended, and the basis of such distribution is fixed by the 
«average number belonging" or which is defined as
meaning "the average number of regularly enrolled full time 
pupils attending a public school•«
1 Indergarten pupils in an established kindergarten who 
have reached the age of six years meet all the qualifications 
of the above statutes and their attendance may be counted 
in the computation for the state aid.
It is therefore, my opinion that kindergarten pupils, in 
an established kindergarten upon reaching the age of six years, 
may be included in the A.N.B. of the school districts and 
their daily attendance considered in determining the amount 
of state financial aid for the schools of their district.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 92 •* 1954
Held: 1. In the submission of the question to the qualified
electors of a high school district whether an extra levy 
should be authorized the amounts needed for each high school 
must be incorporated in one question*
2* An extra levy may be voted by the electorate of a 
school district for the use of the high school of the 
district although the school district is a part of a high 
school district*
August 26, 1954
Mr. «S/. M. Black 
County Attorney 
Toole County 
Shelby, Montana
Dear Mr. Black:
You have requested my opinion concerning the validity 
of two special elections for extra levies. You advise me 
that there are two high schools in one high school district. 
You also state that separate ballots were used at the election 
submitting propositions for extra levies for the sup̂ >ort md 
maintenance of each of the two high schools. The electors 
approved the extra levy for one of the high schools and re­
jected the levy on the high school district for the other 
high school. Subsequently, a special election was held 
in the common school district and a special levy was approved 
for the support and maintenance of the high school whose 
request for an extra levy on the high school district had
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boen rejected*
In considering the problem, it Is necessery to observe
the provisions of two pertinent code sections* Section 75-3801,
R.C.M*, 1947# as last amended by Chapter 247» laws of 1953,
reads In part as follows ;
”{2) Whenever the board of trustees of any district 
or county high school shall deem it necessary to 
raise money by taxation in excess of the levy 
required to meet Its foundation program*.,#****** 
for the purpose of maintaining the high schools of said district or the county high school,,•♦or for 
any other purpose necessary for the proper opera­
tion and maintenance of the schools of said 
district, or county high school, said board of 
trustees shall determine end fix the amount neces­
sary and required for such purpose or purposes 
in addition to any other legal levies on the 
district,*•♦and in the case of the district 
high school it shall submit the question of an 
additional levy to raise said amount to the 
qualified electors residing within the district 
who are taxpayers end whose names appear upon 
the last completed assessment roll of the 
county for state, county and school taxes, 
either at the regular annual election held in 
said district or at a special election called 
for that purpose by the board of trustees of 
said district."
The above quoted authorizes an election on the question
of an additional levy for the support of a district high
school to the voters of the district in which the high school
is situated. Section 75-4609, R.C.M*, 1947, ®s last amended
by Chapter 120, Laws of 1953, provides:
"Special tax Levy - - Election. Whenever the 
board of trustees of the local school district 
within which the high school is situated shall 
deem It necessary to raise money for high school 
purposes In addition to its revenues from county 
and state apportionments, a meeting of the board
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of tnjistees of the high school district together 
%fith the chairjaen of the boards of trustees of 
all common school districts included within the 
high school district shall be called and held to consider the calling of an election to vote upon 
the cuestion of approving a special levy for high 
school purposes# Provided, that any other member 
designated by the board of trustees of any such 
common school district may represent such district 
in place of the chairman thereof# If a majority 
of the board of trustees of the high school district 
and the designated representatives of said common 
school districts attending such meeting shell 
determine that the proposed expenditures are 
necessary for the proper maintenance and operation 
of such high school, said trustees of the high 
school district shall ascertain and determine the 
number of mills required to be raised by special 
levy, and shall cell an election for the purpose 
of submitting the cuestion of making such add!** 
tional levy to the cualified electors who are tax« 
payers voting at such election, the result of said 
election shall be certified to the board of county 
commissioners, and the levy approved by such 
majority vote shall be made upon all property 
within said high school district#”
This section permits the qualified electors of a high 
school district to authorize an additional levy to support 
a high school which levy would be made over the entire high 
school district# It is important to observe that the 
statute states that one levy may be made for the high school 
of the district. As a general rule, there is only one high 
school in each high school district, but under the facta 
here there are two high schools in a high school district# 
The taxing unit is the high school district and the addi­
tional levy may be imposed for high school purposes on this 
taxing district# The authorized purpose as stated in the
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statut© Is to.parait an additional levy to raise money for 
high school purposes above the foundation program. The total 
amount needed for high school purposes in the,district should 
bo incorporated in this single levy# If each of the high . 
schools needs additional funds, then only on© question 
incorporating the full amount of each high school should 
have been suWitted to the electors# Submitting the question 
in this manner would comply with the language used In the 
statute which requires but one additional levy and also 
prevent discrimination between the two schools within the 
taxing area. Section 11 of Article HI of the Montana 
Constitution requires uniforaity in taxation and in Com, v, 
Alden Coal Co* 251 Pa. 134, 96 Â 246, IRA 1916 f  154, it 
was held that the constitutional provision that taxation 
shall be uniform applies not only to the levy and assessment 
of the tax, but to its expenditure and distribution as well. 
The submission of the two questions resulted in a tax over 
the high school district for the use of one of the two 
high schools, and as a consequence there was a lack of 
uniformity in the distribution of the funds.
The tax which was approved by the electorate of the 
common school district for the support of the high school of 
the common school district complies with Section 75-3601,
1947, as amended, and is uniform and not discrimin­
atory.
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It Is therefore my opinion that?
1* In the submission of the question to the ouallfied 
electors of a high school district whether m  extra levy should 
be authorized the amounts needed for each high school must 
be incorporated in one question*
2» An extra levy may be voted by the electorate of a 
school district for the use of the high school of the district 
although the school district is a part of a high school 
district.
Very truly yours,
m m U) H, OLSEM
Attorney General
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Opinion 20 - 1955 .
Held: It is within the power end ©uthorlty of the governing
offices of school districts, cities end counties to provide 
in the current budget for the employer*s contribution in 
anticipation of a favorable vote by referendum of the em­
ployees to be covered under the Social Security Act*
June 22, 1955
Mr* Norman C# Robb 
County Attorney 
Park County 
Livingston, Montana
Dear Mr* Robb:
You have requested my opinion concerning the manner of
financing the employer’s share of Social Security coverage
by cities, counties and school districts*
Chapters 2?0 and 271, Laws of 1955, extend coverage
under the Federal Social Security Act to employees of the
state and to political subdivisions and to members of the
staff and teachers of school districts of the state* It is
to be noted that both of these laws were not specifically
made operative on passage and approval and as a consequence
under Section 43*507, R.C.M*, 1947, both statutes become
effective July 1, 1955*
It is to be noted that under Section 21Ô (d) (3) of the
Social Security Act, a referendum of the employees must be
held and a majority must approve coverage under the Social
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Security Act# Kinety days notice of such referendum must be 
given and as the law is not; effective until July 1, 1955, the 
earliest date for such an election will be approximately 
October 1. However, budgets for cities, counties and school 
districts must be adopted prior to October 1, and as a con­
sequence, a favorable vote for coverage under the Social 
Security Act by the employees of these governmental units 
would impose an immediate obligation on each governmental 
unit# The trustees of the school districts, the boards of 
county commissioners end the councils of cities may antici­
pate in their budgets that each as an employer must make 
contribution for the Social Security coverage#
The source of the money for such payments must be the 
general fund of each governmental subdivision# Ko addi­
tional levy may be made for the employer’s contribution for 
Social Security and this is in direct contrast with the 
contributions to the Retirement Systems# Section 68-603, 
R#0#M*, 1947, authorizes the city to make payment from each 
fund from which compensation for personal services are paid 
and, if general revenue sources are insufficient, then a 
special tax may be levied# A similar provision is made in 
Section 75-2709, R*C.K#, 1947, for school districts.
As there is no statutory authorization for the levying 
of a special tax to meet the employer’s contribution by cities, 
counties end school districts for the Social Security of its
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employees, e©ch unit must provide in the general fund for 
such an expenditure» If the governing offices of each of 
these political subdivisions propose to call a referendum 
and anticipate a favorable vote, It would appear advisable 
to include in the budget now being prepared an item for 
such liability* In the event the employees did not cast a 
favorable vote on the question of coverage under the Social 
Security Act, then such funds so appropriated in the budget 
may be carried in the budget and used in a subsequent 
budget as cash on hand*
It is therefore my opinion that it is within the power 
and authority of the governing offices of school districts, 
cities end counties to provide in the current budget for the 
employer*s contribution in anticipation of a favorable vote 
by referendum of the employees to be covered under the 
Social Security Act*
Very truly yours,
miOLd H* OLSJH
Attorney General
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Opinion 27 • 195$ J
Held: 1* In detenainin^ the maximum amount for which a
high school district may become indebted, the proposed 
indebtedness must be apportioned among the common school 
districts comprising the high school on a proportionate 
valuation basis# If such proposed indebtedness will re­
sult in any one common school district’s exceeding five per 
cent of its valuation when the amount so apportioned is 
added to the outstanding indebtedness of the common school 
district, then the amount of the proposed indebtedness of 
the high school district which causes the common school 
district to exceed five per cent of the value of the 
common school district is invalid#
2* In determining the limitation of indebtedness of a 
common school district, the proportionate share on a 
valuation basis of the outstanding indebtedness of the high 
school district must be deducted from five per cent of the 
valuation of the common school district, and the amount 
remaining is the limit of additional indebtedness which may 
be incurred by such common school districts#
July 13, 1955
f‘5r* Charles W# Jardina 
County Attorney 
Powder River County 
Broadus, Montana
Deer Mr* Jardine:
You have requested my opinion as to whether the maximum
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a high school district may become indebted Is five 
per cent of the valuation of the property of the high school 
district irrespective of the debt bf any of the component 
common school districts* You have also asked if the common 
school district may become indebted to the full five per 
cent of the valuation of the property in the district when 
there is outstanding indebtedness Incurred by the high 
school district of which the common school district is a 
part*
In answering your questions it is first necessary to con­
sider the three taxing units which may issue bonds for high 
schools* County bonds may be issued for the construction 
of county high schools as is provided in Section 75-4112, 
R*0«M., 1947* In Hamilton v* the Board of County Commis­
sioners, 54 Mont* 301 169 Pac* 729, it was hold that county 
bonds issued for the purpose of constructing a county high 
school are obligations of the entire county. In State ex 
rel# Henderson v* Dawson County, 87 Mont* 122, 286 Pac.
125, it was again recognized that bonds issued by a county 
for the construction of a county high school are county 
obligations and that a county in issuing such bonds lends 
the credit of the county for high school purposes* This 
case specifically stated that outstanding county high school 
bonds do not limit school districts in the incurring of 
indebtedness* There is no statutory method now for the
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establishment of county high schools.
High school districts are established under the pro­
visions of Chapter 46, Title 75# &.C,M,, 1947# and a county 
may be divided Into one or more high school districts. From 
your letter it appears that your county has been designated 
as one high school district.
Section 6 of Article XIII of Rontana Constitution 
limits the indebtedness which may be incurred by school 
districts to five per cent of the value of the taxable 
value of the district.
The procedure for issuing high school district bonds is 
the same as that for the issuance of school district bonds# 
Section 75-4604, , 1947, makes all the lews pertaining
to the issuance of bonds by school districts applicable to 
the issuance of bonds by school districts. Section 75-4603, 
R.C.M., 1947, states that the limitation for indebtedness 
for high school districts is that it la not reduced by the 
indebtedness of the common school districts. In House v. 
School District No. 4, 120 Mont. I64 Pac. (2d) 2S5, this 
provision was held constitutional. A contrary conclusion 
was reached in Rankin v. Love, 125 Mont. 495, 240 Pac. (2d) 
862, where the court held that high school districts have the 
authority to incur indebtedness so long as such indebtedness, 
when apportioned among common school districts in proportion 
to the assessed valuation of the property in each and this
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part added to the existing indebtedness of the common school 
districts respectivelyI did not bring the debt of any of the 
latter in excess of the limit prescribed by Section 6, Article 
XIII of the Montana Constitution#
The converse of the above rule Is also true In determining 
the limitation of indebtedness of a common school district#
In ascertaining the possible limit of Indebtedness of a common 
school district the proportionate share of outstanding indebted­
ness of the high school district must he deducted from the 
amount of additional Indebtedness which may be incurred by 
such common school district#
It is therefore my opinion that In determining the maximum 
amount for which a high school district may become indebted 
the proposed indebtedness must be apportioned among the common 
school districts comprising the hl^ school on a proportionate 
valuation basis# If such proposed indebtedness will result 
in any one common school district’s exceeding five per cent 
of its valuation when the amount so apportioned is added to 
the outstanding indebtedness of the common school district, 
then the amount of the proposed indebtedness of the high 
school district which causes the common school district to 
exceed five per cent of the value of the common school district
is Invalid#
It is also my opinion that in determining the limitation 
of indebtedness of a common school district, the proportionate
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share on a valuation basis of the outstanding indebtedness 
of the high school district must be deducted from five per 
cent of the valuation of the common school district, and the 
amount remaining is the limit of additional indebtedness 
which may be incurred by such common school districts#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# OLSùN 
Attorney General
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CHAPTER VIII 
TAXATION
Opinion 40 - I949
Held: 1« Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949j which
imposes a use tax upon trucks, trailers, semi-trailers, and 
automobiles operating over and upon the highways of the State 
of Montana does not apply to (A) school busses owned by a 
school district, and (B) school busses owned by a private indi­
vidual and used exclusively for the purposes of transporting 
school children,
2« Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949, does apply to 
school busses owned by a private individual and used partly for 
the transportation of school children and partly for other 
purposes,
July 23, 1949Mr. Robert J. Nelson 
County Attorney 
Great Falls, Montana
Dear Mr* Nelson:
You have requested an opinion of this office concerning 
Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949#
Chapter 208, Montana Session Laws of 1949 provides in 
part for ® use tax on trucks, trailers, semi-trailers, and 
automobiles operating over and upon the highways of the State 
of Montana, You specifically inquire whether the tax imposed 
by Chapter 208 applies in the following three cases, all involv­
ing trucks and busses operated for the purpose of transporting 
school childrens
-322-
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X» Where the school bus is omed by a school district*
2* Where the school bus is owned by a private individual 
bus is used exclusively for the purpose of transporting school 
children#
3» Where the school bus is owned by a private individual 
and is used partly for other purposes*
Section 1998, R*C*M,, 1935» contains the general statutory 
exemptions from taxation* Section 1998 reads in part as 
follows t
"The property of the United States, the State,
Counties, cities, towns, school districts, 
municipal corporations, public libraries, such 
other property as is used exclusively for 
agricultural end horticultural societies, for 
educational purposes, places of religious 
worship,*.*are exempt from taxation*.##**
As was pointed out at length in Op* N0I36, Vol. 23,
Report and Official Opinions of Attorney General, Section 
1998, supra, provides for two distinct classes of property,
(1) that property which is absolutely exempt, consisting of 
the property of the United States, the State, Counties, School 
Districts, etc., and (2) that class of property which is exempt 
only when used exclusively for certain enumerated purî oses#
A school bus owned by a school district falls in the 
first classification of property and therefore as stated 
above is absolutely exempt from taxation.
A school bus owned by an individual and used exclusively 
for the purpose of transporting school children falls in
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class 2 of Section 199Ô end is exempt from taxation if it is 
in fact used exclusively for the transportation of school 
children# However, it is incumbent upon the ovner to claim 
such exemption and make satisfactory-proof of the exclusive 
use of the property#
A school bus owned by an individual and used partly for 
transportation of school children and partly for other purposes 
falls in neither of the classes of property set out in Section 
199Ô and therefore such a bus is not exempt from taxation.
Therefore, it is my opinion that a school bus owned by 
a school district is exempt from taxation, a school bus owned 
by a private individual and used exclusively for the trans­
portation of school children is exempt from taxation upon 
claim end proof of exemption and that a school bus owned by 
a private individual and used partly for the transportation 
of school children and partly for other py^^sea is not exempt 
from taxation#
V ' ■
Very truly yours,
■ ARNOLD H# OLSaN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 79 - 1950
Hold! 1* A tax erroneously collected due to errors in the 
Treasurer *s books which show a deficit end registered war­
rants for a school district when in fact there were no 
registered warrants and deficit,may be refunded under the 
provisions of Section 2272, 1935, as amended by
Chapter 201, Laws of 1939 (now Section S4-4176, 1947),
Such refund can only be made where there is strict compliance 
with the statute as to the time and manner of making claim 
for refund*
January 7, 1950
Mr. John J. Cavan 
County Attorney 
Wheatland County 
Harlowton, Montana
Dear Mr. Cavan?
You have requested my opinion concerning the refunding of
taxes which were levied for a school district in your County*
You advised me that the books in the County Treasurer’s office
showed a deficit and outstanding registered warrants for the
district at the time taxes were levied and subsequent to such
time it appeared that the books were erroneous and there was
8 balance to the credit of the school district.
It is apparent that the increase in levy for the school
district in question would not have been made if the treasurer’s
books did not erroneously show that there were outstanding
warrants that would have to be paid. In other words the
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additional levy was due to a bookkeeping error end resulted 
In an unjustified levy»
Section 2222, M.G.M., 1935# es emended by Chapter 201,
lews of 1939 (now Section 04-4176, R.C*M», 1947) providesî
**Any taxes, percentum and costs, heretofore 
or hereafter, paid more than once or erron­
eously or illegally collected, may, by order 
of the County Oomalssioners, be refunded by the County Treasurer*”
In Ghristofferson v# Choteau County, 105 Mont» 577, 74 
Fee* (2d) 427, the court considered the Montana cases which 
had previously construed Section 2222, supra, and held that 
the Section would apply to taxes erroneously collected and 
that a previous decision of the court which stated that such 
recovery could not be had was inadvertently made# The court 
adopted the rule that an erroneous assessment occurs vihen the 
taxing officers have power to act but err in the exercise of 
that power end that an illegal assessment takes place when 
they have no power at all to act. Applying this rule to the 
facts submitted it is apparent that a refund by the Board of 
County Commissioners would be proper as the misinformation 
shown by the Treasurer's books led to an erroneous collection 
of the tax. It is also imi>ortant to remember that such refund 
can be made only if there is strict compliance with Chapter 
201, Laws of 1939, which designates the time and the manner 
in which claim for refund can be made.
This problem has been previously considered by the office
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in Opinion No# 129, Vol# 20, Report and Official Opinions of 
the Attorney General end also in Opinion No# 4̂ 5# Vol 19, 
Report end Official Opinions of the Attorney General end these 
opinions are in accord with the views expressed here#
It is therefore, aqr opinion that a tax collected, due 
to errors in the Treasurer's books which show a deficit and 
registered warrants for a school district when in fact there 
were no registered warrants and deficit, may be refunded 
under the provisions of Section 2222, R#G.M., 1933, ®s 
amended by Chapter 201, Laws of 1939 (now Section #4-4176, 
R.G.M,, 1947)* Such refund can only be made where there is 
strict compliance with the statute as to the time and manner 
of making claim for refund#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H# 0L3M
Attorney General
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Opinion 60 - I954
Held; Buildings owned by an educational institution and 
used exclusively as residences for the principal and teachers 
of the school are exempt from property taxation as property 
used exclusively for educational purposes under the pro­
visions of Article XII, Section 2 of the Montana Constltion, 
and Section 04-202̂  1947#
February 4» 1954
Mr* Michael J, 0*Connell 
County Attorney 
Gallatin County 
Boteman, Montana
Tear Mr# O’Connell;
You have asked my opinion upon the following question;
’Are buildings used as residences for the principal 
and teachers of a school owned and operated by a 
religious society exempt from property taxation under the provisions of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution of Montana, and Section #4-202, 
R#G.M., 19477”
You have supplied me with these additional facts; the
I  -
school is primarily for members of the religious society; it
is in a rural area several miles from the nearest city; and
it has boarding pupils as well as day pupils#
The Constitutional provision permitting ex^aptlon of
property from taxation is Article XII, Section 2 of the
Montana Constitution and it provides as follows;
’’Sec# 2. The property of the United States, the 
state, counties, cities, town, school districts, 
municipal corporations, and public libraries shall 
be exempt from taxation; and such other property
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as may be used exclusively for the agricultural 
and horticultural societies, for educational 
purposes, places for actual religious worship 
hospitals, and places of burial not used or held 
for private or corporate profit, institutions 
of purely public charity and evidences of debt 
secured by mortgages of record upon real or per­
sonal property in the State of Montana, may be 
exempt frcxa taxation*"
The statute enacted pursuant to this constitutional 
provision is Section Ô4-202, R*C,M., 1947, which provides in 
part:
"Exemptions from Taxation. The property of the 
United States of ̂ erlca, the state, counties, 
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corpor­
ations, public libraries, such other property as 
is used exclusively for agricultural and horti­
cultural societies, for educational purposes, 
places of actual religious worship, hospitals and 
places of burial not used or held for private 
or corporate profit, and institutions of purely 
public charity, evidence of debt secured by 
mortgages of record upon reel or personal 
property in the state of Montana, and public 
art galleries and public observatories not used 
or held for private or corporate profit, are 
exempt from taxation, but no more land than is 
necessary for such purpose is exempt.,.,"
Since nothing in the statement of facts indicates that the 
residences in question are primarily used for religious worship, 
it appears that the exemption is not claimed for a "place of 
actual religious worship", but rather is based upon the use of 
the property "exclusively ... for educational purposes."
The first, and leading case upon the question of exemptions 
in this state, Montana Catholic Missbns v. County of Lewis 
end Clerk, 13 Mont. 559 35 fac. 2 laid down the rule which has 
been followed consistently. That rule, briefly stated, is that
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the exemption applies to the property Itself, end not to the 
institution owning the property# Under this rule, the funda­
mental consideration is the use to which the property is being 
put at the time that the exemption is claimed* If it is being 
used to earn a profit, the property is not exempt#
This rule has bem followed in numerous opinions issued 
by this office* In 6 Opinions of the Attorney General 2Ô2, 
it was held that portions of a f*M#C*A* building actually 
used by the association in carrying on its work, including 
rooms rented to members for living quarters are exempt from 
taxation, because used exclusively for educational and 
charitable work* In 22 Opinions of the Attorney General 1Ô4, 
Ko. 113, it was stated that a charitable institution is not 
entitled to an exemption from taxation on property which it 
leases or holds for revenue* In 23 Opinions of the Attomey 
General 93, No. 36, this office held that the determining 
factor in deciding whether property used by a hospital associa­
tion is entitled to exemption is whether or not the dominant 
and substantial use of the property is for benevolent and non­
profit purposes, rather than to make a profit for the indivi­
duals who comprise the association* It is the primary duty 
of local taxing authorities to investigate claims for exemption 
and determine whether as a matter of fact, the dominant and 
substantial use of the property la for an exempt purpose. This 
investigation will determine whether the above stated rules 
of law apply in the particular situation*
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There has been no Montana case or previous opinion of this 
office on the subject of residences for teachers at educational 
institutions* However, there have been recent decisions in 
states having substantially the same requirement for exemption 
as our own.
In the case of Application of Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial
College, 77 H.T.S. (2d) 182, it was held that the residences of
teachers are exempt from property taxation. The court said;
”In all fairness, we may take notice of the fact 
that colleges will find It difficult to obtain 
teachers unless they can provide or find living 
quarters for them* It is sheer nonsense to assume 
that the educational process is not progressing 
in the residences of the teaching staff. Prepara­
tions have to be made for recitations, lectures 
and examinations and duties consequent thereto, to say nothing of meetings with the students, either 
singly or in groî )s. Students engage in educa­
tional activities in their roomsî teachers do the 
same in their homes,"
The result In this Case is essentially identical with the 
conclusion reached by Attomey General Poindexter in 6 Opinions
*»i
of the Attorney General 282, supra, in which he held that the 
portion of a X.M.C.A. used as rooms for members was used 
exclusively for education end charitable purposes and was 
therefore exempt.
It is therefore, my opinion that buildings owned by an 
educational institution and used exclusively as residences 
for the principal and teachers of the school are exempt from 
property taxation as property used exclusively for educational
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purposes under the provisions of Article XIÎ  Section 2 of 
the Montana Constitution, end Section S4-202, Revised Codes 
of Montana, 1947*
Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H. QISM 
Attorney General
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CHAFTî a II 
CONSTRUCTION, R^FAIRS, IMFROV&IENT 
Opinion 223 - 194&
Rôldï Money received es insurance for the destruction by fire 
of a high school building, may not be expended for the building 
of an elementary school without authority therefore having 
first been procured from the electorate voting at an election 
called for that purpose* Money received as damages for 
the purpose of purchasing a site and building a new elemen-r 
tary school to take the place of one destroyed, without a 
vote of the electorate*
November 23, 1946
Mr# Frank J* Roe 
County Attorney 
Silver how County 
Butte, Montana
Bear Mr* Roe:
You have requested my opinion concerning the following: 
School District No* 1, Silver Bow County, contemplates 
the construction of a new elementary school* The district has 
on hand funds paid as compensation for the destruction of two 
elementary schools* There is also available insurance money 
paid to the district because of the destruction by fire of the 
high school* You ask if It is necessary to have the approval 
of the electorate of the district before these funds may be 
spent for the construction of a new elementary school*
•*334**'
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This office previously held in Opinion No* IÔ5, Volume 
21, Report end Officiel Opinions of the Attorney General, a 
portion of the funds realized as compensation for the destruction 
of the two elementary schools could be used to purchase a new 
elementary school site which had been approved by the electorate* 
One of the reasons given was that the money realized from the 
settlement was a trust fund, earmarked for the construction of 
a school to replace the schools destroyed* The prind pal 
question involved here is whether or not the board of trustees 
of School District No 1, of Silver Bow County has authority 
to expend cash on hand for the purpose of erecting an elemen­
tary school to replace two elementary schools dams^ to the 
extent they had to be abandoned, without first having obtained 
authority from the electors* The cash on hand consists of the 
sum of $300,000.00 received as Insurance for the destruction 
by fire of an abandoned high school, and the further sum of 
$100,000*00 received for damage to the elementary schools.
Our Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel, Diederichs 
V. Board of Trustees, 91 Mont* 300, 7 Pac. (2d) 543, held that 
insurance money received as a consequence of the destaniction 
by fire of a county high school could be used to construct or 
rebuild a high school to replace the one destroyed, without 
first having submitted the question to a vote of the electorate* 
The court in deciding the question of whether or not the ex­
penditures of the insurance money came within the constitutional 
prohibition as to creating a debt or liability, said:
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"•••The fire converted the building into money 
available only for the reconstruction of the high school and consequently, since the origi­
nal purpose has been given approval by the 
electors, there is now no useful purjxise to 
be subserved by again submitting the ques­
tion of the proposed expenditure to the people 
for approval, nor does the Constitution or lew require it#.##;
It seems plain that the constitutional 
limitation does not apply to the expenditure 
of cash on hand provided for a specific pur- 
pose; but rather to the creation of an 
obligation to be met end paid in the future by the taxpayers*"
Applying the lew as laid down in the Diederichs case to 
the facts here, the money received as insurance from the 
destruction of the high school may be used only for the pur­
pose of replscipg the high school, end for no other purpose, 
without a vote of the electorate* It could not be used for 
the purpose of building an elementary school, S>r the reason 
that the original funds approved by the electorate were for 
a different purpose, that is for the building of a high school* 
The same is true of the money received for damages to the ele­
mentary schools. That money may be used for the purpose of 
building an elementary school to take the place of the ones 
destroyed, and for no other purpose, without a vote of the 
electorate.
Under the provisions of paragraph 6 of Section 1015, R,C#M, 
1935, as amended, before the trustees may build the new school 
or procure a new site they must first be authorized to do so 
by a majority vote of the electors of the district.
I am advised that the trustees have already been authorized
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to procure a site, and In fact, the same has already been 
purchased* I do not understand, however, that the trustees 
were also authorised to build a school building on this Site*
If not, then this question must be submitted to the electorate* 
At the same time the question as to the expenditure of the funds 
received as insurance for destruction of the old high school 
could be submitted to the electorate.
It is therefore my opinion that money received as in­
surance for the destruction by fire of a high school building, 
may not be expended for the building of an elementary school 
without authority therefore having been first procured from 
the electorate voting at an election called for that purpose*
It is further my opinion that money received as damages 
for destruction of elementary school buildings may be used 
for the purchase of a site and building a new elementary 
school to take the place of the one destroyed without a vote 
of the electorate.
Very truly yours,
R. V* BÛTTOMLÏ
Attorney General
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Opinion 93 - 1950
Held; 1* Bidders upon Rural Improvement District Works,
Special Improvement District Works, and upon the construction 
ol* State buildings or the alteration, repair and improvement 
of State buildings and grounds must accompany such bids with 
designated security in the form of a certified check. In 
addition to the aforementioned situations wherein the security
is required by statute, a Board of County Commissioners and
;a Board of School District Trustees may in the exercise of 
their respective discretion end judgment require that bid­
ders upon county end school district contracts deposit 
security with their bids as a means of insuring that all 
bidders are responsible parties.
March 9, 1950
Mr* Melvin 2. Magnuson 
County Attorney Lewis and Clark County 
Helena, Montana
Dear Mr. Magnuson;
You have requested my opinion upon the following question;
”C8n contractors submit certified checks, cashier*s 
checks, or bid bonds as security upon the submission 
of bids to perform county or school district con­
struction work in Montana?”
As examination of the Montana Statutes reveals that there 
are no provisions of the law which require that contractors 
for general county or school district work must furnish se­
curity upon the submission of a bid. There are, however, 
several specific statutes recuirlng bidders upon public works
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to furnish security upon the submission of bids, ihey are 
as hereinafter set forth.
Section 16-1607, R.C.M., 1947, provides that all bids 
submitted upon Rural Improvement District Work must be accom­
panied by a certified check payable to the Board of County 
Commissioners, certified by a responsible bank for an amount 
which shall not be less than ten per cent (10;̂) of the 
aggregate of the proposal.
Section 11-2209, R.C.M., 1947# provides that all bids 
submitted upon Special Improvement District Work must be 
accompanied by a certified check payable to the city, certified 
by a responsible bank for an amount which shall not be less 
than ten per cent (10 )̂ of the aggregate of the proposal. 
Section 62-1133# R.C.M., 1947, provides that when bids are 
submitted to the State Board of Examiners for the construction 
of state buildings or the alteration, repair and improvement 
of state buildings and grounds, such bids must be accompanied 
by a certified check for five per cent i5%) of the amount of 
the bid.
Apart from the three above cited provisions, the law is 
silent as to any recuiraraent that security be deposited with 
a bid upon any public work in the State of Montana. Your 
question thus becomes whether or not the Board of County 
Commissioners or the School District Board of Trustees may, 
in the absence of statute, recuire that bids upon construction
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Section 16-1025, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, grants 
to the Board of County Commissioners the Jurisdiction and 
power under such limitations and restrictions as are pre­
scribed by law to make and enforce such rules for its govern­
ment, the preservation of order and the transaction of business, 
as may be necessary.
Section 75-1624, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, provides 
that the board of trustees of each school district shall have 
custody of all school property belonging to the district and 
shall have the power to transact all business necessary for 
maintaining schools end protecting the rights of the distil ct.
Certainly the powers granted to Board of County Commissioners 
and School District Trustees by the statutes contained in the 
preceding two paragraphs are extensive enough, in my opinion 
to include the authority to establish uniform regulations and 
procedures to be followed in the submission of bids for county 
or school district contracts. If in the exercise of their 
respective discretion and judgment the governing boards of 
counties and school districts decide that the requirement that 
bidders on county and school district contracts deposit security 
with their bids will insure the obtaining of responsible bidders 
upon such projects, I can conceive of no reason under the law 
why such a regulation cannot be promulgated and required.
It is therefore my opinion that bidders upon Rural Improvement
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District Works, Special Improvement District Works, and upon 
the construction of state buildings or the alteration, repair 
and improvement of state buildings and grounds must accompany 
such bids with designated security In the form of a legally 
sufficient certified check. In addition to the aforementioned 
situations wherein the security Is required by statute, a 
Board of County Commissioners and a Board of School District 
Trustees may in the exercise of their respective discretion and 
judgment require that bidders upon county end school district 
contracts deposit security with their bids as a method and 
means of insuring that all bidders are responsible parties*
Very truly yours,
jLaJWOI,!) H.
Attorney General
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Opinion 107 - 1950
Held; A school district has the authority to enter Into a 
contract for the repair of a school building and provide in 
the contract for payment over a period of three years.
May 5, 1950
Mr* James Ty Harrison 
County Attorney 
Phillips County MaltaI Montana
Dear Mr* Harrison;
Tou Tiave requested my opinion concerning the authority of 
a board of trustees of a school district to enter into a contract 
for the repair of school buildings, the payment of which will 
be spread over a period of three years. You have advised me 
that the trustees complied with the law in requesting bids for 
material and labor in the repair of the school building*
This office, in Opinion No* 60. Volume 22, Report and Offi­
cial Opinions of the Attorney General, considered the purchase 
of a school bus by a school district which was to be paid for 
oyer a period of three years* The opinion held that the dis­
trict had the power to miter into ai ch a contract and the 
reasoning in that opinion would apply with equal force to a 
contract for repair of a school building*
Section 75-1632, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, enumerates 
the powers granted to a school board and one of these is the 
authority to repair school buildings* Section 75-1637, R,C,M.
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1947* prohibits m y school trustee from having any pecuniary 
interest in contracts for the repair of schools and It also 
provides that a contract for repair "where the amount Involved 
is two hundred end fifty dollars, or more," must not be let 
without first advertising in a newspaper and calling for bids* 
This letter section does not prohibit contracts being made by 
the trustees, the payment for which shall extend over three 
years* Such manner of payment might well be a convenient 
method for meeting such necessary expenditures without unduly 
burdening the district in any one year*
Compliance with the budget law is necessary for such a 
contract and the annual payments under the contract, for eleraen» 
tary schools, must be included on Item 6 of Section 1 as found 
in Section 75*1703, E,C,M*, 1947, For high schools the annual 
payment should be entered in subsection III, R*C*M* of Part I 
of the high school budget as provided in Section 75-4502, R*C*M, 
1947* The repair of buildings could also be financed by a bond 
issue as subsection (a) of Section 75*3901 names the repair of 
school houses as one of the authorized bond purposes. However 
the trustees of the district ere its managing officers and 
directors and have large discretionary power in managing school 
affairs*
It is therefore my opinion that a school district has the 
authority to enter into a contract for the repair of a school 
building and provide in the contract for payment over a period 
of three years*
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ARNOLD H* OLSSN, 
Attorney Generali
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Opinion 4 •* 1951
HeldI An architectes fee for drawing the plans and speoi* 
ficstions for, and supervising the construction of a school 
building may be paid from the proceeds of the funds realised 
from the sale of bonds for the construction of such a building*
February 24> 1951
Mr# George D* Ore 
County Attorney 
Petroleum County 
Winnetti Montana
Dear Mr, Ore;
You have requested my opinion as to whether an architect's
fee may be paid from the funds realised from the sale of bonds
for the construction of a school.
There is not « specific: statute concerning the payment of
an architect's fee and directing the manner of its payment.
Section 75-3922, 1947 provides in part as follows;
"All moneys arising from the sale of such bonds 
shall be paid to the county treasurer and by him 
credited to the school district issuing the same, 
and shall be immediately available to the pur» 
pose for which the bonds were issued and not other 
purpose,"
In view of this statute it is necessary to determine whether 
the expenditure of funds realised from the sale of bonds in pay­
ment of an architect's fee is included within the purpose of 
the bond issue, A helpful definition of an architect is found 
in 3 Am, Jur, 998, which reads as follows ;
"An architect is one whose occupation it is to form
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or devis» plen» and designs and draw up specifications 
for buildings or structures^ and to superintend their 
construction#**
It is apparent from this definition that the work of an 
architect is supervisory in nature, but enters into the construe» 
tioa of the building because of the fact that he plans the 
building from its initial stage to completion*
Our Supreme Court In Caird Engineering Works vs* Seven-up
«
Mining Company, 111 Mont* 471 111 Pac# (2d) 1267, held that an 
architect is entitled to a mechanic’s lien for furnishing plans 
and specifications for, and supervising the construction of a 
building* In granting such a lien the court recognized that the 
services of an architect were work and labor which entered into 
the construction of the building* If an architect may claim a 
lien for his fee then such a claim could also be paid from a 
building fund as it would be on the same basis as any laborer 
who performed services in the construction of the building* This 
office in Opinion No* 105, Volume 16, Reports and Official 
Opinions of the Attorney General held that an architect’s fee 
could be paid from the general fund of a school district, and 
by Implication, also held that such payment could also be made 
from the building account*
It is, therefore, ay opinion that an architect’s fee for 
drawing the plans and specifications for, and supervising the 
construction of a school building may be paid from the proceeds 
of the funds realized from the sale of bonds for the construction 
of such a building.
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Very truly youro,
m o m  H* OLSEK 
Attorney General
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CHAPTER I 
TRANSPORTATION
Opinion 120 ̂  1946
Held* The State of Montana must pay to the school district one- 
third the cost of transportation by school busses In accordance 
with the schedule fixed by the Board of Education as provided in 
Section 1200«1| R*G#M,, 1935» and also the state must pay to the 
district one-third of the amount paid to parents or guardians 
in lieu of bus transportation as provided in Section 7 of Chapter 
152, Laws of 1941» as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943, and 
Chapter 116, Laws of 1945» and the fact the per capita trans­
portation cost is higher in one class than the other will not 
change the method of computing the amount of the staters reim­
bursement to the school district»
February 6, 1946
Miss Elizabeth Ireland 
Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Ireland*
You have submitted for my consideration the following question*
If a board of trustees of a school district puts on a bus and
employs a bus driver to carry on transportation for the children
in a school district, end if this bus transportation costs more
than individual transportation (See Chapter 152, Section 7 of
the 1941 School Laws), will the state be required to pay one-third
of the cost of the bus transportation ; or is the state required
-349*
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to pay one-third of the coat of the transportation according to the 
schedule as given in the chapter and section quoted above?
In answering your question it is necessary to consider Section
13 of Chapter 152, laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1Ô9, laws
of 1943, which reads in part as follows!
*£ach school district end each county high school meeting the requirements of this act shall be en­
titled to reimbursement from the state public 
school general fund in an amount not to exceed 
one-third (1/3) of the actual coat of transpor- 
tation, or services rendered in lieu of trans­
portation, annually on presentation to the 
state superintendent of public instruction, 
through the office of the county superintendent 
of schools, or certified claims for such reim­
bursement using for such purpose the forms 
provided by the state superintendent of public 
instruction. Such reimbursement shall be made 
in accordance with the provisions of Sections 
1200.1. 1200.6, 1200.7 and 1200.9, of the 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, except that 
the schedule provided in this act for indivi­
dual transportation, or services in lieu 
thereof, shall be used instead of any schedule 
which may have been heretofore or may here­
after be fixed and promulgated by the state 
board of education.**
The above section differentiates between transportation by 
bus and individual transportation in that it provides *such 
reimbursement shall be made in accordance with the provisions of 
Sections 1200*1, 1200.6, 1200.7 and 1200.9 of the Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1935, except that the schedule provided in this act for 
Individual transportation, or services in lieu thereof, shall be 
ised.,*** The schedule for individual transportation, or services 
In lieu thereof, is found in Section 7 of Chapter 152, laws of
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1941, as amended by Chapter 1&9* Laws of 1943, and Chapter ll6,
Lavra of 1945, which reads in part as follows:
"The board of trustees may pay to the parents or 
legally appointed guardian of each child eligible 
for transportation under this act board or rent, or provide transportation for the child, the 
amount called for under the following schedule la 
lieu of furnishing bus transportation#*•"
It would appear, therefore, that the amount of reimbursement 
received by each district would be determined by two tests. In 
one class, bus transportation, the schedule fixed by the Board 
of Education by virtue of Section 1200,1 would be applied, and 
in the other class, individual transportation, the amount paid 
under the schedule set out In Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 
1941, as amended, would be applied* The fact that the cost 
per pupil for transportation is higher in one instance than the 
other does not effect the method of computation or the amount 
paid to the school district by the state* The transportation 
furnished determined the method of computing the one-third 
reimbursement by the state. The payments made under Section 
7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended, states that payments 
made under the schedule found In Section 7 of Chapter 152, shall 
be used as a basis for computing the reimbursement for such 
individual transportation, or services in lieu thereof* All 
other transportation furnished by the district comes within 
the provisions of Section 1200*1, 1200*6, 1200*7 and 1200*9 of 
the Revised Codes of Montana, 1935*
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It is therefore my op in ion that the State of Montana must 
pay to a school district one*.third the cost of transportation 
by school busses in accordance with the schedule fixed by the 
hoard of Education as provided in Section 1200*1, Revised Oodes 
of Montana, 193$, and also the abate must pay to the district 
on@~thlrd of the amount paid to' parents or guardians in lieu 
of bus transportation as provided in Section 7 of Chapter 1$2 
Laws of 1941* as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943* and 
Chapter 116, Laws of 1945* and the fact that the per capita 
transportatlbn cost is higher in one class than the other will 
not change the method of computing the amount of the state’s 
reimbursement to the school district#
. Sincerely yours*
I* V# BOTTÛMLÏ 
Attorney General
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Opinion 1$6 - 1946
Held I 1, Children whose parents have moved into a district and 
whose parents maintain a permanent residence within the district 
are entitled to the same school transportation privileges as are 
the other children of the district without regard to the length 
of residence of the parents within the district*
2* Children whose parents have moved into a school district 
which does not maintain an elementary school are entitled to 
attend the school in another district to which the children of 
the district are transported and the district of the parents 
residence must pay the proportionate amount for such pupil to 
the school attended as provided in Section 4# of Chapter 152,
Laws of 1941*
3* The number of school trustees who must countersign school 
district warrants with the school district clerk is not fixed 
by statute, but the trustees may by appropriate resolution, pro* 
vide for such counter signatures#
August 3, 1946
Mr, Bert L, Packer 
County Attorney 
Teton, County 
Choteau, Montana
Dear Mr# Packers
You have requested my opinion concerning the following ques**
tions;
1. What is the obligation of a school district to pay trans* 
portation and tuition for children who have moved into the district
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from another county? Tou advise me the school district in ques-
•••
tion does not maintain an elementary school but provides transport
tation to an elementary school In another district*
2, What obligation does a school district have to pay
transportation for elementary pupils who have moved from one
district in the county to anothsr district?
3* What number of trustees should sign warrants In school
districts of the second and third class?
four first two questions concerning transportation are
answered by Opinion Ko* 272> Volume 19, Report and Official
Opinions of the Attorney General, wherein it was held:
"School trustees have the power to furnish transpor­
tation, or services in lieu thereof, for all pupils 
residing within their district and enrolled in the 
public schools of their district end also to pupils 
residing within their district whô  are enrolled in 
eny Montana Public School and otherwise eligible 
under Section 9 of Chapter 152 of the Laws of 1941 
to receive transportation aid*"
As you will notq Section 9 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941 > 
does not require the residence in the district be for any fixed 
length of time as the section provides "such child must reside 
with his parents or legally appointed guardian, and his parents 
or guardian must maintain a permanent home within the boundaries 
of the district paying transportation*” It is the district in 
which the permanent home is located which must pay the transpor­
tation end not the district from which the family moved, even 
though the move was made a short time before the request is made 
for transportation*
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The payment of tuition for children who have moved into a 
school district which does not maintain an elementary school is 
covered by Section 4 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941* Section 4 
of Chapter 152 provides the trustees of a school district have the 
power to close an elementary school and transport the pupils to 
a school in another district, which appears to be the case from 
the facts you have given me* Section 4 also provides it shall 
be the duty of the school district which closes its schools to 
assist In the support of the schools of the district where the 
pupils attend in the direct proportion the number of pupils of 
the closed school bears to the number of pupils In the school 
attended.
Chapter 203, Laws of 1943, which amends Section 1013,
1935, provides for the transfer of school funds for children who
attend elementary school in a district other than that of their
residence# Section 1013, as amended, does not specifically
recite the section has application only to individual applications
for transfer and not the transfer of all the children of a school
of one district in a school in another district, but such a
construction would be reasonable and would also be in accord with
the rule adopted in State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 71
Mont* 79, 227 fac* 472, which statesî
"In the construction of a particular statute, or 
in the Interpretation of any of its provisions, 
all acts relating to the seme subject or having 
the same general purpose, should be read in 
connection with it, as together constituting
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
# 3  $ 6 ^
one lew* And the law imposes a duty upon the 
judicial department to  pursue the legislative 
intent so far as possible* It Is our duty to 
reconcile the statutes, if possible, and make 
them operative*”
Applying the above rule to Section 4 of Chapter 152, Laws 
of 1941* and Chapter 203, Laws of 1943, results in the conclusion 
Section 4 of Chapter 152 must be applied when an elementary school 
is closed end all of the students who normally attend the school 
are transferred to a school in another district* There is no 
requirement of authorization for such attendance, and, therefore, 
any pupil whoee parents reside in the district is entitled to 
attend school in the district maintaining a school with the 
resulting obligation on the part of the district of the child’s 
residence to pay the proportionate tuition requirement to the 
district where the child attends school*
There is no specific statutory requirement fixing the number 
of school trustees who must sign school warrants* Section 1019*22, 
H*0*M,, 1935, provides in part; "The clerk of each school district 
must Issue all warrants drawn against any fund of the district in 
triplicate***." Section 1019*23 contains the provisions "that 
no warrant must be issued by such clerk against such appropriation 
item which will exceed the unexpended balance of the appropria­
tion therefor*" These sections by inference would Indicate the 
clerk may issue school warrants* However Section 1015, E.C.M#, 
1935, as amended, provides in part;
"Every school board unless otherwise specially pro­
vided by law shall have the power and it shall be
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itô duty*
*1# To prescribe and enforce rules not Inconsistent 
with law, or those prescribed by the superintendent of 
public instruction for their own government of schools 
under their supervision#”
It would be both good business practice and to the best in­
terest of the school district for the trustees to prescribe by
resolution the number of trustees who must countersign school
>
warrants before such warrants will be valid obligations of the 
district#
It is therefore my opinion*
1# Children whose parents have moved into a district and 
whose parents maintain a permanent residence within the district 
are entitled to the same school transportation privileges as are 
the other children of the district without regard to the Imgth 
of the residence of the parents within the district#
2# Children whose parents have moved into a school district 
which does not maintain an elementary school are entitled to attend 
the school in another district to which the children of the district 
are transported and the district of the parentŝ  residence must 
pay the proportionate amount for such pupil to the school attended 
as provided in Section 4 of Chapter 152, laws of 1941*
3* The number of school trustees who must countersign school 
district warrants with the school district clerk is not fixed by 
statute, but the trustees may by appropriate resolution provide 
for such counter signatures* Sincerely yours, a# V# B o n o i m  
Attorney General
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Opinion 57 - 1947
Helds The «Iteration of the transportation schedule in accord­
ance with subsection 0 of Section 7 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941» 
as amended, is discretionary with the County Superintendent of 
schools* Such an alteration must be approved by the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and cannot be demanded as 
a matter of right by the parents of the children concerned*
August 19, 1947
Mr* M*L* Parcelle 
County Attorney 
Stillwater County Columbus, Montana
Dear Mr* Parcelle I
tou have requested my opinion aa to whether the board of
trustees of a school district has discretionary power to classify
students who live more than three miles from an established bus
route under subsection Ô, Section 7, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941,
as amended by Chapter 1S9, Laws of 1943, and Chapter 116, Laws
of 1945.
Subsection 5 of Section 7# Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as
amended, provides:
"School children living within one and one-half (1 1/2) 
miles of an established bus route shall not be eligible 
for transportation aid, other than the services of the 
established route* Children living more than one and 
one half (1 1/2) but less than three (3) miles from 
such route shall receive transportation eld of one- 
half (1/2) the rates given in subsection one (1) of the schedule sat up in this section. Children living 
three (3) miles or more from such bus route shall 
receive transportation aid on the basis provided in 
the schedule fixed in this section.”
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The above quoted section requires the payment of transpor­
tation to children who live more than a mile and one-half from 
an established bus route.
Subsection 6 of Section 7# Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as 
amended, states that In Isolated cases "this schedule may be 
altered by the county superintendent of schools, with the 
consent and approval of the state superintendent of public 
instruction" and payments made in amounts greater than the 
amounts fixed by the schedule.
Under the facts submitted it does not appear that the 
school in the district has been closed, but the basis for 
transportation aid is that the children live more than three 
miles from the bus route. As was observed above, the children 
are eligible to transportation in accordance with the schedule. 
Subsection S was enacted to take care of the unusual situation 
such as the closing of a school or the difficulties of trans­
portation, but the alteration of the schedule is permitted by 
the county superintendent with the consent of the State Super­
intendent of Public Instruction, The use of the word "may” 
together with the requirement of approval indicates that the 
change in the schedule is discretionary with the county super­
intendent and not mandatory and that justification must be 
shown in each case.
It is therefore, my opinion that the alteration of the 
transportation schedule in accordance with subsection Ô of
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Section 7 of Chapter 152, Iswg of 1941» ®s emended, is dis­
cretionary with the County Superintendent of Schools. Such an 
alteration must be approved by the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction and cannot be demanded as a matter of right 
by the parents of the children concerned.
Sincerely yours,
R. V. BOTTmil
Attorney General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
'361.
Opinion 60 • 1947
Held} 1. A school district is not required to advertise for 
bids in the purchase of a school bus, although it may do so 
where the trustees deem it for the best interests of the district.
2. A school district may purchase a school bus under a condi­
tional sales contract and pay for the same over a period of 
three years.
August 20I 1947
Kr* J.M. Watts 
County Attorney 
Musselshell County 
Roundup, Montana
Dear Mr. Wattsi
You have submitted for my consideration the following 
questions:
1. Must a school district advertise for bids when the 
district purchases a school bus?
2* May the board of trustees of a school district pur­
chase a school bus on a conditional sales contract payable over 
A period of three years?
In answering your first question it is necessary to con­
sider Section 1016, R.C.M., 1935, which provides in part:
”^o beard of trustees shall let any contract for 
building, furnishing, repairing, or other work, 
for the benefit of the district, where the amount 
involved is two hundred fifty dollars, or more, 
without first advertising In a newspaper pub­
lished in the county for at least two weeks, 
calling for bids to perform such work..."
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It would appear that the above prohibition applies to 
school buildings, furnishing for the same and work and labor,
A school bus would not come in any of the classes enumerated in 
the statute# Also, section 1016 was enacted prior to the pre­
sent transportation act, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, and its 
amendments# In other words, the purchase of a school bus was
not possible at the time section 1016 became a law and Its
terms are not broad enough to prohibit the purchase of a bus 
without first calling for bids,
Section 3 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, provides;
”The board of trustees shall have the power to
purchase or rent and provide for the upkeep, 
cere and operation of school busses; or to 
contract end pay for the transportation of 
eligible pupils, such contracts to run for 
terms not to exceed three (3) years#”
It is to be noted that a contract for transportation can­
not exceed three years but no limitation is placed on the 
manner of purchase of school busses, A broad power is granted 
for the purchase of school busses and the manner of purchase 
is not designated.
Section 1022, R#C,M#, 1935, grants to school districts 
the power to purchase personal property for school purposes. 
Section 1015, R,C,M,, 1935 &a amended, defines the duties of 
school trustees, but neither section limits the power to 
contract over a period of years. In Bennett v# Petroleum 
County, ^7 Mont. 436, 266 Pac, 1016, our Court considered the
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validity of a contract entered into by a county which would 
cover a period of four years and held that the fact the 
county obligation would extend beyond the term of office 
of members of the existing board would not make the contract . 
invalid.
In Arnold v# Custer County» 03 Mont» 130» 269 Pac, 396, 
the Court statedt
"When the statutes require an act to be done by 
a county official or county officials and do not provide a method of doing it, any reasonable 
and suitable means may be adopted#* :4
This rule would have application in the problem here pre­
sented, and the purchase of a bus under a conditional sales 
contract would appear to be a reasonable method#
Section 1019*14, and Section 1263.14, R.C.M#, 193$, limit 
the expenditures for any fiscal year to the amount appropriated 
for that year*
The conditional sales contract proposed would fix a. de­
finite amount payable each year, and so long as the annual 
Installments are Included in each budget these sections would 
furnish no obstacle to such a three year term contract.
The amount of the annual installments to be paid for the 
purchase of a bus must be included in Section 1 of the General 
Fund Expenses, for elementary schools, under the item of "New 
Equipment —  Not financed from sale of bonds," Section 1019#3* 
In the case of High Schools, payment should be made under the
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item "New Equipment" which Is found in the "Capital Outlay" 
Account, Section 1263*2, R.C«M*, 1935* There Is no authority 
for the purchase of a bus by the issuance of bonds*
It Is therefore, my opinioni
1# A school district is not required to advertise for bids 
in the purchase of a school bus, although it may do so where 
the trustees deem it for the best Interests of the district*
2* A school district may purchase a school bus under a 
conditional sales contract and pay for the same over a period 
of three years*
Sincerely yours,
R. V* Bonmx,
Attorney General
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Opinion 13*1949
Held; The one-third contribution of school districts for their 
elementary school transportation budgets Is to be paid from the 
five mill district levy authorised by Section 10, Chapter 199, 
Session Laws of 1949» if there are sufficient funds remaining 
after deducting the operation and maintenance costs of the 
budgets for the elementary schools* If there are not suf­
ficient funds remaining, thm an additional levy may be made 
without an election to meet the district’s one-third obliga­
tion for transportation. The one-third contribution of the 
County for the transportation budgets of the elementary schools 
is to be paid from the ten mill levy authorized by Section 
1202 of the R.C.M., 1935» es amended by Section 11, Chapter 
199» Session Laws of 1949, in accordance with the schedule 
set out in Chapter 200, Laws of 1949*
The two-thirds contribution or balance of each county for 
the high school transportation budget is paid from a separate 
transportation county wide levy authorized by sub-section (b) 
of Section 14» Chapter 152» Session Laws of 1941, as amended 
by Chapter 1#9, Session Laws of 1943*
April 11, 1949
Miss Mary M. Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
State Capitol 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the effect of
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Chapters 199 end 200, Laws of 1949, as to payments to be made 
by school districts for both elementary and high school trans­
portation budgets*
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, (H.B, 
l6l) the elementary schools* one-third of the transportation 
budgets was paid under the provisions of Subsection 1, Section 
14 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 189,
Laws of 1943, from the ten mill district levy authorised by 
Section 1203, 1935 as amended by Chapter 51, Laws of
1945# Section 1203 as amended was repealed by Chapter 199,
Laws of 1949 and as a consequence the school district*s con­
tribution to the transportation budget must be found in Chapter 
199, Laws of 1949* Section 10 of Chapter 199 amends Section 
1019*19 of the R*C.M«, 1935, and provides for a five mill dis­
trict levy for elementary school budgets* As the previous 
source of the district*s contribution has been repealed, Sec­
tion 1203 as amended, it is reasonable to assume that an ele­
mentary budget must pay Its contribution to the transportation 
budgets from the five mill levy. However, if the budgets for 
the operation and maintenance of the elementary schools of a 
district will utilise all of the proceeds of the five mill levy, 
end the authorised twenty per cent increase over such an amount, 
then under Subsection 2, Section 14 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, 
as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of 1943, ®n additional levy for 
transportation may be made in such number of mills as will raise
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not to exceed one-third of the total amount set out In the 
Budget for transportation without being authorized at an elec­
tion* An additional levy for transportation may be authorized 
by the qualified electors of the district* It is to be noted 
that the State’s contribution for bus transportation is to be 
computed by the schedule fixed by Chapter 200, Laws of 1949, 
which might not cover the one-third of the approved budgets 
with a resulting deficiency to be paid by the district from 
any excess amount above its one-third contribution remaining / 
from the district five mill levy or from the levy authorized 
by the electors of the district* Opinions No* 120 and 17#, 
Volume 21, Report'and Official Opinions of the Attorney General* 
The county’s one-third share of the transportation costs 
for elementary schools will be paid from the ten mill levy 
provided for in Section 1202, R.C.M., 1935, as amended by Chap­
ter 273, Laws of 1947, and Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, The 
authority for such contribution of the County’s one-third is 
found in Subsection (b), Section 13 of Chapter 152, Laws of 
1941, as amended by Chapter 1#9, Laws of 1943, Chapter 169,
Laws of 1947, and Chapter 200, Laws of 1949* This contribu­
tion by the county is fixed at one-third of the schedule and 
a deficiency may be Incurred from such computation in the same 
manner that was pointed out above in regard to the state’s 
one-third contribution *
District and County high schools receive reimbursement
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from the State for one-third of their transportation budgets|
1computed according to the schedule in the manner outlined in 
Opinion No* 120, Volume 21, Report end Official Opinions of 
the Attorney General. Chapter 200, Laws of 1949, increases 
end fixe® the bus transportation schedule but does not alter 
the method of computation defined by the above cited opinion 
of this office* The remaining two-thirds or balance of the 
high school transportation costs is paid from a County-wide 
tax which is not. limited in ©mount as Subsection (b) of Sec­
tion 14, Chspter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 1Ô9, 
Laws of 1943, reads*
**,*.The County Commissioners, except as herein­
after provided, shall make a county-wide levy 
of such number mills as will raise such total."
It is my opinion*
1. The one-third contribution of school districts for 
their elementary school transportation budgets is to be paid 
from the five mill district levy authorized by Section 10, 
Chapter 199, Laws of 1949, if there are sufficient funds re­
maining after deducting the operation and maintenance costs of 
the budgets for the elementary schools# If there are not suf­
ficient funds remaining then an additional levy may be made 
without an election to meet the district’s one-third obligation 
for transportation.
V
2. The one-third contribution of the county for the trans­
portation budgets of the elementary schools is to be paid from
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the ten mill levy authorised by Section 1202, 1935f
as last amended by Section 11, Chapter 199, Lews of 1949, in 
accordance with the schedule set out in Chapter 200, Laws of 
1949,
3, The two-thirds contribution or balance of each county 
for the high school transportation budgets Is paid from a 
separate transportation county-wide levy authorised by Sub­
section (b) of Section 14, Chapter 152, Lews of 1941, as 
amended by Chapter 1&9, Laws of 1943#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H, OLSdN
Attorney General
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Opinion 57 - 1949
Held; 1* Under Chapter 200  ̂Laws of 1949* the Board of Trustees 
of any School District or County High School has discretionary 
power in the furnishing of transportation to the students of 
the District.
2. If the Board of Trustees elects to furnish transportation 
to any students within the District* they must furnish such 
transportation to all students within the District»
September 21* 1949
Mr# James H» Higgins
County Attorney
White Sulphur Springs, Montana
Dear Mr# Higgins:
You have requested my opinion concerning the interpreta­
tion to be placed on the word "may** as found in Section 1, 
Chapter 200, Laws of 1949, in which the following language is 
used#
"The Board of Trustees of any School District or 
County High School within the State of Montana may 
furnish transportation to and from schools for all 
pupils residing In their Districts#
Prior to the amendment of Section 1, Chapter 152, Laws of 
1941, by Chapter 200* Lews of 1949* it was provided that the 
Board of Trustees "shall have the power to" furnish transporta­
tion and the legislature by the amendment substituted the word 
"may" for "shall have the power ta" The question thus pre­
sented la whether the use of the word "may" is to be construed 
as mandatory» Prior to the amendment of Section 1* Chapter 152,
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supra, this off ica in Opinion No* 111, Vol* 19, Report and 
Official Opinions of tho Attorney General, held that the 
trustees of a School District had a discretionary power in 
the furnishing of transportation# In Opinion No# 240, Toi#
20, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General the 
same conclusion was reached and it was also held that if the 
Trustees decided to furnish transportation to any students 
they must furnish it to all students within the District#
The legislature had before it the above cited interpre­
tations of Section 1 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941 when the 
Section was emended by Chapter 200, Laws of 1949, The sub­
stitution of the word *%@y" for shall have the power to" 
is not, in my opinion, such an expression of the legislative 
intent as to indicate a material change in the interpreta­
tion to be placed on the statutes# Our Supreme Coirt has 
frequently considered the meaning of the word "may" and in 
Durland v, Frickett, 9Ô Mont, 397, 39 Pac# (2d) 652 the court 
quoted from an earlier Montana case, in construing the word, the 
following a
"This word Is sometimes permissive only; some­
times it is imperative# Legislative intent 
determines whether it is directory or manda­
tory#**
It is more than a reasonable assumption that if the 
legislature had intended to deprive the trustees of their 
discretionary power to furnish transportation more explicit 
language would have been used, than the substitution of the
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word "may?
It is, therefore my opinion that under the provisions of 
Chapter 152, Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 200, Laws of 
1949 the Board of Trustees of a school has discretionary power 
in the furnishing of transportation to the students of the 
District*
It is also my opinion that if the Trustees furnish trans­
portation to any students they must furnish transportation to 
all within the limitations of the law.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSaN 
Attorney General<
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Opinion Ô4 • 1950
Held; The payment for transportation to be made by the parents 
or guardian of a student attending a private or parochial 
school may be determined by dividing the total number of stu* 
dents using the bus, including thoseattending the private or 
parochial school, into the cost of operating the bus as fixed 
by the current transportation budget#
January 21, 1950
Mr* Millton G* Anderson 
County Attorney 
Richland County 
Sidney, Montana
Dear Mr, Anderson:
Tou requested my opinion concerning the meaning of "propor­
tionate share of the cost of transportation" which the parents 
or guardian of a child attending a school other then a public 
school must pay in order to entitle such child to ride on a 
school bus, as provided In Section Ô, Chapter 152, Laws of 1941# 
This office has previously considered the question of the 
use of public school moneys for transportation of pupils attend­
ing a private or parochial school and in Opinion Ho# 22#, Vol,
19, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney General it was 
held that "public school moneys may not be expended for trans­
portation for a student attending a private or parochial school." 
This opinion was recognized and approved by a later opirJon of 
this office, Opinion No# 74, Vol. 21, Report and Official 
Opinions of the Attorney General, wherein it was also held:
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"School trustee» hare the discretionary power to 
permit pupils attending private or parochial schools 
to ride on public school busses and the parents or 
guardian of such children pay their proportionate 
share of the cost of such transportation*"
In determining the meaning of the phrase "proportionate 
share of the cost of transportation," the case of Hochsprung 
V# Stevenson, Ô2 Mont. 222, 266, Pac. 406, is helpful as it 
is stated therein, "Proportionate* means adjusted to some-* 
thing else according to a certain rate of comparative rela­
tion." Dividing the total number of pupils using a bus, 
including those attending a private school, into the cost of 
operating the bus will give the comparative relation, and 
also the amount of the contribution of the parents or guardians 
of the pupils using the bus and attending apprivate school.
In your letter you ask if contribution must be made for 
students attending a private school if there is no increase 
in the cost to the district due to the fact such students 
receive transportation. Section Ô of Chapter 152, Montana 
Session Laws of 1941, is specific in requiring that permission 
from the Clerk of the District must be secured and "the 
parents or guardian of the child shall pay their proportionate 
share of the cost of such transportation," If the payments 
so made are not immediately available for use because of a 
lack of an appropriation in the transportation budget, then 
such funds may be used in the transportation budget for the 
next fiscal year.
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It is thereforeI my opinion that the payment for trans­
portation to be made by the parents or guardian of a student 
attending a private or parochial school may be detennined by 
dividing the total number of students using the bus, including 
those attending the private or parochial school, into the cost 
of operating the bus as fixed by the current transportation 
budget.
Very truly yours.
mUQW H« OLSEK 
Attorney General
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0pinion 135 - 1950
Reid; 1# When a School Board closes a school in a school 
district the Board Is not required to furnish actual transpor­
tation by bus or rail, but rather may pay to the parent or 
guardian the cost of transportation in accordance with the 
schedule of payments provided by law*
2* Sections 75-2901, and 75*2906, Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947, provide a procedure for compelling a parent to send 
children within the school age to school*
November 24, 1950
Mr* Roy W# Holmes 
County Attorney 
Carter County Rkalaka, Montana
Dear Mr* Holmess
You have requested my opinion on the following questions
on behalf of the County Superintendent of Schools for your
County*
1# May the Board of Trustees of a school district close 
a school in a district and merely pay the parents of pupils for 
transporting the pupils to another school, or must the trustees 
furnish actual transportation by bus or other vehicle?
2. How may a parent w^o refuses to send his children to 
school be forced to do so?
Section 75-3404, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, was 
originally enacted as Section 4, Chapter 152, Session Laws of 
1941, and provides in part as follows;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
• - 3 7 7 -
"The Board of Trustees âhall have the power to 
close any elementary school within the district# 
and transport the pupils to another school or 
schools within that district, whep the Board deems such act to be for the best interests of all the pupils attending school,,."
It is clear that the Board of Trustees may close a school 
in a district, and the question then arises as to what is meant 
by the word "transport" In the above section.
Section 75-3402, R.C.M., 1947, which was enacted as Section
2 of Chapter 152# Session Laws of 1941# defines what Is meant
by the term "transportation" as that term is used in Chapter
152, of the Laws of 1941# This section providesî
"Unless a different meaning Is plainly required 
by the context, * transportation* shall in this 
act, mean (1) the actual transporting of pupils 
who live three (3) or more miles distant from a 
public school, by bus, rail or otherwise; (2) the providing of any services whereby the school 
board is relieved of actually transporting such 
pupils, such as paying parent or guardian for 
transportation, paying rent or board or any part 
thereof and providing supervised correspondence 
study or supervised home study,"
The context of section 75-3404# supra, clearly indicates 
that the word "transport" as used therein Is defined by Section 
75-3402, supra* Therefore, it is my opinion that if the Board 
of Trustees of a school district closes a school it may pay 
the parent or guardian in accordance with the schedule set forth 
in Section 75-3407# R*C,M,, 1947# as amended by Chapter 200, 
Session Laws of 1949# and need not provide actual transporta­
tion by bus, rail, or otherwise. The purpose of giving the 
term" transport at ion" a dual meaning in Chapter 152, Session
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Î*aw8 of 1941I was to allow a School Board to exercise Its 
discretion and provide for payment to parents for trans­
portation when circumstances were not such as to warrant the 
supplying of actual transportation facilities by the school 
district.
Section 75-2901 to 75-2906, inclusive, make it compulsory
that children between the ages of eight and sixteen years of
age be sent to a school In which the basic language taught is
English# Section 75-2901, as amended by Chapter 61, Session
laws of 1949, provides in part as follows :
"..#Any parent, guardian or other person having 
the care and custody of a child between the ages 
of eight {$) and sixteen (16-) years, who shall fail to comply with the provisions of this section, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
conviction thereof shall be fined not less than 
five dollars (#5*00) nor more than twenty dollars 
(20.00)»
Thus, a parent who refuses to send his child to school 
may be found guilty of committing a misdemeanor, and subject 
to a find.
However, I believe that Section 75-2905, E.G.M*, 1947» 
which provides an alternate procedure in lieu of a fine Is 
perhaps a more effective procedure to compel a parent to send 
his child to school* This section provides that the truant 
officer may notify the parent in writing of the nonattendance 
of his child and of the consequences of continued nonattendance, 
and requires the parent to cause the child to attend school 
within two days from the date of the notice. The statute
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then provides as followsî
’’Upon failure to do sô  the truant officer shall 
make complaint against the parent, guardian, or 
other person in charge of the child, in any court 
of competent jurisdiction in the district in 
which the offense occurs for such failure, and 
upon such conviction, the parent, guardian or 
other person in charge shall be fined not less 
than five dollars nor more than twenty dollars; 
or the court may in Its discretion, require the 
person so convicted to give bond In the penal 
sum of one hundred dollars, with sureties, to 
the approval of the court, conditioned that he 
or she will cause the child under his or her 
charge to attend some recognised school within 
two days thereafter and to remain at such school during the term prescribed by law; end upon 
failure or refusal of any parent, guardian, or 
other person to pay said fine and costs, or 
furnish said bond, according to the order of 
the court then said parent, guardian or other person shall be Imprisoned In the County jail 
not less than ten days nor more than thirty days.”
Thus, through the institution of court proceedings may the 
County Superintendent coerce parents into sending their children 
to school, providing that the children are within the school 
age#
Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H# OLSEN , 
Attorney General
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Opinion 85 - 1952
Held; 1. It is the duty of the board of trustees of a 
third class district to request the county superintendent 
of schools to call an election submitting the question of 
annexation when a petition signed by twenty per cent of the 
qualified electors of the school district has been presented 
to the board of trustees of such third class district*
2* Upon the complaint being made to the county transportation 
committee such comaittee has the authority to fix bus routes 
and to order one school district to discontinue transporting 
resident elementary pupils of another district who have not 
been granted pejmiisslon to attend school in a district other 
than that of residence*
May 19, 1932
Mr* Charles B* Sande 
County Attorney Yellowstone County 
Billings, Montana
Attention: Mr* Arnold A* Berger, Deputy
Dear Mr* Sande;
You have requested my opinion as to whether it is the duty 
of trustees of a third class school district, which has received 
a petition signed by twenty per cent of the qualified electors 
of the district to a second or first class district* You have 
also asked if the county transportation committee may fix bus 
routes and prevent one school district from picking up elementary
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children of another district and transport them in the high
school bus to the district operating the bus.
In answering your first question it is necessary to consider
the provisions of Section 75*-lSl3, 1947, as amended
by Chapter 32, Laws of 1951, which defines the procedure for
the consolidation of school districts* Subdivision 5 of
Section 75-1̂ 13, 1947, as amended, is pertinent to
your question and reads in part as follows ;
"When, in the interest of reducing the cost of 
operation or Improving the school service for 
pupils, a board of trustees, of a third class 
district, shall by a majority vote of its 
members or at the request of twenty per cent 
(20$) of the qualified electors of the dis­
tricts Indicated by a petition, ask the county 
superintendent of schools to annex the terri­
tory and property of such third class district to any second or first class district, the 
county superintendent shall, upon an approving 
vote of the trustees of the district with which 
the annexation is sought, authorize an election 
on such annexation within not less than twenty 
(20) nor more than thirty (30) days*"
The above quoted fixes two methods for requesting the
county superintendent to call an election* The first is by
a majority vote of the board of trustees and the second by a
petition addressed to the board of trustees of twenty per cent
of the qualified electors of the district seeking to be annexed
to a first or second class district* In both instances the
trustees of the district with which annexation is sought must
consent and then it is the duty of the county superintendent
to call an election. Under the facts you presented it appears
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that twenty per cent of the qualified electors petitioned 
trustees of their district to request that the county super­
intendent call an election and that the trustees have failed 
to make such a request*
It is to be noted that the above section states ” a 
board of trustees*,* shall,** at the request of twenty per 
cent of the qualified electors***ask the county superintendent 
of schools to annex,** such third class district to any second 
or first class district,'* The duty imposed is mandatory end
does not permit the trustees to exercise any discretion* If
the trustees do nob present the petition to the county super­
intendent, then they would be guilty of violation of a clear 
legal duty and & mandamus action will lie* Section 93-9102, 
R,C,M*, 1947* provides that a writ of mandamus may be issued 
by a court "to compel the performance of an act which the 
law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office," 
State ex rel* Peterson v* Peck, 91 Mont, 5» 4 Pac, (2d) 10d6*
In State v* McCracken, 91 Mont* 157» & Pac. (2d) 869, the
court said, "Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the perfor­
mance of a ministerial act or duty*" The presentation of the 
request to your county superintendent to hold the election 
would certainly be a ministerial duty and should be performed 
by the trustees.
While no time is fixed by the statute for the trustees to
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request that the county superintendent call an election, It 
must be assumed that the trustees must perform the act within 
a reasonable time as the delay might well defeat the purpose of 
the statute* State ex rel* Venek v* Justice Court * 110 Mont* 
550, 104 Pac* (2d) 14*
It is therefore my opinion that It Is the duty of the bos rd 
of trustees of a third class district to request the county 
superintendent of schools to call an election submitting the 
question of annexation when a petition signed by a twenty per 
cent of the qualified electors of the school district has 
been presented to the board of trustees of such third class 
district*
Your second question Is concerned with the duties and
powers of the county transportation committee* The county
transportation committee was first authorised by Chapter 109#
Laws of 1951# which amended Section 75‘-3412, R*C*M*, 1947*
The committee was granted broad powers as the statute provides ;
^It shall be the duty of the county transpor­
tation committee to approve bus routes and 
applications for increased transportation pay­
ments, and to act In all controversies resulting 
from transportation matters*"
All bus routes are subject to the approval of the transpor­
tation committee end any variance in route from the approved 
route would raise a controversy within the meaning of the above 
quoted section within the jurisdiction of the committee.
Picking up elementary school children in one district and
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transporting them to the district operating the bus is contrary
to Section 75-*3401| 1947» as amended by Chapter 1Ô9,
laws of 1951» if such children were not authorized to attend 
the schools of the district operating the bus* The prohibition 
is found in Section 75*3401» as amended, which reads in part 
as follows;
"The board of trustees of any school district 
,»*may furnish transportation to and from 
school for all pupils residing within their 
district, who are enrolled in the public
schools of their district, or who have been
granted permission to attend a school in 
another district**,*"
fenaisslon to attend school ia a district other then the 
residence of a child must be given in the manner and as provided 
in Section 75*1630, a*C*M,, 1947, as amended by Chapter 20?,
Laws of 1951.
It is therefore my opinion that upon complaint being made 
to the county transportation committee such committee has the 
authority to fix bus routes and to order one school district to 
discontinue transporting resident elementary pupils of another 
district who have not been granted permission to attend school 
in a district other than that of residence*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSiSN
Attorney General
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Opinion 6Ô ■«. 1954
Held: 1* Transportation by a school district of children to
another district for a school term of six months compiled with 
the statute prior to July 1, 1951f and subsequently, the term 
of school for such children was fixed at XÛQ days# Compliance 
with these standards would preclude the district from being 
declared abandoned#
2# It is within the discretionary powers of school trustees 
to require a cash deposit by children to cover breakage and 
excessive us of supplies in the course designated in Section 
75-4232, E#C*M#, 1947.
March 30, 1954
Mr# Henry I* Grant#, Jr#
County Attorney 
Stillwater County 
Columbus, Montana
Dear î-îr. Grant:
You have requested my opinion concerning the length of 
time for each school year that transportation of children by 
one district to another school must be furnished to preclude 
abandonment of the district#
You have also asked if school trustees may require a cash 
deposit to cover breakage and excessive use of supplies#
In answering your first question, it is important to con­
sider Section 75-1522, R#C#M#, 1947# Prior to amendment, Section 
75-1522 supra, provided that transportation of all children 
«to another district for the purpose of attending school
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
therein for a term of at least six (6) months during each of 
such three (3) years" will preclude the necessity of declaring 
a school district abandoned* The amendment to this Section by 
Chapter 109# Laws of 1951# fixed the term of the school year 
for a period of "at least one hundred eighty (ICO) days each 
year*»
The precise problem is whether the 180 days provision of the
amendment applies to each of the preceding three years* If such
a construction were given to the amendment# then a retroactive
effect would be given to this new statute* However# Section
12-201# R*C*M*# 1947 reads as followsî
"Ko law contained In any of the codes or other 
statutes of Montana is retroactive unless ex­
pressly so declared#"
Our Supreme Court# in Educational Bonds Case# 68 Mont 526# 
219 Pae. 637, held*
"There is always a presumption that statutes are 
intended to operate prospectively only# and words 
ought not to have a retroactive operation unless 
they are so clear, strong# and Imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless 
the intention of the Legislature cannot be other­
wise satisfied* Every reasonable doubt is resolved 
against e retroactive operation of a statute,"
In view of the above presumption and the lack of clear 
expression that the amendment is to operate retroactively, it 
must be concluded that the 180 day requirement was applicable 
on July 1, 1951# the effective date of Chapter 109, Laws of 
1951# The test for any school year prior to the amendment is 
a term of at least six months* A school month is defined for
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teacher’s contracts by Section 75-2202, 1947, as
twenty school days, or four weeks of five days each* and 
such definition should be applied to the statute under 
consideration#
Tour second question is answered by Section 75-4232, R#C#M#,
1947, which statesÎ
*Th@ board of trustees of any school district or 
county high school may require pupils in the com­
mercial, industrial arts, music, domestic science, 
scientific or agricultural courses to pay reason­
able fees to cover the actual cost of breakage 
and of excessive supplies used.”
This section contemplates reimbursement by the pupils In
the designated courses for breakage and unusual us© of supplies#
No precise method of assessing the fees is fixed thereof by
the statute and any reasonable method will suffice# Section
75-1632, R.C.M#, 1947 ©s last amended by Chapter 233, lews of
1953, enumerates the duties of school trustees, one of which is:
”To prescribe and enforce rules not inconsistent 
with law, or those prescribed by the superinten­
dent of public instruction for their own govern­
ment of school® under their supervision#”
This gives wide discretionary powers to the trustees and 
is in accord with the general law. See; Whittaker vs# Salem, 
216 Mass# 483, 104 359, and Brooks vs# Shannon, I84 Okla.
255, 86 Pec# (2d) 792#
It Is therefore my opinion that:
1# Transportation by a school district of children to 
another district for a school term of six months complied with
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the statute prior to July 1, 1951* end subsequently| the term 
of school for such children was fixed at 180 days* Compliance 
with these standards would preclude the district from being 
declared abandoned*
2m It Is within the discretionary powers of school trustees 
to require a cash deposit by children to cover breakage and 
excessive use of supplies In the courses designated in Section 
73-42)2, 1947.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSSN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 30 • 1954
Heldî High School students may not be counted in computing 
the average number of children transported by any school 
district so as to preclude the district being declared abandoned 
under the provisions of Section 75-̂ 1522, R.G.M.# 1947  ̂as 
amended by Chapter 109$ Laws of 1951.
June 23I 1954
Mr* Paul J. Murphy 
County Attorney 
Judith Basin County 
Stanford, Montana
Dear Mr. Murphy;
tou have requested my opinion whether a school distdct
in counting children transported may include high school children
so as to avoid the abandonment of the district* Tou advised
me that if the high school students of a district are included
in the number of children transported in each of the last
three years, then an average of more then five children will
have received transportation.
Section 75-1522, R.C.M*, 1947* as amended by Chapter 109,
Daws of 1951, states that a county superintendent must declare
a school district abandoned when a school has not been operated
in the district during a period of three consecutive years*
Such abandonment may be avoided if the school district comes
within the exception found In Section 75-1522, supra, which
reads as follows;
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•♦«♦that if any such school district has provided 
transportation either by bus or by the payment to 
Individuals, or has provided payments for board 
and room in lieu of transportation for an average 
of at least five (5) children of school age, during 
a period of three (3) consecutive years living 
within the district, to another district for the purpose of attending school therein for a terra 
of at least one hundred eighty (180) days each 
year* Such transportation shall be deemed equlva-* 
lent to the actual holding of school ia such district 
for a terra of one hundred eighty (180) days in each 
year, end such district shall not be fordered abandoned«•
It ia to be noted that the above^quoted portion of the 
statute contemplates the furnishing of transportation by the 
school district# examination of Section 75-3414# ,
1947# as amended by ̂ hapter 189, taws of 1951# makes It the 
duty of the Board of Trustees of every school district main­
taining a high school and the Board of Trustees of every county 
high school to provide a transportation budget# The sources 
of the funds for this budget are the State of Montana and a 
county-wide tax levy# One third of the funds are received 
from the state and two thirds from the county levy* The money 
from these two sources is liraited in amount by the schedule set 
forth in Section 75-3407# E.C,M«, 1947, as last amended by 
Chapter 189, Laws of 1951* A greater amount may be included 
in the budget by a special levy either on the high school district, 
the county, or the school district In a priority fixed by the 
statute# In no event is a levy made for the transportation of 
high school students on a school district as such where such 
school district does not maintain a high school# The conclusion
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must then be reached that a school district does not directly 
provide transportation to high school students within the 
meaning of Section 73-1522, supra, so that high school students 
can properly be included in the number transported so as to 
preclude the abandonment of the school district*
In construing Section 75-1522, supra, as amended, the
whole section should be considered in determining the legislative
intent* In State vs* District Court, 51, Mont# 305, 152, Pec#
745, the court said;
"The words, phrases and sentences of a statute 
are to be understood as used, not in any abstract 
sense but with due regard to the context, and In 
that sense which best harmonizes with all other 
parts of the statute#"
A
In applying the above^quoted rule, it is apparent that this 
code section is concerned only with elementary schools# Sub­
section 2 of Section 75-1522^ supra, states, in part, as 
follows Î '
"iVhenever there are five (5) or more children in 
abandoned territory eligible for attendance in an 
elementary school as determined by the county 
superintendent and residing more than three (3) 
miles from an established school in the district 
to which the abandoned territory is attached, the 
school trustees shall provide a school in such 
abandoned territory when requested so to do by 
the parents of at least three (3) of such children!"
The feet that the residence of five or more elementary 
school students in the area makes it the duty of the trustees 
to open a school, leads to the conslusion that elementary school 
students alone constitute the test for determining the necessity
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of operating the school and fixes the meaning of the five
children referred to In Subsection 1 of this act as elementary
school children*
The right to attend a high school by a resident of a
county is not dependent on domicile In any particular school
district since Section 1947» providest
"Attendance at any accredited high school shall be 
free to all eligible high school pupils residing in 
the county wherein such accredited high school is 
located except for such fees as the board of trustees 
are otherwise specially authorised by law to exact,"
As was pointed out above, transportation for high school 
students is not furnished by any school district but is an 
obligation of the county and state without regard to any parti­
cular school district# It must be concluded that if a school 
d̂istrict does not directly pay for the transportation of high 
school students, then a,school district does not "provide 
transportation" within the meaning of Section 75-1522, Also, 
the right to attend m y high school in the county is given to 
every student of the county without regard to residence in any 
particular school district#
It is therefore my opinion that high school students may not 
be counted in computing the average number of children transported 
by any school district so as to precludethe district being de­
clared abandoned under the provisions of Section 75-1522, R#C,K,, 
1947, as amended by Chapter 109, Laws of 1951#
Very truly yours,ARNOLD H. OLSiSN 
Attorney General
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COÜâOU&AîXOSI
Opinion 1)0 - 1946
U%Mt Sohool dletrlot m#y b$ omsolWeted with #n existing 
joint eohool dletriet only toy the oreetloa or e new Joint eehool 
4latrlct in compllenoe with the provision# of Section 1024 end 
1035#. A.OfW.# 19)5$ e« emended,
Fetoraery 26, 1946
Mr. W,. lé Hyde 
County Attorney 
Mineral Cotmty 
Superior, Hontene
Dear Mr# Hyde;
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the consolidation
of a joint school dlstrict with two school districts# Tou
advise me that two school districts la Missoula County are
adjacent to a joint school district and that you would like to
know what procedure to followf
Section 10)4# E#C*M*, 1935, as amended toy Chapter 201,
laws of 194), provides for the consolidation of a school district.
The section provides In part*
«Two or more adjacent school districts lying In 
one county may toe consolidated.•»«
the above quoted precludes the possibility of proceeding
under Eectlon 10)4$ as amended, as the joint school district
of necessity lies in two counties.
Section 10)5, R.O.M., 1935, provides for the creation of
* •394" *
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joint school districts, but is not complete in itself insofar 
as it does not set out the procedure to be followed* However, 
it declares joint districts "may be formed in the same manner 
as other new districts*"
The case of State v* Lensman, lOS Mont, 1X8, 88 fee, (2d) 
63, considered the method of creating a joint school district 
and held that Section 1024 and IO35, R*G*M*^ 1935, were the 
applicable statutes. It should be noted that the above case 
involved the creation of a new joint district from a portion 
of an old joint district and Is therefore an analogous situation 
to the one presented here.
Section 1024, R,C*M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 61, Laws 
of 1943, defines the procedure to be followed as does Opinion 
Ho, 396, Volume 19, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney 
General* Reference is made to Opinion Ho* 396 for the dis­
cussion of the problem which should be helpful* As you will 
note Section 1023, R,C.M*, 1935, precludes the creation of a 
new district between March 1 and July 1 of any calendar year.
It is therefore my opinion that school districts may be 
consolidated with an existing joint school district only by 
the creation of a new joint school district in compliance with 
the provisions of Section 1024 and 1035, R,C,M*, 1935, as 
amended* Sincerely yours,R* V, BOTTUMLI 
Attorney General
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Opinion 147 - 1946
Held: When two or more school district are consolidated, end
à new district is formed, the county superintendent of schools 
must appoint three trustees to serve until the first Saturday 
in April succeeding# In the case of consolidation by annexa­
tion, the officers of the first or second class school district 
shall continue to hold office until the end of the term for 
which they were elected*
April 26* 1946
Mr* M*i* Parcells 
County Attorney 
Stillwater County 
Columbus, Montana
Dear Mr*.Parcells:
Tou have requested my opinion concerning the appointment
of school trustees for a consolidated school district*
Section 1034# R.C.M#, 1935, as amended by Chapter 201,
lews of 1943, provides in part:
"Two or more adjacent school districts lying 
in one county may be consolidated either by 
the formation of a new district, or by the 
annexation of one or more districts to an 
existing district.*#"
It is apparent from the above quoted that the consolidation 
results in a new district| annexation results in the extinguish­
ment of one district by its incorporation into another, which 
district continues to function as an enlarged district*
If the proper steps are followed for consolidation of 
two districts, and the vote of the trustees and of the electors,
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if an election is held, le favorable, the county superintendent
“shall effect the consolidation of such districts" by an
order and "shall appoint three (3) trustees to serve until
the first Saturday in April succeeding." At the next annual
school election trustees ere regularly elected. The trustees
of the discontinued districts relinquish their offices, to-*
gather with the records, funds, and effects of the old districts
to the officers of the new district*
Annexation occurs when a third class district is merged
into an adjacent second or first class district. The officers
of the annexed districts turn over to the officers of the
district to which they are annexed all records, funds, end
effects. The act then providesi
"The officers of the first or second class dis­
trict Involved shall continue to hold office 
under the consolidated district until the end 
of the terms for which they were duly elected 
and their successors shall be regularly elected 
as provided by law."
The provision for annexation has application only when
a third class district becomes merged with a first or second
class district* Consolidation occurs In all other situations
when two or more districts are combined*
It is therefore my opinions
1, When two or more school districts are consolidated 
and a new district Is formed, the county superintendent of 
schools must appoint three trustees to serve until the first
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Saturday in April succeeding#
2# In the case of consolidation by annexation, the
officers of the first or second class school district shall
continue to hold office until the end of the term for which
they were elected*
Sincerely yours,
R* V# B0TTÛM1Ï
Attorney General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"^399"*
Opinion $4 • 1947
Held; In conformity with the law as given to ua by our 
legislature I in an election, on the consolidation of school 
districts, voters in the district which would assume an indebted­
ness by reason of consolidation must have the qualifications 
set out in Section 1002, R$G,M*, 1935» as amended by Chapter 
65f Laws of 1941» and also the qualifications required by 
Section 5199*1, R*C.M., 1935# Thus, In addition to the re­
quirements of Section 1002, as amended, the voters
in such district must be registered and their names must 
appear on the last preceding assessment roll# In districts 
not assuming an indebtedness, the voter need only have the 
qualifications under Section 1002, R.C.M#, 1935* In other 
words, when no indebtedness Is assumed the voter need not be 
a taxpayer, or registered voter#
December 11, 1947
Mr# Truman Bradford 
County Attorney 
Cascade County Greet Falls, Montana
Attention; Mr. W# H# Swanberg, Deputy County Attorney 
Dear Mr. Bradford;
Tou have requested an opinion of this office concerning 
the qualifications of electors at an election on the question 
of consolidation, of two third class school districts. You 
advise me that one of the districts has a bonded indebtedness. 
Section 1034» R*C*M*, 1935, as emended by Chapter 201,
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Laws of 1943» authorises consolidation of school districts by 
the county superintendent of schools after an approving vote 
of the board of trustees of each district# However, such 
consolidation cannot be made if twenty per cent of the qualified 
electors of any one of the districts, or more petition for 
an election in their district on the question, until after 
a favorable vote on the question*
In Opinion No# 3&4, Volume 19, Report and Official 
Opinions of the Attorney General, it was held that electors 
who satisfy the requirements of Section 1002, R,C*M#, 1935, 
as amended, are eligible to vote at an election for the 
consolidation of school districts* The opinion did not 
consider the problem where one district had bonded Indebted­
ness as ie the situation here*
Section 1034, S»C#M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 201,
Laws of 1943, provides in part;
^Bonded indebtedness of any districts merged by 
consolidation or annexation shall be assumed by 
the consolidated district or the district to 
which another is annexed#”
It is apparent that if the bonded indebtedness is assumed
by the consolidated district then a district without any
indebtedness, in becoming a part of a new district would be
assuming a debt or liability in proportion to its assessed
valuation*
Section 2 of Article IV of the Montana Constitution 
provides:
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"If the question submitted concerns the creation 
of any levy* debt or liability the person,.**», 
must also be a taxpayer whose name appears upon 
the last preceding completed assessment roll, in 
order to entitle him to vote upon such question."
The qualifications for voting upon the creation or in­
creasing of indebtedness is covered by Section 5199*1 R.C.M*, 
1935* which readsÎ
"That from and after the passage and approval 
of this set, only such registered electors of 
the city, town, school district, or other municipal corporation whose names appear upon 
the last preceding assessment roll shall be 
entitled to vote upon any proposal to create 
or increase any indebtedness of city, town, school district or other municipal corpora­
tion, required by law to be submitted to a 
vote of the electors thereof."
Our Supreme Court in Weber v* City of Helena, S9 Mont,
109, 297 Pac. 455, said in regard to this section:
"We think the evident purpose of the Act was to 
provide the procedure for all elections to in­
crease or create the indebtedness of the poli­
tical units therein mentioned whenever the laws 
required the approval of electors*.•"
In a district which has indebtedness, but assumes no new 
indebtedness, electors who meet the requirements of bectlon 
1002, R.Ü.M., 1935 as amended by Uhapter 65, laws of 1941, 
could vote on the question of consolidation. This would 
result in different qualifications in the elections held in 
the two districts.
It is, therefore, my opinion, in conformity with the law 
as given to us by our legislature, in on election, on the
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consolidation of school districts, voters in the district which 
would assume an indebtedness by reason of consolidation must 
have the Qualifications set out in Section 1002, R * C 1935, 
as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of 1941, and also the qualifica* 
tions required by Section 5199*1, R*Q*M*, 1935* Thus in 
addition to the requirements of Section 1002, R,C.M*, as 
amended, the voters in such district must be registered and 
their names must appear on the last preceding assessment roll* 
In districts not assuming an Indebtedness, the voter need only 
have the qualifications under Section 1002, R.O«M., 1935# In 
other words, when no indebtedness is assumed the voter need 
not be a taxpayer, or registered voter*
Sincerely yours,
B* V* BOTTOMLT
Attorney General
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Opinion 150 - I94Ô
Held* Property located within school districts which are 
abandoned and annexed to an existing school district prior 
to the fixing of the levy for the latter district, shall be 
taxed at the same rate as all property within the then existing 
district* except in so far as prior indebtedness or out- ’ 
standing bonds are involved*
November 30* 194#
Mr, James H, Higgins 
County Attorney 
Meagher County
White Sulphur Springs, Montana 
Dear Mr, Higgins*
tou have requested my opinion concerning the 3evy for tax 
purposes on property located within three abandoned school 
districts which were annexed to an existing school district,
Tou advise me that the order of abandonment and of annexa­
tion was made by the County Superintendent of Schools on July 
26 and 2#, 194#« Tou also state that residents within the 
territory which was annexed feel that the tax levy on their 
property should not be that of the district to which the 
abandoned school districts were annexed.
Chapter 166, Laws of 1943, authorises the abandonment of 
school districts and it provides that all funds of an abandoned 
school district shall be placed in the general fund of the dis­
trict to which its territory is attached# Thii means that the 
abandoned district has been so merged that there is but one
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legal entity.
Also the levies for school districts are fixed after the 
preparation of the school budgets. Sections 1019.12 and 
1263.19 1935i provide that the Board of Gounty Commiŝ -
eioners shall meet on the second Monday in August for the 
purpose of fixing tax levies# It Is apparent that the an*» 
sexed territory in question must be subject to the same tax 
levy fixed for the school district to which it is attached 
or otherwise escape liability for school taxes as school bud*» 
gets cannot be made for abandoned school districts. All sub­
sequent taxes on property located within the districts aban­
doned and annexed will likewise be at the same rate fixed for 
property within the district to which the abandoned territory 
is annexed, insofar as no prior Indebtedness or outstanding 
bonds are involved.
It ia therefore, my opinion that property located within 
school districts which are abandoned and annexed to an existing 
school district prior to the fixing of the levy for the latter 
shall be taxed at the same rate as all property within the 
then existing district, except as to the above mentioned 
prior indebtedness*
Sincerely yours,
B. V. BOTTOMLX
Attorney General
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Opinion 42 - 1949
Heldî (1) The territory of a Third Class School District which 
is annexed to a First or Second Class District does not assume 
any of the bonded indebtedness of the First or Second Class 
District; but the bonded indebtedness of the Third Class Dis­
trict is assumed by the First or Second Class District to which 
the Third Glass District is annexed#
(2} If a Third Class School District, or any other Class 
District is consolidated with one or more School Districts and 
a new District formed, the bonded indebtedness of each of the 
component Districts Is assumed by the new District and all of 
the territory of the new District is liable for the payment of 
such bonds#
July 30, 1949
Miss Mary M» Condon
State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Helena, Montana
Dear Miss Condonî
You have submitted for my opinion the following questions
"Does a Third Class District which has been annexed 
to a second or third class district assume a share 
of the latter*8 bonded indebtedness?”
In answering your question it is important to consider
Section 1034, R#0#M#, 1935, es amended by Chapter 201, Laws of
1943, which defines the procedure for the consolidation of
School Districts and the annexation of one or more districts
to an existing district* It is to be observed that under the
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provisions of this Section, consolidation of two or more 
districts is effected by the merger of the districts after 
appropriate action of the trustees of the districts concerned, 
with the resulting fonaation of a new district. Annexation of 
a Third Class District occurs when the district Is merged with 
a First or Second Class District, There Is no provision in 
the Section for annexation of a Third Class District to a 
Third Class District as your question suggests# This inter­
pretation of Section 1034» as amended, was recognized in the 
Opinion No* 147# Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of 
the Attorney General wherein it was said;
"The provision for annexation has application only 
when a Third Class District becomes merged with a 
First or Second Class District# Consolidation 
occurs in all other situations when two or more 
districts are combined#"
The portion of Section 1034# as emended which applies
to the bonded Indebtedness reads as follows;
"Bonded indebtedness of any districts merged by 
consolidation or annexation shall be assumed by 
the consolidated district or the district to which 
another is annexed#"
The above quoted statute contemplates two situations. The 
assumption of the bonded indebtedness of the component parts 
of the new district resulting by consolidation of two or more 
districts and the assumption by a First or Second Class District 
of the bonded indebtedness of a Third Class District which is 
annexed. In the case of consolidation, a Third Class District
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which is Included within the new district would assume its 
proportionate share of the bonded Indebtedness of the new 
district, but in the event of annexation of a Third Class 
District to a First or Second Class District no provision 
is made for such assumption•
Section 1029*1, R*C*M«, 1935, '►diieh was amended by 
implication by Chapter 201, Laws of 1943, provided that the 
bonded Indebtedness of a school district which is consoli­
dated or whose boundaries are changed shall remain the 
indebtedness of the original territory against which the 
bonds were issued* Chapter 201 did not alter this rule in 
regard to Third Class Districts annexed to First or Second 
Class Districts and as a consequence such Third Class Dis­
tricts so annexed would not assume the indebtedness of the 
districts to which the Third Glass Districts are annexed*
The foregoing does not apply to school districts which 
have been declared abandoned under the provisions of Section 
970, R*C#M., 1935, as amended by Chapter 16Ô, Laws of 1943, as
f  'such abandoned districts may be attached to one or more con­
tiguous districts on the order of the County Superintendent 
and do not constitute annexation as is contemplated by your 
question* The territory of the abandoned district which is 
attached will continue, under Chapter l6d, to be liable for 
its bonded Indebtedness and there is no assumption of indebted­
ness by the district to which it is attached*
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It is therefore, my opinion that the territory of a Third 
Class District which is annexed to a First or Second Class 
District does not assume any of the bonded indebtedness of the 
First or Second Class Districts, but the bonded indebtedness 
of the Third Class District is assumed by the First or Second 
Class District to which the Third Glass District is annexed.
It is also my opinion that If a Third Class District, or 
any class district, is consolidated with one or more school 
districts and & new district is formed the bonded Indebtedness 
of each of the component districts is assumed by the new dis­
trict end all of the territory of the new district. Including 
that of the Third Class District, is liable for the payment 
of such bonds.
Very truly yours.
AilNOLD H. OLSai 
Attorney General
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Opinion 50 1949
Held! 1. Territory in a School District may be transferred 
to an adjoining School District even though the territory to 
be transferred is within three miles of a school house in which 
school has not bean held for the last four years,
2# The prohibition of Chapter 61, laws of 1943, against 
transferring territory within three miles of a school refers 
to an established school and in my opinion a school house 
wherein school has not been held for the past four years is 
not an established school.
September 7» 1949
Mr# G,0. SchmidtI Jr. 
County Attorney 
Fort Benton, Montana
Dear Mr# Schmidtt
You have requested my opinion concerning the transfer of 
territory In one school district to an adjoining school district 
when the territory to be transferred is within three miles of 
a school house in which school has not been held for the last 
four years# .
Section 1024, R.G.M., 1935, as amended by Chapter 61,
Laws of 1943, provides in part;
majority of the resident taxpayers who are 
registered electors and whose names appear 
upon the last completed assessment roll for 
state, county and school district taxes, re­siding in territory which is a part of any 
organized school district may present a peti­
tion In writing to the County Superintendent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of Schools I asking that such territory he trans** 
ferred to* or included in, any other organized 
district to which said territory is contiguous, 
provided however^ that no territory within three l3) miles of an established school in such dis* 
trlet shall be so transferred and provided further 
that the taxable valuation (the percentage value*
tion upon which levies are made and taxes computed)
of property in the district from which territory 
is taken shall not be reduced to less than seventy* 
five thousand dollars (#75|000.00)*«
The above quoted section prohibits the transfer of terri­
tory from one district to an adjoining district when such 
territory is within three miles of ”an established school**
The territory in question may be transferred to the adjoining 
district if *an established school* means one that is used and 
in operation as a school rather than an unused school house* 
The first portion of Section 1024, as amended, provides that 
the same three mile limitation applies to "any school house*•#
in which a school is maintained,* upon a petition to create a
new district out of one or more existing districts* It is 
reasonable to assume that the legislature would not impose a 
different condition upon the creation of a new district than 
upon transfer of territory from one district to another* 
Uniformity in applying the limitation would result in carrying 
out the purpose of the statute* Such a construction of the 
statute is in accord with the rule found in State v* Millis,
81 Mont* 66, 261 fee, 865, wherein our Supreme Court said 
"Statutes are to be construed so as best to effectuate the 
object of the legislature.*
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It is therefore my opinion that under the provision of 
Section 1024» 1935» as amended by Chapter 61, Laws of
1943» the territory which ispart of an organized school distilct 
and within three miles of a school house which has not been 
used for school purposes in four years may be transferred to 
an adjoining school district provided that the other conditions 
of the statute are met*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H* OLSm 
Attorney General
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Opinion 12Ô « 1950
Held; 1$ High School Building Districts may be consolidated 
by virtue of Section 1, Chapter 130, taws of 1949, and the 
procedure to be followed is found in Section 75-4602,
1947.
2# Surplus funds realized from the sale of a high school con­
structed with the proceeds of bonds issued by a High School 
Building District should be allocated to the component 
elementary school districts of the High School Building District 
if a high school is no longer operated within the High School 
Building District and the subsequent consolidation of the 
High School Building District would not affect such distribution*
September 30, 1950
Mr* Robert 3. Purcell 
County Attorney 
Garfield County 
Jordan, Montana
Dear Mr* Purcell;
You have requested my opinion concerning the procedure
to be followed in consolidating two High School Building Districts,
Also, you have asked what disposition should be made of
the surplus remaining after the payment of debts realized from
the sale of a high school building and dormitory which were
constructed from funds from a bond issue of a High School
Building District*
In answering your first question, it is necessary to
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consider Section 1, Chapter I30, laws of 1949» which reads as 
follows*
**In any Connty which has been divided into High 
School Building Districts, at the request of 
any High School Board of Trustees, the commis-* 
sion, provided for in Chapter 275* laws of 1947* 
may, in accord with the procedure provided in 
said chapter, alter the boundaries of said dis^ tricts or re*divide the County into a different 
number of high school districts, provided that 
such alteration or redivision may not be done 
within three years from the original division 
or the last alteration of boundaries and last redi vision,**
The above quoted portion of Chapter I30 grants the 
authority for the redivision of a County into a different 
number of high school districts* Section 7$-4602,
1947» which was formerly Section 2 of Chapter 275# laws of 
1947# fixes the manner of dividing a County into High School 
Building Districts which procedure can be used for any sub­
sequent alteration of boundaries of high school districts*
In Opinion Ho* 121, Volume 17, Report and Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General, this office held that the only statu­
tory method of consolidation of high school districts was to 
be found in Section 1034, R*C*M*, 1935, which is now Section 
75-1613, R*0*M*, 1947# However, the holding in that Opinion 
no longer has application due to the enactment of Chapter 130, 
Laws of 1949, which specifically deals with the manner of 
redividing a County or altering the boundaries of high school 
districts* In the case of Langston v. Currie 95 Mont 57* 26 
Fac* (2d) 160, the court said:
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**%here there Is one statute dealing with a subject 
in general and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a more
minute and definite way, the two should be read
together end harmonized, if possible, with a view 
to giving effect to a consistent Legislative policy, but, to the extent of any neeesaary repugnance 
between them, the special will prevail over the general,*»
Your second question is not answered by any specific 
statutory provision# The disposition of funds realized from 
the sale of a County High School is covered by Section 75-4127, 
R,C,M,, 1947, and the distribution of remaining funds of an 
abandoned school district is allocated under Section 75-1522, 
R#C*M#, 1947* In the case of State v* Brandenburg, 107 Mont#
199, S2 Pac# (2d) $93, the distribution of funds realized from
the sale of an obsolete building which had been acquired for 
the use of the County High School was made to the County Hi^ 
School account. The reasoning in the case was based on the 
source of the money and the court held that the purchase money 
having come from the distributive share of the County-wide 
High School levy the proceeds of the sale of the building 
should be the property of the County High School* Applying the 
reasoning of that case to the facts presented here the con­
clusion must be reached that the funds realized from the sale 
of the building should be distributed to the general funds of 
the elementary schools comprising the High School Building 
District as it was the area within the High School Districts 
which paid off the bond issue# However, the obligations and 
debts of the High School District must be first paid, before
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distribution of eny surplus to the «oaponent eleaontsry dis* 
triots.
It Is therefore mf opinion t
1# Nigh school Bull<& ng Dlstrlots may be consolidated by 
virtue of Section 1, Chapter 130* lews of 1949# end the pro 
cedure to be followed is found in Section 73*4602# R,0,M,# 1947» 
»] 2, Surplus funds realised Xvm the sale of ft High School
constructed with the proceeds of bonds Issàsd by # High School 
Building district should be allocated to the component elemen* 
tary school districts of the Ki^ School Building District 
if ft high school 1ft no longer operated within the Hi#% School 
Building Districts end the subsequent consolidation of the 
High School Building District would not effect such distrlbu* 
tion.
Very truly yours#
ABHOLB H, OL@m
At to mey General
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Opinion 66 - 195V
Held: An eppeal may be taken to the board of county comaiis-
aloners from an order of the county superintendent of schools 
denying the petition requesting the transfer of territory from 
one school district to another under the provision» of Sub­
section 7 of Section 75-1S05, 1947*
March 29, 1954
Mr* Russell K* Fillner 
County Attorney 
Rosebud County 
Forsyth, Montana
Dear Mr# Fillner;
You have requested my opinion concerning the right of
appeal to the board of county cotmaissioners from the decision
of the county superintendent under Subsection 7 of Section
75-1&05, 1947* You advise me that a petition to
transfer territory from one school district to another was
presented to the county superintendent who, after a hearing,
denied the petition and an appeal was taken to the board of
county commissioners by the petitioners#
Subsection 7 of Section 75-1605, R#C»M#, 1947, provides
that the county superintendent, after receiving a petition
to transfer territory, shall:
»**.proceed to hear such petition, and if he deem 
it advisable end for the best interest of the terri­
tory proposed to be transferred or included, he shall 
grant such petition and make an order fixing the 
boundaries of the district so changed, which order
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shall be finely unless an appeal be taken to the 
board of county commissioners of the county wherein 
such districts are located within thirty (30) days 
thereafter, end upon hearing thereof the decision of said board shall be final***
The above quoted portion of the statue does not state in
precise language that an appeal may be had when the petition 
is denied. However, the statute states that if the petition 
is granted, the county superintendent must make "an order 
fixing the boundaries of the district so changed*” Such an 
order calls for statutory directions, while an order denying 
the petition need not be defined. To authorize an appeal when 
the petition is granted and to prohibit an appeal on the 
denial of the petition would not be justified and would not 
appear to be the legislative intention. The right of appeal 
to the board of county commissioners and the powers of the 
board were broadly construed in the case of Read vs, Stephens,
121 Pîont, 50S, broadly construed in the case of Read vs,
Stephens, 121 Mont, 50S, 193 Pac, (2d) 626. The court in
rendering its opinion did not question the right of appeal
from an order of the county superintendent denying the petition 
and recognized the broad powers of both the county superin­
tendent and the board of county commissioners in the following 
language,
”,*,the legislature has delegated to the county 
superintendent of schools and to the bca rd of county 
conmiissioners a full measure of discretionary power
in creating and changing the boundaries of school
districts,®
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"When an appeal is taken to the board of coimty 
commissioners from the order and decision of the 
county superintendent of schools> this power and 
discretion is vested in the board, end upon 
hearing of the appeal, the statute declares that 
*the decision of said board shall be final*,"
It is therefore my opinion that an appeal may be taken 
to the board of county commissioners from an order of the 
county superintendent of schools denying a petition requesting 
the transfer of territory from one school district to another 
under the provisions of Subsection 7 of Section 75*1805,
1947.
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLS^N 
Attorney General.
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Opinion 69 • 1954
Helds 1# It is the duty of the county superintendent to 
make every reasonable effort to ascertain the number of 
qualified electors In a school district In computing the 
requisite per cent of signers on a petition for annexation 
of a school district.
2. Under the facts submitted the petition requesting 
annexation of a school district had the requisite signatures 
and an election should have been called and the question 
submitted to the qualified electors*
March 31, 1954
Miss Mary M. Condon 
Superintendent of Public Instruction State Capitol Building 
Helenap Montana
Dear Miss Condonj
You have requested my opinion concerning the sufficiency
of fi petition requesting the county superintendent of Flathead
County to annex School District Ho. 1, a third class district,
to District No. 6, a second class district. The petition was
signed by 23 qualified electors, and attached to the petition
is the certificate of the county superintendent which recites
the method followed by the superintendent In ascertaining
whether or not the petition was signed by 20 per cent of the
qualified electors. The pertinent part of the certificate
is as follows ;
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"Basis of Calculation
Humber of voters in a 'contested* school trustee 
election as nhovna by official tally in 1952 election..,70 
Number of voters in a 'contested school trustee 
election as shovn by official tally in 1953 election**.67 
Number of parents listed on 1953 census list.,.*...#***68 Humber of registered voters voting in last general 
e l e c t i o n . *109 Number of registered voters as of now**•«•**•*•«••••*«*112 
A number of people in the district were contacted as to 
probable number of eligible yotera-highest estimate wssllO."
On these facts the superintendent concluded that the petition 
had a sufficient number of signatures and called an election*
The total vote cast at the election was 1151 61 of whom voted
for annexation end an appeal was taken to your office. The 
appellants, In support of their appeal, submitted twelve affi­
davits of persons who stated they were qualified electors and 
did not vote at the election* These affidavits raise the 
question as to the sufficiency of the petition* Emphasis must 
be placed on the dates of the various steps taken in regard to 
the proceedings* The petition was filed with the county super­
intendent on January 2, and on January 5» the superintendent 
acted on the petition by notifying the school boards of the 
petition* The election was held on February 4# The affidavits 
of electors submitted executed more than ten days after the 
election by the appellants recited that each affiant was 
qualified to vote at the election.
This opinion is confined to the sufficiency of the petition, 
as the appeal on the whole record submitted must be decided by you.
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In answering your question as to the sufficiency of the
petition it is important to consider several statutes# The
authority end procedure for the annexation of a third class
district to a first or second class district is found in
Subsection 5 of Section 75-1Ô13» R#C#M,, 1947, as last amended
by Chapter 23, Laws of 1953, which reads in part as follows;
"(5) When, in the interest of reducing cost of operation or improving the school service for 
pupils, a board of trustees, of a third class 
district shall by majority vote of its members 
or at the request of twenty per cent (20) of the 
qualified elednrs of the districts indicated by 
a petition, ask the county superintendent of 
schools to annex the territory and property of 
such third class district In its entirety, or 
proportionately to any number of first or second 
class districts as the board resolution or 
petition requests, the county superintendent 
shall upon an approving vote of the trustees of the district with which the annexation is 
sought, authorize an election on such annexa­
tion within not less than twenty (20) nor more 
than thttty days##*’»
This code section permits two alternatives# Zither a
resolution of the board of trustees or a,petition of 20 per
cent of the qualified electors of the third class district were
able to request that the county superintendent annex the third
class district to a first or second class district# A petition
directed to the county superintendent initiated the proceedings
with which we are concerned#
Only qualified electors of the third class district were
eligible to sign the petition and qualifications of electors
are defined in Section 75-1610, R#C#M#, 1947:
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'•Î̂ Z'Z'T
*'QuftllJflQfttloa8 of Electors* Every cltisen of the UnltW States of the ege of twenty*one yeers or 
ovsr who has resided la the stete of Montana for 
one year# end thirty day# In the school district 
next preceding the election# may vote thereat#"
It is Important to observe that registration 1# not a
condition precedent to costing a vote at a school district
election In a district of the third class. That registration
is not a qualification to vote in a general school election
was the conclusion reached in 22 Opinions of the Attorney
General 1$#, Ko* 94# The Montana Supreme Court# la State
ex rel. Lang vs* furnish# #  Mont# 2d, 134 Pec, 297# expressed
the rule in this language ;
",##It Is « principle long established that 
registration Is no part of the qualifications 
of an elector end adds nothing to thorn; it is 
merely a method of ascertaining who the qualified 
electors are, in order that abuses of the elective 
franchise may be guarded against***"
Ky reason for emphasising that registration Is not an 
essential element to vote at a school election is apparent 
when it is remembered that the county superintendent must 
determine whether a petition is signed by 20 per cent of the 
electors and no registration list Is available as a standard 
in esoertalning the sufficiency of the number of signers.
This perplexing problem was considered in the case of Swaim 
vs, Kedeen# 101 Mont* $21, $5 fee, (2d) 1# although there 
was a marked difference in the statute there considered# as 
the petition had to be "signed and acknowledged by a majority 
of the resident freeholders," The court held that the county
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superintendant wa» justified In relying on the county records
ss *the freeholders of the district ere the freeholders shown
to he such fey the county records** The ©idaion also stated
****Wo do not think It may fee reasonably assumed 
that the superintendent shell personally contact 
each of the residents of the district and by 
direct Inquiry determine whether such resident is a freeholder or not**,*
The Swalm case was followed In State e% rel* Wilson vs, 
Muefeurger, 114 #3nt* 1751 153 fee, (2d* 5&6, and the court 
specifically stated the petition for consolidation of school 
districts Is jurisdictional end it la the duty of the county 
superintendent to search all the county records Including 
those of the clerk of the court In determining the freeholders* 
However» both of these cases must fee distinguished from the 
facts which you presented » as there ha» been & change in the 
statute fey amendment* Ho longer must the aidera fee freeholders» 
but qualified electors for school elections are proper peti­
tioners* . As was previously pointed out» school electors need 
not fee registered and as a consequence the county superintendent 
does not have the benefit of a fixed mathematical basis for
her computation*
As the petition was filed January 2 and the election held 
February 4» more than thirty days elapsed between the two dates. 
The county superintendent acted on the petition January 5» and 
the sufficiency of the petition must be tested as of such date* 
This conclusion Is la accord with the opinion in Swaia vs* Eedeen»
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supraI where the court said;
*’Th« petition was filed In the action at bar 
July 16I 1934» The order calling the election 
or directing that notices of election be posted 
was made between 1*30 and 2*30 P*M,, July 25th.
Some two hours thereafter, or at 3 o*clock P.M*, 
the same day, the deeds heretofore mentioned 
were filed for record so that the number of 
resident freeholders was increased to the 
extent that the petition did not contain a
majority of such freeholders at that time* The
deeds were filed after the election had been 
ordered and came too late to alter the required 
number of signatures on the petition,**"
No showing is made by appellants as to the exact number 
of electors on January 5# and it is conjectural whether there
were more or less than 115 electors at the time the super­
intendent acted on the petition* Six different inquiries 
were made by the county superintendent as set out in the 
"Basis of Calculation" recited in full above, and in my 
opinion each of these was a real probative force in reaching 
the conclusion that twenty-three signers were sufficient. It 
is not reasonable to require the county superintendent to 
conduct a door to door census and this was recognized in the 
Swaim case*
The petition is questioned after the election and this
makes the recent case of State ex rel* Graham vs. Board of
Examiners, 125 Mont* 419, 239 Pac* (2d) 2#3, particularly
applicable as the court in the case discussed attacks on an
initiative petition* The opinion stated the rule;
",,,But after the people have voted on the measure 
and a great majority of the voters throughout the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
•*42
state have expressed their approval, the courts 
presume that the public interest was there and 
technical objections to the petition or its suf­
ficiency are disregarded.”
The delay in challenging the petition until after the
election also mitigates against the appellants* position as it
was held in Reid vs. Lincoln County, 46 Mont. 31, 125 Pac# 429:
”#,.But the election should he held valid unless 
it appears that a sufficient number of legal voters 
to have changed the result were prevented from 
casting their ballots..»”
No showing was made nor was the claim made that any 
elector was deprived of a chance to vote.
It is therefore my opinion that is is the duty of the 
county superintendent to make every reasonable effort to ascer­
tain the number of qualified electors in a school district In 
computing the requisite per cent of signers on a petition for 
annexation of a school district.
It is also my opinion that under the facts submitted the 
petition requesting annexation of a school district had the 
requisite signatures and an election should have been called 
and the question submitted to the qualified elector s*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN
Attorney General
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cHmEa XII :
SCHOOL SITES AWD ABANDONED æHOOL DISTRICTS 
Opinion 3 1946*
Held I 1# That the inclusion o f a site for a high school 
gymnasium in the bond election ballot Is surplusage and the 
location of the site must be determined as an independent 
matter*
2* That the preliminary work in the construction of a county 
high school gymnasium may be done by the county and funds 
realized from bonds used in such work*
December 27# 1946
Honorable Leon G# Olmstead 
Senator from Sweet Grass County 
Big Timber# Montana
Dear Senator Olmsteadi
You have requested my opinion concerning the followingî
The ballot submitted in a bond election for the construction
of a gymnasium for the county high school recited the purpose
of the bond issue was the **constructing and erecting a high
school gymnasium on Lots 6# 7» 6# 9# and 10 (or a portion
thereof) of Block 27 in Boulder Addition Ho* 1 to the City
of Big Timber# î'îontana*'*
1* You ask if the gymnasium may be constructed on the lots
other than those described in the ballot*
2* You ask if the foundation may be constructed with the
use of ' county machinery or if the whole building must be built
by a contractor after bids are called for end the best bid accepted<
Your first question concerning the inclusion in the ballot
-427-
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of the location of the building raises a serious problem# 
Section 4630*11 R#C*M*| 1933, provides that "If bonds are 
sought to be Issued for two (2) or more purposes, then 
separate ballots must be provided for each purpose," The 
location of the building Is not a bonding proposition and 
therefore does not violate this section* However, the 
qualified electors for a county bond issue must be taxpayers 
— Section 4630*12, 1935, as amended by Chapter 136,
Laws of 1939— while there is not the requirement of being a 
taxpayer for eligibility to vote on the question of the 
acquisition, sale or change of a site for a school building. 
Section 1262,63# R*C#M,, Montana, 1935, ae amended by 
Chapter 207, Laws of 1939, and Section 1002, R.C,M,, 1935, 
as amended by Chapter 63, Laws of 1939, and Chapter 65, Laws 
of 1941.
The inclusion of the proposed site in the ballot for the
bond issue does not invalidate the bond issue. In State v#
School District 97, Mont 356, 34 fac* (2d) 522, our Court
considered a bond election at which the selection of a school
site was also submitted* The Court said}
"It will be observed that the site matter was 
submitted at the first election on a separate 
ballot and in a qualified manner*.*Dld the 
submission of the question constitute fraudu­lent misrepresentation to the voters? We do not 
see how it could have done so* There is 
nothing in the record before us to support the 
allegation that anyone was influenced to vote 
for the bonds by reason of the site matter*
There is no evidence that the submission of
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that subject even in the qualified manner effected the result*"
While the site was incorporated in the ballot in your 
election, yet the reasoning of the above quoted case would 
apply end would in effect put the burden on the taxpayer 
who complains to show that there was a sufficient number 
who were misled*
Also the lots described are a portion of the present
high school site and are owned by the county* Without
question the board has the authority to construct the
building on a portion of the high school site* The fact
the description of lots which are a portion of the high
school site was included in the ballot makes one of the
conclusions expressed in Morse v# Granite County, 44 Mont*
7&, 119 fac* 286, pertinent :
"That the electors have been asked to give 
their consent to things which the board may 
or must do without such consent, may not be 
held to restrict the discretion lodged In it 
by statute*"
If the lots in question were contiguous to the high school 
and not owned by the county, the board would have the authority 
without consulting the electorate to pKrchase the same* Section 
1262.83, 1935, AS amended by Chapter 207, haws of 1939#
Such a situation would come within the rule of the Morse case, 
supra* However if non-contiguous lots were to be used for 
the building, the electorate would have to be consulted under 
Section 1262*83, as amended, end such an election would be
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independent of the bond election.
It is thereforeI my opinion that the inclusion of a site 
for a high school gymnasium in the bond election ballot is 
surplusage and the location the site must be determined as an 
Independent matter in accordance with Section 1262,83,
1935» as amended by Chapter 207, Laws of 1939#
The lots described in the ballot under consideration are 
a portion of the present school site and, therefore, their 
inclusion in the ballot constitutes surplusage*
If lots other than those described are to be used for the 
gymnasium site, then it will be necessary to proceed in accor­
dance with Section 1262,83# R*G.M., 1935» as amended by Chapter 
207, Laws of 1939# Under that section, approval of the elec­
torate is necessary if the lots are not contiguous or part 
of a previously authorized site.
Tour second question is also answered by Section 1262*83, 
R*C,M*, 1935» as emended by Chapter 207, Laws of 1939, which 
requires that "all boards of trustees of county high schools, 
or districts maintaining high schools, shall be prohibited 
from letting any contracts for building, furnishing, repairing 
or other work for the benefit of the school" without submitting 
the matter for bids* It is to be noted that the prohibition 
applies to letting of contracts, and your proposal is to use 
county machinery for preliminary work and subsequently submit 
for bids the balance of the construction. Section 1262,83,
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«9 emendW* «tetos th«t the boerd of trusteed eheXX hev« the 
power «et Its Otscretion e# restrieted by lew to build* 
hiĝ i school gyaaiaslums#* The letting of bids would be re* 
strieted by ss above noted ̂ but if the prelimiuery work 
is done by the county, then the provisions concerning bids 
would not be sppliceble#
It is therefore, my opinion that the preliminary work 
in the construction of a county high school gymnasium may 
be done by the county and funds realised from bonds used in 
such work*
Sincerely yours,
m* V* B O T T O M U ,
Attomey Gmeral
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Opinion 43 - 1947
Held; A school site may be sold by the Board of Trustees of 
a school district either under the provisions of subdivision 
Ô of Section 1015 ,1935, as amended, or under the pro­
vision of Chapter 106, Laws of 1939, as amended, and that the 
fact the site and property may be desirable for school purposes 
for schools other than those maintained by the district will 
not preclude the sale by the district*
June 24, 1947
Mr* James Preeboum County Attorney 
Silver Bow County 
Butte, Montana
Dear Mr* Preeboum î
You have requested my opinion concerning the procedure to
be followed In the sale of the site formerly used by the high
school* You advise me that there have been Inquiries made by
other schools for the purchase of the property for school purposes*
This office considered the sale of school sites in Opinion
No* 15, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney
General, and held:
"Abandoned school sites may be sold by the Board 
of Trustees of a school district either under the 
provisions of subdivision 8 of Section 1015, R.C.M*, 
as amended, or under the provisions of Chapter 106,
Laws of 1939***
While the above opinion was written, prior to the amend­
ment of Chapter 106, Laws of 1939, by Chapter 232, Laws of 
1947, yet the rule is not altered by Chapter 232 as the effect
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of Chapter 232 is to provide for the disposition of the funds 
realized from the sale#
If the Board of Trustees decides to proceed under Chapter 
106I Laws of 1939, as amended# in making the sale# the detailed 
steps to be taken must be followed.
It Is to be noted that Chapter 106, as amended, provides 
that ’the Board shall duly pass a resolution declaring such 
lands, buildings, fixtures or other property to be or about to 
become abandoned, obsolete, undesirable or unsuitable for 
school purposes of said District." The fact that the site 
may be suitable for some school other than that maintained by 
the district does not preclude the district from finding that 
the site and buildings are not desirable for the district’s 
schools and therefore are abandoned. As indicated by the 
quoted portion of Chapter 106, it is the lack of usefulness 
for "school purposes of said District" which authorizes the 
board to initiate the procedure for the sale of the property.
It is therefore, my opinion that a school site may be 
sold by the Board of Trustees of a school district either 
under the provisions of subdivision Ô of Section 1015,
1935, as amended, or under the provisions of Chapter 106, Laws» 
of 1939, as amended, and that the fact the site end property 
may be desirable for school purposes for schools other than 
those maintained by the district will not preclude the sale 
by the district. Sincerely yours,R. V# BOTTOmi 
Attorney General
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Opinion 73 • 1947
Holds The territory of a school district \diich Is attached 
to another school district by reason of abandonment in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 970, R*G»M., 1935, 
as amended, is not liable for the bonded or warranted Indebted* 
ness of the school district to which the abandoned district 
is attached#
October 20, 1947
Mr* S.W* Popham 
County Attorney Dawson County 
Glendive, Montana
Deer Mr* Pophamî
ÏOU have requested my opinion concerning the liability
of a school district which was annexed to another district
for the bonded or warranted indebtedness of the latter
district* You advised me that the district which was annexed
was an abandoned district within the meaning of Section 970,
E#C#M*, as amended by Chapter 16Ô, laws of 1943*
Under Section 970, R*C*M., 1935, as amended by 'Chapter
166, laws of 1943, the property of such abandoned district
would be liable for any indebtedness of the district and the
property of the district to which the abandoned district was
attached, would not be liable* This section is silent as to
the liability of the abandoned district for the debts of the
district to which the abandoned district is attached* Ana*
logons situations arise in the creations of new districts or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 4 3 5 -
the consolidation of districts which come within the pro­
visions of Section 1029.1# 1935# this last section
limits the liability for bonded indebtedness to the original 
territory against which such bonds were Issued*
In Opinion So. 91* Volume 15# Report and Official Opinions 
of the Attorney General# this office considered the liability 
of the territory of an abandoned district for outstanding 
bonds of the district to which the abandoned district was 
annexed and held that the territory of the abandoned district 
could not be subjected to a tax levy for the payment of the 
bonds* Many oases were cited and reference is made to the 
opinion for the reasoning found therein.
It is therefore# my opinion that the territory of a 
school district which is attached to another school district 
by reason of abandonment in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 970, R*G,M.# 1935* as amended, is not liable for the 
bonded or warranted indebtedness of the school district to which 
the abandoned district is attached.
Sincerely yours#
R* V. BOTTQMLt
Attorney General
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Opinion 134 # 194^
Hiildt A 0chool distrlet ha® th# authority to opérât a and 
maintain a achool loeated upon ground which bsa been leased to 
it by the United State® government and the students attending 
such school will receive full credit for their woi4c as In 
any public school of this state# if the school is supervised 
and accredited by the proper officers of the state*
August 20# 194^
Kiss Elisabeth Ireland 
Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Capitol Building 
Helena# hWtana
Dear Mia® Irelandf
You have requested my opinion coaeeming the authority of 
a Montana school district to operate and maintain a school 
located on United State® government promrty#
You advised me that the contractor who is constructing 
a dam for the government must# under hi® agreement# provide 
education for the children of government employees* The con­
struction of a school building is also a part of the contractor’s 
obligation*
You also state that « lease for the school site and building 
could be made to the district in the event the board of trustees 
deemed such en arrangement edventageous and to the best interests
of the district*
Sub-section Ô of Section 1015# R*C*M*# 1935# #s amended# 
stakes it the duty of school trustees to acquire sites for
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sehooX hou99S whieh the district wiXl om * Thla would, by 
Implication, permit the leeaing o t lend for the use of such 
schools end would also allow the district to opereto a school 
on land to which e formal lease has not been given# Section 
lOOd, h#0»K*, 1933, as emended by chapter 206, laws of 1939 
provides for notice to the trustees by the owner of lend of 
the termination of the use by the district of school sites 
•used by will or suffranco #• By such enactment It would appear 
our legislature has recognised that sdhools have been located 
end operated on lend to WdLch the district had rights that 
were less than a freehold or leasehold interest# However, 
it would be advantageous to school districts always to have a 
deed or a written lease in such instances, and thus avoid %m- 
certainty as to the districts rights#
In your letter you state that the contractor must, under 
such an arrangement, pay to the district tuiticm charges for 
the education of employees» children# Sub-section 3 of Section 
1015, R.O.M#, 1935, as amended, grants the power to school 
trustees "to determine the rate of tuition of non-resident 
pupils#* It will, therefore, be a subject for negotiation 
between the school trustees and the contractor of the amount of 
the tuition charge#
I further understand that under the contract of construc­
tion, the contractor has obligated himself and his bondsmen to 
provide a school building or buildings, the heat, light, end ell
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necessary equipment, as well as the necessary Instructional 
staff t In fact, to provide at his own expense a school that 
will In all respects meet the standards and qualifications 
required by our state laws of all public schools for all of 
the school children who have accompanied their parent, guar­
dian or legal representative, who ere employed by the con­
tractor In or about the dam and the works*
The school contemplated will be operated within the 
boundaries of the school district and will be used primarily 
for the children of employees, yet the location of the school 
site on government land should not preclude the school district 
from exercising its supervisory powers, if it Is determined 
by the board of trustees to be more advantageous to the district 
to assume such responsibility and relieve the contractor thereof# 
It is therefore, my opinion that a school district has 
the authority to operate and maintain a school located upon 
ground Wiich has been leased to it by the United States govern­
ment and the students attending such school will receive full
credit for their work as in any public school of this state,
if the school is supervised and accredited by the proper of­
ficers of the state#
Sincerely yours,
H# V# BOTTÜMLÏ
Attorney General
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Opinion 144 - 194^
Held* The legislature has provided where a district has been 
abandoned and the territory annexed to another district and 
the requirements» as amended have been ascertained and 
determined it is mandatory on the Board o f Trustees of the 
district to which the abandoned territory is attached to 
provide a school for such children when requested to do so 
by the parents of at least three of such children#
October 15» 1948
Mr# John F# McGough 
County Attorney 
Jefferson County 
Boulder, Montana
Dear Mr# McGoughs
You have submitted for my opinion the following*
^^ere a school district has been abandoned and 
annexed to another district end where there are five or more children In such abandoned terri- 
toiy eligible for attendance in an elementary 
, school,'as determined by the County Superin­
tendent, and such children reside more than 
three miles from an established school in the 
district to which the abandoned territory is 
attached, are the trustees of such district 
to which the abandoned territory has been 
attached, required to furnish a school for 
such children#*
The answer to your inquiry is found in Section 970
1935* as amended by Chapter 168, Laws of 1943*
Prior to the amendment, there was no relief for such
situated school children# A protest from all over the State
arose because of the harsh results of abandoning a district
«
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and annexing the territory to another district without pro­
viding for the elementary school children that might be re­
siding in such abandoned territory*
The legislature I to correct the situation, amended Section 
970 1935» by Chapter 168, taws of 1943, by providing
the same method of abandoning a school district end then made 
provision for a school in such abandoned territory under the 
following condition*
1# Whenever there are five or more children in such 
abandoned territory eligible for attendance in an elementary 
school#
2# Such eligibility to be determined by the County 
Superintendent#
3# Said children residing more than three miles from an 
established school In the district to which the abandoned 
territory is attached#
4» That after the foregoing requirements have been ascer­
tained then;
3# The School Trustees shall provide a school in aban­
doned territory when requested so to do by the parents of at 
least three of such children#
Therefoi^ it is my opinion the legislature has provided 
that where a district has been abandoned and the territory 
annexed to another district and when the requirements, Nos#
Ij 2, end 3, set forth above have been ascertained and
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determined to be correct| then the legislature, by the above 
mentioned amendment, hag made it mandatory on the Board of 
Trustees of the district to which the abandoned territory Is 
attached, to provide a school for such children when requested 
to do so by the parents of at least three of the chlldrai#
Sincerely yours,
B. V. BOXTOMIT 
Attorney General
t'
\
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Opinion 73 - 1949
Held* County Superintendent of Schools must declare a school 
district abandoned where school has not been held for three 
(3) consecutive years, and the School Trustees have no pro­
vided transportation in school bus operated under contract 
let by school district# Furnishing of any service in lieu 
of transportation to children of district will not preclude 
district from being declared abandoned#
December 1, 1949
Mr. Robert J# Nelson 
County Attorney 
Cascade County 
Great Falls, Montana
Dear Mr# Nelson*
You have requested ray opinion concerning the power of the 
County Superintendent of Schools to declare the abandonment of a 
school district in which school has not been actually held during 
the last three years# You advised me that the children of the 
district have been attending school in a nearby district and 
the district of their residence has been paying to the parents 
of the children money in lieu of providing actual bus trans­
portation#
Section 970, R#C.M#, 1935, as amended by Chapter 16S,
Daws of 1943, provides that the County Superintendent "must 
declare a school district abandoned when terms of school ag­
gregating at least twelve (12) months have not been actually
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held in a district during a period of three (3) consecutive
years*" Section 970 contains an exception which la pertinent
to the facta which you submitted end reads as follow»s
"That If any such district has provided transportation for all children of school age, living within the 
district, to another district for the purpose of attending school therein for a term of at least six 
(6) months during each of such three (3) years, such 
transportation to be by means of a safe and proper 
omnibus or omnibuses, driven or operated by the 
Board of Trustees of the district, and which driver, 
or drivers, shall be under proper and sufficient 
bonds, such transportation shall be deemed equlva* 
lent to the actual holding of school in such district 
for a term of six (6) months in each year, and such 
district shall not be ordered abandoned*"
It is to be noted in the above quoted exception that bus 
transportation under contract let by the trustees of the dis­
trict will relieve the district from any question of being 
abandoned* Section 2 of Chapter 152, Laws of 1941 defines
"transportation" as used in the school transportation act to
#
Include payments to parents in lieu of furnishing actual bus 
transportation* As Section 970, ss amended, deals specifically 
with the abandonment of school districts its terms, which are 
unambiguous, will control the determination of the manner of 
declaring school districts abandoned*
This office in Opinion No* 182, Vol» 19, Report and Offi­
cial Opinions of the Attorney General considered the exception 
found in Section 970 end it was stated therein as follows x
«In making the exception to the law, the Legisla­
tive intent is clear to the effect other modes of 
transportation, such as rent, board and room,
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paying parents or guardian and providing 
supervised correspondence study or supervised 
home study, are not to be considered*”
This office has held in many opinions that the actual 
transportation in school buses operated by the district is 
necessary to prevent the abandonment of a district under the 
provisions of Section 970, R*C.M*, 1935. See Opinion No*
344* ?ol* 19* Report and Official Opinions of the Attorney 
General for an extensive discussion of the interpretation 
of the statute in question*
It is therefore, my opinion that the County Superintendent 
of Schools must declare a school district abandoned where 
school has not been held for three (3) years* consecutively, 
and the trustees have not provided transportation in a 
school bus operated under a contract let by the district 
and that the furnishing of any service in lieu of transpor­
tation to the children of the district will not preclude the 
district from being declared abandoned*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD M# OLSEN
Attorney General
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Opinion 91 *• 1950
Held* An elementary school may be constructed adjacent to 
an existing elementary school and on the same site after the 
qualified electors of a third class school district have 
authorised the construction of a new elementary school at 
a bond election, without the necessity of an election to 
designate the site for the new building*
February 10, 1950
Mr# Walter T* Murphy 
County Attorney 
Mineral bounty 
Superior, Montana
Dear Mr. Murphy*
You have requested my opinion concerning the necessity
for an election for a school site in a third class school
district. You advise me that bonds were authorized at an
election to construct it adjacent to the old elementary
school and the two are to be connected.
The construction of the new elementary school on land
which is a part of the location of the old elementary school
will not result In a change of the school site. This office,
in Opinion No# 11&, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions
of the Attorney General, quoted with approval from 5# C. J.
740 the definition of "site" as follows*
"A plot of ground suitable or set apart for some 
specific use; a seat or ground plot. The term
does not of itself necessarily mean a place or
tract of land fixed by definite boundaries."
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From the above quoted it Is reasonable to Interpret the 
use of the word ”slte" in our codes as meaning a general loca« 
tion for a specific purpose* The site for the old elementaiy 
school was selected by the qualified electors in accordance 
with Section 7$»3101̂  R*C,M*, 1947» which provides for the 
election in school districts of the third class. Nichols v* 
School District No. 3» 67 Mont. 161, 267, fee. 264*
The question submitted to the electors in the bond elec­
tion recited that the bonds were to be issued ”for the purpose 
of constructing a new grade dr school building.** Subsection 
(a) of Section 75-3901, R.C,M., 1947, is the authority for 
the submission of such a question and the site having been 
previously selected, the new building may be constructed on 
the site.
If a new site had been contemplated by the trustees or 
the electorate an independent election could be held for the 
determination of such question under the procedure set out in 
Section 75-3101, 1947* As no such question has been
presented there is no need for an election.
It is therefore my opinion that an elementary school may 
be constructed adjacent to an existing elementary school and 
on the same site after the qualified electors of a third class 
school district have authorized the construction of a new 
elementary school at a bond election, without the necessity of 
an election to designate the site for the new building.
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Very truly yours.
ARNOLD H« OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 123 • 1952
Held; The Board of County Conmilssloners does not have the 
power to give to a school district a public park owned by 
the county for the use of the school district as a school 
site,
October 1, 1952
Mr* Michael J* 0♦Connell 
County Attorney 
Gallatin County 
Bogeman* &!ontana
Dear 0♦Connell;
You have requested my opinion concerning the authority
of the board of county commissioners to make a gift of lands
contained in a federal townsite and designated for public
park purposes to the board of trustees of the school district
to be used by the school district as a school site. The
land in question is not in an incorporated city or town and
there is no problem of ownership by the federal government*
The power of a county to acquire land for park purposes
is found in Section 62-101, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,
which reads in part as follows;
"The several counties of this state are hereby 
authorized and empowered to acquire by purchase, grant, deed, gift, devise or condemnation, or 
otherwise, lands suitable for public camping and 
public recreational purposes, civic centers, 
youth centers, museums, recreational centers and 
any combination thereof, or may lease such land 
tracts, each of which shall be so situated as to 
offer ready access to a public highway."
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Also I a county has the authority to hold lands within its 
limits under the provisions of Section I6-ÔO4, 1947«
There is no statutory authority authorising a county to vacate 
the use of the land for park purposes* In the case of Lloyd 
vs* City of Great Falls, 107 Mont. 442, $6 Pac. (2d) 395> the 
court quoted with approval the following*
* i
**Where lands have been dedicated and used for 
a public park or square, the municipal corpora­
tion holds the title in trust for the public and 
has no power, unless specially authorised by the 
legislature, to appropriate such lands for the 
use and benefit of private persons or corporations, 
sell the same, or in any way divert the land from 
the uses end purposes of its original dedication."
In the absence of specific statutory authority to vacate 
the land for park purposes the board of county commissioners 
does not have the power to divert the use of the land to the 
school district* The board of county commissioners has only 
such powers as are conferred by law, either expressly or by 
Implication, Lewis vs. Petroleum County, 92 Mont# $63, 17 Pac* 
(2d) 60.
I realize that the public interest might be served by
authorizing the county to give the land to the school district#
,
However, such cannot be considered as the rules stated in
Franzke vs# Fergus County, 76 Mont. 150, 245 Pac* 962, applies
to the problem presented* The court in this case said:
"The fact that the contemplated action may be in 
the best Interest of the county is not an admissible 
argument# The doctrine of expediency does not enter 
into the construction of statutes."
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It Is therefore my opinion that the board of county 
commissioners does not have the power to give to a school 
a public park owned by the county for the use of the school 
district as a school site*
T&ry truly yourar.
AEHOLD“ H. OLSülK 
Attorney General
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Opinion 32 -» 1955
Held* A high school building financed by bonds issued by a 
high school district, may be constructed on land owned jointly 
by the county high school and a school district,
August 4# 1955
Hr, Edwin T, Irvine 
County Attorney 
Granite County 
Philllpsburg, Montana
Dear Hr, Irvine *
You have requested ray opinion as to whether a new high
school building financed by bonds issued by the high school
district may be built on land owned jointly by the county
high school and a school district#
High school districts, as provided in Section 75-4605,
1947, are established for construction, repair, im~
proveraent and equipment purposes only* This law was enacted
to provide an additional method of borrowing money. High
school districts are not operating units of our school system
and do not have budgets for the maintenance of the schools
constructed from the proceeds of high school building district
bonds. In Pierson vs, Hendricksen, 96 Mont, 244, 36 Pac* (2d)
991, the court approved the expenditure of funds realised
from high school district bonds on the county high school and
said;
"Nor is it of controlling Importance that the 
Improvements contemplated are to be made on the
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coimty high school building, legal title to which 
is in the county* The county, la the management of the county high school, is simply the agency 
of the state for that purpose#♦•The beneficial 
title of the school property is in the state#**
(Cases Cited}
From the above quoted It must be concluded that the fact 
that the beneficial title to school property is in the state 
permits the use of high school district funds on property of 
the county high school* In Hebei vs# High School District "C**, 
Mont#, fee# (2d), 12 St* Hep# 170, it was held that lots ac* 
quired by the trustees of a school district as the site for a 
high school, financed by bonds issued by the high school 
district may be used as a proper location for the construction 
of the new high school building#
As a high school district is organized primarily for 
raising construction funds, there are no statutory restrictions 
on the uses of the funds# However, the money realized from 
bonds must be used for high school purposes end the title to 
the land where the building is located is not material so 
long as it is school land*
It is therefore my opinion that a high school building 
financed by bonds issued by a high school district, may be 
constructed on land owned jointly by the county high school 
end ft school district*
Very truly yours,
ARHOiD H* OhSSN
Attorney General
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CHAPTER XIII 
MISaEELANSOUS OPINIONS 
Opinion 110 - 1946
Heidi A liquor license may not be granted for use on premises 
which fire directly across the street from a school although 
the main entrance of the school is not on the same street as 
the premises applying for the license, but the entrance of the 
school is within six hundred feet of the entrance of the 
premises seeking the license*
January 2, 1946
Honorable Sam iC* Ford 
Governor of Montana 
State Capitol 
HelenaI Montana
Dear Governor Ford;
You have requested an opinion from this office concerning
the granting of a liquor license for premises located in the
3SOO block on Second Avenue North, directly north of and across
Second Avenue North from the school for the deaf end blind,
whose address is 3^00 Second Avenue North, Great Falls, Montana*
You also submitted a plat showing the location of the
school end the premises operating under the license* It would
appear from the plat that the main entrance of the school is not
on the same street as that of the licensed premises, but that the
side lawn of the school Is directly across the street. The
distance in a straight line between the center of the main
• 454*»
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entrance of the school and the center of the nearest entrance 
of the licensed premises is less than six hundred feet.
Chapter 041 Laws of 1917» was adopted by vote of the 
people at the general election held November 0» 1930 and be­
came effective by virtue of the Governor^a proclamation on 
January 21, 1939*
Section 13 of the act providess
”No license shall be granted for any premises 
which shall be on the same street or avenue end 
within six hundred feet of a building occupied ex­
clusively as a church, synagogue or other place 
of worship, or school, except a commercially 
operating school; the measurements to be taken 
in a straight line from the center of the nearest entrance of such school, church, synagogue or 
other place of worship to the center of the 
nearest entrance of the prmises to be licensed{ 
except however that no license shall be denied 
because such restriction may apply to any pre­
mises so located which are maintained as a bona 
fide hotel, restaurant, railway car, club or 
fraternal organisation or society except similar 
places of business established and in actual operation for one year prior to the passage and 
approval of this act.”
The obvious purpose of the above quoted section is to
protect students from the environment surrounding a tavern
which serves liquor. The public policy involved is to protect
the young and in construing such a statute, the principle set
out in In re Wilson’s Estate, 102 Mont# 170» 56 fao# (2d)
should be followed# The court said:
«In the construction of a statute the primarv 
duty of the court is to give the effect to the 
intention of the legislature in enacting it,”
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The main entrance of the school la not on the same street 
as the tavern, but only the grounds of the school are across 
the street therefrom. Section 13 provides in part that "no 
license shall be granted for any premises on the same street 
or avenue,,,,,as a school," The act could have provided that 
the school and the proposed licensed premises must front on 
the same street for the tavern to be in the prohibited class. 
However, the act does not so provide, but does prohibit the 
licensing of premises on the same street when the entrances of 
the two buildings are within six hundred feet of each other#
It is therefore my opinion that under the facts presented, 
a liquor license may not be granted for use on praaises which 
are directly across the street from a school although the 
main entrance of the school is not on the same street as the 
premises applying for the license, but the entrance of the 
school is within six hundred feet of the entrance of the pre­
mises seeking the license.
Sincerely yours,
E, V, BOTTÛMLÏ
Attorney General
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O p in io n  164 -  1946
Held; A sehool district» through its board of trustees, does 
not have the power or authority to enter into an oil and gas 
lease concerning school district land which is not necessary 
for school purposes.
June 6, 1946
Mr* Wilbur P. Warner 
County Attorney 
Glacier County Cut Bank, Montana
Dear Mr. Werner*
You have requested my opinion whether a school district
may enter into an oil and gas lease# You advise me the land
in question is an abandoned school site one acre in area and
the school board does not anticipate the lend will be needed
in the future for school purposes*
Subsection 9 of Section 1015# R.C.M#, 1935# ®s amended,
makes It the duty of the board of trustees to hold property
for the benefit of the school* In other words, the power
and duty of the school district is to own real property for
school purposes, and the grant of power is not given for the
purpose of permitting the district to engage in profit ventures.
Section 100Ô, R.C.M*, 1935# as amended by Chapter 206,
taws of 1939# provides in part;
«The trustees of the district shall have the 
power to lease any property belonging to the
district which is not being used for school
purposes."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The above quoted portion of Section lOOS is broad in its 
terms, but must be construed in relation to other pertinent 
statutes, (Register Life Insurance Co* v* Keniston, 99 Mont* 
191, 43 Pac, (2d) 251.)
Our Supreme Court in îoung v. Board of Trustees, 90 Mont. 
576 4 Pac* (2d) 725, held a school district had the power to 
rent a school building for public dances under a statute which 
authorised the trustees **to rent, lease and hire such halls, 
gymnasiums and buildings and portions of buildings as may be 
suitable for public entertainment." The court considered the 
question of a school district entering into competition with . 
citizens who operated similar places of entertainment and held 
by the above statute that the legislature had fixed the public 
policy in the matter. The court observed the fact that tax 
exempt property was used in competition and noted the com-* 
mercial aspect of the power granted the trustees.
In Herald v. Board of Education, 65 W.Va. 765, 65 S.S.
102, the court held a board of education could not lease a 
schoolhouse lot for the production of oil and gas, since it had 
only the powers given by statute and such as were absolutely 
necessary to execute its powers, and could not engage in 
business or make contracts outside its functions touching 
education.
Our court, in McNair v. School Pistrict No. 1, 67 Mont. 
423, 266 Pec. 166, statedI
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school district. Is a political subdivision 
of tho stateI created for the convenient dis* 
patch of public business# It is a public 
corporation# Tho Board of Trustees, therefore, 
constitutes the board of directors and managing 
officers of the corporation, and may exercise only 
those powers expressly conferred upon them by 
statute and such as are necessarily implied in 
the exercise of those expressly conferred. The 
statute granting power must be regarded both as 
a grant and a limitation upon the powers of the board,.#"
It would appear from the above quoted limitation on the 
powers of the trustees that they must be able to point to a 
specific statute authorizing an oil end gas lease. Such a 
lease would mean the district was engaging in a commercial 
enterprise for profit which was far removed from any educa^ 
tlonal function.
This office, in Opinion No* 19, Volume 21, Report and 
Official Opinions of the Attorney General, held the trustees 
of a school district had the power, under Section 1000, R.C.M#, 
1935, *s amended, to lease a teacherage not needed for school 
purposes as a residence. However, It was sfiid "in making the 
lease the trustees must bear in mind that the property in 
question is trust property which is for the benefit of the 
schools," The underlying principle is that the power to grant 
a lease is ancilary to the trust for school purposes and is 
limited at all times by the necessity of utilizing the property
for the schools.
While it is a fortuitous circumstance that abandoned school
land has an enhanced value because of its proximity to a
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producing oil well, yet such a fact would not justify the 
trustees In engaging In a long time lease with a purely com­
mercial aspect* The whole theory and policy of our school 
laws is to give to the school trustees the powers necessary 
and requisite to manage and conduct schools for school pur­
poses only.
The trustees may realise a profit by the sale of the 
lands upon being directed to do so by the electors of the 
district* Such a sale would have to be of the whole of the 
property as there la no provision in the statutes granting the 
power to sell for the reservation of the mineral Interests*
The procedure for sale was set out in an opinion of this office, 
Opinion No# 15, Volume 21, Report and Official Opinions of the 
Attorney General, and I refer you to it*
It should be kept in mind the legislature determines the 
policy end the law governing school districts, and the author­
ity of boards of school trustees* Boards of county commissioners 
for many years have been granted the authority to lease county 
owned lands, but before they could enter into an oil and gas 
lease for the county on such lands, it was necessary for the 
legislature to enact special enabling laws granting to boards 
of county commissioners that particular authority and setting 
up procedural practice therefore* The legislature may see 
fit to grant such authority to boards of trustees of school 
districts, but until such enabling legislation is enacted, it
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would appear to me that such a procedure Is beyond the present 
authority granted to boards of school trustees by the legis­
lature#
It Is therefore# my opinion a school district, through its 
board of trustees, does not have the power or authority to 
enter into an oil and gas lease concerning school district 
land which is not necessary for school purposes#
Sincerely yours,
R# V# BOTIOMLY
Attorney General
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Opinion 44 - 1947
Held: The residence of a child committed to the State Orphans*
Kome is that of his parents• If the parents move from the*
state of Montana the county of the former residence of the 
parents is no longer under obligation to transfer funds to the 
hi^ school at Twin Bridges in Madison County* The expense 
of such*education is the obligation of the State of Montana*
July 11, 1947
Mr* J* Chandice Ettlen 
County Attorney 
Granite County 
Phillpsburg, Montana
Beer Mr* Sttien:
You have requested my opinion concerning the following:
A child whose parents were resident in Granite County
was committed by the district court to the Montana State
Orphans* Home* The parents subsequent to the coimitment moved
V
from Granite County to the State of Washington* Must Granite 
County provide for the transfer of funds to Madison County 
for the education the child in the High School located at 
Twin Bridges under the provision of Chapter 219, laws of 1943?
The question to be decided is the residence of the child, 
as Chapter 219 provides that the county treasurer of the county 
of a pupil*» residence shall transfer to the Twin Bridges 
High School in Madison County funds for education of the child* 
Section 33, R.C.M*, 1933, provides in part:
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“Th« residence of the father during his life, and 
after his death the residence of the mother while 
she remains unmarried is the residence of the 
unmarried minor child*"
From the above quoted it would appear that the residence 
of the child follows that of the father and would now be In 
the State of Washington*
In State ex rel Johnson v* Kassting, 74 Mont* 25 23Ô Pac* 
582, our Court considered the residence of girls commiitad to 
the Vocational School in lewis and Clark County* The Court 
held that even if the state has become the guardian of the 
child committed, the residence of such minor children will 
not be changed by the committment to the school* The Court 
said I
"Therefore these girls cannot be held to have 
acquired a residence in School District Ho* 6 
of Lewis and Clark County, nor lost their 
residence in the county in which their parents 
resided by reason of committment to this school»"
There is an apparent conflict between the rule stated in 
the above case and Section 585O, R*C*M*, 1935* which penaits 
a parent entitled to the custody of a child to change his 
residence* As the commitment to the Orphans* Home deprives 
the parents of the custody of the child, it might well be 
argued that the right to change the residence is dependent 
on the right to custody. However, Section 585O must be con­
sidered in conjunction with related sections end the conclusion 
reeched that the section has reference to the conflicting 
claims of the two parents, and no application when there is no
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controversy between the parents, as is the case here# Also
the general rule is stated In 17 Am# Jur# 62#;
"A needy, delinquent, or neglected child does
not lose the domicile of its parents by being 
sent to an Institution#*
It might b® urged that Section 1051, R#C#M#, 1935 as 
amended, would also preclude the chlldiï'om being considered 
a resident of Granite County as this section fixes the rules C 
for the making of the school census# However, the transfer 
of funds under Chapter 219, Laws of 1943, is based on the 
residence of the pupil, and whether the pupil is included 
in the school census Is Immaterial#
The parents of the child having moved from the state of
Montana and thus relieved the county from the duty to transfer
funds, it now becomes the duty of the State to pay the expense 
of education, as Section 1492 and 1493» R#C#M*, 1935, provide 
that inmates of the Orphans^ Home are to receive free educa­
tional benefits at the expense of the State# Chapter 219,
Laws of 1943, would control, being subsequent legislation, if 
the parents continued to reside in Montana, but having departed. 
Sections 1492 and 1493 will fill the need and supply the neces­
sary funds#
It is therefore, ny opinion that the residence of a child 
committed to the State Orphans* Home is that of his parents#
If the parents move from the State of Montana the county of 
the former residence of the parents is no longer under
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
obligation to transfer funds to the high school at Twin Bridges 
In Madison County» The expense of such education Is the obli­
gation of the state of Montana*
Sincerely yours*
R* ?, BOTTOMLÎ 
Attorney General
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Opinion 92 - I94Ô
Held; 1. The state and local boards responsible for voca­
tional education have the responsibility of furnishing and 
providing related end supplemental instruction for apprentices, 
and the coordination of instruction with job experience, and 
the selection and training of teachers and coordinators for 
such instruction.
2» The state board of education is designated as the state 
board for vocational education and has the authority to make 
all rules and regulations governing the establishment, conduct 
and administration of vocation courses, including the power 
to fix the qualifications of instructors and the course of 
study to be followed, in conformity with the requirements of 
the federal board of vocational education.
3. The Apprenticeship Council is authorized to make rules
and regulations, but such rules and regulations must be limited 
in their purpose and effect as aid in the administration of 
the law.
4. It was the purpose and intent of the legislature that all 
departments of state and federal government concerned with
the administration of the act, or its fulfillment, to cooperate 
to the fullest extent within their respective fields, to the 
end that the apprentice may receive the full benefits of the
act.
January 6, 1946
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Montana State Apprenticeship Connell 
Mr* James B* 0*Brian. Chairman State Capitol 
HelenaI Montana
Bear Sir*
Tou have subaitted the following question for my opinion:
**1* le the Montana State Apprenticeship Council 
as a whole responsible for providing ’related and 
supplemental Instruction for apprentices*, in­
cluding the selection of teachers, providing 
textbooks, outlining the classroom curricula and 
other such similar factors, or does this entire responsibility rest with state and local boards 
responsible for vocational education?
"2* Is there a State Vocational Education De­
partment or some other Department or Division of 
the State Government who might have the responsi­
bility of providing such related and supplemental 
instruction for apprentices? If so, what is the 
official name of the Department or Division?
**3. If there is such a State Departmmt or Divi­
sion of Vocational Education, Is It directly under 
the supervision of the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction or the State Board of Education, 
or is there some other department, board, bureau, 
or division under which the Department of Voca­
tional Education operates? If so, what la the 
name and officers of such a Department, board, 
bureau, or division?
•5
**4.# Does the Council have the authority to issue 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out the intent and purposes of the act, which in the 
opinion of the Council would rebound to the benefit 
and protection of the apprentices and the industry 
involved as a vdiole?
«5* Is it the Intent end purpose of the Act to 
cause governmental agencies such as the Council 
itself, the Federal Apprentice Training Service or 
Federal Committee on Apprenticeship, the State Department of Vocational Education, the Federal 
Veterans Administration, the State Superintendent
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of Public Instruction and the State Board of 
Education to cooperate with each other, causing 
bona fide apprentice training to come about and 
related Instruction for apprentices to become a 
possibility in fact? If$ for example, related 
instruction is not being provided apprentices by 
the Vooational Education Departments end the 
apprentices suffer because of the lack of such 
supplemental related Instruction, then should not 
the Council as a whole, as well as the other govern» 
mental agencies, do whatever be within their power 
and through legal means to cause the State Depart* 
ment of Vocational Education and the Local Coordin­
ators for Vocational Education to bring about 
related instruction for apprentices?**
As to your first question, I call your attention to Section
2 (5) of Chapter 149, Laws of 1941, which provides as follows;
"Related and supplemental instruction for apprentices, 
coordination of instruction with job experiences, 
and the selection and training of teachers end coor­
dinators for such instruction shall be the respon­
sibility of the state and local boards responsible for vocational education ’ *•*
Tour second and third questions may be considered together* 
By Chapter 14#, Laws of 1931, uow Section 1262*93 to and 
including 1262*100, K*G*M*, 1935, as amended by Chapter 160, 
Laws of 1939, the legislature reaffirmed the state's acceptance 
of the Act of Congress providing for promotion of vocational 
education in the several states* By said Chapter 14#, the 
state board of education was given authority, "to adopt all 
necessary rules and regulations governing the establishment, 
conduct and administration of vocation courses, including the 
power to fix the qualifications of instructors and the course 
of study to be followed.**" The Act also provides for the
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appointment of an advisory committee consisting of four citizen 
members representing the manufacturing and commercial Interests, 
the agricultural interests, skilled labor and home making 
Interests, and the state superintendent of public instruction or 
a person designated by the state superintendent* The board is 
directed to cooperate with the several boards of trustees of 
school districts and of county high schools in the establish­
ment and maintenance in the public elementary and high schools, 
appropriate courses for vocational training in agriculture, 
home economics, the trades and industries and commercial branches* 
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction is the 
executive officer of the vocational board and is charged with 
the responsibility for the administration of all laws of Montana 
relating to vocational education, and the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the board*
The state board of education, therefore, is constituted 
the state board for vocational education*
Chapter 160, Laws of 1939, authorises the state board for 
vocational education to designate any district high school, 
county high school or high school district maintaining a 
vocational training department as a vocational center* This 
chapter also provides that all rules end regulations governing 
admission to such centers shall be promulgated by the state 
board for vocational education*
As to your fourth question. Section 1 (b) (2), of Chapter
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1491 of 1941, provide a:
**{2)#,*lsau© euch rules and regulations as may 
be necessary to carry out the intent and purposes of this act;,,**"
The Council, therefore is authorized to make rules and
regulations as are necessary to carry out the intent and
purposes of the Act* In the case of Mc^atridge v* District
Court, 113 Mont, 81, 88, 122 Pac, {2d) 834# our Supreme Court
in speaking of the power end authority of the Montana Liquor
Control Board to make rules and regulations under a similar
provision in the Liquor Control Act as the abovesaid*
"The board is an administrative body, func«* tloning as a bureau of the executive department 
of the state government* It has no lawmaking 
power# Any attempt to create for itself authority 
and discretion not given by the legislature must 
fail# The board is authorized to make rules and 
regulations, but these must be limited in their 
purpose and effect as aid in the administration 
of the law,"
Your Council may, therefore make rules end regulations, 
but such must be limited in their purpose and effect as aid 
in the administration of the law*
It is very apparent from a reading of the provisions of 
the Apprenticeship Act that the legislature intended its 
administration to be in conformity and in conjunction with the 
federal legislation on apprenticeship# In providing for the 
personnel of the Council end its composition, it would seem 
clear that the intent was to have all those departments of 
state government represented In such council to work together
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la their respective fields to carry out the purposes and Intent 
of the lew to the end that the apprentice be given the full 
benefits therein provided# It Is only by the full cooperation 
of all those departments mentioned in your fifth question that 
the propose of the act may be fully carried out and those 
Intended to be benefited thereby receive all benefits intended# 
It is therefore, my opinions
1» The state end local boards responsible for vocational 
education have the responsibility of furnishing and providing 
related and supplemental instruction for apprentices, and the 
coordination of instruction with job experience, and the selec­
tion and training of teachers find coordinators for such 
instruction#
2, The state board of education is designated as the state 
board for vocational education, and has the authority to make 
all rules and regulations governing the establishment, conduct 
and administration of vocation courses, including the power to 
fix the qualifications of instructors and the course of study to 
be followed, In conformity with the requirements of the federal 
board of vocational education#
3# The Apprenticeship Council is authorized to make rules 
and regulations, but such rules and regulations must be limited 
in their purpose and effect as aid in the administration of the 
law#
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4» It was the purpose and Intent of the legislature that 
all departments of state and federal government concerned with 
the administration of the act, or its fulfillment, to cooperate 
to the fullest extent within their respective fields, to the 
end that the apprentice may receive the full benefits of the 
act*
Sincerely yours,
E* V* BOTTOMLI 
Attorney General
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Opinion 123 1950
Held* The title to a eehooX building erected on the land of 
an individual under a tenancy at will or sufferance remains 
in the district and can be removed by the district until 
title is divested as provided in Section 75*1624# 1947*
August 10, 1950
Mr* M, K* Daniels 
County Attorney 
Powell County 
Deer Lodge, Montana .
Dear Mr. Daniels:
You have requested ray opinion concerning the ownership of
a school house which has not been used for school purposes for
several years* You advised me that the school building Is
located on land which is owned by an individual* You also
state that there was no written lease or agreement concerning
the use of the land by the district*
The problem presented is answered by Section 75*1624#
8.S.M*, 1947* which reads in part as follows*
«Whenever# after the passage and approval of this 
act, « conditional deed has been issued to a school 
district for land or whenever land has been used at will or sufferance for a school site and therehas 
been built upon such land a school house and other 
improvements, and said building and improvements 
cease to be used for the maintenance of a school in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 75*1631 
and 75*1632, said Board of Trustees must be notified 
in writing by the owner or claimant of the land which 
which has been so deeded or used by will or sufferance 
for a school site that he intends to repossess the 
land and the school trustees shall within a period 
of not exceeding one (1) year, remove the building 
and improvements placed thereon or they shall be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 4 7 4 * *
deemed thereafter to have forfeited any further right to such property. Provided futher that 
before the landowner or claimant to said land 
shall have the right to give the notice of re* 
moval aforesaid, the intent to abandon said land 
by the school district must have been expressed 
by the dulty qualified electors In the school 
district in accordance with the provisions of 
subdivision eight (Ô) of Section 75-1632*
It la to be noted from the above quoted statute that the 
owner of the land before he can claim title to the building 
must give written notice of his intention to repossess the 
land reciting that the trustees shall remove the building 
within a year’s time* This is a statutory recognition that 
a school house located on the land of another is the property 
of the district and the school district can be divest of title 
only by failure to remove after written notice*
As was stated in Van Hess v, Pecard, 2 Pet (U*S*) 137, 71* 
Ed* 374:
"The general rule of the cimmon law certainly is 
that whatever is once annexed to the freehold 
becomes pert of it, and cannot afterwards be re*
moved except by him who is entitled to the in*
heritance* The rule, however, never was, at 
least as far back as we can trace into the books, 
inflexible end without exception,"
The exceptions referred to above are multiple in regard to 
trade fixtures and include buildingsuused in trade such as 
filling stations* In Farmer v* Golden Rule Oil Co*, 130, Ken, 
#02, 287 pac* 706, the court held that a tenant who had leased 
premises for a filling station under a five-year lease could 
remove the building erected by him at the end of his lease
without a specific reservation of the right to do so in the
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lease « Cases of similar import which permitted the removal of
building erected for commercial purposes are the following;
Firth V, Eowe 53 N. Eq, 520, )2 A 1064 
Earle v. Kelly 21 Cal* App# 460, 132 Pac* 262 
Ri Barcroft and Sons Co* v. Cullen 217 Cal, 706,20 Pao. (2nd) 665
Only one case has come to our attention concerning a school 
building* In Wlttenmeyer v* Board of Education, 10 Ohio C,G# 
119, 6 Ohio G#D* 256, 2 Ohio Dec# S* P* 555, it was held that 
a school building erected upon leased premises by a lessee 
Board of Education and used exclusively for school purposes, 
was held to be governed by the same rule as that applying to 
trade fixtures, end therefore to be removable by the lessee 
during the term, or within a reasonable time after the expira*̂  
tion thereof, although the lease contained no agrément to 
that effect# /
The fact that there is not any written lease providing that 
the building cannot be removed leads to the concluaion that the 
school district used the land at the will or sufferance of the 
owner# The statutory rule as to the notice and the common law 
rule concerning fixtures Is determinative of the question, The 
title to the building remains in the district until such time 
as the owner of the real property divests the district of its 
title by the notice and procedure provided in Section 75̂ 1624, 
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947#
It is therefore my opinion that the title to a school
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building erected on the land of an individual under a tenancy 
at will or sufferance remains in the district and can be removed 
by the district until title is divested as provided in Section 
7$-1624» Revised Codes of Montana, 1947*
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN, 
Attorney General
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Oplûloa 7# - 1952
H«ldt The latent of the legleletura In «nooting tho low 
extending «ducetionol bonofits to all ollgiblo vatorona who 
torvod honorably in tho United State a in any of its ware* is 
construed as extending tho said benefits to veterans of tho 
Korean Conflict « which although not technically declared a 
war» contains all of the attributes of a war as ©nvlsaged by 
tho loglslsturo»
Educational benefits as provided by state law may properly bo 
extended to eligible veterans of tho Korean Conflict»
April 25» 1952
t
Mr# 8»J# Callaghan» Director 
Veterans e’olfaro Commission 
State of Montana 
Helena» Montana
Dear Mr* Callaghani
Tou have recently requested my opinion as to whether veterans
of tho Korean Conflict are entitled to tho benefits as provided
by Chapter 194» laws of 1943# as emended by Chapter 44» lews of
1945. Section 1 of this Act» as amended» reedsi
•All honorably discharged persons who served 
with the United States forces in any of its 
wars» and who were bona fide residents of the 
state of Montana at the time of their entry 
into said United States forces shall have free 
fees and tuition in any and all of the units 
of the University of Montana» including the 
law end medical departments» and for extra 
studies in any of the units of the University of Montana» provided, however» that the pro*, 
visions of this act shall not apply to pers<xis 
who qualify under the provisions of the
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♦servicemen*® readjustment act of 1944* being 
♦public law 346 of the seventy eighth-congress| 
chapter 268, second session* and public lew 
16 of the seventy-eighth congress, chapter 22, 
first session,* end all acts supplementary end amendatory thereof***
The answer to your Inquiry depends upon the Interpretation 
to be given the above emphasised words* It is evident from 
the very language of the act that the intent of the legislature 
was to provide educational benefits to eligible veterans, 
however it is noteworthy that the provisions thereof wore not 
limited to veterans of World War II, on the contrary the act 
expressly states that the benefits will accrue to "all honor-̂  
ably discharged persons who served with the United States forces 
in any of its wars****#"
Is the present Korean Conflict a "war" as was contemplated 
by the legislature at the time of the original enactment of 
Chapter 194, Laws of 1943, and at the time of the subsequent 
amendment as contained in Chapter 44, Laws of 1945? In con­
struing a statute, the intention of the legislature is the 
controlling consideration, and, in the construction thereof, 
courts may look to the history of the times and the cause of 
necessity influencing the passage of the Act. (Lerch v. 
Missoula Buick & Title Co*, 45 Mont* 314, 123 Pac, 25j Fergus 
Motor Co,,y* Borensor, 73 Mont* 122, 235 Pac. 422; State ex 
rel* Williams v, Kamp, 106 Mont# 444, 7^ Pao* (2d) 5̂ 5)• At 
the period the Act in question was passed, this country end
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the citizens of Montana In the armed forces were engaged in 
a struggle of force against the force and forces of enemy 
nations* Through an act of Congress this struggle was de­
signated a war and specifically named *»World War II"* The 
present struggle in Korea of force against force involves all 
of the elements of a war with the sole exception that the 
Congress of the United States has not declared the aame to be 
a war* It has been designated a conflict and a police action* 
Realistically war may be defined as hostile contentions 
by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states 
or rulers* (Gillow v* Kiely, P*C*H#T*, 44 F* (2d) 227» 233)* 
It means and intends the destruction of life and property.
(The Ambrose Light, 25 F* 40S)« It was held in Area v. State, 
Tex*, 202 S,W. 951, L*R*A* 1916 E* 358, that in the battle 
of San Tgnacio between United States troops led by General 
Pershing and expeditionary forces of Mexico commanded by 
officers of the Carranza de facto government, where soldiers 
engaged in combat were killed, wounded and captured, that a 
state of war existed* The court in holding such cited an 
official opinion issued by Brig* Gen, Enoch H* Crowder, Judge 
Advocate, U,S,A* as follows;
«It is thus apparent that under the lew there need be no formal declaration of war but that 
under the definition of Vattel a state cf war 
exists so far as concerns the operations of the United States troops in Mexico by reason 
of the fact that the United States is prosecu­
ting its rights by force of arms and in a manner
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In which warfare Is usually conducted» The 
statutes which are operative only during a 
period of war have been Interpreted as relating to a condition and not a theory#
X am therefore of the opinion that the actual 
conditions under which the field operations in 
Mexico are being conducted are those of actual 
war# That within the field of operations of 
the expeditionary force in Mexico it is a time 
of war within the meaning of the fifty-eighth 
article of war»"
In the case of Hamilton v# McClaughrey, I36 F, 445, the
court statede
"Mr# Justice Grier, delivering the opinion 
In Prize Cases, 6? Ü#S* (2Black) 666, 17 
L# Ed. 459, seyst ’War has been well defined 
to be that state In which a nation prosecutes 
its right by force#’ In the present case, at 
no time was there any formal declaration of 
war by the political department of this govern­
ment# A formal declaration of war, however, 
is unnecessary to constitute a condition of war#
The court then held that a condition of war existed in 
China within the spirit and intent of the fifty-eighth article 
of war#
Recurring to the history of the time when Chapter 194, laws 
of 1943, was enacted to determine the intent of the legislature, 
it was their Intent to benefit those citizen veterans who had 
served during time of war# I cannot limit the construction of 
that law so as to exclude those veterans who have served their 
country honorably in the present Korean conflict, which is at
least a condition of war#
It is, therefore, my opinion that the intent of the legis­
lature was to provide educational benefits to all eligible
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veterans who served In the United States forces In any of its 
%rarS| and that the present Korean Conflict* although not 
technically declared a war* has all the attributes of a war 
as contemplated by the legislature# It follows, of course, and 
it Is my opinion, that educational benefits should be extended 
to eligible veterans of the Korean conflict#
Very truly yours,
ARNOLD H. OLSEN 
Attorney General
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Opinion 124 1952
Held! A notice of non-renewal of a contract of an assistant 
professor given hy the chief executive of the Institution 
and approved by the Chairman of the Board of JSducation is* 
during the time the office of Chancellor is vacant* in sub­
stantial compliance with regulation 5 of the State Board of 
Education#
October 2, 1952
Miss Mary M# Condon 
Superintendent of fublic Instruction State Capitol Building 
Helena* Montana
Dear Miss Condon;
You requested my opinion concerning the contract of an
assistant professor at Eastern Montana College of Education#
You advised me that the assistant professor was under a one
year term contract# You also stated that she has not been
under contract for three years# Notice was given to her that
her contract would not be renewed by the President of the
institution with the approval of the Governor as Chairman of
the Board of Education#
The problem presented calls for an Interpretation of
regulation No# 5 adopted by the State Board of Education end
incorporated in the contract signed by the assistant professor#
This regulation reads as follows;
"At the expiration of the term of appointment 
of a professor or an associate professor* if
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
i
appointed for a limited term, or of an assistant 
professor, lecturer* instructor, or assistant, 
there is no obligation whatever to renew the 
appointment, and without renewal the appointment thereupon lapses and becomes void» In every 
case of such non-renewal of appointment* official 
notice thereof shall be given by the chief execu­
tive of the Institution, station, or division, 
with the approval of the Chancellor, not later 
than April 15thj provided, that a notice given 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the contract shall be sufficient in case of the non-renewal of 
the appointment of any member of the Agricultural Extension Staff»”
From the above quoted regulation it appears that a term 
contract lapses and becomes void If not renewed. However, the 
regulation also requires that the chief executive of the insti­
tution give notice that the contract will not be renewed and 
such notice must have the approval of the Chancellor. As we 
know, there Is not a Chancellor in Montana at the present time, 
and as a consequence the approval by the Governor as Chairman 
of the Board of Education would seemingly be sufficient as it 
would be unreasonable to preclude a unit of the university 
from terminating a contract becuaee there is not an incumbent 
in the office of Chancellor. As I observed before, the notice 
must be given by the chief executive of the institution and 
approved by the Chancellor# This is required under the regu­
lation, rather than a notice by the Chancellor. In State ex 
rel. Keeney vs* Ayers, 10Ô Mont* 54-7> 92 Pac. (2d) 306, our 
Supreme Court considered regulation No. 5 and recognized the 
sufficiency of a notice of termination given by the president
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of the institution» It is my understanding the assistant pro­
fessor does not contend that she did not receive notice in 
ample time* but does contend that there being no Chancellor 
she can never receive a notice of non-renewal# Such a con­
tention* if it were valid* would mean that any assistant 
professor who received a term contract for one year would 
thereby secure permanent tenure#
The subject of a permanent appointment Is within regulation 
No# 2* which reads as followsi
^Professors and associate professors are on 
permanent appointment{ provided* however* that the initial appointment to a full professorship 
may be for a limited term# Such limited term 
appointment may be renewed; provided, however, 
that reappointment, after three years of service 
shall be deemed a permanent appointment.**
Bedanse she is an assistant rather than an associate pro­
fessor* she cannot secure permanent tenure by three years of 
service# However* the acquisition of a permanent appointment 
is relative to the issues Involved in her case#
In State ex rel# Keeney vs# Ayers, supra, the court inter­
preted regulation No. 2 which held that any reappointment after 
three years of service constituted a permanent appointment# The 
distinction between a temporary and permanent appointment was 
expressed by the court In the following manner#
*In this connection it should be emphasised that 
the only difference between a temporary and a 
permanent appointment under the rules is that as 
to the former,’without renewal the appointment
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thereupon lapses end becomes void* automatically 
and without hearing, and upon mere notice thereof 
(Regulation 5), which was given; whereas in the 
case of a permanent appointment, the employment 
automatically continues, unless terminated after 
an investigation and a hearing, as provided in 
regulations 7 and 8* The difference Is thus not 
In the length of the tenure, but in the nature 
of it whether terminable with or without an 
investigation and hearing*’*
If it were held that a tm porsxy appointment could be 
terminated only by a notice which had the Chancellor's approval 
then so long as there is a vacancy in the office of Chancellor, 
a temporary appointment would in fact be a permanent appoint­
ment with permanent tenure and terminable only after an investi' 
gation and a hearing before the CoBBnittee on Service# Such 
an interpretation would nullify that part of regulation No# $ 
which states in regard to a term appointment that "there is 
no obligation whatever to renew the appointment, and without 
renewal the appointment thereupon lapses and becomes void#"
A rule of construction which is of assistance here is found in 
the case of E^er vs# States Realty Company, 223 Minn* 305, 26 
N#W* (2d) 464, where the court saidI
"Unless required by the contract as a whole, no 
construction of a subsidiary provisionî ls permis­
sible which runs counter to and is in frustration 
of the dcrâinant purpose of the contract#"
In applying this rule the portion of regulation No* 5 
which requires notice of non-renewal be given by the chief 
executive of the institution with the sp proval of the Chan­
cellor should not be given such a strict interpretation as to
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preclude the giving of notice during the vacancy in the office 
of Chancellor* In Snider vs* Carmichae*^ 102 Mont* 387,
Pac* (2d) 1004» the court said, concerning a contract, that 
«it must be so interpreted as to give effect to the intention 
of the parties at the time contractingThe intention of 
the parties in the contract under consideration was not to 
give her permanent tenure when she was employed for one year 
and in fact the limited term given is in derogation of per­
manent status*
A reasonable method was used in giving notice of non-renewal 
and the fact the Chairman of the Board of Education approved the 
notice in place of the Chancellor in no way injured her*
The fact the Committee on Service investigated and con­
sidered the non-renewal of her contract is not material as 
under regulation 7 and Ô such committee has jurisdiction to 
investigate proposed removals and suspensions of Instructional 
and scientific staff members and here our problem is that of 
a legal nature*
It is therefore, my opinion that a notice of non-renewal 
of a contract of assistant professor given by the chief executive 
of the institution and approved by the Chairman of the Board 
of Educations is, during the time the office of Chancellor Is 
vacant, in substantial compliance with regulation 5 of the 
State Board of Education* Very truly yours,ARBOLD H* OtSEK 
Attorney General
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Oplnion 5 - X955
Hdldt ^h« Workmen’s Compensation. Act is, as to a school district, 
exclusive, compulsory and obligatory upon both employer and 
employee and there Is no right to elect whether or not each 
shall be subject to the act,
April 4, 1955
Mr* lames Ç* Wilkins, Jr*
County Attorney 
Fergus County Lewistown, Montana
Dear Mr. Wilkinsï
You have requested my opinion as to whether it is mandatory
for school districts to comply with the Workmen’s Compensation Act*
In answering your question, it is necessary to consider
Section 92-206, 1947» which reads in part as followss
"Where a public corporation is the employer, or 
any contractor engaged in the performance of con­
tract work for such public corporation, the terms, 
conditions and provisions of compensation plan 
Ho. 3 shall be exclusive, compulsory» and obligatory 
upon both employer end employee."
There is no doubt th#t a school district is a public oor-
poratlon, as Section 75-1603, 1947, provides that every
school district Is a body corporate. In Jay vs. School District
Ho. 1, 24 îtont. 219, 61 Pac. 250, and State ex rel School district
No. 26 vs. ürton, 76 Mont. 456, 246 Pac. 369» it was held that
school districts are public corporations.
In Butte vs. Industrial Accident f̂ oard, 52 Mont 75, 156
Pac. 136, our Supreme ^ourt considered the above quoted statute
and held that plan Ho. 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is
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to a city, exclusive, compulsory end obligatory upon both • 
employer and employee. Approval wag given to this conclusion 
in Alekslch vs* Industrial Accident Fund, 116 Mont. 127, 151 
Fac* 1016, where it was held that the "Workmen’s Compensation 
Act as to the public corporations and their employees is 
exclusive, compulsory and obligatory."
In your letter you suggest that Section 92-206, R.C.M.,
19471 means that all public corporations. If they are engaged
In an Inherently hazardous industry and elect to come under
the act, must take their Insurance from the state, rather
than from a private company or carry it themselves. Thit
contention was specifically considered in Butte vs. Industrial
Accident Board, supra, where the court said:
"If this was the intention of the lawmakers, the 
least that can be sâid is that they made a superla­
tive effort to conceal their intention in a multitude 
of useless words. To express the view of the attorney general, it was only necessary to say: ’Whenever a 
public corporation elects to become subject to this 
Act, the provisions of compensation plan No* 3 shall 
be exclusive as to It#* But the legislature did not 
so express Itself; on the contrary, it declared that 
where a public corporation is the employer, the terms 
conditions and provisions of compensation plan No. 3 
shall be not only exclusive but compulsory and obliga­
tory as well. It is a general rule of statutory 
construction that ’every word of a statute must be 
given scnae meaning if it is possible to do so.*
(State ex rel# Patterson v. Lentz, 50 Mont. 322,146 Pac. 932.) But, if the contention of the attorney 
general prevailed, the words ’compulsory and obliga­
tory* would be meaningless."
You also call attention to the fact that Section 92-301,
.
R.C.M., 1947, states the act applies to all inherently hazardous
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occupations* This section Is Introductory to the four following 
sections dealing with hazardous occupations and is primarily 
limited in scope to these sections* This conclusion was recog­
nized in Alekslch vs# Industrial Accident Fund̂  suprâ  and was 
not construed as a limitation on Section 92-206, R*G*M*, 1947#
In the Butte Case the court stated the act must be read 
as a whole and la light of the history of similar acts* The. 
Court said in this connectiont
*At the time the bill for this Act was under con­sideration by the legislature the impression was 
general throughout this country that an Act com­pulsory upon private employers would not be constitutional, whereas the right of the state to 
impose the provisions of the Act upon Itself could 
not be questioned (Wood v* City of Detroit,(Mich#),
155 N.W, 592,) There is some reason, therefore, to 
assume that the legislature made the Act compulsory 
as far as it was deemed possible to do so#*
It is, therefore, my opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation
Act is, as to a school district, exclusive, compulsory and
obligatory upon both employer and employee#
Very truly yours,
ÂRHOIH H. 0L3SN 
Attorney General
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CHAPTER 117
tEGAL fiACKÜROHHD
SOURCES OP SCHOOL LAW
Stephen P# Roach states that there are four basic sources 
of authority In the Control of public education in the United 
States* These four sources are constitutions, legislatures, 
court decisions end the rulings of the appropriate governmental 
officers.^
Oonstitutlcns. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States reserves to the several states all matters 
not specifically delegated to the United States# Since ©du«* 
cation was not mentioned In the United States Constitution, 
it is a state function*
Remmlein holds that the Pourtemth Amendment to the 
Constitution made many of the restrictions of the Bill of 
Rights applicable to the states* Hence, no state may violate 
any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the first ten 
amendments* This includee the field of education which Is 
within the sphere of state control*^
School law has been developed within the framework of
^Stephen P» Roach. "Court Opinion Concerning School 
Boards," Educational Administration 3upervl.g.lon 39:147# 
March 1953*
Madeline K* Remmlein, The Law pf Local Public, School 
î minifttration (Hew fork: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc**
1953)# P# if Madeline K# Remmlein, School Law (Hew York; 
MicGraw-Hill Book Company Inc*, 1950)', p.H*
-491"*
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thô Federal Constitution by the provisions o f the state 
constitutions and state statutes# Each of the forty*eight 
state constitutions has some mention of the staters responsi­
bility in the field of education*̂
State Legislatures# State legislatures| as required 
by State Constitutions, have enacted literally thousands of 
school laws#^ These state statutes are the most prolific 
source of regulations concerning public schools# Some 
aspects of the public school program are specifically spelled 
out while others are merely mentioned end the power of
eregulation is delegated to the State Board of Education#"̂
Like the official opinions of the attorney general, the 
rulings of the State Board of Education have the force and 
effect of law until challenged and overruled in the courts# 
Oourt Decisions# Court decisions are primarily of two 
typesÏ (1) interpretations of constitutional and statutory 
law and (2) the application of the principles of common law#'̂  
The application of the principles of common law comes about 
only when a particular set of circumstances has not been 
decided upon and the court finds it necessary to protect the 
rights of the parties concerned by applying general traditional
3Joachim F, Weltzln, T M  Legal Authority of American 
Public School (Grand Forks, North Dakota;The Hid West 
Book Concern, 1931), PP# 23 - 24#
^Remmlein, clt, p. 2#
^Ibld. p.,3.
^bid.
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principles*
Government Officers# There are several governmental 
officers whose decisions are binding upon schools and school 
districts# The State Board of Education was already mentioned# 
Another officer is the State Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion* The officer with which this study is concerned Is, of 
course, the Attorney General of the State of Montana
The attorney general, as the chief law officer of the
state, has several duties# One of these duties is that of
*
advisor to the various other officers of the state# This1
advice is usually given in the form of opinions* There are 
three types of opinions* oral* written or letter and official# 
This study Is concerned only with official opinions* In 
this type of opinion the research is usually done by an 
assistant attorney general who specializes in the field under 
consideration and is revised and criticized by the attorney 
general himself or the rest of the legal staff before issuance# 
Opinions are often sought because the courts cannot 
possibly consider all of the legal questions arising in the 
various departments in the state# Oftentimes there is a time 
factor to be considered# The office requesting the opinion 
may have to act quickly in the best interests of public wel­
fare and hence might not wish to bog down the administrative 
system while preparing and presenting the information to the 
courts*
The attorney general has the highest professional res­
ponsibility for his opinions, which stand with the weight of
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law, affect and even control governmental admlnlatretlon ̂
1 •*'
and act as a protection and a safeguard for the rights and 
privileges of the general public.
LEGAL FTilHCIPLSa OP SCHOOL LAW 
Although very little literature was found directly 
relating to the role of the attorney general in the field of 
educationg the literature relating to the adjacent fields of 
school law, constitutions, court decisions and other adminis­
trative rulings seems to indicate several basic premises upon 
which many of the official opinions of the attorney general 
were based.
Local school districts are territorial divisions of a 
state created for the express purpose of operating public 
schools*^ The agency in charge of the schools in a specific 
school district is the school board. The powers given to 
the school board are only those specifically granted and 
necessarily implied for the performance of the specific function 
of operating the public schools*^
The school district and the school board are state agencies 
and as such are subject to the will of the state legislature 
and the state educational authorities, except in those matters
^Roger B. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public 
Education (Chicagoî The Foundation Press, Inc », 1941), p. 523
0. Garber, Handbook of School Law (New London, 
ConnecticutJ Arthur i2T"5ro2Ts“̂uSîIcâtion3, 1954) PP.3-4; 
Hamilton and Mort, pp. clt, P# 6̂#
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V
left to local determination*^ The powers of the school
district therefore are delegated by the state and are not
inherent# The school district is a territorial area populated
by the residents thereof{ the school board is composed of
locally elected officers chosen to operate the local schools
but whose responsibility is to all the people of the State
of Montana rather than only to the people of their local
school district* In school law, however» the district must
be thought of as a unit and the school board as a body rathem
than as a group of individuals#̂ .© School districts and school
boards are corporate entitle
Therefore, when there is a change In the personnel of the
school board» the board continues as an entity regardless of
12the change in membership# Contracts, titles to property and 
other business is not carried on in the names of members of 
the board* It is carried on in the corporate name of the 
school district even though the names of members of the school 
board may appear on official documents as officers authorized
^Calvin Grieder and Willis Everett Rosenstengel, Public 
School Administration (New York* The Ronald Press Go#, 1954) 
PP# 35-361 Remmlein, Law of Local. Public School Administration 
PP# 6-7*
^^Eemmlein, 0P« citf. p# 7» Weltzln, op# clt#. pp# 37~39#
^Hamilton and Mort, ̂ #  clt## p# 67} Remmlein, School» 
Law# P# 12#
^^loc# clt#
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to *ct for the local school district
Courts have held, In general, that legislation providing 
for school consolidation does not carry with it the right to 
provide transportation# Authority to transport does not 
carry with it the implied authority to purchase liability 
insurance covering the operation of transportation facilities 
Courts are not In agreement as to whether a law authorizing 
the transportation of private and parochial school pupils at 
public expense is constitutional* They are generally agreed, 
however, that the board may not transport such pupils without 
statutory authority
In local elections the courts have generally agreed that 
the statutes must be strictly complied with but that minor 
irregularities are not necessarily f a t a l T h i s  has been 
particularly true in the case of elections where such minor 
irregularities have not been shown to have affected the result# 
The school district’s right to issue bonds is somewhat 
like its right to tax. It la not an Inherent power* It is a 
power derived from the granting statute# The proceeds derived 
from the sale of school bonds can be used only for the purpose 
designated and for no other. In the issuance of school
^^Ibld, p, 13.
'barber, op. clt,. p. 154* 
l̂ Ibld.
lÔRemmlein, law of Public School Administration, 
p. 240; Garber, oĵ é cit.. p. 19#
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district bonds the statutes must be followed explicitly. If
this is not done, the legality of the bonds may be affected,^^
Bonded indebtedness cannot be incun*ed in unlimited
amounts. The laws restricting the amount of bonded indebted*
ness must be faithfully and carefully observed if the actions
10of the district are to be legal#
The school district has no Inherent right to levy and 
collect taxes. Authority to do so is delegated to it from 
the state# The state exercises this power through constitu­
tional and statutory enactments# In a situation where a 
state compels the school district or county to levy a tax 
for educational purposes the tax, regardless of who levies it, 
is a state tax*^^
When the statute delegates to some agency the authority 
to levy a school tax, the mandatory provisions of the statute 
must be followed explicitly In order to make the tax valid. 
This is not true, however, if the provision was made discre­
tionary*
It must constantly be remembered that money received 
from taxes levied for a certain purpose must be used for
^^Garber, ô * clt#. p# 52*
^%arber, ̂ #  clt#» p. 57*
^^Hamilton and Î4brtj o£# pp# 51*56; Weltzln,
op, clt#, p# 57; Garber, op. eg, p, 46.
^®loc# clt#
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th«t purpo99 «Ü4 mon# For exmplo^ monies derived
I'roai a t«x levied for ssohooX melatmemee canaot be used to
retire bonds end mooey oolleeted for teechers* ssXerlee
oenmot be used for building purposes,
^%ere statute provides for free publie eduostlon#
it le genersliy held that # child must attend » school
loosted la the district in which he resides in order to
receive free tuition, Ordinsrily the child is held to be a
resident of the district in which his parents reslde#^^
The right to attend school free from the paymmt of
tuition is not «a absolute ri#t. In some states It has
been held that schools may set up reasonable roles and
regulations covering admission to schools, and may reject or
exclWe any applicant» %Ao do not meet these requirements*^^
This, of cotirse, cannot be done in a state whose constitution
provides for a uniform system of free public cducsticai*
The major Ideas expressed ia this discussion c m  be
stated briefly as follows*
1, In school matters there exists a supremacy of 
state regulation over city and home rule charter*
2* ill school officer®, no matter how appointed, 
are agents of the state*
Raymond Trusler, S il ̂ SÎS22i(Hilwaukee, '«flsconslnt The Bruce ruollshing Company, 192?)
p# 5̂ *
3̂ibid,. pp* 111-112.
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3* The responsibility o f local school officers 
is directed to the people of the entire state 
rather, than to Just the people of the locality*
4* The state legalization of school districts gives , 
these districts only the powers to carry on 
certain functions delegated to them by the state# 
The local school district has no inherent rights* 
The state legislature in most states may at any 
time alter district boundariesi increase or 
restrict delegated district authority or eliminate 
the districts entirely*
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CHAPTER XT 
SUmARI, CONCUJSIOHS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SBMARI AND CONCLUSIONS..........
1
The one hundred thirty official opinions concerning edu­
cation rendered by the office of the attorney general in the 
ten year period under consideration would seem to the writer 
to be indicative of the varied and numerous question that 
can arise concerning legal problems which involve education* 
The educational system of the State of Montana is founded 
on Montana’s State Constitution with further elaboration by 
the state’s Legislative Assembly, interpretations by the 
courts and, as is seen in this paper, the official opinions 
of the attorney general*
It should be noted that in the summary and conclusions 
in this study the tentative nature of any interpretations 
made by the author will be a distinct limitation upon their 
usefulness*
The Interpretative power of the attorney general ia 
needed as a time-saving Intermediate step between state 
officers and the Supreme Court because the relationship 
between the Constitution of the State of Montana, the Montana 
Legislative Assembly and the Interpretations of the courts 
appear in many Instances to conflict with one another in 
apparent or theoretical contradictions and movement to the 
courts is of itself time consuming action when time may be 
the most important consideration*
-500-
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Any real progress In education must be based upon a sound 
legal foundation* The needs and demands of education In the 
State of Montana change with the passing of time* The attorney 
general, howeverp ‘ cannot alter the laws to meet these changing 
needs but rather must be most careful to render all opinions 
In a manner consistent with the Montana State Constitution, 
statute law and pertinent court decisions* This, in the 
opinion of the writer, the attorney general has done* The
i
office of the attorney general appears to have met every 
question fairly and impartially* It would seem that in al­
lowing for changing local conditions the office of the attorney 
general has tried, by his interpretations, to allow freedom 
from state interference to local boards of education In meeting 
the educational needs and demands In their own local situations* 
The attorney general points out time and time again, however, 
that in the case of McNair v* School District No* 1 (È7 Mont* 
483, Fae* 1#) the Supreme Court of the State of Montana 
said that the board of trustees may exercise only expressly 
conferred and necessarily Implied powers, and that the 
statute granting power is both a grant and a limitation*
Grieder end Rosenstengel seem to concur in their work Fubltc 
School Administration when they state that in most states 
"there is wide leeway In which boards may act so long as they 
follow the spirit of the law and do not contravene consti­
tutional statutory requirements or prohibitions*"^
Calvin Grieder and William Everett Rosenstengel, Fublic 
School Administration (New York; The Ronald Press Co*, 1954) 
p. ill*
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The opinions considered in this paper did not seem to 
indicate that tBere was any clearly discernable trend in 
thinking on the part of the office of the attorney general.
There did seem to be more consistency of interpretation in 
the opinions of the two attorneys general under consideration 
than had been anticipated. The reason for this was found to 
be that both Mr. Olsen and Mr# Bottomly utilised the services 
of the same lawyer in research on educational problems.
It appeared to the writer that the attorney general in 
some Instances was handling matters that were already adequately 
covered by specific sections in the law which do not seem to 
require interpretation. One Instance of this is Opinion 11 
of 1947 in which it was held by the attorney general that 
school districts may recover the cost of educating elementary 
children when permission for attendance has been given.
This matter seems to be adequately covered by the pro­
visions of Chapter 203̂  laws of 1943 and Section 1022 
1935. Chapter 203, laws of 1943, provides in part that children 
may attend schools in other counties when permission has been 
secured and that the child’s school district shall pay the 
actual costs of education*
Section 1022, 1935, provides further that a school
district ’may sue and be sued.®
In a few of the opinions considered it was noted that 
an official opinion of a previous fttomey general was con­
tained within the opinion rendered. One example of this is 
found in Opinion 43 of 1951 in which the attorney general
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quoted directly m  opinion of former Attorney General Poin­
dexter* Poindexter had stated that a school district is not 
liable in tort and that the decision of the Supreme Court 
with respect to non-liability of counties for tort and Indl-
* I t i
vidual liabilities of county officers for neglect* applies 
with equal force to school districts end the officers of the 
school district*
Elections* The eight opinions considered in the chapter 
on elections bring out some vital Issues# Of general interest 
is the ruling by the attorney general that the public meeting 
for the purpose of nominating school trustees in a first 
class district must be held forty full days before the elec­
tion and that the day of the meeting and the day of the 
election cannot be counted in the forty full day period* 
Another key opinion seems to be Opinion 06 - 1952 in 
which it was ruled that the names of deceased voters may 
not be deducted in computing the forty percent necessary for 
passing a bond issue# The impact of this decision might be 
keenly felt in the case of a failing bond election in which 
the vote was quite close*
*
A third decision which seems of general fundamental 
interest is Opinion 25 - 1951# This opinion states that 
retail beer and liquor licensees must remain closed during 
all school elections* The fundamental importance of this 
opinion is not apparent at first glance* The significance is 
in the fact that the law requires the closing of these estab­
lishments only in the case of a general election* In order
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to rule that they must be closed also for school elections 
the attorney general has, In effect, ruled that school 
elections are general elections#
'This chapter on elections gives the impression that 
there is some confusion in the mind of schoolmen in the 
matter of interpretation of the election law# This is to 
be expected when we consider that for a law to be effective 
it must be general enough to be workable in a variety of 
circumstances*
Trustees# A reading of the nineteen opinions considered 
in the chapter on trustees gives a brief idea of the powers 
and some of the limitations of school boards# It may be 
seen, for example, that the trustees have the power to lease 
any land and buildings which they deem necessary and which 
will be used for school purposes although they do not have 
the power to engage in any activity which is not exclusively 
for educational activities.
There are four opinions in this chapter which seemed 
to be, because of their more general nature and more general 
application, of more importance than the others. Opinion 43 * 
1951 states that neither school districts nor boards of 
trustees are liable in tort for injuries of pupils* The 
implications here can readily be seen. School districts 
are immune from suit caused by negligence of school officers. 
Using this basic reasoning the attorney general also held 
that schools cannot expend money for liability insurance 
simply because the school, not being liable, has no . need
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for such Insurance*
Another opinion which seems of general Importance Is 
Opinion 102 * 1952 which states that school districts cannot 
engage in any activity which la not exclusively for educational 
purposes* The importance of the opinion seems to be that 
schools cannot and should not engage In any activity which 
might be used as commercial or general service device and 
which therefore would be in competition with local merchants*
In Opinion 24 1955 the attorney general ruled that
school districts cannot budget for and establish six-year 
high schools* Although many small communities would find it 
advisable and expedient* In their own situations* to budget 
for a six-year high school* It is not legally possible* The 
attorney general shows that the statutes make absolutely no 
provision for this set up*
Opinion 55 « 1955 deals with appointments to principal- 
ships in Butte* Montana under the terms of an agreement with 
the Butte Teachers Union* The importance of this opinion 
lies In the fact that the attorney general has upheld this 
agreement* It would seem that upholding this agreement Is 
tantamount to upholding the existence of a closed shop among 
professional educators although this seems to have been his
only legal recourse*
The twenty opinions in this chapter on trustees cover 
many of the powers and limitations of trustees# The office 
of the attorney general has been liberal in its interpretation 
of the law* The local boards of tinistees have been allowed
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aa Bruch power In the adialnistration of local school affairs 
as is consistent with Imposed statutory limitations# Evidence 
of this Is seen la the attorney general’s repeated references 
to the doctrine of Implied powers#
Attendance# Although there are only five opinions In • 
this chapter on attendance, It should be noted that there Is 
only one central problem# That problem is tuition# In order 
for a district to collect tuition the child must have the 
permission of the county superintendent in the county of his 
residence to attend school out of the county end also the 
permission of the county superintendent of the county in which 
the child is to attend school#
In the attendance chapter also Is found the procedure 
for compelling a parent to send school ago children to school# 
The law provides a fine of not leas than five dollars nor more 
than twenty dollars for any parent, guardian or other person 
having care and custody of a child between eight and sixteen 
years who fails to send said child to school# An alternate 
procedure is also provided wherein the court may require the 
person to give bond of one hundred dollars on condition that 
the child will attend school within two days and remain at 
such school during the term. Upon failure to comply the 
aaid parent or guardian can be sent to the county jail for 
not less than ten nor more than thirty days*
The central problem of tuition collection indicates that 
the legislature might well consider a revision of the statutes 
in the area of pupil residence and attendance# It would also
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seem that some more workable or practical method of forcing 
reluctant parents to send their children to school be made 
since the primaty method seems inadequate and the alternate 
method is quite cumbersome in its requirements for a court 
trial*
Hijdi SchOQl Districts. In the chapter on high school 
districts three opinions of the fourteen seem to require 
special attention♦ In Opinion 157 - 1946 the attorney general 
held that proportionate share of the high school district’s 
debt must be included in computing the debt of common school 
districts* This is important because if the districts were 
considered separately the common school districts could bond 
Independently* The attorney general# by his decision, has 
limited the burden of taxation* This whole picture may be 
changed by a referendum in 1956* The voters will determine 
whether or not they want the common school district to bond 
independently*
Opinion 130 - 1952 declares that isolated high schools 
are not entitled to state aid unless aoaredited by the state 
board* He added, however, that their board of trustees might 
vote an extra levy for maintaining their school#
In Opinion 91 - 1954 the attorney general ruled that 
non-accredited high schools were not entitled to the county 
ten mill special high school tax. This opinion seems important 
because it might easily have served as one means of forcing 
a consolidation end reorganization of high schools# However, 
later legislation has authorized distribution of county taxes
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to non^accredited high schools*
An opinion which Is related to others in a different 
chapter is Opinion 175 * 1946 which deals with attendance of 
high school pupils# It should be noted that although grade 
school pupils may attend schools in other counties with pen# 
mission and that such counties will receive reimbursement 
based upon actuel costs of education, districts In which out 
of county high school pupils are in attendance receive only 
one hundred fifty dollars regardless of educational costs*
This Inequality might merit legislative consideration, 
investigation, and possible legislative correction*
In the remaining opinions will be found a variety of 
Information# High schools may Issue bonds for construction#
The vribole of the county must be divided into high school 
building districts and these boundaries are not altered by 
the merger of conaaon school districts* High school districts 
must be created if requested by the county high school board 
of trustees* Property of an abolished county high school 
should go to the district maintaining a high school* The 
territory of one high school district may be transferred to 
another*
The opinions on high school districts are so closely 
Interwoven with common school districts that the following 
plan la suggested* Would not the legislature do well to 
consider unifying all of the small independent common school 
districts within a high school district under the administrative 
head of the high school superintendent? It would seem that
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thls might alleviate many of the problems brought out not 
only in the chapter on high school districts but also in the 
chapter concerning budgets and levies and in the chapter on 
consolidation*
jProfegsional Staff. Chapter VI on the Professional 
Staff has only twelve opinions but seems to be a chapter of 
considerable importance because of the relationship of these 
opinions to the entire teaching staff and the potential 
bearing on teacher turnover In the state of Montana. There 
are two opinions which deal directly with teacher tenure.
They are Opinion 47-1951 and Opinion 26-1955• These opinions 
basically tell what action a teacher must take in case of 
being deprived of tenure and also what actions the board must 
take.
Opinion 23-1949 explains that a teacher must retire on 
September 1st after his or her seventieth birthday. This 
will probably be felt most strongly when a teacher of this 
age is employed by a district and when both district and 
teacher feel that it would be beneficial to the school 
children to retain the teacher.
There are two opinions which deal with teachers* 
associations and the conventions of these associations. In 
Opinions 9 and 106 the attorney general held that If a school 
district closes its schools during the state convention of 
any teachers* association all teachers must be paid regardless 
of membership or attendance. Whether for good or bad it must 
be noted that the attorney general has placed the American
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Federation of Teachers and the Montana Education Association 
on an equal plane* In the opinion of the writer the teaching 
profession would do well to consider the fact that one 
professional teachers* organization would present a united^ 
stronger front, capable of gaining the respect and prestige 
the profession should claim. Since the profession itself 
presented this problem to the attorney general by presenting 
him with the dilemma of two professional organizations thus 
giving him no choice but to recognize them both, it becomes 
incumbent upon the educators to solve their own problem by 
uniting.
The attorney general also has ruled that married women 
teachers must have the same employment benefits as single 
teachers. They may not be discriminated against in any way.
In another opinion the attorney general states that a 
county superintendent cannot occupy such office end also hold 
the position of teacher. The reasoning of the attorney general 
on this point Is that it would be impossible for the super­
intendent to adequately supervise himself*
Budgetq and levies. ■ The twenty-eight opinions in the 
chapter on budgets and levies indicate the numerous problems 
which can arise in this field# The opinions in this chapter 
are relatively unrelated except for their general application 
to school district monetary problems. The reader will quickly 
realize that although there may be broad general application 
of the majority of these statements the very divergence of 
their subject matter precludes the possibility of a well
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connected general summarlaatlon*
Hero Is one area In which the board of trustees Is very 
definitely limited In its powers# The statutes are specific, 
possibly too specific, in their limitation of power in this 
field. This is easier to understand when one takes into 
consideration that school trustees are considered to be 
agents of their state and not of their local districts.
Some of the basic ideas expressed by the attorney general 
in this field may be stated quite generally. School districts 
may provide in the current budget for an anticipated favorable 
vote on social security# Budgets may be set up to provide 
for school site purchases# The amount paid for transportation 
is governed by the transportation budget# Junior colleges 
are to be financed by the inclusion of the necessary amount 
in the high school budget and by a tuition not to exceed one 
hundred twenty-five dollars per year* Outstanding warrants 
are to be paid from the budget of the prior year. Proceeds 
from a bond issue must be used for the purpose approved by 
the voters* Although Items may be transferred from one fund 
to another within a budget, they may not be transferred from 
one budget to another* The board of school budget supervisors 
la limited in power and cannot take power away from the board 
of trustees* While the excess general fund monies of both 
elementary and high school may be used the next year to meet 
state aid deficiencies, only the high school may also use it 
in the field of permissive levies* Kindergarten pupils may 
be counted in the A.N.B. after their sixth birthday# In a
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Joint school any deficiency in ..state aid must be met by a 
levy on the entire district# Funds received under Public 
Law 874 may be used only to alleviate local tax burdens* 
Taxation* The three opinions in this chapter were 
segregated from the chapter preceding them because of the 
fact that they consider the problem of money and taxation 
from such a divergent stand# Opinion 60 - 1954 and Opinion 
40 - 1949 are quite clear in their position* School district 
property used for educational proposes is tax-exempt* Opinion 
79- 1950 merely indicates that erroneously collected taxes 
may be refunded when claims are properly filed#
Construction. Rewlrs end Improvement# In the four 
opinions in the chapter on construction# repairs and 
improvement the attorney general stated that persons bidding 
on Jobs must prove to the satisfaction of school and other 
state officers that they are responsible persons# This may 
be done by deposit of a certified check or some other 
security# The attorney general has also stated that the 
insurance payment received by the school district for the 
destruction of an elementary school may be used for the pur­
chase of a site and a new building without a vote of the 
electorate# In the case of necessary repairs the contract 
may provide for a payment over a period of three years# If 
the case should necessitate a bond election, an architect’s 
foe may be paid from the proceeds of the bond sale#
Transportation. In the chapter on transportation there 
were only ten opinions rendered* More requests for opinions
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ftrose from a lack of understanding of the state transportation 
schedule than from any other single cause*
la the elementary district one third of the cost of 
transportation is paid by the state* one third by the county 
end one third by the district* Payments are based upon a 
state transportation schedule* which was indicated by the 
questioners to be inadequate*
In the hi^ school transportation system one third is 
paid by the state and two thirds by the county#
i:
In another opinion the attorney general ruled that 
parochial school children may be transported* but that they 
must pay a proportionate cost of the operation of the bus*
The school district therefore cannot be sàid to be helping 
in the support of sectarian education*
Another point made by the attorney general is that if 
the board elects to transport one child* transportation must 
be provided for all children in the district* All children 
are entitled to transportation regardless of the length of 
time they have resided in the district* If the child lives 
in a district which does not maintain a school, he is entitled
to transportation costs*
It seems that the attorney general by these opinions 
has removed any chance of favoritism being shown by the 
school district*
nnnsolldation* The chapter on consolidation had only 
nine opinions in it* A central problem approached in this 
section was the assumption of bonded indebtedness* In a
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consolidation of the school district bonded Indebtedness of 
each district Is assumed by the new district formed# In 
annexation a third class district does not assume the bonded 
Indebtedness of the third class district. When a district 
Is assuming bonded Indebtedness voters In the election on 
consolidation must be registered and their names must appear 
on the preceding assessaent roll# In the case of consolidation 
with a joint district, there must be formed a new joint 
school district.
Another opinion states that the county superintendent 
is the person responsible for ascertaining the number of 
qualified electors in a school district for the computation 
of the required per cent on petition for annexation# Since 
registration has no part in determining the qualifications 
of an elector It may be seen that the county superintendent 
has A most difficult problem in attempting to ascertain the 
per cent of the qualified voters signing the petition#
The small number of opinions rendered in the ares of 
school consolidation, annexation and reorganisation at a time 
when such things are growing on a national scale poses an 
interesting question. Does Montana school law need revision 
to make these things easier? Perhaps the push should come 
more forcibly from the state level since education is a state 
function* The small number of opinions indicates that pro­
bably very little consolidation Is taking place in Montana# 
Assuming that consolidation would benefit the education of 
our youth it may be said that not enough is taking place#
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Schopl Sites# In the chapter on school sites of the 
nine opinions rendered it was noted that the most prevalent 
problems were those involving abandoned school districts*
It should first be noted that the county superintendent must 
declare a school district abandoned where school has not 
been held for three years and actual bus transportation has 
not been provided* Also mentioned was the fact that when 
requested by parents of at least three children school must 
be provided la the abandoned district by the district to 
which attached* The abandoned district retains liability 
for its own bonded indebtedness#
Other opinions in the chapter relate to various problems. 
School sites may be sold by the board of trustees regardless 
of the proposed use by the buyer* Schools may be constructed 
adjacent to existing buildings without an election to designate 
the site* Rl#i schools financed by bonds may be built on 
land owned jointly by the county high school and a school 
district* County commissioners may not give a public county 
paHc to the school district as a school site*
Miscellaneous Opinions# In the thirteenth chapter 
were placed those opinions of the attorney general which did 
not seem to JCitl logically into any of the regular categories 
and which would not coBsaonly affect the administration of our 
public schools* These opinions may be briefly stated as 
follows* Idquor Jlloenses will not be granted for use on 
premises across the street from schools* School districts
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®ay not enter Into oil and gas leases* The residence of a 
child in the state orphans’ home is that of his parents and 
if they leave the statê  the expense of his education becomes 
the responsibility of the State of Montana*
The title to a school building erected on private lend 
where there was no written agreement remains in the district 
and can be removed by the district* Notice of non^renewal 
of a contract of an assistant professor given by the chief 
executive of an institution end in the absence of the 
Chancellor complies with regulation 5 of the State Board of 
Education* The Workmen’s Compensation Act is, as to a school 
districtI exclusive, compulsory and obligatory both to em» 
ployer and employee without the right to elect whether or 
not each shall be subject to the act*
One opinion which has had far reaching consequences la 
opinion • 1952 in which Attorney General Olsen stated 
that educational benefits as provided by state law for veterans 
of any of the wars of the United States may be extended to 
veterans of the Korean Conflict* In writing this opinion the 
attorney general referred to statements of authoritative 
individuals such as the Judge Advocate of the Army and even 
went back to the case of Hamilton V* McClaughney which con» 
cemed the Boxer Rebellion in China* According to a personal 
talk with former Attorney General Olsen, much research was 
done on this problem end in searching for a precedent it was 
f ound that no other state had taken a similar step with regard
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to the Korean Conflict# Montana^ therefore| was the first 
state to grant wartime benefits to Korean veterans,^
The number of problems presented to the attorney general 
during this ten year period end their variance in subject 
matter, together with the vast number of problems presented 
to the various county attorneys during this same period, 
has led the writer to the conclusion that the legislative 
assembly at its next session might well consider a complete 
revision of school law in this state#
RECOKraDATIOKS 
If a compilation and segregation of the official opinions 
of the attorney general such as has been presented in this 
paper was to be kept up to date and disseminated to interested 
parties, it might then be possible to eliminate some unnecessary 
work on the part of the attorney general and his staff.
A looseleaf manual containing all official opinions of 
the attorney general relating to education would in all pro­
bability be the most practical and economical type to be kept 
up to date* The office of the attorney general could then 
send out mimeographed copies of the official opinions of the 
attorney general to all offices designated to receive copies
2June 13, 1957# Permission to quote secured#
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o t the official opinions* This would eliminate the time lag
r
which occurs while offices wait for the bound copies of the 
MIÛ Official Opinions the Attorney General. An 
undertaking of this type would also serve many of the purposes 
of the digest which was recommended by former Attorney General 
R» V# Bottoffily. He felt that "such a volume would be incal­
culable assistance to county attorneys, all state and county 
offlcero" and to the office of the attorney general*
Distribution should of course, include the university 
units, Junior colleges, state custodial institutions, vocational 
schools, the Department of Public Instruction, city superin­
tendents of schools, county superintendents of schools, district 
superintendents of schools and the office of the county attorney 
of each county* Since it would seem to be almost impossible 
for a copy to be sent to each public and private school teacher 
in the state it Is recommended that a copy be placed in the 
libraries of larger schools and institutions* A copy should 
also be placed in each public library for the information of 
interested school patrons*
It is also recommended that a committee composed of the 
attorney general and selected county attorneys or competent 
persons designated by them go over these opinions at least 
once every five years for the purpose of deleting those which 
have been rendered obsolete by reason of new laws enacted by 
the Legislative Assembly or recent decisions of the courts*
By discarding these opinions the proposed manual can be 
kept to a minimum size* This recommendation should not be
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80 construed as to indicate that all opinions rendered by 
the attorney general should not be kept In bound volumes 
in some designated depository*
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